Assembly of Western European Union Proceedings Twenty-second Ordinary Session, First Part. Volume I: Assembly Documents. Paris, June 1976 by unknown
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
PROCEEDINGS 
TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION 
FIRST PART 
.June 1976 
I 
Assembly Documents 
WEU 
PARIS 


ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
43, avenue du Pr~sldent Wilson, 75ns Paris Cedex 16- Tel. 723.54.32 
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
PROCEEDINGS 
TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION 
FIRST PART 
June 1976 
I 
Assembly Documents 
WEU 
PARIS 

The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes: 
Volume I : Assembly Documents. 
Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Prooeedings, Official Report of Debates, 
General Index. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
List of Representatives and Substitutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Documents: 
694. Agenda of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session, Paris, 
14th-17th June 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
695. Order ofBusiness ofthe First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session, 
Paris, 14th-17th June 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ll 
696. Symposium on a European armaments policy - Order 45 adopted by the 
Presidential Committee on 12th January 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
697. Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly on the 
Council's activities for the period 1st January to 31st December 1975 . . . 17 
698. European union and WEU- Report submitted on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
699. European union and WEU- Resolution 59 adopted by the Presidential 
Committee on 1st March 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
700. Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply to the Twenty-First Annual 
Report of the Council - Report submitted on behalf of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur . . . . . . 53 
2 Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
701. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European 
Union for the financial year 1976 submitted on behalf of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur 65 
702. Political activities of the Council - Reply to the Twenty-First Annual 
Report of the Council - Report submitted on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee by Mr. Peridier, Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
703. Detente and security in Europe - Report submitted on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur . . . . . 98 
4 Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 
704. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy 
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 - Report submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by 
MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren, Rapporteurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ll5 
TABLE OF OONTENTS 
705. Scientific, technologica.l and aerospace questions- Reply to the Twenty-
First Annual Report of the Council- Report submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by 
Page 
Mr. Richter, Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
706. Relations with Parliaments - Information Report submitted on behalf of 
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments by Mr. Delorme, Rappor-
teur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 
707. Reserve forces - Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur . . . . 147 
708. Security in the Mediterranean - Report submitted on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur 172 
3 Amendments.................................................. 209 
709. Strategic mobility - Preliminary Report submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Duvieusa.rt, 
Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 
710. Replies of the Council to Recommendations 273 to 283 . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 
711. Role of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today- Report submitted 
on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur 238 
712. Security in the Mediterranean - Supplementary Report submitted on 
behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. 
Buck, Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 
IJST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY 
BELGIUM MM. JEAMBRUN Pierre Dem. Left 
LA OOMBE Rene UDR 
Representatives du LUART LadiBlaa RIAS MENARD JaCI]UilB Ind. Rep. 
MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo Socialist PIGNION Lucien SocialiBt 
DEQUAE Andre Chr. Soc. SOUSTELLE Jacqu68 Non-party 
KEMPINAIRE Andre PLP V ADEPIED Raoul UODP 
LEYNEN Hubert Chr. Soc. WEBER Pierre Ind. Rep. (App.) 
SCHUGENS Willy Socialist 
de STEXHE Paul Chr. Soc. 
TANGHE Francis Chr. Soc. 
Substitutes FEDERAL REPUBUC OF GERMANY 
MM. BREYNE GustatJ6 SocialiBt 
de BRUYNE Hektor VolkBUnie Representatives 
DUVIEUSART Etienne FDF-RW 
M re. GODINAOHE-LAMBERT MM. AHRENS Karl SPD Marie-TMrue PLP 
MM. HULPIAU Raphael Ohr. Soc. ALBER Siegbert CDU/CSU 
PLASMAN Marcel Ohr. Soc. AMREHN Franz CDUJCSU 
V AN HOEYLANDT D. Bemard SocialiBt DREGGER Alfred CDUJCSU ENDERS Wendelin SPD 
GESSNER Manfred SPD 
KEMPFLER Friedrich CDU/CSU 
FRANCE LEMMRICH Karl Heinz CDUJCSU 
MARQUARDT Warner SPD 
Representatives MATTICK Kurt SPD MENDE Erich CDU/CSU 
MM. BOUCHENY Serge Communist MOLLER Giinther CDUJCSU 
BOULLOCHE Andre Socialist RICHTER Klaus SPD 
BRUGNON Maurice Socialist SCHMIDT Hansheinrich FDP 
BURCKEL Jean-Claude UDR SCHWENCKE Olaf SPD 
CERNEAU Marcel Centre Union SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut SPD 
DELORME Claude Socialist VOHRER Manfred FDP 
GRANGIER Edouard Dem. Left Mrs. WOLF Erika CDUJCSU 
KAUFFMANN Michel UCDP 
de MONTESQUIOU Pierre Soc. Dem. Ref. 
NESSLER Edmond UDR 
President of the Assembly Substitutes 
PERIDIER Jean Socialist 
RADIUS Rene UDR Mra. von BOTHMER Lenelotte SPD 
RIVI.ERE Paul UDR 
ROGER Emile Communist MM. BtJOHNER Peter SPD 
SCHLEITER Fran9ois Ind. Rep. OARSTENS Karl ODUJOSU 
SCHMITT Robert UDR (App.) G()LTER Georg ODUfOSU 
V ALLEIX Jean UDR HAASE Horst SPD 
VITTER Pierre Ind. Rep. HOLTZ Uwe SPD 
KLEPSOH Egon ODUJOSU 
Substitutes KLIESIN G Georg ODUJOSU 
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hane ODUfOSU 
MM. BEAUGUITTE Andr6 Ind. Rep. LENZER OhriBtian ODUJOSU 
BELIN Gilbert SocialiBt OPITZ Rudolf FDP 
BIZET Emile UDR (App.) PAWELOZYK Alfone SPD 
BOURGEOIS Georg68 UDR SOHAUBLE Wolfgang ODUfOSU OERMOLAOOE Paul OommuniBt 
OROZE Pierre Ind. Rep. SOHULTE Man/red SPD 
DAILLET Jean-Marie Soc. Dem. Ref. WALTHER Rudi SPD 
DEPIETRI Odsar OommuniBt WENDE Manfred SPD 
FORNI Raymond SocialiBt WORNER Man/red ODUJOSU 
GRUSSENMEYER Frant;ois UDR WURBS Richard FDP 
8 
ITALY 
Representatives 
MM. A VERARDI Giuseppe 
BETTIOL Giuseppe 
BOLOGNA Giaoomo 
COPPOLA Mattia. 
FlORET Mario 
LAFORGIA Antonio 
LEGGIER! Vincenzo 
MAMMI Oscar 
MINNOCCI Gia.ointo 
Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI Amalia. 
MM. PECORARO Antonio 
PICA Domenico 
PRETI Luigi 
QUILLERI Fausto Samuele 
TALAMONA Augusto 
TREU Renato 
VEDOV ATO Giuseppe 
ZAFFANELLA Renzo 
Substitutes 
MM. ARFE Gaetano 
ART ALl Mario 
BONALDI Umberto 
OASTELLUOOI Albertino 
Mrs. OATTANEO-PETRINI Giannina 
MM. OA VEZZALI Paolo 
FARABEGOLI Furio 
LA ROSA Giuaeppe 
MA GLIANO Terenzio 
MANOINI Antonio 
MONETI Al/redo 
NEGRARI Andrea 
P ACINI Arturo 
PREARO Roberto 
PUMILIA Oalogero 
REALE Giuaeppe 
SANT ALOO Oarmelo 
SPORA Ettore 
LUXEMB()URG 
Representatives 
MM. ABENS Victor 
MARQUE Georges 
MART Rene 
MM. HENGEL Rene 
KONEN Rene 
SPAUTZ Jean 
1' - I 
Substitutes 
Socialist 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
Cbr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
Republican 
Socialist 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
Socialist 
Liberal 
Socialist 
Chr. Dem. 
Cbr. Dem. 
Socialist 
Socialiat 
Socialiat 
Liberal 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Socialiat 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Socialiat 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Soc. Workers 
Chr. Soc. 
Dem. 
Soc. Workers 
Dem. 
Ohr. Soc. 
9 
LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES 
NETHERLANDS 
Representatives 
MM. CORNELISSEN Pam 
DANKERT Pieter 
de NIET Maarten 
PORTHEINE Frederik 
REIJNEN J ohannes 
SCHOLTEN Ja.n Nico 
VOOGD Joop 
Substitutes 
MM. de KOSTER Hans 
van OOIJEN David 
PEIJNENBURG Marinua 
PIKET Frederik 
SOHLINGEMANN Johan 
STOFFELEN Pieter 
WALTMANS Henk 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Representatives 
MM. Ronald BROWN 
Paul CHANNON 
Julian CRITCHLEY 
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH 
MM. John FARR 
Andrew FAULDS 
W. Percy GRIEVE 
Peter HARDY 
John HUNT 
Arthur LEWIS 
John MENDELSON 
John PAGE 
Lord PEDDlE 
Sir John RODGERS 
MM. John ROPER 
David STEEL 
Thomas URWIN 
Phillip WHITEHEAD 
Substitutes 
Mr. Gordon BAGIER 
Lord BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY 
Sir Frederic BENNETT 
MM. Antony BUCK 
John OORDLE 
Jim ORAIGEN 
Lord DUNOAN-SANDYS 
Sir Harwood HARRISON 
Mr. Paul HA WKINS 
Lord HUGHES 
MM. Toby JESSEL 
Kevin MeN AMARA 
Dr. Oolin PHIPPS 
Lord SELSDON 
Mrs. Ann TAYLOR 
Lord WALLAOE of OOSLANY 
MM. Kenneth WARREN 
John WATKINSON 
Pop. Oath. 
Labour 
Labour 
Liberal 
Pop. Oath. 
Antirevolution. 
Labour 
Liberal 
Labour 
Pop. Oath. 
Ohr. Hiat. 
Liberal 
Labour 
Radical 
Labour 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Liberal 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Liberal 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Document 694 19th May 1976 
AGENDA 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
Paris, 14th-17th June 1976 
I. Report of the Council 
Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council 
to the Assembly 
11. Political Questions 
I. Political activities of the Council - Reply 
to the Twenty-First Annual Report of 
the Council 
2. Role of the Atlantic Alliance in the world 
today 
3. Detente and security in Europe 
Ill. Defence Questions 
I. Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply 
to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the 
Council 
2. Security in the Mediterranean 
3. Reserve forces 
4. Strategic mobility 
IV. Technical and Scientific Questions 
I. Scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions - Reply to the Twenty-First 
Annual Report of the Council 
2. European aeronautical policy - Guide-
lines emerging from the colloquy on 2nd 
and 3rd February I976 
V. Budgetary and Administrative Questions 
Draft Opinion on the budget of the minis-
terial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial year I976 
VI. RelatioDI with Parliaments 
Relations with parliaments 
IO 
Report tabled by Mr. Peridier on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of 
the General, Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions arul, Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Buck on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions arul Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions arul, Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Duvieusart on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions arul, Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological arul, Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren 
on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gicaJ, arul, Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs arul, Administration 
Information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf 
of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
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Morning 9 a.m. 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
Paris, 14th-17th June 1976 
MONDAY, 14th JUNE 
Meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
10 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
11.30 a.m. 
12th June 1976 
Meetings of the Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives and of the Socialist 
Group. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the Session by the Provisional President. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
5. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session. 
6. Ratification of decisions of the Presidential Committee: 
(a) Symposium on a European armaments policy: 
Order 45 adopted by the Presidential Committee on 12th January 1976. 
(b) European union and WEU : 
Resolution 59 adopted by the Presidential Committee on 1st March 1976. 
7. Detente and security in Europe : 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on beha1f of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUESDAY, 15th JUNE 
Morning 9 a.m. 
Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
10 a.m. 
1. Twenty-first annual report of the Council: 
presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council. 
11 
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2. Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ha.a.se on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
3. Political activities of the Council- Reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Peridier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
4. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions - Reply to the twenty-first annual report of the 
Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate on the annual report of the Council and the replies of the Committees. 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
At the close of the sitting 
Meetings of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 
1976: 
presentation of the report tBbled by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren on behalf of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
3.30 p.m. 
Address by Mr. Cha.bert, Minister of Communications of Belgium. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Relations with Parliaments : 
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
At the close of the sitting 
Meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
WEDNESDAY, 16th JUNE 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
10 a.m. 
I. Dra.ft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial 
year 1976: 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
Vote on the draft opinion. 
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11 a.m. 
Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
2. Security in the Mediterranean: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Buck on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
3. Reserve forces: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Reserve forces : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Strategic mobility : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Duvieusart on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
THURSDAY, 17th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
Address by Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. 
Relle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
11.30 a.m. 
Vote on the draft recommendations not already voted upon by the .Assembly. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
Role of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION 
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Symposium on a European armaments policy 
ORDER 45 
adopted by the Presidential Committee 
on 12th January 1976 1 
The Presidential Committee, 
12th January 1976 
Anxious to secure widespread recognition of the need for a European policy on the production and 
procurement of armaments ; 
Aware of the interest of such a symposium attended by members of parliament and experts; 
Noting the success of the colloquy on a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe organised 
by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
INSTRUCTS 
The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to organise a symposium on a European 
armaments policy as set out in the explanatory memorandum of this order and to submit proposals to the 
Presidential Committee for approval, including the expenditure to be authorised and the list of persons 
to be invited. 
1. In accordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. 
14 
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APPENDIX 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments) 
The Presidential Committee has noted the 
success of the colLoquy on a civil and military 
aeronautical policy for Europe organised by the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions in Paris in September 1973 and 
the fact that a second colloquy on the same 
subject is to be held in Toulouse, France, in 
February 1976. 
They consider · that the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments should be 
instructed to organise a symposium on a Euro-
pean armaments policy. 
I. Aims 
1. One of the main aims of this symposium 
should be to help to define a European arma-
ments policy allowing the Western European 
countries to take joint action to safeguard and 
develop their armaments industries, which are 
now threatened, while increasing their defence 
effectiveness. 
2. The limited resources and market of the 
European countries often make it necessary for 
the individual countries to specialise or be sub-
contractors. But Western Europe as a whole 
must avoid being forced to fall. back on the pro-
duction of less sophisticated types of equipment 
or merely purchasing licences or being a sub-
contractor for the equipment it requires. On the 
contrary, Western Europe must be in a position 
to take part in the race for technical advance-
menlt in research, development and production 
and at the same time increase the effectiveness 
of its defence effort through the procurement 
of standardised equipment. To this end, the 
European countries must concert their efforts 
through joint research, development, production 
and procurement of their defence equipment. 
3. By strengthening European industries work-
ing for defence, such a European armaments 
policy would help to lay the foundations for 
fruitful co-operation with the United States and 
Canada. 
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II. Organisation 
1. Chairmanship 
The symposium as a whole would be chaired 
by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments; working sessions by 
distinguished experts. 
2. Participants 
The 100 to 150 participants would be 
nationals of the Western European countries 
as follows: 
(a) members of parliament: 
( i) · the President of the Assembly ; 
( ii) the members of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Arma-
ments; 
( iii) the bureaux of the General 
Affairs Committee and the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions; 
( iv) the Chairmen of the Defence 
Committees of the parliaments; 
(b) national armaments directors of mem-
ber countries; 
(c) representatives of armaments indus-
tries; 
(d) those responsible for bi- or multilateral 
armaments programmes; 
(e) Standing Armaments Committee of 
WEU; 
(f) representatives of member countries' 
headquarters staffs, NATO headquar-
ters and military agencies; 
(g) one or two members of the Commis-
sion of the European Communities; 
(h) persons invited on an individual basis. 
3. Date 
The proposed symposium should not be held 
before autumn or winter 1976 at the earliest. 
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4. Place 
The symposium might be held in Paris if 
the French Government agreed to grant its 
patronage. 
5. Procedure 
The symposium would last two or three days. 
Three or fom half-day closed sittings would 
each be devoted to a different topic introduced 
by a distinguished expert. One half-day might 
be devoted to discussions in working groups. 
The opening and closing sittings would be 
public. 
The text of the proceedings would be confi-
dential. The last sitting, during which the Chair-
man and designated speakers would summarise 
the information emerging from the symposium, 
would be open to the press. 
At a subsequent session of the Assembly, 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
16 
ments would submit a report on the pro-
ceedings and present its conclusions. 
6. Languages 
Symposium documents would be issued in 
French and English. Speeches and statements 
might be made in the official languages of the 
member States. The secretariat would ensure 
simultaneous interpretation into French and 
English. 
7. Finance 
The cost of organising the symposium 
would be met from the ordinary budget of the 
Assembly. 
8. Preparation 
The Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments would establish a preparatory com-
mittee composed of its bureau., rapporteur and 
experts. 
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Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1915 
INTRODUCTION 
I. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-First Annual 
Report on their activities, covering the period lst January to 31st December 1975. 
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters : 
I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly.................................. 18 
11. Activities of the Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Ill. Armaments Control Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
V. Public Administration Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . 35 
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
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CHAPTER I 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
In 1975, the Council again gave their fullest 
attention to the maintenance of good relations 
with the Assembly ; they wish to observe, in this 
connection, that the general remarks contained 
in Chapter I of their twentieth annual report 
are still valid. 
A. Annual report of the Council to 
the Assembly 
In view of the opening date for the twenty-
first ordinary session of the Assembly, the Coun-
cil made a special effort to forward the report 
on their activities in 197 4 considerably earlier 
than usual. They appreciated the Assembly's 
expression of satisfaction on this point. 
B. Assembly recommendations to the Council 
and written questions put to the Council by 
members of the Assembly 
The Council answered the particularly large 
number of recommendations - seventeen in all 
- adopted by the Assembly during the second 
part of the twentieth ordinary session and the 
first part of the twenty-first ordinary session. 
These recommendations were numbered 256 to 
259, and 260 to 272, and covered a wide range 
of questions relating to the construction of 
Europe (foreign policy, defence, scientific, tech-
nical and space questions in particular). 
The Council also sent eleven replies to 
Written Questions 152 to 164 put by members 
of the Assembly. 
The Council continue to attach great value 
to the recommendations and written questions 
initiated by the Assembly. In their reply to 
Recommendation 266, moreover, they confirmed 
their appreciation of the useful contribution 
which the Assembly makes in drawing attention 
to and debating questions of European security 
and integration. 
This reply stressed that recommendations 
and written questions from the Assembly and its 
members received close and careful attention 
from governments. It went on to say that when-
ever possible, the Council would continue to give 
the Assembly full and substantial replies reflect-
ing the common positions of the seven member 
governments, even if they sometimes related to 
matters dealt with primarily by other organis-
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ations. During the year 1975 now under review, 
the Council in fact referred in several cases to 
consultations between Western European govern-
ments in other bodies. 
The same reply added that the Council were 
aware of the fact that for its work, the Assembly 
needed adequate information on matters relat-
ing to European security and the integration of 
Europe. It further stated that, while the Council 
were not always in a position to provide full 
answers to the Assembly's recommendations and 
written questions, member States remained pre-
pared to make the fullest possible use of other 
means of communication, such as the particip-
ation of government members in Assembly 
sessions. 
C. Speeches by Ministers to the Assembly or 
its Committees 
The commemoration of the Assembly's 
twentieth anniversary at the sitting held on 
26th May 1975 provided an opportunity for 
member States to pay tribute, through their 
representatives, to the Assembly's achievements 
and to confirm their interest in its work (see 
Annex). 
Furthermore, in 1975, as in previous years, 
several Ministers spoke during the Assembly's 
debates (see Annex). 
In their speeches and their replies to 
questions put by members of the Assembly, they 
stated the attitudes of their governments. The 
Council noted with satisfaction that the parti-
cipation of Ministers in its work was again 
appreciated by the Assembly, as is shown by the 
report accompanying Recommendation 266. 
As in the past, representatives of Assembly 
Committees also had talks with Ministers during 
visits to member countries. 
D. Meetings between the Council and Assembly 
bodies 
The Council met the Presidential Commit-
tee as well as the General Affairs Committee 
of the Assembly at a luncheon given after the 
ministerial meeting held in London on 20th May 
1975. 
E. Budgetary questions 
The difficulties mentioned in the previous 
annual report which arose when the Assembly's 
budget estimates for 1975 were submitted to the 
Council for opinion, were resolved after dis-
cussions between the Council and the Assembly. 
In this connection, it is recalled that agreement 
was reached on a new annual time-table for the 
various stages in the procedure for approving 
the Assembly budget. This time-table was applied 
successfully, and to the Assembly's satisfaction, 
to the budget estimates for 1976. 
* ** 
As stated in their reply to Recommendation 
258, the Council attach great importance to the 
Assembly's relations with national parliaments 
which, in their view, contribute to strengthening 
the spirit of European solidarity. They added 
that member governments would, as in the past 
and in accordance with their established practice, 
continue to inform their parliaments on inter-
national developments considered by the Council 
or the Assembly of WEU, and on the progress 
of co-ope:vation in WEU. They further observed 
that members of the Assembly were at liberty 
to question their governments whenever they 
wanted a more detailed consideration of various 
policy matters of particular concern to WEU ; 
this possibility was also recalled in the reply to 
Recommendation 266. 
ANNEx 
Speeches by Ministers of member States 
made during the Twenty-First Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly 
First part (26th-29th May 1975) held in Bonn 
- Sitting to commemorate the twentieth 
anniversary of the Assembly : 
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Mr. Georg Leber, Minister for Defence of 
the Federal Republic of Germany ; 
Mr. Paul V anden Boeynants, Minister for 
Defence and Brussels Affairs of Belgium ; 
Mr. Emile Krieps, Minister for Public 
Health, the Environment, Civil Service and 
Armed Forces of Luxembourg ; 
Mr. Frederick Mulley, United Kingdom 
Minister for Transport ; 
Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of France ; 
Mr. Adolfo Battaglia, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of Italy ; 
Mr. P. H. Kooijmans, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. 
- Other sittings : 
Mr. Renaat Van Elslande, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation 
of Belgium and Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil ; 
Mr. Karl Moersch, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many; 
Mr. Gaston Geens, Secretary of State for 
Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium ; 
Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of France. 
Second part (1st-4th December 1975) held in Paris 
Mr. Karl Moersch, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many; 
Mr. William Rodgers, United Kingdom 
Minister of State for Defence; 
Mr. Luigi Dalvit, Secretary of State for 
Defence of Italy. 
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CHAPTER II 
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL 
In 1975, the Council met at ministerial level 
in London on 20th May, under the chairmanship 
of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. James 
Callaghan. 
The permanent representatives met thirte~n 
times, and the working group held twenty-siX 
meetings to prepare their discussions. 
The declarations made by their representa-
tives to the Assembly in Bonn on 26th May demon-
strated that the governments of member States 
continue to be fully aware of the undertakings 
which they gave under the modified Brussels 
Treaty ; this is confirmed, moreover, by the 
Council's replies to Recommendations 266 and 
270. 
These replies also pointed out that the Coun-
cil, both at permanent representative and at 
ministerial level, are and will continue to be 
responsible for ensuring the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. However, the treaty 
stresses the undesirability of a duplication of 
effort. A number of issues of relevance to WEU 
are also dealt with by the governments of mem-
ber countries in other international fora : the 
European Communities, nine-power political co-
operation, the Atlantic Alliance, OECD ; the 
Council of course take account of the work done 
by these organisations in planning their own 
activities. 
A. Political questions 
1. East· West relations 
- As in previous years, the Council devoted 
a considerable part of their discussions to this 
question at the ministerial meeting in London on 
20th M'ay 1975. 
The German Delegation gave an account of 
the state of relations between the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic. There was also an exchange of infor-
mation and views on recent developments in 
relations between the other WEU countries and 
the German Democratic Republic. 
In addition, Ministers discussed develop-
ments in bilateral political and economic rela-
tions between the member countries of WEU and 
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the other member countries of the Warsaw Pact. 
In this context, the main points raised were : 
the visit of the United Kingdom Prime Minister 
to the USSR in February and that of the French 
Prime Minister in March ; the visit of the Queen 
of the Netherlands to Romania in May. The Ger-
man Delegation, in a statement, reported on their 
relations with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Romania. 
Multilateral East-West relations and, in par-
ticular, the negotiations for the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe, were also 
discussed. 
- Exchanges at this WEU ministerial meet-
ing showed that, 'like the Assembly, member 
countries are convinced of the need for con-
tinuous discussions between the western countries 
on their bilateral and multilateral relations with 
the eastern countries. The reply sent in Novem-
ber to Recommendation 263 pointed out ·that 
governments of the member countries of the 
union and those of their partners in the Alliance 
had held such exchanges in the North Atlantic 
Council and were continuing to do so. This repiy 
also stressed the special importance of consulta-
tions between the member countries of the Euro-
pean Community ; those held between the Nine 
at Geneva during the second phase of the CSCE 
with a view to concerting their negotiating posi-
tion set an example to be followed in this respect. 
They are being continued in a different form to 
ensure that the Final Act of Helsinki is imple-
mented. 
- With regard to the CSCE, the Council 
stated in the same reply that, apart from minor 
differences of emphasis which had to be expected, 
the jointly-adopted positions were supported by 
all during the Geneva negotiations. In return for 
certain concessions to the other side, the western 
powers gained appreciable concessions to which 
they attached considerable importance. These 
relate to the first basket, for which they won 
acceptance of formulations for the declaration 
of principles in line with their wishes, as well 
as confidence-building measures which take 
account of certain military aspects of European 
security; certain subjects of the second basket 
are specially worthy of note, such as the improve-
ment of business facilities, the promotion of the 
exchange of economic and commercial informa-
tion, and the encouragement of industrial co-
operation ; and, above all, the western powers 
attach particular importance to the contents of 
the third basket : human contacts, spread of 
information, cultural and educational exchanges. 
The communique published at the close of 
the North Atlantic ministerial meeting held in 
Brussels on 11th and 12th December, referred 
(point 3) to the high priority attached by the 
member countries of WEU and their partners in 
the Alliance to the full implementation of the 
Final Act of Helsinki by all the signatories. 
- In their reply to this same Recommenda-
tion 263, the Council also assured the Assembly 
that the member States would continue, in their 
relations with the German Democratic Republic, 
to take account of the special situation resulting 
from the existence of two States in Germany, and 
the responsibility of the four powers towards 
Germany as a whole. They also stated that they 
shared the Assembly's views regarding strict 
compliance with, and full application of the 
quadripartite agreement on Berlin, and also 
considered that there was an essential link 
between detente in Europe and the Berlin situa-
tion. The position of the member countries of 
WEU and their partners in NATO on this mat-
ter was reaffirmed in the communique published 
after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in December (point 6). 
2. Relations between Europe and the United States 
- The Council followed with interest the 
debates which the Assembly again devoted to co-
operation ,between Europe and the United States, 
the importance of which is fully recognised by 
the governments of all member States, particular-
ly as regards the progress of East-West relations. 
- In their reply to Recommendation 271, 
they reca;Hed the part played by co-operation 
within the Atlantic Alliance which, by ensuring 
the collective security of the countries party to 
it during the twenty-six years of its existence, 
has enabled each of its members to initiate and 
develop the dialogue with the countries of 
Eastern Europe on both the bilateral and multi-
lateral level. 
In the spirit of the Harmel report of 1967, 
which emphasised the importance of the Alliance 
as a clearing house for the exchange of informa-
tion and views, frequent discussions of this kind 
have been held within the North Atlantic Council 
on the various negotiations which concern some 
or all of its members, such as the CSCE or 
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MBFR. The United Stat€S have also kept their 
European allies regularly informed of the state 
of the strategic arms limitation ta:lks (SALT). 
The reply to this recommendation stressed 
the Council's view that such close and frank 
consultations between the United States and 
their European allies are in the vital interest of 
the Alliance as a whole, insofar as they enable 
the Europeans to bring their influence to bear 
on all matters affecting their security. 
- On the separate question of the dialogue 
between the nine member countries of the Euro-
pean Community and the United States, the 
Council refer the Assembly to the reply sent the 
previous year to Recommendation 252, which 
mentioned the informal practical arrangements 
put into effect in 197 4. 
3. Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 
- In their report for 1974, the Council 
expressed the concern of member governments at 
events in Cyprus during the summer of that 
year, and at the situation to which they gave 
rise, and informed the Assembly of the positions 
they had taken in the matter. 
- The replies sent in March 1975 to Recom-
mendation 256 and, in November, to point 4 of 
Recommendation 269, showed the broad measure 
of agreement between the Council and the 
Assembly on the question of Cyprus as regards 
both its humanitarian and political aspects and 
its consequences for security in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
The Council pointed out that all member 
countries had contributed substantially to the 
humanitarian aid being provided for refugees in 
Cyprus, particu:J..arly in response to appeals 
issued by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees. They further expressed the hope 
that negotiations between the two communities 
in Cyprus would eventually result in a long-term 
settlement for the refugee problem and the 
rehabilitation of the refugees the:rnselves. 
The Council agreed with the Assembly that 
any lasting solution to the crisis as a whole 
depended on an improvement in the relations 
between Greece and Turkey, and between the two 
communities in Cyprus. They affirmed their 
continuing concern for the sovereignty, inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus. They recalled the declaration to 
that effect adopted by the Foreign Ministers of 
the nine member countries of the European Corn-
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munity in the framework of political co-operation 
at their meeting in Dublin on 13th February 
1975. 
- The course of events in Cyprus was 
closely followed by the Nine and the North 
Atlantic Council throughout the year under 
review. Furthermore, in the United Nations, the 
United Kingdom, France and Italy took an active 
part in the debates of the Security Council, and 
supported the resolutions adopted on 12th March 
and 13th June 1975. The delegations of the 
Seven later voted for the resolution adopted by 
the General Assembly on 20th November ; in this 
context, the Italian presidency presented the 
position of the Nine. 
The Council were most anxious that the talks 
between the communities should be resumed 
without prior conditions under the auspices of 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. 
Wrruldheim, with a view to reaching a general 
settlement covering all aspects of the problem. 
4. Energy questions 
In their replies to Recommendations 259, 
260 and 271, the Council expressed views broadly 
in agreement with those of the .Assembly on this 
subject. As a result of the progress of events 
over the last few years and the present energy 
crisis, the economic future of the continent of 
Europe largely depends on finding a solution for 
energy problems. 
The Council declared that they shared the 
Assembly's wish for the early definition of a 
European Community energy policy. They 
recalled two major developments in that direc-
tion : on 17th September 197 4, the Council of 
the European Community declared their political 
intention of defining and implementing a Com-
munity energy policy involving common object-
ives; these objectives were enumerated in a 
resolution adopted by the same Council on 17th 
December 197 4. The reply added that efforts 
are being continued in the Community to imple-
ment such a policy and to resolve the main 
problems involved by appropriate harmonisation 
of the varying interests of the member countries 
of the Community. 
The Council also recognised the need for real 
co-ordination by member governments at inter-
nationaJ. level of long-term policy and research 
into the economic use of, and substitutes for, 
energy resources. Efforts are being made to 
establish such co-ordination within the frame-
work of the OECD. The activities of that organi-
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sation in the energy sector have been streamlined 
by amalgamating the former Oil and Energy 
Committees into a new Energy Policy Commit-
tee. In addition, the International Energy 
Agency, forming part of the OECD, was set up 
on 18th November 1974; in this connection, the 
Council recalled that representatives of the Com-
mission of the European Communities attend all 
meetings of the Agency, and that numerous 
meetings within the Community provide oppor-
tunities for all member countries to exchange 
views. 
Furthermore, the efforts to achieve genuine 
concertation between energy-consuming and 
energy-producing countries are of vital import-
ance. In this context, the Council welcomed the 
positive outcome of the second preparatory meet-
ing for the Conference on International Econo-
mic Co-operation as opening the way for 
constructive discussions on energy questions. 
This conference was held in Paris from 16th to 
19th December 1975 and closed with a joint 
communique which showed clearly that these 
questions were given the fullest attention. 
B. Scientific, technical and space questions 
The Council followed with interest the work 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions, directed to the progress 
of European co-operation in the aeronautical and 
space fields, and the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. 
They answered four recommendations (257 
on the state of European aviation activities, 262 
on the state of European nuclear energy pro-
grammes - security aspects, 268 on the Euro-
pean Space Agency, and 272 on the European 
aeronautical industry and civil aviation) adopted 
by the Assembly in December 197 4 and May 
1975. 
1. Aviation 
In their replies to Recommendations 257 and 
272, the Council referred to the reply to Recom-
mendation 244, the main points of which were 
recalled in their twentieth annual report. 
The views expressed by the Assembly in 
Recommendation 257 were brought to the notice 
of the governments of member States. On this 
occasion, the Council assured the Assembly that 
all aspects of the important problem about which 
it was concerned continued to receive the fullest 
attention of those governments. 
In their reply to Recommendation 272, the 
Council repeated the view they had expressed on 
several previous occasions, namely, that for the 
civil aircraft industry to be sufficiently com-
petitive and capable of taking its rightful posi-
tion among other industries, closer European 
collaboration is necessary in this field, at both 
governmental and industrial level. 
The Council noted that, following consulta-
tions in the EEC, a resolution on member coun-
tries' industrial policy in the aeronautical sector 
had been approved by the Ministerial Council 
of the EEC on 4th March 1975, and was to be 
followed by a first report on the functioning of 
the European aircraft industry. 
They further noted that six major companies 
had decided to co-operate in order to provide the 
airline companies with a strong industrial basis. 
The Council expressed satisfaction at these 
initiatives and added that they were awaiting 
further results with interest. 
2. Space 
In their reply to Recommendation 268 on 
the European Space Agency, the Council drew 
the Assembly's attention to the following points : 
- Following the decision by the member 
States of ESRO and ELDO to carry out the 
extensive common programme approved in 1971 
and 1973 within a single European Space 
Agency, the Convention setting up that agency 
was signed on 30th May 1975. 
- The agency is responsible for a scientific 
programme, :for application programmes (tele-
communications, sea and air communications, 
meteorology), :for a heavy launcher programme 
and :for a manned space laboratory programme, 
as well as for ground support :facilities including 
a launching base at Kourou which is necessary 
for the development of the Ariane launcher. Its 
main emphasis will be on elaborating and imple-
menting a long-term European space policy, on 
co-ordinating the European space programme 
and national programmes, and integrating the 
latter progressively, on elaborating and imple-
menting an appropriate industrial policy, and on 
concerting member States' policies with regard 
to other international organisations and institu-
tions. 
- Meetings of its Council, which can be 
convened at ministerial level, will assist the 
agency in :fulfilling this mission, the aims o:f 
which, as its convention states, are exclusively 
peaceful. 
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3. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
- In 1974, the Council set out their views 
on a European policy on the peaceful uses o:f 
nuclear energy in their reply to Recommenda-
tion 253. 
- Recommendation 262, received in 1975, 
was concerned with safety problems associated 
with developing the peaceful uses o:f nuclear 
energy. The details given in the reply to this 
recommendation showed that the governments 
of all member countries are paying special atten-
tion to these problems. 
Member States collaborate on nuclear safety 
matters, including the protection of public 
health, within the European Communities, 
through international organisations such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
Nudear Energy Agency of the OECD, and in 
bilateral contacts. The Council consider these 
existing channels o:f co-operation to be sufficient 
at present. 
The importance attached by member coun-
tries to an adequate civil nuclear liability regime, 
particularly at regional level, has been demon-
strated by their accession to the Paris and Brus-
sels Conventions negotiated under the aegis of 
the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. The 
Council noted that these governments believe 
that, at present, their interests and respons-
ibilities are adequately covered as a result. 
Lastly, the Council acknowledged it to be o:f 
the utmost importance in securing public accept-
ance of the uses o:f nuclear power :for peaceful 
purposes that information relating to the siting, 
construction and operation of nuclear power 
plants, including information on safety matters, 
and on their environmental impact, should be 
available to the public. 
* 
** 
The Council :fully recognised the importance 
attached by the Assembly to the development o:f 
co-operation between Europe and Canada in the 
field of advanced technology, which formed the 
subject o:f Recommendation 259 adopted in 
December 1974; their reply enumerated the 
main features of existing bilateral and interna-
tional collaboration and concertation on energy 
and space questions. 
Finally, the Council replied to Written 
Question 162 put by a member o:f the Assembly 
concerning the development of mineral resources 
on the ocean floor. They observed that a number 
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of industrial firms were already collaborating in 
such development. 
C. Defence questions 
Two twentieth anniversaries took place in 
1975 : thaJt of the entry into force of the modified 
Brussels Treaty on 6th May 1955, and also of the 
inauguration of the WEU Assembly. Both these 
occasions offered an opportunity for the mem-
bers of the Council, as well as for the parlia-
mentarians, to stress the importance they 
attached to defence matters and to the value of 
the Brussels Treaty in this context. 
In the course of presenting the twentieth 
annual report to the Assembly in May, the Chair-
man-in-Office, Mr. Van Elslande, in laying 
particular stress on the Council's view that 
defence questions remain a matter of paramount 
concern, recalled that the Brussels Treaty, with 
its formal commitments of mutual assistance in 
the event of aggression against one of its mem-
bers, is one of the keystones in the security of 
its signatory States. He also emphasised the care 
taken by the Council to ensure that the protocols 
concerning the levels of member States' forces 
and armaments are observed. 
The members of the Council noted Resolu-
tion 55 on European union and the defence of 
Europe, adopted by the Presidential Committee 
of the Assembly on 11th September and sent to 
the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, 
responsible for submitting a report on European 
union to the European Council. 
1. Level of forces of member States 
Under the general heading of forces and 
armaments control, the Council, with the 
assistance of the Armaments Control Agency, 
have continued in 1975 to carry out their res-
ponsibilities as laid down in the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and its protocols. 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member States of WEU place 
under NATO command are fixed in Articles I 
and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels 
Treaty. Article Ill of the protocol provides for 
a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these 
levels to be increased above the limits specified 
in Articles I and II. 
So that they may satisfy themselves that the 
limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol 
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No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive 
information every year concerning the levels of 
forces placed under NATO command by member 
States of WEU which contribute to the inte-
grated structure. This information is obtained 
in the course of inspections carried out by the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is 
transmitted to the Council by a high~ranking 
officer designated by him to that end. 
The information, as at the end of 197 4, 
which was conveyed by this officer at the appro-
priate time, was presented by him to the Council 
on 20th March. Information indicaJting the status 
as at the end of 1975 was requested in December. 
Furthermore, the Council have taken the 
necessary steps to implement the procedure laid 
down in their resolution of 15th September 1956, 
whereby the levels of forces under NATO com-
mand are examined in the light of the annual 
review. 
Thus, for the year 197 4, a meeting was held 
in Brussels on 17th December 197 4 of the per-
manent representatives (or their substitutes) to 
the North Atlantic Council of the Federnl 
Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
The Council examined the report from this meet-
ing on 15th January 1975, and noted that the 
level of forces of these member States, as set out 
in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits 
fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. The Council also 
took note at the same time of a declaration by 
the permanent representative of France on the 
level of French forces for 197 4. The same pro-
cedure has a'lready been set in train, for 1975, 
by the end of the year under review. 
(b) Forces under national command 
The strength and armaments of forces of 
member States on the mainland of Europe 
remaining under national command are fixed in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in the 
agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 
1957, implementing Article V of Protocol No. II 
to the modified Brussels Treaty. 
* 
** 
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been 
able to fulfil in 1975 their obligations under 
Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty 
concerning levels of forces. 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent 
of Europe 
In accordance with the undertaking given 
in paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 213, the United Kingdom Government 
declares that the total level of British forces on 
the continent of Europe at 30th November 1975 
amounted to 60,066 men plus the Second Tactical 
Air Force. 
The continued need for the presence of 
troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary 
for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be 
redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 30th 
November 1975, there were some 3,700 men from 
BAOR in Northern Ireland. As has been 
previously stated, it is expected that these units 
could be speedily returned to their duty stations 
in an emergency affecting NATO. 
3. Examination by the Council of the activities of 
the Standing Armaments Committee and of the 
problems of the standardisation of armaments in 
Europe 
On 20th May in London, the Ministerial 
Council held a detailed discussion on this subject. 
Since that time, the permanent representatives 
have continued to exchange views but no definite 
conclusions have yet been reached. The matter 
remains however on their agenda. 
As the Assembly is aware, questions of 
European armaments procurement and standard-
isation have been much debated by interested 
governments during the year in various fora 
where the member governments of WEU have 
made substantial contributions to the study of 
the problem. 
In their replies to Recommendations 267, 
269 and 270, communicated to the Assembly in 
October and November, the CounciJ set out their 
views. In particular, they indicated that careful 
consideration was being given to the tasks which 
might be taken on by the various bodies capable 
of dealing with this problem within the Atlantic 
.Mliance and WEU, while bearing in mind the 
need to avoid duplication of effort. 
In December, during the part-session of the 
Assembly, the Council observed the degree of 
emphasis put on the need for increased European 
armaments co-operation. 
4. Assembly recommendations and written questions 
(a) Defence subjects specifically dealt with in 
the recommendations adopted by the Assembly 
in December 1974 and May 1975, and to which 
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the Council gave as full replies as possible, 
included: 
- European security and the situation in 
the Eastern Mediterranean (256) ; 
- conditions of service in the armed forces 
(261) ; 
- the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
(264) ; 
- the application of the Brussels Treaty 
(267) ; 
- the state of European security (269). 
Replying to the parts of this recommen-
dation that concerned greater defence 
co-operation in Europe (see also 3 above), 
the Council stressed the need for the 
European countries to be a:ble to identify 
their armaments requirements and to use 
their own research, development and 
production capabilities; 
- European union and WEU (270). Here 
the Council stated in their reply that 
they were aware of the implications of 
world-wide security problems for the 
process of European political unification. 
Questions arising in connection with 
adequate provision for the defence of 
Europe would be discussed in the appro-
priate fora. 
Another three recommendations were 
drafted by the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments and adopted by the Assembly 
a:t the December part-session : 278 on develop-
ments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic 
Alliance ; 281 on European and Atlantic co-
operation in the field of armaments ; and 283 on 
air forces on the central front. The Council have 
already begun their study of these texts. 
(b) In dealing with several written questions on 
defence subjects, the Council and the member 
States considered various aspects of this 
important problem. 
* 
** 
Contacts with other international organisations 
In the course of the year, the principal 
officers of the Secretariat-General, representing 
Western European Union, attended a number of 
meetings of other international organisations as 
observers when questions of concern to WEU 
were under discussion. As in previous years, the 
most frequent of these contacts were made with 
NATO and the Council of Europe. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY 
A. Introduction 
The Agency has a dual task. Under the 
terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, it is 
required: 
- firstly, to control the level of stocks of 
armaments held by member countries on 
the mainland of Europe, this control 
extending to production and imports to 
the extent required to make the control 
of stocks effective ; 
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic 
of Germany not to manufacture certain 
types of 'armaments on its territory are 
being observed. 
In 1975, the Agency's activities continued 
very much along the same lines and at the same 
rate as in previous years. 
Subject to the comments made under point 
B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the 
Agency for 1975, the twentieth year of control, 
was carried out satisfactorily. 
B. General problems 
1. General operating methods 
Within the Agency's terms of reference, con-
trols from documentary sources serve mainly 
for checking levels of armaments as a whole. 
They also contribute to the preparation of field 
measures for the control of levels and of the 
non-production of certain categories of arma-
ments. This aspect covers all activities concerned 
with processing, for the purposes defined above, 
any useful documentary material including, in 
particular, countries' replies to the Agency 
questionnaire, and the results of field control 
measures carried out earlier. 
The execution of test checks, visits and 
inspections, and all that is linked with these 
functions, constitutes that part of control carried 
out physically wherever there are activities and 
stocks subject to control and, more generally, 
wherever this is necessary to ensure that the 
information supplied is correct and that under-
takings not to manufacture certain types of 
armaments are observed. 
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The control system is based primarily on 
controls from documentary sources, the purpose 
of field control measures being to verify, physic-
ally, the accuracy of all the information col-
lected in implementation of Part Ill of Protocol 
No. IV. 
Documentary and field control measures are 
complementary, and equally essential for the 
accomplishment of the Agency's task. 
Traditionally, the annual report has always 
presented documentary and field control measures 
separately, in the interests of both convenience 
and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten 
that these measures together make up a single 
control function. 
The Agency's operating methods, the main 
lines of which are set out above, did not change 
during the year under review. 
Although the principles of the present 
methods, which have proved their worth, remain 
unchanged, their applications are under constant 
examination with a view to improvement. 
The Agency draws gre8!t benefit from the 
continuity of its methods ; by its steadily-
growing knowledge of the organisation of the 
forces of each member State, of the progress of 
armament production or procurement pro-
grammes, the Agency develops its control activ-
ity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing 
of levels and quantities of armaments and in the 
choice and assessment of its control measures. 
2. Fields where the Agency is or is not authorised 
to exercise its mandate 
The situation described in previous annual 
reports, regarding certain armaments, remained 
unchanged in 1975. 
In present circumstances, the Agency's 
activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in 
one member State, to what that State calls 
"strategic forces". 
Nor does the Agency apply any controls to 
biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter therefore concern other armaments. 
It is further recalled that only non-produc-
tion controls are so far applied to chemical 
weapons. 
C. Controls from documentary sources 
In this field of control, the Agency studies 
the relevant documents with the main purpose 
of comparing the quantities of armaments held 
by the member States with the levels fixed by 
the Council and thus establishing whether these 
constitute appropriate .levels within the terms 
of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. Information processed by the Agency 
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies 
by member States 
The questionnaire sent to member States 
for 1975 did not differ substantially from those 
of previous years. 
As in all previous years, follow-up action 
on the replies was twofold. It is recalled that 
some of the facts reported are checked physic-
ally by means of field control measures. In 
addition, all the replies are studied by the 
Agency experts, and compared with the other 
sources of information availaMe, including mem-
ber countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO 
questionnaires and budgetary documents. 
(b) Request for annual information 
In the case of one of the member States, 
control of the non-production of certain types 
of armaments takes the form of field control 
measures. 
Nevertheless, these measures are partly pre-
pared from a study of documents. This study is 
baBed, in particular, on the replies of the country 
concerned to the Agency's request for annual 
informaltion. 
This procedure applies to long-range mis-
siles, guided missiles and chemical weapons. 
(c) Information provided by NATO 
See point 2 (a) below. 
(d) Information provided by the United States 
of America and Canada (Article XXIII of 
Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency received, through the Council, 
information supplied by the Governments of the 
United States and Canada concerning their pro-
grammes of external aid in military equipment 
to the forces of member States stationed on the 
mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries 
have provided no aid to the forces concerned. 
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(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information 
(Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) 
In 1975, the defence budgets published by 
member States and their replies to the Agency 
questionnaire on this subject were studied in the 
same way as in previous years. 
The national authorities also gave additional 
information, whenever necessary, in response to 
the Agency's requests. 
The scrutiny of ·budgets confirmed the find-
ings of other studies carried out by the experts 
to determine quantities of armaments. 
2. Verification of appropriate lever. of armaments 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the member 
States' rep.Iies to the annual questionnaire and 
studying the statistical reports furnished by the 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) 
and, in particular, by the NATO International 
Staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for 
the annual consultations with the NATO military 
authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol 
No. IV. 
As in previous years, these consultations 
included a joint study session at Casteau, on 
28th November 1975, attended by Agency experts 
and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and 
concluded with a meeting in Paris on 12th 
December 1975 under the chairmanship of the 
Deputy Director of the Agency ; this meeting 
was attended by the representatives of the Direc-
tor of the International Military Staff of the 
NATO Military Committee, and of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff Logistics, Armaments and Admin-
istration, SHAPE, as well as by the Agency 
experts. There were no comments on the total 
quantities of armaments declared as held by the 
member States (Article XIII of Protocol No. IV), 
and presented by the Agency for study by these 
authorities. 
In consequence, the total quantities of arma-
ments declared to the Agency by the member 
States for forces placed under NATO authority 
and stationed on the mainland of Europe can 
be considered as appropriate levels for the con-
trol year 1975 within the terms of Article XIX 
of Protocol No. IV. 
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(b) .Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command on the 
mainland of Europe 
The quantities of armaments declared to the 
Agency by the member States as being required 
on 31st December 1975 for their forces main-
tained under national command on the mainland 
of Europe have been accepted or approved by 
the Council, who have taken note of these figures 
of maximum levels of armaments for these forces 
in 1975. The quantities notified to the Agency 
can thus be considered as appropriate levels of 
armaments for the current control year within 
the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV. 
D. Field control measures 
1. Principles governing the application of field control 
measures and general methods of execution 
<a) As recalled in the introduction to this Chap-
ter, the treaty requires the Agency : 
- to satisfy itself that the undertakings 
not to manufacture certain types of 
armaments are being observed ; 
- to control the level of stocks of certain 
armaments. 
Field control measures continued during 
1975 on the same basis as during previous years, 
as an essential part of the Agency's work, in 
accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV. 
The Agency's basic assumption in this respect 
is that the undertakings and declarations of 
member countries are being honoured. Clearly, 
if any doubt existed on this point, control 
measures would have to be increased. In any case, 
the measures taken by the Agency must provide 
a sufficiently high probability of detecting any 
contravention. 
In the case of its primary task of non-
production controls, the Agency once again 
relied, in 1975, on a comparatively small num-
ber of field control measures. However, these 
measures must be viewed in the context of wide 
and continuing studies and within a continuing 
pattern of inspections. Taken overall, these 
provide a solid basis for the Agency's confidence. 
For the second of its tasks, the basic inform-
ation on levels of stocks of the types of arma-
ments subject to control by the Agency is pro-
vided by member countries in their replies to the 
annual questionnaire. This information is cross-
checked not only against earlier declarations, 
but also against other information received from 
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a variety of sources, including the findings of 
previous field control measures. On the basis 
of these analyses, a programme of field control 
measures is worked out covering an appropriate 
sample of the various establishments and sources 
contributing to the overall levels of stocks. 
This programme, involving units, depots 
and factories, varies in composition from year 
to year as equipment programmes and other 
defence policies take effect. Care is taken to 
maintain the correct balance, while ensuring 
that the Agency's efforts are directed in the 
most effective manner. For example, inspections 
at factories are planned for what is considered 
to be the most informative stage of the produc-
tion cycle, and a reasonable ba:lance is aimed at 
in the distribution of control activities between 
member countries. In addition, due weight is 
given to such special factors as policies for the 
concentration of stocks to reduce management 
costs or for their dispersal for reasons of vul-
nerability. The final programme is modified to 
take account of the latest information available. 
Accounting checks and physical inspections are 
then strictly applied by experienced teams of 
experts. As a result of this thorough check of the 
figures selected for scrutiny, the accuracy of the 
remainder can be accepted with every confidence. 
Although the Agency's two tasks are sepa-
rate and specific, the field control measures 
involved are not considered and programmed in 
isolation. Thus, at a single factory, control of 
the quantities of arms being produced may be 
combined with a non-production control of cer-
tain proscribed weapons 
(b) Article VIII of Protocol No. IV is of con-
siderable assistance to the Agency in carrying 
out its mission. It states that to avoid duplication 
of effort, control measures in respect of forces 
under NATO authority shall be undertaken by 
the appropriate NATO authorities. The percent-
age of forces to be inspected by the Agency 
therefore varies between member countries, and 
this must be taken into account in the prepar-
ation of its programme. Special considerations 
apply to the depots also covered by the same 
Article. In peacetime, each country is wholly 
responsible for the logistic support of forces 
placed under NATO authority. It is therefore 
difficult to determine which of the material in 
depots is or will be assigned to forces under 
NATO authority and which is or will be a:ssigned 
to forces under national command. The system 
of combined Agency-SHAPE inspections, intro-
duced in 1957, was again applied in 1975. 
(c) As the Convention for the due process of 
law 1 has not yet entered into force, the control 
measures carried out by the Agency at private 
concerns had, in 1975, as in previous years, to 
take the form of "agreed control measures". 
One consequence of this situation is that, in 
order to obtain the agreement of the firms con-
cerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' 
notice. This agreement has never been withheld. 
2. Type and extent of field control measures 
The programme drawn up by the Agency 
was carried out in full, in accordance with the 
well-tried procedure of previous years, except for 
minor modifications for practical reasons. 
In 1975, the total number of seventy-two 
control measures was slightly higher than the 
average for the six previous years. 
These measures fall broadly into the follow-
ing categories : 
(a) quantitative control measures at depots ; 
(b) quantitative control measures at units 
for forces under national command ; 
(c) control measures at production plants: 
(i) quantitative control measures: 
These control measures were car-
ried out at aircraft and aircraft 
engine plants, at plants manufac-
turing armoured equipment, at 
plants manufacturing missiles and 
ammunition, and at shipyards. 
(ii) non-production control measures: 
These control measures were car-
ried out at plants producing chemi-
cals and missiles. 
3. Conclusions 
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exer-
cise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively 
to carry out its task of applying control measures. 
Such problems as arose from the very com-
plex nature of the inspections were dealt with 
1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member States of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Agency for the Control of Arnlaments to carry 
out its control effectively and making provision for due 
process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of 
the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed 
in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th 
December 1957). 
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satisfactorily through good relations with the 
national authorities. 
(b) On the basis of all the field control measures 
carried out in 1975, the Agency was able to 
report to the Council : 
- the measures taken for the control of the 
levels of stocks of armaments at depots, 
units under national command and 
production plants confirmed the data 
obtained from documentary control 
measures; 
- the measures taken for the control of 
non-production revealed no production 
contrary to undertakings. 
E. State and problems of control in certain 
particular fields 
1. Armaments for land forces 
(a) Current production and purchases 
With regard to armoured material, most of 
the major programmes for renewal of the 
Leopard I and AMX-30 battle tanks were 
completed in 1975. Those relating to other 
armoured vehicles (Mard.er, AMX-10P and 
M-113) are continuing in 'a number of countries. 
Production of armoured reconnaissance vehicles 
began in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
eo-production of the Scorpion by Belgium and 
the United Kingdom was continued. 
Two major anti-aircraft equipment pro-
grammes are being developed : the Gepard tank 
and the Roland missile launcher jointly pro-
duced by France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
In the field of artillery, the manufacture 
of Pluton missile launchers continued in France; 
in addition, several countries have begun to take 
delivery of Lance missile launchers. 
(b) Control activities in 1975 
Control measures were carried out at a 
number of depots, at several units under national 
command, and at plants manufacturing arma-
ments for land forces. 
2. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles 
(a) Current production 
The following modern guided missiles_ are 
under production in the member States : Milan 
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and Swingfire anti-tank missiles; Crotale, 
Masurca, Blowpipe, Rapier and Sea-Dart surface-
to-air missiles; Martel air-to-surface missile; 
Matra Magic R-550 air-to-air missile; Exocet 
sea-to-sea missile ; Malafon ASW missile. 
In addition, the following guided missiles 
of the previous generation are still being pro-
duced: SS-11 surface-to-surface missile; Vigi-
lant and Cobra anti-tank missiles; AS-12 and 
AS-30 air-to-surface missiles. 
Production of surface-to-surface 110 lll'lll. 
artillery rockets by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many continues and that of Zuni air-to-ground 
rockets has started in Belgium. 
(b) Exports 
Guided missiles exported include Cobra, 
SS-11, Exocet MM-38 and Crotale. 
(c) Control of le1'els in 1975 
Control measures were carried out at a 
number of depots containing guided and other 
self-propelled missiles or launchers, at units 
under national command equipped with these 
weapons, and at plants manufacturing guided 
and other self-propelled missiles. 
(d) Verification of non-production undertakings 
As it does each year, the Agency sent a 
"request for annual information in order to faci-
litate the Agency's non-production control of 
guided missiles and long-range missiles" to the 
State concerned. No production contrary to 
undertakings was found during verifications 
which followed a study of the reply received. 
3. Military aircraft 
(a) O.urrent production and purchases 
Joint production of the Jaguar A/E by 
France and the United Kingdom is continuing, 
as is work on another important programme, that 
of the Mirage F-1, in France. In Italy, produc-
tion of the G-91Y aircraft was completed in 
1975, and work on the F-104S programme was 
continued. 
The German air force has received the 
majority of Phantom F-4F aircraft ordered 
from the United States. 
(b) Future prospects 
Two major 'aircraft construction programmes 
were mentioned in the previous annual report 
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as being in train : the MRCA 75, built jointly 
by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Italy; and the Alpha-Jet, by 
France and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Four MRCA 75 prototypes are undergoing tests, 
and the Alpha-Jet will go into production in 
1976. 
The United Kingdom programme of Hawk 
trainer aircraft has reached the prototype stage. 
(c) Control activity in 1975 
Control measures were carried out at depots 
holding aircraft or aircraft engines, at air force 
units under national command, and at plants 
manufacturing aircraft or aircraft engines. 
4. Warships 
(a) Current construction 
Work was continued in 1975 on the new 
warship construction programmes mentioned in 
the previous annual report as being in progress 
in member countries on the mainland of Europe. 
(b) Control activity in 1975 
Control measures were carried out at naval 
shipyards. 
5. Chemical weapons 
(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control 
As in previous years, the Agency asked 
member countries whether they wished to renew 
in 1975 the list of chemical weapons subject to 
control. 
The member countries agreed to this 
renewal. This was reported to the Council, who 
noted the fact. 
(b) Control activities in 1975 
The replies given to the questions asked in 
implementation of Article Ill of Protocol No. Ill 
show that no effective production of chemical 
weapons has yet been undertaken on the main-
land of Europe by member countries which have 
not renounced the right to produce such weapons. 
As in previous years, the Agency also 
addressed to the appropriate authorities of the 
State concerned a "request for annual informa-
tion to facilitate the non-production control of 
chemical weapons". The reply received to this 
request was, as in the past, of great assistance 
to the Agency in seleeting chemical plants at 
which to carry out agreed control measures in 
1975. 
The supplementary procedure designed to 
increase the effectiveness of the Agency's action, 
which has been tried out since 1973, was again 
applied successfully in 1975. 
For each control measure carried out, a 
delegation from the national authorities was 
present. 
None of these measures revealed any indi-
cation of production of chemical weapons within 
the terms of Annex II of Protocol No. Ill. 
6. Biological weapons 
All member countries reported to the Agency 
their agreement to renew in 1975 the list of 
biological weapons subject to control. This was 
reported to the Council, who noted the fact. 
However, it will be recalled (see point B.2 
of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises 
no control in the field of biological weapons. 
7. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation remained the same as 
in previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated 
in point B.2 of this chapter, to exercise any con-
trol in the atomic field. 
F. Technical information visits and other 
means of improving the proficiency of the 
experts 
1. Technical information visits have long con-
tributed significantly to improving the docu-
mentation available to the Agency's experts. 
Combined with other existing methods, these 
visits have enabled them to keep abreast of the 
most recent developments in the technology of 
armaments production. 
With the active assistance of member coun-
tries, at whose invitation these visits take place, 
it is now possible to plan each annual TIV 
programme as an integral part of a comprehen-
sive long-term projeet. A clearer picture of the 
overall value of TIVs is given by the follow-
ing summary. 
TIV s carried out in 1975 include : 
- participation in the following events : 
( i) military and air shows, which are 
held regularly, such as the exhibi-
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tion of army weapons and equip-
ment at Satory, and the Le Bour-
get Air Show, in France ; 
(ii) the Royal Navy symposium in Lon-
don and the exhibition of naval 
equipment at Greenwich ; 
( iii) a tactical demonstration of arm-
oured vehicles and anti-tank 
weapons at Miinsterlager in the 
Federal Republic of Germany ; 
- visits to establishments offering pro-
grammes specially prepared for the 
Agency: 
( i) in France, to establishments 
involved in the European space 
programme, supplementing earlier 
visits to factories working on 
strategic missile projects ; 
( ii) in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, to the "Bundesamt fiir 
W ehrteehnik und Beschaffung" 
(BWB), which is responsible for 
equipment procurement, and to 
one of its weapons test centres ; 
( iii) in Italy, to a missile and rocket 
test range, which was undergoing 
a major modernisation programme; 
( iv) in the United Kingdom, to three 
large factories where the Agency 
experts were shown current and 
future national and international 
military aircraft and missile pro-
grammes, and given briefings on 
modern production .techniques. 
The chemical and biological TIV s enabled 
the experts to study certain particular aspects 
described below, and to hold useful discussions 
with senior scientists. 
Chemical TIV s were made to Italy and the 
Netherlands. The Agency experts obtained infor-
mation on the industrial development of new 
therapeutic substances for treating the effects of 
chemical agents. 
In the biological field, TIV s were made to 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Agency's experts were briefed on the develop-
ment of general-purpose or specific microbe 
culture media for the diagnosis of bacterial 
diseases. In Italy, they were briefed on the 
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preparation of vaccines against viral diseases, 
toxins and animal venoms. In the Netherlands, 
they were more particularly briefed on the large-
scale culture of viruses. In the United Kingdom 
also, they examined large-scale virus culture 
processes and the culture of pathogenic bacteria 
by continuous-flow processes. 
2. The Documentation Office continued to col-
lect and collate, for the benefit of the experts, 
both specialised and other published documents 
dealing with armaments under study, being 
developed or in production. 
This provides the experts with a continuing 
source of information, enabling them to keep up 
to date and increase their knowledge ; and they 
take advantage of the opportunity to compare 
the information selected by the office, as 
required, with facts noted in situ on the occa.sion 
of visits or control measures in the member 
countries of the organisation. 
G. Miscellaneous contacts 
1. Contacts with the national authorities 
The Agency again maintained its numerous 
ties with national authorities, through Agency 
officials sent on mission and through national 
representatives visiting Paris. 
As in previous years, the main object of 
these contacts wa:s to arrange inspections and 
technical information visits, or to solve problems 
relating to control measures. As usual, these 
contacts were very helpful to the Agency in 
fulfilling its task. 
2. Contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation 
Contacts were maintained with the appro-
priate NATO authorities in accordance with the 
provisions of the revised Brussels Treaty. 
Mention should be made, in particular, of 
the two meetings held to fix the level of arma-
ments of the forces under NATO command, 
already referred to in point C. 2 (a) of this 
chapter. The second of these meetings was 
followed by an unofficial exchange of views on 
matters of common interest. 
3. Visits to the Agency 
The staff and students of the Italian Centre 
for Advanced Military Studies visited the 
Agency. 
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The Agency was also visited by several 
groups of young civil servants from one of the 
member countries, sent by the European Cultural 
Agency. 
H. General conclusions 
In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the 
Council that, as a result of the control exercised 
in 1975, the figures obtained in accordance with 
Article XIII of Protocol No. IV : 
- for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article XIV 
of Protocol No. IV; and 
- for armaments of forces maintained 
under national command under the terms 
of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Pro-
tocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th 
December 1957 concluded in execution of 
Article V of Protocol No. II, 
represented for the control year 1975 and for 
each of the member States, the appropriate levels 
of armaments subject to control for those 
categories of armaments over which the Agency 
has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate. 
As required by Article XX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course 
of field control measures at production plants, it 
did not detect for the categories of armaments 
which it controls : 
- either the manufacture in these establish-
ments on the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany of a category of 
armaments that the government of this 
member State has undertaken not to 
manufacture ; 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess 
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV) or not justified by 
export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
In 1975, the Agency again applied controls 
effectively in those fields which are open to it. 
In this, relations between the Agency and 
the national authorities and services of the mem-
ber States, and also with those of NATO and 
SHAPE, continued to play an important part. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE 
A. Activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee 
1. Relations with FINABEL 
Co-operation between the SAC and FINA-
BEL continued in line with the conclusions of 
the joint meeting of May 1973, referred to in 
the last two annual reports. 
2. Co-operation on armaments questions 
It will be recalled that the activities of the 
SAC cover all three services. 
On the basis of replies to a questionnaire 
drawn up at the request of France, information 
was exchanged in 1975 on the target-drone 
requirements for the three services in some of 
the member countries, in order to bring them 
into line while taking account of the work of 
FINABEL relating to ground forces. 
The SAC instructed Working Group No. 8 
on operational research to study a general 
method for evaluating military equipment, tak-
ing account of national studies already com-
pleted and of all available information. In the 
initial phase, the group was requested to carry 
out a preliminary study based on the example 
of the heavy recovery vehicle proposed by the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The German 
Delegation was first asked to present a summary 
of an earlier study on the evaluation of this 
recovery vehicle. Following this, with a view to 
launching a pilot study to test the effectiveness 
of this general method on some simple piece of 
equipment not previously evaluated, the group 
was asked to give its views on the composition 
of the body it considered most suitable for this 
task. 
3. WEU agreement 4 .FT .6 
WEU agreement 4.FT.6 on the technical 
testing programme for wheeled transport vehicles 
was approved 'by the SAC and came into force 
on 31st January 1975. 
The SAC decided that this document should 
be brought up to date by correspondence, under 
the responsibility of a pilot country. The United 
Kingdom, which accepted this task, has already 
started work. The United Kingdom co-ordinator, 
assisted by the International Secretariat, drafted 
a document which was circulated early in May 
1975, laying down the procedures to be adopted 
2-1 
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by the national experts for the two-yearly revi-
sion of this agreement. Amendments and com-
ments were circulated early in November as a 
first draft of the up-dating report for 1975. 
The International Secretariat also circulated 
two vehicle identification schemes, submitted by 
Belgium and Italy respectively, together with 
two initial information sheets submitted by the 
Netherlands. 
An interim progress report on this work as 
a whole was presented by the pilot country co-
ordinator at the SAC's meeting in November. 
4. Visits 
At the invitation of the French military 
authorities, members of the SAC visited the 5th 
Exhibition at Satory on 11th June. They saw 
equipment for ground forces which was manu-
factured either in France or jointly by French 
and foreign firms, particularly from European 
countries. 
National delegates to the SAC also paid a 
visit, on 19th September, to the Helicopter 
Division of the SNIAS at Marignane where they 
gained some insight into the activities and 
potential of this plant which plays an important 
role in European industrial co-operation. 
5. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on joint 
production of armaments 
On 18th February, a meeting of the Liaison 
Sub-Committee on joint production of arma-
ments was held in Paris. At this meeting when, 
as on previous similar occasions, the Chair was 
taken by the Chairman of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU 
Assembly, the Assembly representatives were 
given an overall report of the activities of the 
SAC and its working groups. In reply to 
questions, additional information on this report 
was given by SAC delegates and members of the 
International Secretariat. 
B. Activities of the working groups 
Member countries' participation in the work-
ing groups is not limited to general discussion 
but also takes the form of studies and the stimu-
lation, or in some cases the exploitation, of 
research carried out elsewhere. Such studies can 
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lead to activities being piloted by a single coun-
try with the direct involvement of national 
experts, thereby avoiding the need to set up 
further working groups. 
1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research 
In the course of the year, Working Group 
No. 8 on operational research held two meetings, 
the first being combined with a symposium and 
the second with a visit to the Operational 
Research Centre of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many at Ottobrunn (Munich). 
Exchanges of information continued in the 
form of communication of new subjects for 
study, declarations of interest and bilateral 
exchanges of reports. A WEU library of opera-
tional research reports has been set up to assist 
these exchanges. 
Reference was made in earlier annual 
reports to the important work, begun in 1971, on 
the compilation of a WEU glossary of opera-
tional research terms in five languages, on the 
basis of an existing Anglo-French glossary. 
Translation of this document was almost com-
pleted at the end of 1975, and the International 
Secretariat was considering the form it should 
take. In addition to furthering the main aim of 
standardisation, this work should also make it 
easier to use the national language of each mem-
ber country without risk of confusion. 
A symposium on the value of battlefield 
information gave rise to very detailed discussions 
of the studies presented by the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the United Kingdom. 
At the invitation of the German authorities, 
the group visited the facilities of the Industrie-
anlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft (IABG) at Otto-
brunn; a series of studies was presented, dealing 
mainly with air defence, underwater mine war-
fare, army personnel questions and battlefield 
surveillance. 
2. Working Group No. 9 on hindrances 
Working Group No. 9 is responsible for an 
experimental three-service study of new means 
of hindering enemy movement. As this group has 
now completed most of its studies, it has been 
decided to suspend its activities until new studies 
are proposed. In the meantime, the studies on 
sliding agents and liquid and slurry explosives 
are judged to be sufficiently advanced and have 
been transferred to FINABEL which will 
determine the relevant military requirements. 
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C. International Secretariat 
1. Contacts with member countries and the Council 
In Bonn in May 1975, the Assistant Secre-
tary-General discussed the SAC's activities with 
Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs and Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
In the course of the year, the Assistant 
Secretary-General, at the invitation of the 
governments concerned, visited armaments 
factories in Germany, in Italy and in the United 
Kingdom. 
These visits were accompanied by useful 
discussions with the managements of the com-
panies concerned and by working meetings with 
government representatives dealing with these 
matters in Rame and London. 
Finally, on 29th April, the Assistant 
Secretary-General as usual presented his annual 
verbal statement to the Council on the activities 
of the SAC and its working groups. 
2. WEU Assembly 
All references made during sessions of the 
Assembly to questions relating to armaments 
co-operation were reproduced in a document 
prepared by the International Secretariat for 
the benefit of delegates to the SAC. 
3. Contacts with NATO 
As usual, the Assistant Secretary-General 
attended the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors as an observer; similarly, a NATO 
observer was invited to attend the SAC's meet-
ings, and a representative of the SAC's Interna-
tional Secretariat attended meetings of the 
NATO Naval Armaments Group. 
4. Contacts with FINABEL 
Harmonious relations were maintained 
between the International Secretariat of the 
SAC and the FINABEL Secretariat. At their 
annual meeting the chiefs-of-staff of the FINA-
BEL member countries' ground forces, who are 
concerned by the problem of duplication, noted 
that the good contacts between the two organisa-
tions ensured that neither would duplicate the 
work of the other. 
As in the last two years, the SAC's Interna-
tional Secretariat was represented at the annual 
meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Com-
mittee in November 1975. These meetings, in 
which current and planned work is reviewed, 
also provide an opportunity for exchanges of 
views and information with the chairmen of all 
the FINABEL working groups. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A. Meetings of the Committee 
The Public Administration Committee held 
its two annual meetings in Munich, from 21st to 
23rd May, and at Sarlat, from 29th September 
to 1st October. 
At these meetings, the Committee continued 
its exchanges of information on new develop-
ments affecting the administrations of member 
countries. The subjects dealt with included : the 
position of unestablished staff (contractual and 
auxiliary) ; the lowering of the age of I~etire­
ment ; the access to administrative documents for 
the public ; the participation of trade unions in 
determining conditions of employment in the 
civil service ; the implementation of regionalisa-
tion in Italy. 
The Committee has studied two subjects in 
greater detail in recent months. The first con-
cerns the organisation and methods of informing 
the public about the administration (duties, 
organisation, co-ordination of information ser-
vices, etc.). The subject of the second study, now 
nearing completion, is the remuneration of civil 
servants and systems of adjusting payment in 
public administration (elements of remuneration, 
deductions, criteria and procedures for perio~Uc 
adjustments, etc.) ; a comparative table, showmg 
the similarities and differences between the 
systems applied in member countries, will shortly 
be completed. 
B. Multilateral course for government officials 
The twenty-fourth course for government 
officials, organised by the Public Administration 
Committee, took place in Florence from lOth to 
21st November. 
For the reasons given in the Council's twen-
tieth annual report, the Committee decided that 
in 1975, they would make a break from the 
series of training courses for young civil servants, 
which they had been organising for some years, 
and would revert to the study of a specific 
subject by experienced civil servants. As 1975 
was International Women's Year, the Committee 
thought it appropriate to select for this course 
a theme fitting in with the numerous other events 
arranged in this connection. The subject was : 
The position of women in the civil service. 
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With this in mind, a majority of the twenty-
two officials attending were women. A series of 
meetings with women representatives of the civil 
service was also included in the programme. 
The various problems of women's employ-
ment were considered, not only from the purely 
statutory point of view, but also with regard to 
the practical problems raised by the employment 
of increasing numbers of women staff in the 
public service. Participants studied the legal 
and practical aspects of women's position in the 
traditional civil service (promotion, appointment 
to senior executive posts, etc.), and their place in 
departments such as that of justice, the prison 
service, the police and the social services. 
Once again, the organisers noted the interest 
shown by participants in courses of this kind, 
which provide them with an opportunity -
sometimes for the first time - to exchange views 
and experiences with their colleagues from other 
member countries, within a sufficiently small 
group to allow genuine personal contacts to be 
made. The fresh knowledge and wider horizons 
so acquired by the participants confirm the value 
of this aspect of the Public Administration Com-
mittee's activities. 
C. Study visits 
The programme of study visits arranged 
under the auspices of the Committee continued as 
usual during the year. 
These visits enable officials to spend one 
or two weeks studying their own speciality within 
the administration of another member country. 
They therefore naturally cover a wide variety 
of subjects, as can be seen from the following 
examples of visits during the year under review : 
administration of and technical problems asso-
ciated with botanical gardens ; recommended 
resale prices ; dispersal of government work ; 
administration of the system of regional finan-
cial incentives for industrial developments ; 
organisation of police agencies at national and 
regional level in respect of road traffic ; social 
assistance policy and practice to individuals and 
families in trade disputes, etc. 
A report is prepared after each visit and 
circulated to all members of the Committee who 
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forward it to the departments concerned in their 
own administration. This dissemination of results 
is undoubtedly one of the special features of 
visits made under the auspices of the Public 
Administration Committee. 
D. Secondment of national officials to 
international organisations 
As stated in the previous annual report, the 
Public Administration Committee was instructed 
by the Council in 197 4 to follow the implementa-
tion by member States of the principles defined 
by the special working group set up in 1971 to 
study the secondment of national officials to 
international organisations. These principles, 
which the Council transmitted to the member 
governments with a recommendation for their 
application, were given in Chapter VI, point F. 1 
of the twentieth annual report. 
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Acting on these instructions, the Committee 
asked each of its members to carry out a survey 
in his national administration, on the basis of a 
common questionnaire to assess how far these 
principles are applied and to identify the nature 
of any difficulties encountered. 
In their reply to point II of Recommenda-
tion 265, sent to the Assembly at the end of 
November, the Council stated that this survey 
was in course of completion and that they would 
shortly be receiving the results. They in fact did 
so four weeks later. The Council will therefore 
be able to consider this question afresh at the 
beginning of 1976, to determine whether the 
Public Administration Committee should be 
asked to take their survey any further or to look 
at the position again after an interval. The 
Council will keep the Assembly informed of 
developments in this field, if it so requests. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
A. Budget 
Summaries of the main, revised and total 
budgets for 1975 and the main budget for 1976 
are shown in the appendix to this report. 
A revised budget for 1975 was introduced 
to take account of the effects of increases in 
salaries and allowances resulting from the 197 4 
general review which received the approval of 
Councils in the course of 1975. 
The new form of presentation of the WEU 
budget, which was described in the twentieth 
annual report, was maintained in the 1976 bud-
get. The time-table for presentation of the budget, 
however, was rearranged in order to conform 
with that agreed between Council and Assembly 
for examination of the Assembly's budget. 
A new format, to take account of the 
anticipated introduction of the pension scheme, 
was approved by the Budget and Organisation 
Committee. This would entail the inclusion of 
two new chapters in the existing budgets of the 
WEU offices. 
B. WEU administrative meetings 
To facilitate common application of admin-
istrative policies and to examine matters of 
common interest, administrative officials of the 
Secretariat-General, the Armaments Control 
Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the Office of the Clerk met periodically in 
the course of 1975. 
C. WEU provident fund 
The continued fluctuation in currency pari-
ties throughout 1975 much concerned the 
Secretariat-General and the advisory panel set 
up in 1972 to make practical arrangements for 
the administration of the provident fund. In 
order to protect staff as much as possible against 
capital losses resulting from the depreciation of 
certain currencies, the policy of investing on a 
short-term basis, which had been adopted in 1974, 
was considered to be the most prudent, while 
appreciating that interest rates were, in some 
cases, less beneficial than investment in the longer 
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term. With a view to mitigating risks and secur-
ing higher interest rates, the number of cur-
rencies in which the fund was invested was 
reduced in the course of the year. 
D. Introduction of new British social security 
scheme 
The introduction of the new British social 
security scheme, incorporating an earnings-
related pension system in addition to the basic 
State pension, has given rise to several delicate 
problems and will, if applied in its entirety to 
WEU, entail very much higher contributions 
than hitherto, both from the organisation and 
staff members serving in the United Kingdom. 
Negotiations have therefore been opened 
between the British Government and WEU in 
order to determine under what conditions and 
to what extent (if any), WEU and the staff 
should participate in the scheme. Pending a 
solution, provision has been made in the WEU 
budget for payment of the employers' contribu-
tions under the new scales and the contributions 
from staff members have been deducted from 
their monthly salaries. These sums will be held 
by the organisation until arrangements for 
participation in the scheme have been concluded. 
E. Activities within the framework of the 
co-ordinated organisations 
I. Committee of Heads of Administration 
Most of the meetings of the Heads of 
Administration of the co-ordinated organisations 
during 1975 were devoted to the pension scheme, 
the draft rules for which were under discussion 
in the Co-ordinating Committee of Government 
Budget Experts, the 1974 general review, and the 
proposal by certain governments to amend the 
procedures by which salaries of international 
staffs are adjusted. 
The Administrative Committee on Pensions, 
which had been set up in 1974 to draft internal 
instructions for the application of the pension 
scheme rules, had completed its task by the end 
of 1975 and the draft instructions now await 
approval by the Standing Committee of Secre-
taries-General. 
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2. Standing Committee of Secretaries-General 
The Standing Committee of Secretaries-
General held several meetings, both formal and 
informal, in the course of 1975, in addition to 
four joint meetings with the Standing Committee 
of Staff Associations. 
As in the case of the Committee of Heads of 
Administration, the Standing Committee of 
Secretaries-General was primarily concerned 
with the pension scheme, the 1974 general 
review and the proposed changes in the salary 
adjustment procedures. It also submitted to the 
Co-ordinating Committee a number of proposals 
for the exceptional review of salaries for staff 
serving in several member countries, in accord-
ance with agreed procedures. 
3. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts 
The Co-ordinating Committee of Govern-
ment Budget Experts, which met fifteen times 
in 1975, issued seventeen reports, Nos. 110-126, 
in the course of the year. 
Those which affected WEU were the follow-
ing: 
111th report :Exceptional review of salaries 
for staff serving in the United Kingdom and 
United States. (6.1 % cost-of-living increase for 
staff serving in the United Kingdom) 
114th report :Exceptional review of salaries 
for staff serving in France and Norway. (7.6% 
cost-of-living increase for staff serving in 
France) 
116th report: Annual review of rates of 
subsistence allowance for staff on mission. 
117th report : Exceptional review of salaries 
for staff serving in Japan and the United King-
dom. (5.9 % cost-of-living increase for staff 
serving in the United Kingdom) 
118th report: 1974 general review of salaries 
for B and C grade staffs of the co-ordinated 
organisations. 
122nd report: Exceptional review of salaries 
for staff serving in Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom. (8.6 % cost-of-living increase 
for staff serving in the United Kingdom) 
123rd report : 197 4 general review of 
salaries for A and L grade staffs of the co-
ordinated organisations. 
125th report : Annual review of salaries of 
all staff of the co-ordinated organisations. 
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126th 1·eport : Pension scheme - cost of 
validating past service. 
The main activities of the Co-ordinating 
Committee focused on the draft pension scheme 
rules and, among the principal problems which 
created difficulty were, first, the extent to which 
pensions should be taxed and, secondly, the 
amounts required from serving staff for the 
validation of past service in order to qualify for 
a pension. 
A solution to the taxation problem, which 
was the subject of the Co-ordinating Committee's 
1 09th report to Councils at the end of 197 4 (see 
twentieth annual report), lies broadly in the 
reimbursement of 50 % of tax paid by pensioners 
on their pensions. A centralised taxation unit, 
to deal with the taxation of pensions of staff of 
all the co-ordinated organisations, is likely to be 
set up. 
On the question of validation, the inability 
to reach agreement within the Co-ordinating 
Committee led to its issuing the !26th report 
which sought the aid of Councils in finding a 
solution (see !26th report above). 
It is to be hoped that this problem will be 
resolved early in 1976 to enable the Co-ordinat-
ing Committee to submit, for Councils' approval, 
the full texts of the draft pension rules. 
Other questions concerning pensions in 
which the Assembly has expressed interest, were 
answered by the Council in their replies to 
Recommendations 250 and 265. 
As indicated in the twentieth annual report, 
the proposals of the Secretaries-General for the 
1974 general review were limited to salary 
adjustments to take account of standard-of-
living trends between 1st October 1971 and 1st 
July 1974. No modifications or additions to the 
system of allowances were proposed. These 
proposals, subject to certain reductions, were 
approved by the Council in the course of 1975. 
The acceleration of inflation in several coun-
tries, resulting in frequently recurring excep-
tional reviews of staff remunerations to meet 
increases in cost of living, led the Co-ordinating 
Committee to re-examine the procedures adopted 
since 1971 for salary adjustments. To this end, 
the Committee decided to set up a special work-
ing group to study alternative procedures, 
covering exceptional, annual and general reviews. 
The working group was instructed to report its 
findings to the Co-ordinating Committee by 31st 
October, to enable the Committee to recommend 
to Councils new procedures which would take 
effect from 1st July 1976. Pending the introduc-
tion of these new procedures, exceptional reviews 
would be suspended as from 1st July 1975. 
The Co-ordinating Committee is currently 
studying the working group's report and is 
expected to make its recommendations to Coun-
cils early in 1976. 
F. WEU Staff Association 
The Secretariat-General has, at the request 
of the WEU Staff Association, brought to the 
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notice of governments, a number of points which 
are giving rise to serious preoccupation among 
the personnel. These concern the proposed rules 
for the taxation of pensions, the projected modi-
fication of salary adjustment procedures and 
in the case of non-resident staff, the particular 
difficulties facing them in meeting commitments 
in their own countries as a result of currency 
fluctuations. 
G. Secondment of national officials to 
international organisations 
See Chapter V, D. 
DOOUMENT 697 APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
Summary of WEU main budget for 1975 
A* B* C* Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ 481,305 4,850,790 10,609,960 15,460,750 
Travel ........................... 13,360 72,700 229,000 301,700 
Other operating costs ............. 61,605 270,925 396,620 667,545 
Purchase of furniture, etc. . ........ 3,210 13,500 18,300 31,800 
Buildings ......................... - - - -
ToTAL ExPEND~E .............. 559,480 5,207,915 11,253,880 16,461,795 
WEU tax ........................ 154,355 1,645,020 3,602,970 5,247,990 
Other receipts .................... 7,315 12,000 16,600 28,600 
TOTAL INOOME .................... 161,670 1,657,020 3,619,570 5,276,590 
NET TOTAL ....................... 397,810 3,550,895 7,634,310 11,185,205 
National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1976 
600ths 
Belgium ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
Germany ......................... - .. 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Netherlands .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
TOTAL ............................ 600 
*A Secretariat·General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
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£ F. frs. 
39,117.98 1,099,878.49 
79,562.00 2,237,041.00 
79,562.00 2,237,041.00 
79,562.00 2,237,041.00 
1,326.04 37,284.02 
39,117.98 1,099,878.49 
79,562.00 2,237,041.00 
397,810.00 11,185,205.00 
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Summary of WEU revised budget for 1975 
A* B* C* Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ + 17,430 + 162,663 + 417,281 + 579,944 
Travel ........................... - - - -
Other operating costs ............. + 4,900 - - -
Purchase of furniture, etc. ......... - - - -
Buildings ......................... - - - -
ToTAL ExPENDITURE .............. + 22,330 + 162,663 + 417,281 + 579,944 
WEU tax ........................ + 7,745 + 72,743 + 87,237 + 159,980 
Other receipts .................... - - - -
ToTAL INCOME .................... + 7,745 + 72,743 + 87,237 + 159,980 
NET ToTAL ....................... + 14,585 + 89,920 + 330,044 + 419,964 
National contributions called for under the WEU revised budget for 19'15 
600ths 
Belgium ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
Germany ............................ 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Netherlands .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
TOTAL ............................ 600 
* A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
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2° - I 
£ F. frs. 
1,434.19 41,296.46 
2,917.00 83,992.80 
2,917.00 83,992.80 
2,917.00 83,992.80 
48.62 1,399.88 
1,434.19 41,296.46 
2,917.00 83,992.80 
14,585.00 419,964.00 
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Summary of total WEU budget for 1975 
A* B* C* Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ 498,735 5,013,453 11,027,241 16,040,694 
Travel ........................... 13,360 72,700 229,000 301,700 
Other operating costs ............. 66,505 270,925 396,620 667,545 
Purchase of furniture, etc .......... 3,210 13,500 18,300 31,800 
Buildings ......................... - - - -
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .............. 581,810 5,370,578 11,671,161 17,041,739 
WEU tax ........................ 162,100 1,717,763 3,690,207 5,407,970 
Other receipts .................... 7,315 12,000 16,600 28,600 
TOTAL INCOME .................... 169,415 1,729,763 3,706,807 5,436,570 
NET ToTAL ....................... 412,395 3,640,815 7,964,354 11,605,169 
National contributions called for under the total WEU budget for 1976 
600ths 
Belgium ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
Germany ............................ 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Netherlands .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
ToTAL ............................ 600 
* A Secretaria.t.General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
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£ F. frs. 
40,552.17 1,141,174.95 
82,479.00 2,321,033.80 
82,479.00 2,321,033.80 
82,479.00 2,321,033.80 
1,374.66 38,683.90 
40,552.17 1,141,174.95 
82,479.00 2,321,033.80 
412,395.00 11,605,169.00 
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Summary of WEU draft main budget for 1976 
A* B* 
£ Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ 591,510 5,239,270 
Travel ........................... 15,245 72,700 
Other operating costs ............. 70,995 349,200 
Purchase of furniture, etc. . ........ 1,915 13,000 
Buildings .....................•... - -
ToTAL EXPENDITURE .............. 679,665 5,674,170 
WEU tax ........................ 192,635 1,771,220 
Other receipts .................... 3,750 21,200 
TOTAL INCOME .................... 196,385 1,792,420 
NET ToTAL ....................... 483,280 3,881,750 
* A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Annaments Committee. 
C Anna.ments Control Agency. 
43 
C* 
Frs. 
11,549,010 
297,400 
423,120 
20,800 
-
12,290,330 
3,925,820 
34,960 
3,960,780 
8,329,550 
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Total B + C 
Frs. 
16,788,280 
370,100 
772,320 
33,800 
-
17,964,500 
5,697,040 
56,160 
5,753,200 
12,211,300 
{_f;l. 
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Weber), Cermolacce, Fioret, Fletcher (Substitute: 
1. Adopted in Committee by 17 votes to 0 with 2 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Sieglerachmidt 
(Chairman); Sir John Rodgers (Substitute: Ohannon), 
Mr. Bettiol (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens (Substitute: 
Margue), Amrehn (Substitute : Alber), Sir Frederic 
Bennett, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon (Substitute: 
44 
Mendelson), Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute : de 
Bruyne), MM. Gra.ngier (Substitute: SOUBtelle), Leynen 
(Substitute: de Ste:x:he), Mende (Substitute: Mrs. Wolf), 
Minnocci, N esaler, de Niet, Peifnenburg, Peridier, Portheine, 
Preti (Substitute: Magliano), Quilleri (Substitute: Treu), 
Schmidt, Steel, Urwin (Substitute: Lewia), Van Hoeylandt. 
N.B. The names of Representatives who took part in the 
vote are printed in italiea. 
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Draft Resolution 
on European union and WEU 
The Assembly, 
Noting the decision by the nine member countries of the EEC to set up a European union by 1980 
and to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage as from 1978; 
Noting the report submitted by Mr. Leo Tindema.ns, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the members 
of the European Council in January 1976; 
Noting further that the modified Brussels Treaty is at present the only juridical basis for a European 
defence policy ; 
Considering that the development of the European union must not be an occasion for weakening 
the mutual commitments of the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Believing that continuing consultations between European countries on defence policy must be 
based on recognition of existing reciprocal obligations ; 
Recalling that the WEU Assembly, established under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
is responsible for supervising the application of that treaty ; 
Considering that this Assembly cannot therefore entertain the transfer of its activities to another 
parliamentary assembly unless the latter has the right and obligation to supervise the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, 
INVITES THE EUROPEAN CoUNOIL 
1. To make certain that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are respected in establishing 
the European union ; 
2. · Not to infringe the rights of any WEU body unless its full responsibilities have been transferred 
by treaty to a. body of the union ; 
3. To examine how to integrate WEU in the union rather than develop new institutions in fields in 
which WEU has legally-instituted responsibilities ; 
4. To maintain at all events a parliamentary assembly with statutory competence for all aspects of 
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Ever since its inception, the WEU .Assembly 
has kept a continuing watch on every aspect of 
the organisation of Europe. It received its 
mandate from the modified Brussels Treaty 
which provided for a joint defence policy 
between the seven member countries (Articles IV 
and V) and close co-operation in the economic 
field (Article I) and irn politicaL, cultural and 
social matters (Articles VIII, Ill and 11). How-
ever, as am.d when new forms of European co-
operation developed, particularly the European 
Economic Community, the WEU Council - and 
even the .Assembly in some cases - stopped 
dealing with matters which were discussed by 
all the mem.ber countries irn other frameworks. 
2. For instance, since the United Kingdom 
joined the European Community and nine-
power political consultations were introduced, 
WEU has stopped handling economic and social 
matters and the WEU Council., which now meets 
only rarely, has relinquished most of its political 
activities in favour of nine-power intergovern-
mental consultations. This in no way means that 
WEU has relinquished the responsibilities 
assigned to it by the modified Brussels Treaty, 
but only that it relies on others to exereise them. 
It should also be noted that the Assembly has 
continued, particularly in the political field, to 
consider a large number of matters not dealt 
with by the Council and that the latter has 
undertaken to report to it on the state of Euro-
pean co-operation in a1l fields relating to the 
modified Brussels Treaty, even if such co-
operation is conducted elsewhere. 
3. It is not therefore surprising that the WEU 
Assembly has followed most attentively all. the 
steps taken by member governments in recent 
years to organise a European union. European 
union has been on the agenda of all its sessions 
for several years and, on 11th September 1975, 
the Presidential Committee met between sessions 
and adopted Resolution 55 which conveyed the 
Assembly's opinion to Mr. Leo Tindema;ns, Prime 
Minister of Belgium, responsible for submitting 
a report on the prospects of European union to 
the nine governments. Mr. Edmond Nessler, 
President of the Assembly, personally ha-nded 
this resolution to Mr. Tindemans and thus had 
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am. opportunity of explaining the Assembly's 
views on matters of concern to it before the 
Minister submitted his report to the European 
Council at the beginning of 1976. Resolution 55 
specifically urged Mr. Tindemans: 
"To facilitate the exereise by the WEU 
Assembly of its responsibilities :iJn the 
defence field by recommending that the 
European Council seek its opinion on any 
plans it may draw up for the defence of 
Europe." 
4. Mr. Tindemans' report has now been 
published, and your Rapporteur's aim is to 
study its implications for WEU. 
D. The Tindemans report and prospects of 
European union 
5. Mr. Tindemans' report appears to have two 
aims. The first, implicit throughout the text, 
is to pave the way for the constitution of a 
federal-type Europe :iJn the not too distant 
future. This overa;ll goal emerges :iJn at least 
three connections. 
( i) The report imposes no limits on the respon-
sibilities which it proposes governments should 
accord to the European Parliament. 
( ii) The report proposes that henceforth only 
the President of the European Communities be 
appointed by the Council, i.e. by the represen-
tatives of member States. The President of the 
Commission would then be invested by the Euro-
pean Parliament and would himself form the 
rest of the CoiiUDdarlon :iJn accordance with a 
procedure which would make him a real Euro-
pean Head of Government. 
( iii) The report proposed including at a very 
early da;te among the responsibilities of the 
European union matters not assigned to it by 
international treaty - defence, for instance, 
which is of prime interest to WEU and its 
Assembly. 
6. It must be borne in mind that Mr. Tinde-
ma;ns' report does not aim even in part at draw-
ing up the charter of the futme Europe and 
the author says so in the covering letter, but 
merely at making a series of proposals for con-
sideration by the nine governments in respect of 
decisions to be taken fairly soon. In the letter 
communicating his report to his colleagues on 
the European Council, Mr. Tindemans invites 
them to discuss all the matters touched upon in 
his report. 
7. Moreover, it is clear that Mr. Tindemans 
wished to be realistic and avoid proposing any-
thing which governments would find unaccept-
able now or in the fairly near future. Thus it 
is confirmed that the Council still carries greater 
weight than the Commission, although subse-
quently the balance may swing more in the 
Commission's favour. Again, in cases of absolute 
necessity, in the monetary field for instance, the 
report makes provision for individual countries 
to be allowed to delay application of principles 
defined for the Community as a whole. But 
since such countries are required to take part 
in Community deliberations, if not decisions, on 
matters concerning which they have reserved 
their rights, their position would be considered 
exceptional and provisional and consequently it 
would be taken that they had adhered to the 
principles although deferring their application. 
8. But Mr. Tindemans' proposals about the 
future European union are far from exhaustive. 
Inter alia, they leave it to the Council. to define 
Europe's policy in at least three fields left open 
i:n the report : 
9. (i) Quite understandably, the report does 
not specify the juridical form of the European 
union. This leaves the Community free to 
develop outside international treaties. It will be 
recalled that General de Gaulle based his action 
in the European Community on the treaties in 
order to oppose activities extending beyond the 
treaty commitments and this to some extent 
paralysed and disorganised the European Com-
munity. The union foreseen by Mr. Tindemans 
would not evade such risks, France not being 
the only country with reservations about a 
federal trend in the Community. At the moment, 
for instance, it is an open secret that the United 
Kingdom has major reservations in economic 
and monetary matters and the Netherlands in 
defence. 
10. (ii) Mr. Tindemans mainly indicates where 
institutional progress may be made bUJt does not 
- nor was it his task moreover - say what 
Community policy might be. This is particularly 
clear in passages on Europe's relations with the 
United States and defence policy. This approach 
has the great advantage of allowing pM'liamenrts 
to give their opinions before governments are 
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committed to final, set positions, leaving it in 
the long run to the European Council to give 
substance to the machinery thus created. 
11. Tactically, this way of looking at things 
can be of great value since it allows States, or 
even parties, to accept progress towards a federal 
Europe without first adopting a position on the 
principles which they have to explain to theiT 
own public opinion. A risk with this method, 
however, is that difficulties and differences may 
be kept in store for the future European union. 
Finally, the outcome could be just the opposite 
of what was intended, i.e. certain countries or 
parties might a priori accuse the European union 
of encouraging what they do not want. This 
danger is now taking shape in the attitude 
adopted by certain political forces in several 
European countries. 
12. ( iii) The report does not place the Euro-
pean union in its relations with the United 
States. Although it proposes that the European 
countries be represented by one person or body 
when negotiating with the United States, this 
is not enough to solve the problems raised by 
such relations. Thus to advocate a European 
defence policy is unavailing if nothing is said 
about what it could be in relation to NATO. 
Similarly, to envisage monetary union calls for 
an explanation of how it can become more than 
a mere extension of the present monetary policies 
of European States, which make Europe 
dependent on the dollar area, in other words 
a sector where monetary stability or instabi.Jity 
is still governed by the ups and downs of Amer-
ican domestic policy. 
Ill. European union and defence problems 
13. A brief sketch of Mr. Tindemans' report 
had to be drawn in order to bring out the 
significance of the passages dealing more speci-
fically with defence questions and WEU. 
14. Mr. Tindemans recognises that it is impos-
sible at present to advance resolutely towards 
a European defence policy in view of the very 
different positions adopted by the European 
Community countries. At the same time, he has 
tried to indicate what progress he feels could 
be achieved now, however limited it may be. 
15. There are several reasons for thinking that 
Europe is still far from being able to define a 
joint defence policy. 
16. (i) France and the United Kingdom are 
nuclear powers and, as matters now stand, intend 
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to keep their nuclear weapons and probably, in 
the case of France at least, exclusive control of 
them. Conversely, the Netherlands Government 
has frequently stated that it would not agree 
to European defence including nuclear weapons. 
On 22nd January 1976, for instance, Mr. Vrede-
ling, Netherlands Minister of Defence, told the 
Second Chamber of the States-General in The 
Hague, when commenting on Mr. Tindemans' 
report: 
"The trend is towards a European union 
and some form of defence co-operation is 
desirable, but it is complicated by the fact 
that France and Britain are nuclear powers. 
The Netherlands view is and remains that, 
in the framework of closer European co-
operation, unacceptable developments in the 
nuclear field must be rejected." 
17. But it is fundamental for any European 
defence policy to know whether it can be based 
on the use of nuclear weapons straight away 
by some European countries and perhaps later 
by a European organisation. But at the present 
juncture the European Council seems to be in 
no position to give the matter serious consi-
deration. 
18. ( ii) It should be recalled that eight of the 
EEC member countries are members of the 
Atlantic Alliance, but not Ireland. Furthermore, 
seven of them are members of WEU, but not 
Ireland and Denmark. Seven are also members 
of NATO, but although Denmark is a member, 
France is not, nor, of course, Ireland. This means 
that defence commitments entered into by the 
Nine are very unequal and different, and they 
have a very low common denominator. There is 
no reason to think that Ireland is about to aban-
don its policy of non-alignment. The <kneral 
Affairs Committee completed a recent visit to 
Denmark with the impression that the Danish 
Government had absolutely no intention of join-
ing WEU. Finally, although France co-operates 
with NATO in a number of fields iJt appears 
unlikely to return to NATO, at least for some 
time. 
19. ( iii) Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty contains a mutual assistance clause which 
is infinitely more binding thoo that contained 
in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: 
whereas signatories of the latter 'agree only to 
take "such action as it deems necessary" in the 
event of an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe, the Brussels Treaty on the 
contrary makes it binding upon the members 
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of WEU to afford "all the military and other 
aid and assistance in their power" - and thus 
where appropriate by nuclear means for the 
countries so able - should any of them be the 
object of an armed attack. It should be added 
that in the case of the Atlantic Pact this action 
is to be taken "in concert with the other parties", 
which implies a unanimous decision, whereas 
under the Brussels Treaty it is automatic. 
20. Conversely, although not set out in a treaty, 
NATO military integration is a de facto com-
mitment by the member countries to take joint 
action in the event of war in Europe. The result 
is that, apart from Ireland, the Community coun-
tries are in fact committed to a policy of joint 
defence, although France and Denmark do not 
have the same obligations. Europe's defence is 
therefore ensured only by the coexistence of the 
Atlantic Pact, the NATO integrated military 
structure and WEU. The disappearance of one 
of these elements might dislocate or at least 
seriously weaken the whole defence system to 
which Europe owes twenty-five years of peace. 
21 (iv) Mr. Tindemans' proposals for a Euro-
pean armaments agency in the framework of the 
Nine and increased consultations on defence and 
foreign policy in the same framework, meet an 
oft-repeated wish of the WEU Assembly. For 
instance, on 30th November 1971, the Assembly 
adopted Recommendation 211, SU!bmitted by Lord 
Gladwyn on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, urging the WEU Council to : 
"Make a real effort to set up a Western 
European armaments agency, involving 
standardisation of European armaments, 
designed to produce a more efficient defence 
for the same, or even at reduced cost, thus 
establishing Western Europe as a valid 
'partner' of the United States in a continu-
ing Atlantic Alliance." 
22. Again, on 28th May 1975 it adopted Recom-
mendation 270, submitted by Mr. Krieg on behalf 
of the same Committee, asking the Council to : 
"Propose that a future meeting of the Euro-
pean Council study the requirements of a 
European defence policy in the framework 
of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
With this conference in view, ask member 
governments to make the necessary prepar-
atory studies now." 
23. Moreover, when Mr. Tindemans proposes to 
make the European Parliament responsible for 
considering matters relating to European defence 
he takes as a basis the de facto solidarity bet-
ween the Nine in the security field. 
24. At the present stage, however, great care 
sholrld be taken to ensure that action taken in 
the name of the future European union does 
not lead to machinery being introduced for con-
sultations which are no longer linked with 
obligations. First, progress towards a European 
union must not be merely institutional but a 
real move towards joint political action. It is 
above all essential that the European union 
should not fall short of what already exists in 
Europe. If machinery for co~tation does not 
involve positive commitments, it is highly 
probable that, in view of the widely-differing 
approaches to defence matters among the Nine, 
any joint decision might be blocked at any time 
the moment one of them failed to agree with 
certain implications of the joint defence policy. 
What recourse would then be possible ? Pro-
vision would obviously have to be made for the 
special case of Ireland, but it is not easy to see 
how the Netherlands, with its defence policy, 
could do other than refuse systematically any 
European initiative in the nuclear field. Like-
wise France might oppose a.ny organisation of 
conventional defence if it were to be more closely 
linked with NATO. Hence the WED Assembly 
has always emphasised that the modified Brus-
sels Treaty is the soundest basis for a European 
defence policy. As soon as the idea of a Euro-
pean union was mooted, the Assembly adopted 
Recommendation 226 on a report by Mr. Scott-
Hopkins, asking the Council to : 
"Examine how best to organise the defence 
of Western Europe within the Atlantic 
Alliance using WED as the nucleus of such 
an organisation in the context of the Euro-
pean union foreseen for 1980 in the com-
munique of 22nd October 1972." 
25. ( v) Mr. Tindemans' report does not men-
tion the Standing Armaments Committee but 
advocates the creation of a European armaments ' 
agency. If formed in the framework of the EEC 
this would have the advantage of associating 
Ireland and Denmark with the seven member 
countries of the SAC, but the armaments pro-
duction of these two countries does not justify 
replacing the SAC by a European agency. 
26. The problem is therefore to determine what 
this .European agency will be, its position in 
relation to the SAC on the one hand and Euro-
group and the European programme group on 
the other. Mention should be made here of the 
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attempts by several WED member countries 
since 1973 to reactivate the SAC. After the 
ambitious but vaguely-defined proposals by 
Mr. Jobert in December 1973, Mr. Van Elslande 
proposed to the Assembly in December 1974 
that the study of possibilities for European co-
operation in the field of armaments production 
be taken over by the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee. Inter alia, he said: 
"The industrial problem, and that of exports 
which is closely bound up with it, are by 
far the most vast and most delicate. I 
believe that WED could devote itself to 
the study of these questions, to which insuf-
ficient attention has hitherto been paid. 
WED includes the chief European pro-
ducers. The first step must be a thorough 
study of the structures of the military 
sectors in the economy of each country. We 
must also ascertain what is their relative 
importance, what forms of specialisation are 
possible and what can be done about the 
pooling and financing of research activities. 
Finally, we must determine the best ways 
towards progressive integration, taking 
account of existing financial structures and 
of alliances which may constitute an advan-
tage or a disadvantage, depending on cir-
cumstances." 
27. The rather vague information since supplied 
by the WED Council gives the impression that 
no real progress has been made in this field, 
although it has never been officially stated that 
the study has been abandoned. But perhaps the 
proposals made by Eurogroup at the end of 1975 
imply that efforts in the framework of WED 
have failed. 
28. Admittedly the Standing Annaments Com-
mittee was not established by the modified Brus-
sels Treaty itself but by a decision of the WED 
Council of 7th May 1955 which can be renounced 
without modifying the treaty. 
29. However, there seems no reason to believe 
that the stumbling-block now impeding the work 
of the Standing Armaments Committee, i.e. 
governmental reluctance to overcome economic 
and technical obstacles to standardisation and 
particularly the joint production of armaments 
by the seven WED countries, would not still 
exist for a European agency if the latter were 
not based on commitments similar to those 
entered into by the WED countries. On the con-
trary, Resolution 55 of the WED Assembly urged 
Mr. Tindemans: 
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"When considering defence, to take account 
of the fundamental provisions of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty and its Protocols, i.e. : 
- the existence of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee which is in a position 
to make a major contribution to the 
preparation of a joint European policy 
in the field of armaments and equip-
ment and thus to pave the way for the 
creation of a 'European arms agency'." 
IV. European union and the WEU Assembly 
30. On page 52 of the English version of 
Mr. Tindemans' report, a footnote reads: 
"The extension of the competences of the 
European union and consequently those of 
the European Parliament to matters hither-
to discussed in the Assembly of Western 
European Union leads one to question the 
need to maintain the activity of the par-
liamentary institution of the WEU." 
31. It would therefore seem that Mr. Tindemans 
is proposing that the WEU Assembly should be 
wound up as soon as possible and its respon-
sibilities transferred to the European Parlia-
ment. 
32. Closer scrutiny of this text, however, shows 
that the existence of the WEU Assembly could 
be called in question only after "the compe-
tences" of the European union have been 
extended. But the competences of the WEU 
Assembly are governed by Article IX of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. The treaty would have 
to be revised for them to be transferred to ano-
ther organisation. It must therefore be recog-
nised that Mr. Tindemans proposes winding up 
the WEU Assembly only in the event of the 
European Council having actually taken over 
all the responsibilities assigned to WEU in the 
Brussels Treaty, i.e. when there is no 1onger 
any reason for the Council to report on its work 
to two different assemblies depending on whe-
ther it concerns economic or defence matters. 
33. Were he to propose that the modified Brus-
sels Treaty no longer be applied, it would be 
tootamount to admitting that any of the com-
mitments it contains could be considered a dead 
letter. Such a point of view would be very 
dangerous since it might aJso apply to the limita-
tion and control of armaments and to the Bri-
tish commitment to maintain the Rhine army, 
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or even to Article V, which is France's main 
defence commitment towards its European 
partners. Furthermore, to revise the Brussels 
Treaty would open the door to negotiations 
which might cover all these matters, provide one 
or other country with an opportunity of with-
drawing from its commitments and thus disturb 
the comp:lex balance of commitments on which 
the treaty as a whole is based. If the treaty 
were now to be renegotiated it is not at all 
certain that the Seven would again accept the 
commitments they were willing to accept in 1954, 
although there seems to be no strong call to 
change them. 
34. It must therefore be ensured that through 
WEU, or merely through its Assembly, the 
whole Brussels Treaty mechanism is not com-
promised by Community bodies assuming, with-
out formal transfer, the responsibilities exer-
cised by WEU. This in no way means that WEU 
must, in the long term at least, remain outside 
the European union. Quite the contrary, the 
integration of WEU as a whole by merging the 
Brussels and Rome Treaties in the European 
union would allow the defence side of the union 
to be developed without detracting from what has 
already been achieved by the Brussels Treaty 
and the organisation built around it. Then, and 
in the framework of a merger of the treaties, 
the Assembly's fate might be re-examined. 
35. This was the Assembly's view on 2nd 
December 1975 when it adopted Recommenda-
tion 273, submitted by Mr. Leynen on behalf 
of the General Affairs Committee, asking that 
the Council : 
"Implement in the framework of its respon-
sibilities the principles defined in Resolu-
tion 55 of the Assembly, and in particular : 
(a) ensure that all the provisions of the 
modified Brussels Treaty are applied 
in full until such time as the European 
union has the necessary powers and 
means of action to exercise defence res-
ponsibilities ; 
(b) maintain all its activities as long as 
they have not been attributed by treaty 
to the institutions of the union." 
36. Where the Assembly is more specifically 
concerned, several solutions might be envisaged : 
one might be for the Assembly to be composed 
of the representatives of the member countries 
to the European Parliament and no longer the 
Council of Europe so that it might continue to 
play, in the framework of the European union, 
the role assigned to it by the Brussels Treaty. 
The election of the European Parliament by 
direct universal suffrage, planned for 1978, 
might then be considered as a starting point for 
extending the powers of the parliament to include 
the responsibilities of the WEU Assembly, in 
the framework of a merger of the treaties. 
37. However, your Rapporteur is rather 
cautious towards this prospect : the defence res-
ponsibilities which Mr. Tindemans' report fore-
saw for the future European union are inevitably 
conservative and clea:rtly for a long time to come 
all major decisions in this field will be taken 
by the governments whose normal partners will 
continue to be the national parliaments. On the 
other hand, an assembly elected by direct uni-
versal suffrage, which would consequently no 
longer represent these parliaments, would carry 
little authority vis-a-vis the governments if its 
opposite number is the European Commission 
which has no responsibilities in defence matters. 
Elected by universal suffrage, the European 
Parliament could be an excellent parliamentary 
partner for the union's executive in fields in 
which the union has effective responsibilities but 
not where true power lies with the government. 
The great merit of the WEU Assembly in its 
twenty-one years of existence has probably been 
to accustom parliamentarians from the member 
countries to consider defence problems from a 
European standpoint. Electing the European 
Parliament by universal suffrage will not allow 
it to fulfil this task, and your Rapporteur is 
convinced that at the present juncture it would 
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be preferable for the WEU Assembly to remain 
unchanged and for the Council to continue to 
report to it on the implementation of the Brus-
sels Treaty, even in fields where its respons-
ibilities are exercised by other organisations. 
V. Conclusions 
38. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that 
the ambiguity arising from the note on the WEU 
Assembly in Mr. Tindemans' report must be 
dispelled. The Assembly should adopt a position 
on this essential matter before the European 
ColiDcil discusses Mr. Tindemans' report in 
detail and communicate its opinion to the mem-
bers of the European Council as soon as possible. 
39. In accordance with the arrangements made 
by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly, 
he therefore proposes that, without waiting until 
the next session, the Presidential Committee 
meet to adopt a resolution which the President 
might submit to members of the European Coun-
cil as previously in the case of Resolution 55. 
The purpose of this approach would be to recall 
how essential the modified Brussels Treaty is 
for the European union. At the same time, it 
would be a warning concerning any institutional 
procedure destined to simplify and rationalise 
the organisation of the European union, which 
might in the long run weaken the defence com-
mitments of the member countries, it being 
undeniable that the various elements of the 
modified Brussels Treaty cannot be taken 
separately, nor can WEU be split away from 
the treaty which created it. 
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The Assembly, 
European union and WEU 
RESOLUTION 59 
adopted by the Presidential Committee 
on 1st March 1976 1 
1st March 1976 
Noting the decision by the nine member countries of the EEC to set up a. European union by 1980 
a.nd to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage as from 1978; 
Noting the report submitted by Mr. Leo Tindema.ns, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the members 
of the European Council in Ja.nua.ry 1976; 
Noting further tha.t the modified Brussels Treaty is a.t present the only juridica.l basis for a. European 
defence policy ; 
Considering that the development of the European union must not be an occasion for weakening 
the mutual commitments of the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Believing that continuing consultations between European countries on defence policy must be 
ba.sed on recognition of existing reciprocal obligations ; 
Reca.lling that the WEU Assembly, established under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
is responsible for supervising the a.pplica.tion of that treaty ; 
Considering tha.t this Assembly ca.nnot therefore entertain the transfer of its activities to another 
parliamentary assembly unless the latter has the right and obligation to supervise the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, 
INVITES THE EUBOl'EAN COUNCIL 
1. To make certain that a.ll the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are respected in establishing 
the European union ; 
2. Not to infringe the rights of a.ny WEU body unless its full responsibilities have been transferred 
by treaty to a. body of the union ; 
3. To examine how to integrate WEU in the union rather than develop new institutions in fields in 
which WEU has legally-instituted responsibilities; 
4. To maintain a.t a.ll events a. parliamentary assembly with statutory competence for all a.spects of 
the applica.tion of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. In accordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the .Assembly. 
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Application of the Brussels Treaty 
Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Cowacil 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
7th April 1976 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty- reply to the twenty-first annual 
report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY :MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
Report of the Council 
Chapter I : Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
Chapter 11 : Activities of the Council 
Chapter Ill : Armaments Control Agency 
Chapter IV : Standing Armaments Committee 
Conclusions 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Member8 of the Committee: Mr. Oritchley (Chairman) ; 
MM. Klepsch (Substitute : .AZber), Dankert (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Avera.rdi, Beauguitte (Substitute: 
Delorme), Bizet, Boulloche, Buck, Haa~e, Hardy (Substi-
tute: Sir Hanoood. Harri8on), Kempinaire, Konen, de 
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Koster (Substitute : Piket), Lo.forgia, Lemmrich, Mena.rd, 
Pawelczyk (Substitute : Ender8), Faulds, Pumilia, Reale, 
Richter (Substitute : Schwencke), Rivi6re, Roper, Scholten, 
Schugens (Substitute: Breyne), Ta.nghe, Vedovato. 
N. B. The name8 of Repruentativu who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council 
Welcoming the continued prompt action by the Council which enabled the twenty-first annual report 
to be communicated by 4th March ; 
Believing that when the mutual defence obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty are effectively 
incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling all its external defence and foreign policy, only 
then will the time have come to abrogate the arms control provisions of the treaty; 
Again congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried 
out in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too-limited tasks assigned to it by the Council, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Apply each year the Secretary-General's new procedure for the prompt communication of the 
annual report ; 
2. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty until such time as the mutual defence under-
takings are effectively incorporated in a treaty of European union, and meanwhile that it : 
(i) Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited ; 
( ii) Include in the conclusions of the arms control chapter of the annual report a full and clear 
statement of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are 
not fully applied as it did in earlier years ; 
(iii) Continue to press for the entry into force of the convention for the due process of law 
signed on 14th December 1957; 
3. Report to the Assembly on the -rflle it envisages for the independent programme group. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The twenty-first annual report of the 
Council, covering the year 1975, follows a now 
familiar set pattern. The activities of WEU 
having changed little for a number of years, 
except for a reduction in the necessary level of 
consultation in the Council which followed ihe 
accession of the United Kingdom to the European 
Community in 1973, it follows that the Commit-
tee's present report in reply, while welcoming 
the general trend towards greater European and 
Atlantic cohesion in other frameworks, repeats 
many of the reservations expressed in previous 
years. 
2. The Committee again notes with satisfaction 
however that the new administrative arrange-
ments introduced by the Secretary-General 
enabled the present report of the Council to 
be communicated to the Assembly in good time, 
the last part having reached the Office of the 
Clerk on 4th March. Committees have thus been 
able to take full account of the report in pre-
paring their own reports to the Assembly for the 
first part of the present session. 
Annual report of the Council 
CHAPTER I 
Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
3. The Committee notes with satisfaction the 
Council's continued undertaking, in connection 
with its replies to recommendations and 
questions, "to give the Assembly full and 
substantial replies reflecting the common posi-
tions of the seven member governments, even if 
they sometimes related to matters dealt with 
primarily by other organisations." While it is a 
matter of regret that a common position does not 
always exist, the Committee stresses the import-
ance of substantive replies from the Council on 
defence matters which the Council by its 1950 
decision transferred to NATO for implementa-
tion. 
4. The reasoned reply to Recommendation 283 
concerning air forces on the central front states 
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the position of "the member countries of the 
Council of WEU which participate in the NATO 
integrated system" and the Committee welcomes 
the Council's willingness to report on mutual 
defence arrangements implemented in the NATO 
framework. This reply demonstrates the validity 
of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty 
which provides that the member countries "shall 
work in close co-operation with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation". 
5. While the Committee draws satisfaction 
from the reasoned replies received to recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly on the 
proposal of the Committee, some of which are 
mentioned below, the Committee points out that 
at the time the present report was adopted, 
replies had not been received to Recommenda-
tions 278 (developments in the Iberian peninsula 
and the Atlantic Alliance) and 281 (European 
and Atlantic co-operation in the field of arma-
ments). 
6. The Committee held no joint meeting with 
the Council in 1975, but has requested that such 
a meeting be held before the first part of the 
1976 session of the Assembly. 
CHAPTER II 
Activities of the Council 
7. As in 197 4, the Council met only once at 
ministerial level in 1975, devoting most of its 
discussion to East-West relations. This reduced 
level of ministerial activity reflects the increas-
ing effectiveness of political concertation in the 
framework of the Nine and the North Atlantic 
Council in both of which all members of WEU 
participate. 
8. The Committee can only welcome this 
continuing trend in itself, provided that the 
credibility of the mutual defence commitment 
enshrined in Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty is not eroded. The Committee is therefore 
glad to note that the Council "will continue to 
be responsible for ensuring the application of 
the Brussels Treaty" 1• Meetings of the permanent 
1. Annual report of the Council, Chapter II, third 
paragraph. 
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council, at the level of ambassadors, numbered 
thirteen in 1975 and sufficed to deal with 
remaining business covering largely replies to 
the Assembly, and the force level and arms 
control functions mentioned below. 
Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 
9. The full statement of th~ Council's position 
concerning Cyprus, in reply to reports emanating 
from the Committee, reflects the unanimity of 
the views of the Council and Assembly and 
recalls the Council's concern for the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of the 
Republic of Cyprus. 
Defence questions 
10. The Council having transferred to NATO in 
1950 everyday responsibility for implementing 
the mutual defence obligations of the Brussels 
Treaty, a decision subsequently enshrined in 
Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty in 
1954, the Council in its second annual report 1 
defined the scope of its residual defence and 
related activities : The seven governments 
considered that the activities of the Council in 
the field of defence questions and armaments 
should relate only to : 
" (a) matters which the contracting parties 
wish to raise, especially under Article 
VIII; 
(b) the level of forces of member States ; 
(c) the maintenance of certain United 
Kingdom forces on the continent ; 
(d) the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments; 
(e) the Standing Armaments Committee." 
11. As far as the Committee is aware, no member 
State has ever, so far, chosen to raise mattel'8 
under Article VIII of the treaty (" ... any situa-
tion which may constitute a threat to peace, in 
whatever area this threat should arise, ... ") so that 
the effective activities of the Council in the field 
of defence now relate to items (b) to (e) above. 
Items (d) and (e) are dealt with separately in 
Chapters Ill and IV of the annual report, 
discussed below. 
Levels of forces of member States 
12. Under Protocol No. 11 of the Brussels 
Treaty, the Council has important functions 
1. Document 37, 26th February 1957. 
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concerning the determination of the levels of 
forces to be maintained by member countries. 
The Committee notes that the Council continues 
to report fully on its procedures which were 
applied during the year under review. This 
information has been incorporated in response 
to Written Questions 130 and 141 and Recom-
mendation 247 of the .Aa:lembly. 
13. Under Protocol No. 11, the United Kingdom 
undertook to maintain specified levels of forces 
on the continent. In response to Written Question 
122 t, the Council stated that : 
"... The level of British forces on the main-
land of Europe approved by the Council is 
therefore once more (subject to the temporary 
redeployment referred to above) 55,000 men 
plus the Second Tactical Air Force." 
In response to Recommendation 213 2, the United 
Kingdom undertook to state in the annual report 
each year the current actual level of British 
forces on the continent. The Committee notes 
that the level duly reported at 30th November 
1975 amounted to 60,066 men plus the Second 
Tactical Air Force- a level virtually unchanged 
from that reported for the previous year. Accord-
ing to the United Kingdom Defence White 
Papers 3, the average level of BAOR in the year 
reviewed in the Council's report was to be only 
54,900. With the Berlin garrison of 3,000 the 
total would still be only 57,900. The correspond-
ing figures for 1976-77 are 54,700 and 57,800. 
14. While the Committee is satisfied that the 
present undertaking (55,000) is being respected 
in these years, the Rapporteur has called for an 
explanation of the discrepancy in Written 
Question 170. 
Amendments to the list of prohibited weapons 
15. On some twelve occasions since the conclusion 
of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954, the 
Council has amended the list at Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill which specifies the weapons 
which the Federal Republic of Germany under-
takes not to manufacture on its territory. No 
amendments to this list have been reported by 
the Council during 1975, the year covered by the 
annual report. 
1. Put by Mr. Vedovato on 13th April 1971. 
2. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1971, 
on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Document 558, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato. 
3. Statement on defence estimates 1975 and 1976. 
16. The last amendment to this list, made by 
the Council on 26th September 1973, raised the 
tonnage of submarines which Germany is author-
ised to manufacture on its territory from 450 
to 1,800 tons. Under the previous limit, Germany 
had also been authorised to manufacture up to 
six submarines not exceeding 1,000 tons, and 
this quota of six submarines had subsequently 
been exported - four to Greece and two to 
Turkey - as the Committee has previously 
reported 1 • 
17. It is not clear whether the 1973 amendment 
was made to permit the export of submarines by 
Germany, rather than to meet the requirements 
of the German armed forces assigned to NATO 2• 
Written questions - the Montreux Convention 
18. The Committee regrets that the Council did 
not take a firmer stand on a correct interpreta-
tion of the Montreux Convention which would 
prevent the passage of Soviet aircraft carriers 
from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The 
first of these carriers, the Kiev, is expected to 
be operational in 1976 8• 
CHAPTER III 
Armaments Control Agency 
19. The Assembly has always stressed the 
importance of the application of the arms control 
provisions of the Brussels Treaty. Article IX of 
that treaty makes it clear, in fact, that the chief 
reason why the Assembly was set up was precisely 
to watch over the way in which the Council 
carried out its responsibilities in this respect. The 
provisions of the treaty concerning the control 
of weapons have been summarised on numerous 
occasions, most recently by the Oommittee in 
an earlier report 4• In Recommendation 247, 
adopted on 18th June 1974, the Assembly called 
on the Council to "include in its annual reports a 
prominent, full and clear statement of all aspects 
of the arms control provisions of the Brussels 
1. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 
638, paragraph 11, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe. 
2. See in particular Written Question 139 and reply. 
3. See the previous report, Document 673, paragraph 22. 
4. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 
638, paragraph 15 et aeq., Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe. 
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Treaty which are not fully applied ... " The fol-
lowing statements are to be found in various 
parts of Chapter III of the annual report now 
under review : 
"In present circumstances, the Agency's 
activities do not extend to atomic weapons 
or, in one member State, to what that State 
calls 'strategic forces'. 
Nor does the Agency apply any controls 
to biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter therefore concern other armaments. 
It is further recalled that only non-
production controls are so far applied to 
chemical weapons. 
(c) As the Convention for the due process 
of 1aw 1 has not yet entered into force, the 
control measures carried out by the Agency 
at private concerns had, in 1975, as in 
previous years, to take the form of 'agreed 
control measures'. 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the 
firms concerned, the Agency must give some 
six weeks' notice. This agreement has never 
been withheld." 
20. The serious situation arising from the con-
vention not having come into force is made clear 
by more ample information contained in previous 
annual reports but omitted from the present 
report. Thus the eighteenth report for 1972 
(Document 598) states, in Chapter III, Section 
D, that: 
"In the absence of a due process of law, it 
cannot be claimed that the Agency's methods, 
particularly in the case of chemical weapons, 
have reached a fully satisfactory state of 
development." 
and earlier reports that "one of the principal 
reasons for this situation [non-application of 
1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member States of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry 
out its control effectively and making provision for due 
process of law in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the 
Brussels Treaty as modified by the Protocols signed at 
Paris on 23rd October 1954. The Convention has been 
ratified by only six of the seven: Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. 
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controls on biological weapons] is the -absence 
of any legal guarantees to protect private inter-
ests". 
21. In connection with the non-production of 
chemical weapons, the report now under review 
states that "the supplementary procedure 
designed to increase the effectiveness of the 
Agency's action, which has been tried out since 
1973, was again applied successfully ;n 1975", 
but it is clear that the improvement does not 
compensate for the absence of the proper control 
powers embodied in the convention. 
22. The present report of the Council omits the 
statement of earlier years concerning the deter-
mination by the Council of the appropriate levels 
of armaments for the forces of the WEF coun-
tries: 
"... the term 'armaments', whenever used 
with reference to levels in this report, should 
be understood to mean : 
- armaments declared by the member 
States as being held by their forces on 
the mainland of Europe, with the excep-
tion of armaments with nuclear capa-
bility and of the armaments of what 
one member State calls strategic forces, 
that is to say, the armaments over which 
the Agency has so far been enabled to 
exercise its mandate of controlling 
levels." 
23. Mr. Zamberletti put Written Question 131 
to the Council on 16th April 1973, asking which 
categories of armaments were covered by the 
expression "the armaments of what one member 
State calls 'strategic forces' ". The Council replied 
on 14th June 1973 that "the Armaments Control 
Agency has no knowledge of the categories of 
armaments included in the expression 'strategic 
forces' ... The Agency is, therefore, unable to 
report on them in any way to the Council". It 
is thus clear that the Council itself is unaware 
of the categories of armaments over which it 
declares itself unable to exercise control by 
virtue of the foregoing comment. The Com-
mittee is aware that the FreilJCh tactical nuclear 
surface-to-surface missile "Pluton" became oper-
ational on 1st May 1974 and that on 24th 
January 1976 French ballistic missile submarines 
were equipped for the first time with thermo-
nuclear warheads. 
24. The Council's report concludes with com-
placency: 
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"In 1975, the Agency again applied controls 
effectively in those fields which are open 
to it." 
25. The Committee last year found the Coun-
cil's complacency over the failure to apply the 
arms controls provisions particularly dangerous 
for two reasons : 
(a) Application of the arms control provi-
sions remains one of the very few activ-
ities left to the Council in the defence 
field. The Council has recently reiterated 
the importance of the defence provisions 
of the Brussels Treaty... These will 
inevitably lose credibility if the Council 
is unable to take action under the 
treaty. 
(b) If the member countries of WEU are 
unable to apply among themselves those 
arms control measures on which they 
were agreed in 1954, there is little or no 
hope of reaching agreement on serious 
arms control in an East-West context 
such as SALT, MBFR, and the confi-
dence-building measures associated with 
CSCE, or in a world-wide context such 
as the non-proliferation treaty. 
Activities of the Agency 
26. The Committee's criticism of the Council 
is in no way to be construed as criticism of the 
Agency, which has continued to carry out its 
task efficiently in difficult circumstances. 
27. It may be said that controls are applied in 
respect of conventional weapons on the mainland 
of Europe (including aircraft) and various missile 
systems capable of carrying nuclear bombs and 
warheads - although, of course, the warheads 
concerned remain in United States' custody and 
are not subject to control by the Agency. The 
Council confirmed the situation in reply to 
Written Question 142, put by Mr. Tanghe on 
27th May 1974: 
"(a) Is it correct that the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments carried out inspec-
tions of certain of these missiles [i.e. mis-
siles with a nuclear capacity], as well as 
tactical aircraft with a possible nuclear 
capability ? " 
The Council replied : 
"(a) It is correct that the Armaments Con-
trol Agency carried out both documentary 
and field controls on sections of missiles 
and on aircraft covered by the terms of 
Protocol No. III, Annex IV, 2, 3, 4 and 11." 
Statement of the number of inspections 
28. Annual reports of the Council up to and 
including the eleventh, covering the year 1965, 
gave details of the number of inspections carried 
out by the Agency. Those reported for the years 
1961-65 inclusive are summarised in the follow-
ing table: 
Numbers and types of inspections 
carried out by the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments 
(from the corresponding annual reports 
of the Council) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 
------
Inspections in mili-
tary depots and cen-
tral records offices 29 26 35 39 
-- --
----
Inspections of natio-
nal units 15 20 13 19 
-- --
----
Agreed controls of 
levels at production 
plants (including 
shipyards) 12 11 13 13 
------
Agreed non-produc-
tion controls at fac-
tories 7 7 10 9 
1965 
--
26 
--
16 
--
11 
--
7 
-- ----
sol6o TOTALS 63 65 74 
It will be noted that totals do not always tally 
with the figures given ; it is understood that 
there are errors in the figures reported by the 
Council, but they are only minor. 
29. Annual reports of the Council covering the 
years 1966 onwards have omitted figures con-
cerning the number of inspections carried out. 
The Assembly, in Recommendation 183 adopted 
in June 1969, demanded the reinstatement of 
these figures in the annual reports of the Coun-
cil. It reiterated this demand on a number of 
occasions in 1970 and 1971 1 • The Council finally 
1. See reply to the fifteenth annual report adopted on 
1st June 1970, Recommendation 213 adopted on 30th 
November 1971 and Written Question 123 put by Mr. 
Vedovato on 13th April 1971. 
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agreed 1 to comply with the .Assembly's repeated 
requests, but on a confidential basis only, and 
the detailed figures for inspections in the years 
1970-75 have been duly communiooted to mem-
bers of the Assembly by the Secretary-General. 
30. Officially, the figures for the years 1966-69 
have not been communicated, but in fact your 
Rapporteur understands that the Agency's activ-
ities continued unabated as follows : 
1966119671196811969 
Control measures at depots 
(including central account-
ing offices) 
Control measures at units 
under national command **** 
Control measures at pro-
duction plants (quantitative 
control measures) 
Control measures at pro-
ducti on plants (non-pro-
ducti on control measures) 
Total control measures 78 1~1-;-1-;-
**** Confidential material deleted from the published 
report. 
31. When communicating the (confidential) 
figures for 1971, the Council reported that the 
Agency had adopted a new system of present-
ing its summary table of inspections and was 
thenceforth counting inspections of several small 
grouped ammunition depots as a single inspec-
tion. An apparent reduction in numbers of 
inspections resulted that in fact reflected no 
reduction in the activities of the Agency. For 
comparison, the Council reported both sets of 
figures (old and new style) for the years 1970 
and 1971. The following table shows the num-
bers of inspections reported (confidentially) for 
the years 1970-75. 
32. The Committee continues to regret that the 
Council refuses to publish the detailed figures 
1. See reply to Written Question 123 dated 1st June 
1971, reply to Recommendation 213 dated 20th March 
1972, and subsequent letters from the Secretary-General 
of 17th March 1972, 19th April 1972, 12th March 1973, 
22nd April 1974, 26th February 1975 and 15th March 1976 
on the same subject. 
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Numbers and types of inspection carried 
out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(Communicated confidentially by the Council) 
1970 11971 11972,1973,1974,1975 
Old style Control measures at depots New style 
Control measures at units under Old style national command New style 
Control measures at production 
style **** plants (quantitative control Old 
measures) New style 
Total quantitative control mea- Old style 
sures New style 
Control measures at production 
plants (non-production control Old style 
measures) New style 
-----------
Total control measures (all cate- Old style 82 **** - - - -
gories) New style **** 72 66 66 71 72 
•••• Confidential material deleted from the published report. 
of inspections since 1965, because the unneces-
sary secrecy can only lead the uninitiated to 
suspect that the activities of the .Agency have 
been curtailed. From the confidential inform-
ation available to it the Committee is able to 
state that this is not the case ; the activities of 
the .Agency have continued at broadly uniform 
levels for the last ten years. The apparent fluctua-
tions in the total numbers of inspections is 
due only to the change in accounting methods. 
The Committee is of course aware that these 
figures are administrative and do not give a full 
picture of the .Agency's activities, but in the 
absence of fuller information they provide the 
only quantitative indication available. 
33. The Committee again recommends that 
future annua;l reports state clearly numbers of 
inspections carried out, both by category, 8iS W8iS 
done in the years prior to 1966, and by country, 
so 8iS to give a clear picture of the .Agency's 
activities. 
60 
"No effective production of nuclear and biological 
weapons" statement 
34. For some years annual reports of the Coun-
cil have stated that "the replies received from 
member countries which have not renounced the 
right to produce chemical weapons show that 
no effective production h8iS yet been undertaken 
on the mainland of Europe". (The countries con-
cerned are all the member countries except Ger-
many.) No corresponding statement is made in 
respect of bacteriological and nuclear weapons, 
despite the fact that the provisions of the treaty 
concerning control of these weapons are iden-
tical to those for chemical weapons. In Recom-
mendation 209 the Assembly therefore called on 
the Council to incorporate in annual reports 
similar "no effective production" statements in 
respect of bacteriological and nuclear weapons, 
but in its replies the Council did not agree to 
these proposals. 
Conclusions on arms control 
35. The Committee is of course fully aware of 
the difficulties adumbrated by the Council which 
have prevented the arms control provisions of 
the treaty from being applied. The Committee 
has stated the dangers of this situation (para-
graph 25 above) but recognises that there is 
little political reason today, as far as the WEU 
members themselves are concerned, for the arms 
control measures of the treaty. As the Council 
says in its report : 
"The Agency's basic assumption (in respect 
of field controls) is that the undertakings 
and declarations of member countries are 
being honoured. Clearly if any doubt 
existed on this point, control measures 
would have to be increased ... " 
36. The Assembly in Recommendation 269 called 
for the collective defence commitments of the 
Brussels Treaty to be retained in any future 
European union, and in its reply the Council 
recognised that the setting up of such a union 
"may well have repercussions on questions of 
security and defence". The Committee believes 
that when the mutual defence commitment is 
effectively incorporated in an instrument estab-
lishing a European union, and that union con-
trols all of its external security functions, 
including defence and all foreign policy matters 
relating to external security, the time will have 
come to abrogate the arms control provisions 
of the Brussels Treaty. 
37. Meanwhile, they should be fully applied, 
and the Council must continue to report clearly 
and unambiguously on all areas in which they 
are not. 
CHAPTER IV 
Standing Armaments Committee 
38. The Standing Armaments Committee was 
established by a decision of the Council dated 
7th May 1955. In this framework governmental 
delegates meet : "to encourage ... agreements or 
arrangements on such subjects as the develop-
ment, standardisation, production and procure-
ment of armaments". 
39. On 18th February 1975, the Committee 
met the members of the Standing Armaments 
Committee in the framework of the liaison sub-
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committee on which the Committee reported last 
year1 • 
40. As previous annual reports have noted, the 
Council has been engaged since 15th February 
1973 in a comprehensive review of the role of 
the Standing Armaments Committee, on the 
understanding that there should be no dupli-
cation of the work of other collaborative fora. 
'l'he present report of the Council states that : 
" ... no definite conclusions have yet been 
reached ... 
As the Assembly is aware, questions of Euro-
pean armaments procurement and standard-
isation have been much debated by interested 
governments during the year in various 
fora where the member governments of 
WEU have made substantial contributions 
to the study of the problem." 
In its reply to Recommendation 280, received 
on 13th February 1976, the Council states that 
" ... it is envisaged that additional work among 
European countries on [European defence pro-
curement] will take place in an independent 
group open to all the European members of the 
Alliance ... " 
41. The Committee welcomes the first meeting 
of the new independent programme group held 
in Rome in February, attended by France and 
1<Juropean members of NATO. In future it will 
pay increasing attention to the work of the 
independent programme group, since an import-
ant part of the tasks of WEU is to be handled 
in that body. The Committee therefore expresses 
the hope that early progress will be made on 
the joint production of armaments in Europe 
and on non-discriminatory mutual procurement 
of armaments by Europe and the United States. 
The Council is requested to state its views at 
an early date on the role to be assigned to this 
group. 
Conclusions 
42. The Committee's chief conclusions are set 
forth in the draft recommendation : 
Preamble 
First paragraph 
43. The Committee again expresses satisfaction 
at the action taken by the Secretary-General 
1. Document 673, paragraph 42. 
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to expedite communication of the annual report. 
See paragraph 2 above. 
Second paragraph 
44. The terms on which the arms control 
functions of the treaty might be abrogated are 
described in paragraphs 35-37 above. 
Third paragraph 
45. The sterling work of the Arms Control 
Agency is described in Chapter HI above, para-
gl'laphs 26 et seq. 
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Operative text 
Paragraph 1 
46. See comment on first paragraph of the 
preamble above. 
Paragraph 2 
47. The problems of the arms control provisions 
and the Council's report are described in Chapter 
HI. 
Paragraph 3 
48. The Committee welcomes the advent of the 
independent programme group to which the 
Council has drawn attention. See paragraphs 40 
and 41. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Haase 
Uth June 1976 
At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Welcoming the Council's replies to Recommendation 281 and to Written Question 167, and the 
assignment to the Standing Armaments Committee of a study of the situation of the armaments 
industry in the member countries,". 
Signed : H aase 
1. See 2nd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 2 
AppUcation of the Brussels Treaty 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Haase 
14th June 1976 
In pa.ra.gra.ph 2 of the operative text of the dra.ft recommendation, before sub-pa.ra.gra.ph (i) insert 
a. sub-pa.ra.gra.ph a.s follows: 
" ( i) Include in a.nnua.l reports, in addition to the present statement of the total level of British forces 
on the continent a.t 31st December, a. statement of the level of British forces on the ma.inla.nd 
on that da.te, established in accordance with the Council's definition of the approved level ;". 
Sub-pa.ra.gra.phs (i), (ii) a.nd (iii) become sub-pa.ra.gra.phs (ii), (iii) a.nd (iv). 
Signed : H aaiJe 
1. See 2nd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Amendment agreed to). 
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OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS 
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1976 1 
submitted on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 11 
by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Opinion 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial year 1916 
Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has 
complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
Having taken note of the contents, 
Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee : 1\fr. Dequae {Chairman) ; 
Lord Selsdon (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Ahrens, Alber, de 
Bruyne, Castellucci, Depietri, Hengel, Kauffmann, de 
Koster (Substitute : Peijnenburg), Lewis (Substitute : 
Lord Wallace of Goslany), Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie 
3 • I 
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(Substitute : Lord Darling of Hillsborough), MM. Prearo, 
Schleiter (Substitute: Pignion), Talamona, Vohrer, Wait-
mans, Mrs. Wolf. 
N. B. The names of Representatives who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on improuing the status of WEU staff 
The Assembly, 
Recalling Recommendations 250 and 265 ; 
Deploring the slow progress of work in the Co-ordinating Committee ; 
Regretting that the governments have still not introduced a pension scheme for all the co-ordinated 
organisations ; 
Regretting the governments' decision to abandon present procedure for adjusting salaries before 
introducing new procedure ; 
Noting the ensuing unrest among staff members of the co-ordinated organisations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
I. Endeavour to have the pension scheme brought into effect before the end of 1976, its provisions 
being applied as from the date of adoption of the regulations governing its application, but payment of 
pensions for retired officials still being made as from 1st January 1973; 
2. Ensure that the scheme includes all necessary guarantees, based inter alia on joint management 
for all the co-ordinated organisations in accordance with the principles set out in Recommendations 250 
and 265; 
3. Amend the Staff Rules to avoid the widow or orphans of an official suffering hardship through a break 
in income during the period preceding payment of the first arrears of the pension; 
4. Introduce procedure for salary reviews similar to practice in the European Communities ; 
5. Improve the speed and efficiency of co-ordination by tightening up procedure ; 
6. Change the system of indemnities for loss of job on the lines of regulations in the European Communi-
ties and in the meantime improve the pension rights of officials who have become redundant by adding to 
their entitlement the period for which an indemnity for loss of job is granted ; 
7. Make provision for a reinstallation allowance for officials terminating their service and who were 
granted an installation allowance at the time of recruitment, as is the case in the European Communities ; 
II. Ask the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly as soon as available its study 
on conditions for seconding national officials. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur) 
I. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
(i) Approval 
1. I have studied the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 and 
have, for the time being, no comment to make 
thereon. I therefore submit the attached draft 
opinion and draft recommendation to the Com-
mittee for its approval. 
(ii) The budget 
2. The total budget of WEU for 1976 as com-
pared to 1975 is as follows : 
1975 Budget 1976 Budget 
£ F £ F 
Secretariat-General ............. 397,810 483,280 
Standing Armaments Committee .. 3,550,895 3,881,750 
Agency for the Control 
of Armaments ................ 7,634,310 8,329,550 
Office of the Clerk .............. 6,065,000 6,559,000 
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU .......... 397,810 17,250,205 483,280 18,770,300 
(iii) WEU establishment 
3. The total establishment of WEU for 1976 
is as follows : 
Secretariat-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Standing Armaments Committee . . . . 28 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 52 
128 
Office of the Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
'fOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 1976 156 
11. Reviewing procedure for co-ordination 
in the co-ordinated organisations 
4. Comments were made on the cumbersome 
and inadequate procedure for co-ordination in 
the report submitted to the Assembly in Decem-
ber 1972 (Document 584)1. There have still been 
no changes and the situation therefore remains 
the same. 
1. "3. Delays in taking decisions 
48. Over the years, the Assembly has made a number of 
recommendations in the administrative and budgetary 
fields. The table at Appendix VIII lists the most important 
of these, stating how many times they have been put 
forward and their outcome. 
49. The delay in adopting and implementing any deci-
sions taken is more than striking. The Assembly is fully 
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5. The situation has in fact deteriorated over 
the last two years and relations between staff 
and employers in the co-ordinated organisations 
have gradually worsened, producing a situation 
of real concern. Recent, almost unprecedented 
stoppages of work in NATO and the Council of 
Europe bear witness to this. It must be realised 
that staff recruited for WEU and the other 
co-ordinated organisations accept employment 
not only for the remuneration they will receive 
but also for the job satisfaction they hope to 
obtain by working in a European or international 
body. Furthermore, they can reasonably expect 
to be informed, on recruitment, of procedure in 
force for the adjustment of salaries and allow-
ances in line with cost-of-living increases, their 
pension rights, the possibilities of obtaining hous-
ing loans, etc. It is obviously quite wrong that 
staff either already in service or newly recruited 
should see themselves suffering serious financial 
prejudice as a result of governments adopting 
new procedure without prior consultation. 
6. There have been obvious shortcomings in 
co-ordination procedure in two important fields : 
(i) Pensions 
7. In 1973, a working party studied conditions 
for introducing a pension scheme in the co-
ordinated organisations and drafted detailed 
regulations. In January 1974, the Co-ordinating 
Committee submitted a report to the Councils 
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outlining the proposed scheme. This report 
(No. 94) was adopted with little delay by all the 
Councils and they instructed the Co-ordinating 
Committee to submit the draft regulations to 
them ; it was decided that the scheme should 
come into force on 1st July 1974, six months 
being considered long enough to complete the 
regulations. 
8. The Co-ordinating Committee has since con-
sidered the regulations at thirty-two meetings, 
usually lasting two days, at which they were the 
only item on the agenda. Only in the first quarter 
of 1976 was it able to report to the Councils, and 
it should be noted that on several important 
points it was unable to make unanimous recom-
mendations. It will be for the Councils to choose 
between several possible solutions, which are 
highly technical and should not be raised at 
Council level. 
9. Your Rapporteur will not dwell on the cost 
of such an undertaking, which involved govern-
aware of the Council's difficulties, which stem mainly from 
the necessity for unanimity, but much is due to the cum-
bersome and ahnost inert complex machinery for co-ordi-
nation. 
50. Current procedure for dealing with matters subject 
to co-ordination is as follows : 
(i) A proposal is submitted by a Secretary-General 
to the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General 
which, before taking a. decision, often seeks the 
opinion of the Committee of Heads of Adminis-
tration. 
(ii) The Standing Committee transmits the relevant 
proposal to the Co-ordinating Committee of 
Government Budget Experts. 
(iii) The Co-ordinating Committee of Government 
Budget Experts, in turn, frequently sets up 
working groups to study a specific issue. 
(iv) Meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee and the 
working groups, attended by representatives of 
the Secretaries-General, are held at fairly infre-
quent intervals - once a month at most. 
51. When the Co-ordinating Committee has formulated 
its recommendations, the same procedure is followed in 
reverse order before the question is passed to the Councils 
of the co-ordinated organisations for decision. 
52. It should not be overlooked that any decisions with 
financial implications taken by the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee of Government Budget Experts and approved by 
the Councils necessitate the submission of estimates to 
the Budget Committees of the various organisations. 
These are subsequently transmitted to the Councils for 
approval. 
53. The Assembly is of the opinion that the Council 
should give urgent consideration to simplifying the sys. 
tern for examining matters requiring co-ordination. One 
such matter is the problem of the appeals board and appeals 
jurisdiction." 
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ment experts who came from their respective 
places of employment, members of the adminis-
trations of the organisations and the Inter-
Organisation Study Section on Salaries and 
Prices. 
10. He will merely note that there are serious 
shortcomings in the system and that both the 
negotiations and their results have been far too 
slow. 
11. The most deplorable effect of these short-
comings is that many former officials who have 
retired are still not drawing a pension, although 
it is more than two years since it was agreed that 
they were entitled to one ; payment of arrears 
will certainly not solve the often serious financial 
problems with which they have been faced dur-
ing this period. 
(ii) Salary adjustments 
12. Here the problem is quite different. The 
conclusions reached by a group of experts set up 
in 1958 were given in the lOth report of the 
Co-ordinating Committee on 5th May 1960. Since 
then, there have been only minor changes and 
the procedure has worked for fifteen years to the 
satisfaction of governments, the administrations 
of the co-ordinated organisations and staff. 
13. On 6th August 1975, without any new 
regulations having been introduced or even 
discussed, the Co-ordinating Committee recom-
mended that existing procedure be purely and 
simply abandoned. 
14. New procedure is now being discussed. It 
cannot come into force before summer or autumn 
1976 at the earliest. In this era of rapid monetary 
erosion there is thus no provision for adjusting 
the salaries of international staff to take account 
of the cost of living, and this situation will have 
lasted for over a year. 
15. Without passing judgment on the reasons 
for calling existing procedure in question, it may 
be said that such a step was certainly most 
untimely from a psychological point of view. It 
has caused unrest among the staff, who are 
devoted servants of the organisations. It is 
important to maintain good staff relations if the 
organisations are to continue to run smoothly. 
16. As an urgent priority, the WEU Council 
must therefore suggest that the other Councils 
adopt without delay major changes in co-ordina-
tion procedure in order to put an end to the 
present situation. 
17. Since member governments value the present 
structure of co-ordination and wish to extend it 
to other organisations such as the European 
Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting 
and the European Patents Organisation, they 
have the utmost interest in ensuring its 
efficiency. 
18. Such a plan is reasonable and administra-
tively sound and, at least as far as salaries are 
concerned, co-ordination should be sought with 
the European Communities. There is in fact no 
valid reason why such arrangements should not 
be made ; they would be an effective step towards 
the still remote possibility of setting up a Euro-
pean civil service and allow decisions to be taken 
on the basis of common criteria and after 
thorough discussion. 
19. Governments should therefore aim at a com-
pletely transformed and wider co-operation pro-
cedure by taking the appropriate decisions as 
soon as possible. 
Ill. Joint management of pensions -
guarantees 
20. In Recommendations 250 and 265, the Assem-
bly advocated the creation of a joint management 
body with its own legal status separate from the 
organisations in respect of which each govern-
ment would enter into financial commitments 
which would thus remain unaffected in the event 
of a country withdrawing from one of the 
co-ordinated organisations or an organisation 
being wound up. 
21. Such a structure would doubtless offer the 
best guarantees for a pension scheme where 
stability is essential. However, it is ambitious 
and would take a long time to set up, if only 
in order to obtain the ratification of all member 
States, but it remains a desirable objective. 
22. In this field, the 127th report of the 
Co-ordinating Committee contributes little. Para-
graph 5 provides that : 
"... the arrangements for assisting in the 
actual running of the scheme by a joint 
administrative unit to handle those tasks 
where centralisation is desirable should be 
worked out." 
Moreover, paragraph 34 refers to the event of a 
country withdrawing from an organisation and 
invites Councils : 
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"(i) to decide that the commitments entered 
into by such country shall not be 
extinguished, but that it shall be 
incumbent on it to continue to par-
ticipate in financing the cost of 
pensions, and that this problem should 
be dealt with as part of the general 
financial arrangements relating to 
withdrawal ; 
(ii) to provide that in such event pro-
visional measures shall be taken in the 
form of an interim contribution made 
on a provisional basis, pending final 
settlement." 
23. Although interesting, such provisions are 
not very precise. 
24. The withdrawal of a country from an organ-
isation would raise many difficult problems and 
it is even harder to be certain to what extent 
such a State would continue to co-operate once it 
had left the organisation. 
25. But it is no less certain that centralised 
management of the pension scheme and perpetual 
financing are two necessary aims which should 
be attained by concrete measures to be studied 
and adopted as soon as possible. Such measures 
are particularly necessary since the budgetary 
nature of the scheme and the receipt by govern-
ments of sums corresponding to the validation of 
past service will leave no other resources for 
running the scheme. 
IV. Date of entry into force of the 
pension scheme 
26. Paragraph 23 of the 94th report of the 
Co-ordinating Committee specifies that in agree-
ment with the Secretaries-General the pension 
scheme should come into force on 1st July 1974. 
It was also specified that members of the staff 
who retired between 1st January 1973 and 
1st July 1974 were entitled to pensions. 
27. These dates were justified by the fact that 
the 94th report had been submitted to Councils 
for approval on 9th January 1974 and it could 
reasonably be thought that during the first half 
of 1974 the regulations necessary for its applica-
tion would have been finalised and approved. 
28. As mentioned above, this was not so, and at 
the end of the first quarter of 1976 these 
provisions had still not been approved by 
Councils. 
29. It therefore seems that the date of 1st July 
1974, considered to be that on which the scheme 
DOCUMENT 701 
would come into force, is absolutely unrealistic. 
It should be modified so as to avoid a long period 
of purely arbitrary retroactivity which would 
give rise to administrative, financial and perhaps 
legal difficulties. 
30. Any such change however should not affect 
the operative date for paying pensions to retired 
staff who should not suffer further through 
delays which cause them considerable hardship 
and which are none of their making. 
V. Date on which emoluments cease to be paid 
in the event of death 
31. On a staff member's death, payment of his 
emoluments stops on the day of his death. A 
pension becomes payable to his widow or depen-
dent orphans only at the beginning of the month 
after his death. 
32. There is a strong argument for continuing 
payment of the emoluments to the widow or 
orphans until the end of the month in which the 
staff member died. This gesture would help to 
keep the family out of financial difficulties at a 
critical time. 
VI. Loans for the purchase of accommodation 
33. The problem of loans for the purchase of 
accommodation in the framework of the pension 
scheme was mentioned in the report submitted to 
the Assembly in June 1975 (Document 666) and 
Recommendation 250. 
34. It is satisfying to note that the provisions 
in the draft pension scheme regulations and the 
instructions now being worked out provide 
reasonable solutions for the settlement of out-
standing debts. 
35. Conversely, it is still necessary and urgent 
to find another means of financing future loans, 
particularly since staff members, who are not 
usually nationals of the country in which they 
are employed, cannot benefit from the same legis-
lative or statutory provisions as those adopted by 
most governments for their own nationals. The 
social aspect of this problem has been recognised 
by all the member countries of the organisation. 
VD. Indemnity for loss of job 
36. The rules concerning the indemnity for loss 
of job 1 provide in certain conditions for the 
1. See Appendix VII. 
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award of an indemnity to staff members holding 
indefinite term appointments, amounting to one 
month's emoluments for each year of service with 
a ceiling of twenty-four months. 
37. This rate is considerably lower than that 
applied in the European Communities. 
38. There seems to be justification for recon-
sidering this indemnity on the basis of the rules 
applied in the European Community. 
39. When the pension scheme is introduced, it 
would be normal to take the abovementioned 
period of twenty-four months into account when 
calculating pension rights, subject of course to 
the deduction of the 7 % employee's contribution 
provided for under this scheme. This is now the 
practice in the European Communities. It would 
admittedly be a modest step, but would help to 
improve the situation of redundant staff. 
VID. Transfer of emoluments 
40. This question was raised in the report sub-
mitted to the Assembly in June 1974 (Document 
631). 
41. Recommendation 250 recommends that the 
Council: 
"3. Seek a means of allowing non-resident 
officials to meet financial commitments in 
their countries of origin by authorising -
subject to specific justifications - the pay-
ment of a portion of their salaries in their 
national currencies on the basis of salary 
scales applicable in the countries concerned." 
42. The adoption of such provisions would pro-
vide a fair solution to the often difficult prob-
lems encountered by staff members in meeting 
financial commitments in their countries of origin 
and is most urgent in the present period of 
instability and monetary disturbances. 
IX. Reinstallation allowance 
43. The reasons for granting an installation 
allowance to staff whose place of residence was 
far from their place of employment when they 
were recruited would justify granting an allow-
ance to staff members leaving the organisation 
insofar as their reinstallation involved a similar 
move. 
44. Such a reinstallation allowance would be 
justified in view of the expense involved when 
leaving the organisation, and is provided for in 
the staff rules of the United Nations and the 
European Communities. 
45. It should be allocated not only to the staff 
member himself but to his spouse in the event 
of his death. 
46. However, it should be granted only if the 
staff member has been employed by the organisa-
tion long enough - five years, for instance -
and provided he returns to his recognised home. 
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Such a measure would not be appropriate if the 
former staff member took up another appoint-
ment, when any expenditure involved should if 
necessary be borne by his new employer. 
X. Seconded national officials 
47. On the basis of the Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 265, the .Assembly wishes to be kept 
informed about the progress of work in this field. 
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APPENDIX I 
WEU BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR 1976 
Proposed expenditure and income 
A* B* 
£ Francs 
Salaries and allowances ............. 591,510 5,239,270 
Travel ............................. 15,245 72,700 
Other operating costs ............... 70,995 349,200 
Purchase of furniture ............... 1,915 13,000 
Buildings .......................... - -
Total expenditure ................... 679,665 5,674,170 
WEU tax .......................... 192,635 1,771,220 
Other receipts ...................... 3,750 21,200 
Total income ....................... 196,385 1,792,420 
-
NET TOTAL ••.•••••••••••••••••••••• 483,280 3,881,750 
* A - Secretariat-General. 
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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c• TOTALB + C 
Francs Francs 
11,549,010 16,788,280 
297,400 370,100 
423,120 772,320 
20,800 33,800 
- -
12,290,330 17,964,500 
3,925,820 5,697,040 
34,960 56,160 
3,960,780 5,753,200 
8,329,550 12,211,300 
APPENDIX I 
National contributions 
A* 
600ths 
£ 
Belgium .................... 59 47,522.53 
France ..................... 120 96,656.00 
Federal Republic of Germany . 120 96,656.00 
Italy ...................... 120 96,656.00 
Luxembourg ...............• 2 1,610.94 
Netherlands ................ 59 47,522.53 
United Kingdom ............ 120 96,656.00 
600 483,280.00 
Total WEU budget 
* A • Secretariat-General. 
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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B* C* Office of the Clerk 
Francs Francs 
1,200,777.84 644,968 
2,442,260.00 1,311,800 
2,442,260.00 1,311,800 
2,442,260.00 1,311,800 
40,704.32 21,864 
1,200,777.84 644,968 
2,442,260.00 1,311,800 
12,211,300.00 6,559,000 
£483,280 
Francs 18,770,300 
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APPENDIX II 
In accordance with Opinion 9 adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1963, 
the Council has communicated details to the Assembly regarding the duties of the 
members of the staff of the ministerial organs of Western European Union. 
A. Secretariat-General 
Post No. Grade Function 
1 HG Secretary-General 
2 » Deputy Secretary -General 
3 )) Assistant Secretary -General 
4 A6 Legal Adviser 
5 B4 Personal Assistant to Secretary-General 
6 B3 Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
7 B5 Post suppressed 
8 B4 Private Secretary to Deputy Secretary-General 
9 B4 Personal Assistant to Legal Adviser 
General .Affairs Division 
10 A5 Head of Division 
11 A3 Deputy Head of Division 
12 A3 Committee Secretary 
13 B4 Assistant fV erbatim Writer 
14 B3 Secretary /Assistant 
.Administration and Personnel Division 
15 A5 Head of Division 
16 A3 Deputy Head of Division 
17 A2 Administrative Officer 
18 B4 Assistant (Personnel) 
19 B4 Assistant (Administration) 
20 B3 Secretary 
Linguist Division 
21 L5 Head of Division 
22 LT4 Reviser 
23 LT3 Translator F fE 
24 LT2 Translator E fF 
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Post No. Grade Function 
Registry and Production Servicu 
25 A2 Head of Registry 
26 B4 Documentation Clerk 
27 B4 Head of Typing Pool 
28 B3 Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
29 B3 » 
30 B3 I 
31 B3 I 
32 B2 Shorthand-typist 
33 B2 • 
34 B2 ll 
35 B2 Assistant (distribution) 
36 B2 Assistant (reproduction) 
General Servicu 
37 B1 Telephonist 
38 B1 I 
39 03 Chauffeur Mechanic 
40 03 I 
41 03 Maintenance Supervisor 
42 02 Messenger 
43 02 I 
Security 
44 C4 Senior Security Guard 
45 03 Security Guard 
46 03 )) 
47 03 11 
48 03 )) 
49 03 I 
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B. International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee 
Post No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
17 his 
18 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Grade 
HG 
B4 
B3 
B4 
C4 
A5 
A4 
A4 
A4 
LT4 
LI3 
LT3 
LT3 
B4 
B3 
B3 
B3 
B3 
B3 
B3 
B4 
A4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C3 
C3 
C3 
Function 
Assistant Secretary -General 
Private Secretariat, M ail, Documentation 
Assistant responsible for the private secretariat 
Secretary /Shorthand-typist 
Archivist, responsible for distributing documents 
Driver Mechanic 
Committee Secretariat 
Assistant to Head of International Secretariat 
Committee Secretary 
» » 
» 
Reviser 
Interpreter 
» 
Linguistic Staff 
Translator and Minute Writer 
» )) 
Clerical Staff 
Assistant 
Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
» » » 
» » » 
Telephonist 
Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
» )) )) 
Administrative and General Staff 
Administrative Assistant 
Deputy to Head of Finance and Administration Section, 
Head of Finance and Account Office 
Roneo Operator 
Storekeeper and Technician 
Security Guard 
» » 
)) Jj 
» » 
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C. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
Post No. Grade Function 
1 HG Director 
2 A2 Director's Assistant 
3 A7 Deputy Director 
4 B4 Assistant 
Director' 8 Office 
5 A4 Head of the Office and Assistant to the Director, 
Security Officer 
6 A3 Head of Central Documentation 
7 A2 Assistant to the Head of Central Documentation 
8 B4 Assistant Documentation Clerk 
9 LT3 Translator E fF 
10 LT3 » FfE 
11 B3 Secretary 
12 B2 Shorthand-typist 
13 B4 Assistant, Head of Central Registry, Assistant to the 
Security Officer 
14 B3 Secretary 
Information and Study DiviBion 
15 A6 Head of Division 
16 A5 Head of the Industrial Section 
17 A5 Expert on biological and chemical weapons 
18 A4 Logistics Expert on armaments for land forces 
19 A4 Logistics Expert on armaments for air forces 
20 A4 Logistics Expert on naval armaments 
21 A4 Assistant to the Head of Division for General Questions 
22 B4 Assistant 
23 B3 Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
24 B3 » • 
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Post No. Grade Function 
Inspection antl Control DiviBion 
25 A6 Head of Division 
26 A5 Expert on artillery and tanks 
27 A5 Expert on guided missiles 
28 A4 Expert on biological weapons 
29 A5 Expert on armaments for air forces 
30 A4 Expert on artillery 
31 B4 Assistant 
32 B3 Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
Administration antl Legal Affairs DiviBion 
33 A6 Head of Division 
34 B4 Assistant 
35 A4 Legal Expert 
36 A5 Head of Finance and Administration Section 
37 B3 Chief Clerk 
38 B4 Assistant Accountant 
39 B2 Senior Clerk 
40 B4 Head of Group responsible for General Services 
41 B3 Chief Clerk, Assistant to Head of Group responsible 
for General Services 
Other services antl Security Seroice 
42 05 Head Designer and Duplicator Operator 
43 03 Driver Mechanic 
44 03 Security Guard 
45 03 » • 
46 03 ll ll 
47 03 11 • 
48 03 » ll 
49 03 11 » 
50 03 » » 
51 03 » ll 
52 B3 Telephonist 
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Grade 
HC 
HC 
A5 
A5 
A5 
A5 
A5 
A4 
A4 
A3 
A2 
A2 
A2 
B6 
B4 
B4 
B4 
B4 
B3 l B3 B3 
B3 
B3 
B3 
B3 
C6 
C3 
C3 
APPENDIX Ill 
Of/lee of the Clerk 1 
Function 
Clerk 
Clerk Assistant 
Counsellor in charge of defence questions and armaments 
Counsellor in charge of political questions 
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Counsellor in charge of scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions 
Counsellor in charge of finance and administration 
Counsellor in charge of Press Department 
First Secretary JHead of the Publications and Translations 
Department 
First Secretary Reviser /Publications 
Secretary Head of Archives and Committee Secretary 
Secretary-Translator fPublications 
J) 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator 
Chief Accountant 
Secretary to the President and the Clerk 
Secretary to the Clerk Assistant f Assistant Sergeant-at-Arms 
Office 
Proof Reader and Assistant Translation Department 
Assistant to the Archives and Mail Department 
Assistants to Committees 
Assistant to the Administrative and Financial Department 
Assistant to the Translation Department 
Assistant to the Press Department 
S~tchboard Operator 
Head of Roneo Section /Storekeeper 
Roneo Assistant fM.essenger 
Messenger 
1. On 1st January 1976. 
79 
DOCUMENT 701 
Al 
Secretary-General 1 
Deputy Secretary-General 1 
Director of the Agency -
Assistant Secretary-General 1 
A7 
-
A6 1 
A5 2 
A4 
-
A3 3 
A2 2 
L5 1 
L4 1 
L3 1 
L2 1 
B6 
-
B5 
-
B4 8 
B3 7 
B2 5 
B1 2 
C6 -
C5 -
C4 1 
C3 8 
C2 2 
48 
I. A - Seoretariat-General. 
APPENDIX IV 
Table of estGlJUshment 
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
Bt Cl Total A,B,C 
- - 1 
- - 1 
- 1 1 
1 - 2 
- 1 1 
- 3 4 
1 6 9 
4 8 12 
- 1 4 
- 2 4 
- - 1 
1 - 2 
3 2 6 
- - 1 
- - -
- - -
4 8 20 
7 8 22 
- 2 7 
-
-
2 
- - -
- 1 1 
4 
-
5 
3 9 20 
-
-
2 
28 52 128 
B - International Seoretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
2. Including four secretaries Translations /Publications. 
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Office of the Clerk 
Clerk 1 
-
-
Clerk Assistant 1 
-
-
5 
21 
1 
31 
-
1 
-
4 
7 
-
-
1 
-
-
2 
-
28 
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APPENDIX V 
RECOMMENDATION 265 1 
on improving the status of WEU staff 2 
The Assembly, 
Aware of the effort made by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations to establish a pension 
scheme for the staff of these organisations ; 
Deploring nevertheless the fact that the governments have not yet been able to set up a joint man-
agement body for all the organisations, a single appeals board or guarantee the payment of pensions should 
one of them withdraw or an organisation be wound up; 
Deeply regretting that the Co-ordinating Committee has been unable to agree to a reversionary 
pension being granted to widowers of female staff in the same way as to widows of male staff ; 
Welcoming the action taken on Recommendation 200 and the definition of principles to be implemented 
with regard to the secondment of national officials to the co-ordinated organisations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
1. Establish a joint management body for the pension scheme ; 
2. Set up a single appeals board; 
3. Guarantee the full and uninterrupted payment of pensions even in the event of a government with-
drawing or an organisation being wound up and to this end apply the provisions set out in Recommendation 
250 of the Assembly ; 
4. Grant widowers of female staff a reversionary pension in the same conditions as for widows of male 
staff; 
5. Afford officials who have obtained home loans from the provident fund a means of continuing those 
loans should they opt for the pension scheme ; 
6. Ensure that serving officials who do not opt for the pension scheme continue to benefit from the 
social advantages linked with the present provident fund system ; 
7. Grant officials of equal grade and length of service, regardless of the date of their retirement, a 
pension calculated on the basis of salaries payable to serving staff ; 
8. Take note of the problems arising from the introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security 
Act in April 1975 ; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration (Document 666). 
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9. Establish a system for readjusting emoluments whereby the co-ordinated organisations may : 
- hold general reviews every four years or more frequently if circumstances warrant it ; 
- asse88 trends in the standard of living in the middle of the period between general reviews ; 
- examine cost-of-living trends every six months ; 
- take the necessary steps to adjust salaries in accordance with the trend of the cost of living as 
quickly as possible by abolishing the two-month observation period ; 
II. Invite the Public Administration Committee to submit to it as soon as po88ible a first report on the 
way member States have implemented the principles defined by the special group of experts set up in 
October 1971 to study conditions for seconding national officials to international organisations, on the diffi-
culties encountered in this respect and, as appropriate, ways of alleviating such difficulties. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 265 
I. Measures recommended by the Assembly in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations. 
I. It has not so far been possible to reach agreement within the Co-ordinating Committee to establish 
a joint management body for the pension scheme, as desired by the Assembly, since some organisations do 
not support this. 
However, as indicated in Article 31, paragraph 1 of the draft pension scheme rules, a joint adminis-
tration unit will be "responsible for such part of the work as can be centralised". 
Within this context, the Secretaries-General have proposed the establishment of a "taxation unit" 
within the Inter-organisations Section (which works at the OECD) if the present draft pension scheme rules 
are adopted. 
2. The full and uninterrupted payment of pensions in the event of a member State withdrawing or an 
organisation being wound up is guaranteed under the terms of Article 40, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft 
pension scheme rules applicable to the permanent staff of the co-ordinated organisations : 
"In the event of a merger, reconstitution or other transformation or in the event ofdissolutionofthe 
organisation, the Council or any ad hoo body set up, where required in one of the aforementioned cases, 
shall take the necessary measures to ensure uninterrupted payment of the pension scheme benefits 
until the cessation of entitlement of the last beneficiary. 
Should a country, being a member or ex-member of the organisation, fail to comply with its obligations 
under this article, the other countries shall meet the cost thereof in proportion to their contribution 
to the budget of the organisation as fixed annually from and after the said country's default." 
3. With regard to the granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same condi-
tions as for widows of male staff, the Co-ordinating Committee was unable to make proposals to this effect, 
because some delegations did not support those who favoured such a provision. 
4. The possibility for officials who have obtained home loans from a part of their provident fund to 
continue these loans if they opt for the pension scheme is covered by Article 44, paragraph 3 of the draft 
pension scheme rules : 
"Where a staff member has exercised his right to make withdrawals from his provident fund holding 
and where, in consequence, the amount standing to his credit is less than the amount he would have 
surrendered under paragraph 2 if he had not made withdrawals, service prior to 1st July 1974 shall 
only be credited in the proportion these two amounts bear to each other. 
This provision shall not apply where a staff member has, by 1st July 1975 * at the latest, undertaken 
to repay the difference between the two amounts, plus compound interest at the rate of 4% per annum 
as from that date. 
If the staff member makes only partial repayment, past service shall only be credited in the proportion 
referred to in the first sub-paragraph above." 
5. The Co-ordinating Committee has not yet found it possible or useful to make a detailed study of 
the question of enabling serving officials who do not opt for the pension scheme to continue to benefit from 
the social advantages linked with the present provident fund system. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1975. 
* This date will have to be amended in the final text. 
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6. The answer to the Assembly's question is to be found in Articles 36 and 49 of the draft rules, which 
read as follows : 
"Article 36 
Should the Council of the organisation responsible for the payment of benefits decide on an adjustment 
of salaries in relation to the cost of living, it shall decide at the same time on an identical adjustment 
of the pensions currently being paid, and of pensions whose payment is deferred. 
Should salary adjustments be made in relation to the standard of living, the Council shall consider 
whether an appropriate adjustment of pensions should be made." 
"Article 49 
4. Benefits under this Article shall be calculated by reference to the staff member's grading when 
he left the service before 1st January 1973, but on the basis of the corresponding scales in force on 
1st January 1973, subsequently adjusted in accordance with Article 36." 
7. The problems arising from the introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security Act in April1975 
are under consideration by the appropriate United Kingdom authorities and by the organisation. 
8. It is intended to hold a. general review of emoluments every two years. In the intervening period, 
salaries could be adjusted every six months if the trend of the cost of living made it necessary. 
The Council have considered item I, 2 of the Assembly's recommendation together with the remarks 
in the explanatory memorandum in Document 666 concerning the desirability of setting up a single appeals 
board. In view of the fact that the other co-ordinated organisations were reluctant, at this stage, to pursue 
the matter, it is felt that a. further invitation by the Secretary-General to his colleagues would be premature. 
However, since the jurisdiction of the appeals board within each of the co-ordinated organisations should 
normally include pension scheme matters, the Secretary-General intends once again to draw his colleagues' 
attention to this suggestion as soon as the pension scheme comes into force. 
II. The survey undertaken by the Public Administration Committee, at the Council's request, on the 
implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council for the secondment of 
national officials to international organisations is nearing completion. The Council will very shortly be receiv-
ing the results of this survey and will consider whether the Committee should be asked to go further into 
certain aspects. The Assembly will, at its request, be kept informed of progress in this field. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Written questions and replies of the Council 
(i) Question put by Mr. Richter on the 
proposed pension scheme and the reply of the 
Council 
Question : A pension scheme is now being pre-
sented to the staff of the co-ordinated organisa-
tions whereby staff mem:bers supposedly have a 
choice between accepting the scheme or opting 
to continue with the provident fund. Is this 
choice real since the amount standing to the 
credit of each member in the provident fund is 
the figure reached on 1st July 1974 which has 
already lost 10 to 15% of its value through 
inflation and, secondly, since the management of 
the provident fund has produced interest of 
merely 7 % on the sum in question for the period 
after 1st July 1974? 
What arrangements are being made for the 
provident fund in respect of staff members who 
cannot opt for the pension scheme since they 
have less than 10 years' service? 
Should not a reappraisal be made of the 
management of the provident fund since the fall 
in the value of the dollar and the high rate of 
inflation have deprived the fund of its main pur-
pose which is to provide staff with a means of 
subsistence during a period of readaptation ? 
Reply : The urgent need to introduce a pension 
scheme, with benefits linked to the cost of living, 
became increasingly apparent when, in 1973, ris-
ing levels of inflation and other factors revealed 
clearly the inherent weaknesses of the provident 
fund system, whereby the real value of the fund's 
assets was being rapidly eroded. The Councils 
of the co-ordinated organisations consequently 
instructed the Co-ordinating Committee of 
Government Budget Experts to draw up the 
outline of a pension scheme which was, in due 
course, submitted to the Councils in the form of 
the 94th report. 
This report, approved by the WEU Council 
on 20th March 1974, was designed to replace the 
savings scheme of the provident fund with a 
system of social security and retirement benefits 
in many respects better than comparable schemes 
of some member countries. However, the transi-
tional measures, included in the draft pension 
rules at present being prepared, provide an 
option to those officials already in service on 
1st July 1974 to continue in the provident fund 
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although, as the 94th report points out, staff so 
opting "should be made aware that the provident 
fund system will, under no circumstances, be 
improved and that it will retain its character as 
a pure savings scheme with all the attendant 
uncertainties of such an arrangement". This 
represents an effort to improve the conditions of 
service of officials belonging to the co-ordinated 
organisations. 
The option to join the pension scheme or to 
remain in the provident fund is open to all staff 
members in service on 1st July 1974, irrespective 
of their length of service. It is possible to adhere 
to the new pension scheme validating retro-
actively prior service by purchase out of provid-
ent fund holdings. Those who opt for the pension 
scheme but who leave the organisation before 
completing ten years' service will be entitled to 
a severance grant amounting to a sum broadly 
equivalent to that which such officials would 
have received under the provident fund system. 
It is inevitable that, in the current world-
wide financial situation, the provident fund 
should not be yielding the beneficial results that 
were derived in recent years. The situation has 
been exacerbated recently because, until the 
pension scheme is finalised and until it is known 
how many staff members intend to draw on the 
fund to v'alidate their pension rights, most of the 
fund's assets must be kept on short-term, low 
interest deposit. 
To make a reappraisal of the management of 
the provident fund at this stage would not seem 
to be appropriate. A portion of the holdings wi11 
have to be surrendered to member States as from 
1st July 1974 when the pension scheme comes 
into effect. Furthermore it has never been con-
sidered the main purpose of the provident fund 
to provide staff with a means of subsistence dur-
ing a period of readaptation. In all organisations 
the provident fund is deemed to provide for times 
of old age. Old age benefits in the future will 
be granted from the pension scheme. 
(ii) Question put by Lord Selsdon on the 
procedure for salary reviews and the reply of 
the Council 
Quest·ion : Is the Council aware of the uneasiness 
felt by staff of the co-ordinated organisations 
DOCUMENT 701 
which recently led to stoppages of work in NATO 
and the Council of Europe and which may soon 
become more widespread and serious ? 
This uneasiness is due to the governments 
having denounced, since 1st July 1975, a pro-
cedure for adjusting salaries, which had been 
working satisfactorily for some fifteen years, 
without any new procedure being introduced in 
its place, so that there now appears to be a 
serious threat to the purchasing power of salaries. 
Is there not a risk of this unprecedented 
situation affecting the smooth running of the 
organisations ? 
Would it not be appropriate to seek an early 
solution to this problem by introducing procedure 
for reviewing salaries similar to that in force in 
the EEC, which has been approved by nine 
European governments including those of all the 
WEU member States Y 
Reply: The Council are fully aware of the situa-
tion resulting from the abandonment, since 1st 
July 1975, of the procedure for adjusting the 
remuneration of staff of the co-ordinated organ-
isations, which had been in force for some fifteen 
years. 
However, in the light of the incomes policy 
followed by the member States of these organisa-
tions, particularly with regard to civil service 
salaries, it had become necessary to reform a 
procedure which had the effect of widening, 
from year to year, the gap between the remunera-
tions of national civil servants and of inter-
national civil servants. 
The Council hope that the immediate problem 
will shortly be solved on the basis of a procedure 
agreed by governments taking account of discus-
sions with the Secretaries-General of the organ-
isations. 
In their view, the grounds for objecting to 
the parallel movement of salaries paid in national 
civil services and in the co-ordinated organi<m-
tions are weakened by the fact that the European 
Communities have themselves accepted the 
principle. The member States of the European 
Communities have, in fact, begun discussions 
with the Commission on this basis, for changes 
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in the procedure for cost-of-living and standard-
of-living adjustments of Community salaries. 
The Co-ordinating Committee is following 
this example in its efforts to work out a new 
adjustment procedure. 
(iii) Question put by Mr. Dequae on loans 
for purchasing accommodation and the reply 
of the Council 
1. When the pension scheme comes into force 
in the co-ordinated organisations, will the Council 
consider allowing WEU staff members to 
continue to obtain loans for purchasing or 
building accommodation Y 
2. Would the Council be prepared to set up a 
fund for this purpose using part of the sums 
paid by staff for validating past service Y 
Reply : The Council recognise that the facility 
provided by the WEU Staff Rules permitting 
staff members to obtain housing loans is benefi-
cial both to the employee and even to the 
employer in contributing to a certain stability 
among the staff. They are not, consequently, 
opposed in principle to the continued granting 
of these loans after the introduction of the pen-
sion scheme. 
For those staff who opt to remain in the 
provident fund, this facility will continue to be 
available, since loans are financed by with-
drawals from their holdings in the provident 
fund. 
However, since the pension scheme is not 
yet in force and since staff will, from its 
introduction, be allowed a further year in which 
to exercise their option, it is not possible at 
present to forecast the financial implications of 
the introduction of the scheme. Until this is 
known, any decision on this question would be 
premature. 
Moreover, the Council note that this problem 
concerns not only WEU but other co-ordinated 
organisations as well. Although it may be 
difficult to find a common solution for all the 
organisations, the Council would welcome a joint 
examination by the Secretaries-General and the 
Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts of alternative means of financing hous-
ing loans which would not entail special 
demands on government funds. 
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APPENDIX VII 
Indemnity for loss of job 1 
C. Termination of contracts - indemnity for 
loss of job 
Termination of a contract by the Assembly 
may, in certain circumstances, give rise to the 
payment of an indemnity for loss of job. The 
regulations governing the payment of this 
indemnity are set out below. 
General principles 
1. The Clerk following the decision of the 
Council shall have power to award an indemnity 
for loss of employment to any staff member 2 : 
( i) who holds a firm contract 3 ; 
(ii) and whose services are terminated for 
any one of the following reasons : 
- suppression of the budget post oc-
cupied by the staff member ; 
- changes in the duties of the budget 
post occupied by the staff member 
of such a nature that he no longer 
possesses the required qualifica-
tions; 
- general staff cuts including those 
due to a reduction in or termination 
of the activities of an organisation ; 
-the withdrawal from the organisa-
tion of the member country of 
which the staff member is a 
national; 
I. See Staff Rules, Article 11, Contracts, pages 21 to 25. 
2. For the purposes of these regulations, the term "staff 
member" shall mean a member of the international civilian 
staff, whatever the nature of his contract. The present 
regulations shall therefore not apply to staff of local 
status, temporary staff, experts or consulta.nte. 
3. A firm contract shall be interpreted to mean a 
contract made with a staff member on completion of the 
probationary period. It goes without saying that a staff 
member who has held a firm contract in a co-ordinated 
organisation and who has subsequently been offered, either 
in that organisation or in another co-ordinated organis-
ation, a contract involving a probationary period, shall 
be deemed to satisfy this condition if such contract is 
terminated during or on completion of such probationary 
period. 
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- the transfer of the headquarters of 
the organisation or of any of its 
units to another country and the 
consequent transfer of the whole 
staff concerned ; 
- the refusal by the staff member, 
where his contract does not cover 
the point, to be permanently 
transferred to a country other than 
that in which he is serving ; 
- withdrawal of security clearance on 
grounds which do not warrant the 
dismissal of the staff member as a 
result of disciplinary action ; 
( iii) and who 
- is not offered a post in the same 
grade in the same organisation, or 
- is not appointed to a vacant post 
in one of the other co-ordinated 
organisations at a comparable 
remuneration, or 
- if employed in the public service, 
has failed to obtain immediate 
reintegration in his national, civil 
or military administration. 
2. The method of calculating the indemnity 
differs as between fixed term appointments and 
indefinite term appointments. 
(a) Fixed term appointments 
Amount of indemnity 
3. The amount of indemnity for loss of job shall 
be equal to half the product of the monthly 
emoluments of the staff member (basic salary, 
including cost of living allowances, plus the 
organisation's contribution to the provident fund 
and, where appropriate, the head of household 
allowance and the dependant's allowance) 
multiplied by the number of months remaining 
up to the expiry of the term of his contract, pro-
vided that it shall in no case exceed: 
- five months' emoluments in the case of 
a contract for three years or less ; 
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- eight months' emoluments in the case of 
a contract for four years, or for any term 
between three years and four years ; 
- ten months' emoluments in the case of a 
contract for more than four years. 
4. The emoluments to be taken into account in 
calculating the amount of the indemnity shall be 
those received by the staff member at the date 
of leaving the organisation. 
Payment of the indemnity 
5. The indemnity shall be paid to the staff 
member in full at the time he leaves the organisa-
tion. 
(b) Indefinite term appointments 
Amount of indemnity 
6. The amount of the indemnity, expressed in 
months or fractions of a month of emoluments 
(basic salary, including cost of living allowance 
plus the organisation's contribution to the pro-
vident fund and, where appropriate, the head 
of household allowance and the dependant's 
allowance) shall be one month's emoluments for 
each year of service from the date when the staff 
member joined the organisation. However, the 
amount of indemnity so calculated shall be 
subject to a ceiling. This ceiling is set at eighteen 
months' emoluments at 1st January 1972 and 
shall be raised at the rate of one month per year 
up to a maximum level of twenty-four months. 
Furthermore, the amount of indemnity shall not 
represent a number of months, or fractions of a 
month in excess of the period which the staff 
member would still have to serve before reaching 
the age limit specified by the Staff Rules of the 
organisation. 
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7. The emoluments to be taken into account in 
calculating the amount of the indemnity shall be 
those received by the staff member at the date 
of leaving the organisation. 
Payment of the indemnity 
8. The indemnity shall be paid to the staff 
member in full at the time he leaves the organisa-
tion. 
Miscellaneous provisions 
9. In calculating the amount of indemnity for 
loss of job under paragraph 6 above, account 
shall be taken, where appropriate, of any years 
of service previously performed by the staff 
member concerned in other co-ordinated organisa-
tions and in respect of which he has not received 
any indemnity for loss of job provided, however, 
that no account shall be taken of any years of 
service preceding : 
(i) an interruption of the service of the 
staff member concerned with the co-
ordinated organisations ; 
(ii) the termination for disciplinary reasons 
of his services with any co-ordinated 
organisation. 
10. Any staff member who has served not less 
than ten consecutive years with one or more co-
ordinated organisations and whose services are 
terminated in the conditions specified in para-
graph 1 hereof shall be entitled to an indemnity 
for loss of job calculated under the provisions 
of paragraph 6 and, where appropriate, of para-
graph 9 hereof, whatever the nature of the con-
tract held by him at the time when his appoint-
ment is terminated. 
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Breakdown of staff in the co-ordinated organisations on 1st January 1916 
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APPENDIX IX 
Membership of the co-ordinated organisations 
Organisation 
Member country Council 
OECD of NATO ESA WEU 
Europe 
EUROPE 
Austria X X 
Belgium X X X X X 
Cyprus X 
Denmark X X X X 
Finland X 
France X X X X X 
Germany X X X X X 
Greece X X X 
Iceland X X X 
Ireland X X 
Italy X X X X X 
Luxembourg X X X X 
Malta X 
Netherlands X X X X X 
Norway X X X 
Portugal X X 
Spain X X 
Sweden X X X 
Switzerland X X X 
Turkey X X X 
United Kingdom X X X X X 
AMERICA 
Canada X X 
United States X X 
AsiA 
Japan X 
AUSTRALASIA 
Australia X 
New Zealand X 
TOTAL 24 18 15 10 7 
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Political activities of the Council 
Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Peridier, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
lOth May 1976 
on the political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-first annual 
report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Peridier, Rapporteur 
I. General 
11. Political activities of the Council 
Ill. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
IV. Conclusions 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the 0Jm1 tittee: Mr. Sieglerachmidt 
(Chairman); Sir John Rodprs, Mr. Bettiol (Vice-Chair-
men) ; MM. A bens, Amreh· 1, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mrs. 
von Bothmer (Substitute: Schwencke), MM. Brugnon, 
Cermolacce, Fioret, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute: 
de Bruyne), MM. Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Mendelson 
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(Substitute : Ohannon), Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnen-
burg, Peridier, Portheine, Preti (Substitute: Magliano), 
Quilleri, Schmidt, Steel (Substitute : Lord Beaumont of 
Whitley), Urwin (Substitute: Lewia), Van Hoeylandt. 
N. B. The names of RepreaentatW68 who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply of the twenty-first annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Noting the twenty-first annual report of the Council; 
Recalling Resolutions 55 and 59 ; 
Noting with satisfaction that the Council "makes no distinction between the Council of Western 
European Union meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of Permanent Repre-
sentatives" ; 
Recalling that the Council "is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in 
the treaty" as long as these rights and duties have not been transferred by treaty to another institution: 
Deploring that the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives makes only excep-
tional use of its prerogatives ; 
Noting however that circumstances continue to make it essential to maintain procedure for consul-
tation between the Western European countries on matters affecting their security; 
Noting that the Council's refusal to reply to Written Questions 158, 159 and 160 and to hold a joint 
meeting with the General Affairs Committee in 1975 shows that the Council is shirking its responsibilities in 
respect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Recalling that the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty commits its signatories to "preserve 
the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the 
rule of law, which are their common heritage" ; 
Recalling finally Recommendation 266 to which the Council gave only a very incomplete reply, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by : 
(a) examining in which framework each question concerning European security should be discussed 
by the Seven ; 
(b) dealing effectively with the various problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty even when it meets at the level of Permanent Representatives ; 
(c) examining attentively the means whereby it may complement possible action by the Nine in 
defence matters, particularly in emergencies ; 
(d) illustrating how the Council's activities reflect the constantly-repeated statement by the Council 
and by the member countries that they attach the greatest importance to the full application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
2. Give the Assembly a precise reply to paragraph 3 of Recommendation 266; 
3. Report without hesitation in its communications to the Assembly on any differences between the 
positions adopted by its members, as it did in its reply to Recommendation 283; 
4. Consider, together with the other powers concerned, how it might follow the political consultations 
between the nine member countries of the EEC on the one hand and on the other, in view of the study it 
is undertaking on "the possibility that WEU might undertake additional work connected with the stan-
dardisation of armaments in Europe", the activities of the European programme group ; 
5. Should not invoke the possibility of members using national procedure in order to avoid replying 
to recommendations and written questions. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Peridier, Rapporteur) 
I. General 
1. In 1976, it is of even greater importance to 
consider the annual report of the WEU Council 
in the light of events in Western Europe and the 
Atlantic Alliance in the past year with particular 
regard to future developments now taking shape. 
These events have led observers to ponder the 
role WEU could or will play and perhaps, in 
some cases, to wonder whether sooner or later 
WEU will not disappear. Quite obviously con-
sideration of the Council's activities should take 
such prospects into account in order to ascertain 
how far the Council's present concept of its work 
helps to pave the way for a European union 
which many hope will be established within the 
next few years. 
2. (i) In Western Europe, the nine member 
countries of the European Economic Commun-
ity have been busy working out the form of the 
European union they have undertaken to set up 
by 1980. Two major documents have been 
published, one by the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities in June 1975 and the other 
by Mr. Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, 
at the request of the European Council, in 
January 1976. The WEU Assembly responded 
to these two texts in two resolutions adopted by 
the Presidential Committee between sessions. The 
first was ratified by the Assembly at its 
December 1975 session and the second is to be 
submitted for ratification at the June 1976 
session. Both give the Assembly's views on the 
place of WEU in the European union. 
3. Both Mr. Tindemans' report and that of the 
Commission had to bear in mind that the govern-
ments of the nine member countries of the Euro-
pean Communities do not have a joint attitude 
towards defence matters and that defence would 
consequently remain what the Commission called 
a "potential competence" of the union for an 
indefinite period, whereas in other fields both 
texts proposed the immediate development of the 
union's responsibilities. Consequently, it seems 
that WEU will remain outside the union for some 
time even if subsequently it will be called upon 
to take its place in the union. 
4. In its two resolutions, the Assembly 
indicated very clearly that it intended WEU to 
retain its full responsibilities during the inter-
mediary period until such time as they could be 
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transferred to the future European union by 
treaty. The Assembly has always recognised the 
WEU Council's concern to avoid duplication of 
work by not discussing certain matters which 
its members deal with in wider frameworks such 
as the nine-power political consultations, but it 
has never considered that WEU thus lost any of 
the responsibilities assigned to it by the modified 
Brussels Treaty, nor has the Council ever 
expressed a contrary view. 
5. However, there now seems to be some 
thought of making a distinction between the 
modified Brussels Treaty, to which all the 
member countries have confirmed their continu-
ing loyalty, and WEU as an organisation. It 
should be recalled that the treaty instituted both 
the Assembly and the Council of WEU, as well 
as the Agency for the Control of Armaments, 
and the organisation cannot be touched without 
affecting the treaty. From a more political point 
of view, moreover, it is hard to imagine how such 
a binding alliance as that set up in Article V of 
the modified Brussels Treaty could work without 
procedure for permanent consultations between 
member governments allowing them to discuss 
all problems arising from the operation of the 
alliance. Nine-power consultations cannot replace 
those in the WEU Council altogether unless the 
responsibilities involved in applying the modified 
Brussels Treaty are transferred to another 
organisation. Finally, the prospect of a European 
union makes it essential to establish close contacts 
between WEU and the Nine and it is deplorable 
that there are no indications of this in the twenty-
first annual report of the Council, which gives 
the impression that nothing has been done in 
this connection. 
6. (ii) In the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance a number of problems now make it more 
important than ever for Western Europe to 
retain the institutional means for concerting 
defence efforts. One problem is the possibility 
voiced a few years ago by certain American 
authorities of a partial withdrawal of American 
troops stationed in Europe. Whatever the 
present position of the United States Govern-
ment, which in any event is concerned with 
elections at the end of 1976, this threat will 
continue to be present in view of the revival 
of the isolationist trend in American public 
opinion in recent years. Although there is no 
indication that the United States Government 
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has decided or is about to decide on such with-
drawals, Western Europe must not leave itself 
without the means of facing the changed military 
and political situation which would arise from 
a reduction of the American military presence 
in Europe. 
7. Furthermore, in the early months of 1976 
the highest American authorities and General 
Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the American 
forces in Europe as well as of the NATO forces, 
have said that if there were to be communist 
participation in the governments of certain 
Western European countries the United States 
would give considerable thought to its stake in 
the Atlantic Alliance. The present political 
situation in France and Italy leaves the door 
open to such participation, perhaps even in the 
fairly near future. 
8. It is therefore essential for the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance to consult with 
each other about the possible repercussions of a 
change in United States membership of the 
Alliance. This concern was expressed in Written 
Question 165, put to the WEU Council by 
Mr. Radius on 8th March 1976, when he asked 
whether the Council considered : 
"that the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty would also be jeopardised if 
communist party members were to join the 
government of a WEU member country." 
I 
9. At the time of writing, your Rapporteur 
has not yet heard the Council's reply, but he 
feels that it can but be negative insofar as the 
modified Brussels Treaty contains no ideological 
provisions but constitutes an alliance between 
sovereign States to the extent that these States 
endorse the principles set out in the preamble 
to the treaty, inter alia : 
"To fortify and preserve the principles of 
democracy, personal freedom and political 
liberty, the constitutional traditions and the 
rule of law, which are their common 
heritage." 
Only if one of the States were to renounce its 
membership of the modified Brussels Treaty -
a most unlikely event - would there be any 
repercussions on the application of the treaty 
insofar as the principles set out in the treaty 
were in fact respected. 
10. (iii) Application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. In these circumstances it was therefore 
logical that in 1975 some members of the 
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Assembly should have given thought to the way 
the modified Brussels Treaty was being applied 
and asked the Council to give its views on the 
matter. Your Rapporteur welcomes the Council's 
full reply to Written Question 156 which he 
believes gives useful information on the member 
countries' attitude towards the application of 
Articles V and VI of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
11. However, it is still an open question as to 
what the WEU Council would do if, after 
deciding that an act by a third power against 
one of its members was an "armed attack", the 
United Nations Security Council failed to agree 
with it. 
12. Your Rapporteur's opinion is that, although 
the WEU Council has undertaken to report to 
the Security Council all collective defence 
measures taken in application of Article V and 
to terminate them as soon as the Security Council 
has taken the measures necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security, it is not 
bound by the Security Council's definition of 
the term "armed attack". Therefore, if the WEU 
Council considered that the Security Council was 
not taking the necessary measures to maintain 
or restore international peace, it would be 
entitled not to terminate the collective defence 
measures taken. This seems particularly clear 
since, in its reply to Written Question 156, the 
WEU Council recognised that the Security 
Council was not bound by any mandatory defini-
tion of an armed attack. 
13. Your Rapporteur wishes the Council to 
discuss this problem and, without waiting for an 
emergency in which Article V of the treaty 
might have to be implemented, to consider most 
carefully all the questions raised by the applica-
tion of Articles V and VI and inform the 
Assembly of its conclusions. 
U. Political activities of the Council 
14. In his reply to the twentieth annual report 
of the Council, Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur of 
the General Mfairs Committee, considered how 
the WEU Council could operate in the new 
circumstances arising from the development of 
nine-power political consultations, and the 
recommendation adopted by the Assembly was 
largely devoted to this matter. The Council's 
reply to Recommendation 266, although long and 
detailed, obliges the Assembly to emphasise 
certain points which the Council failed to take 
up either in Mr. de Bruyne's report or in the 
Assembly's recommendation. According to its 
reply: 
"The modified Brussels Treaty makes no 
distinction between the Council of Western 
European Union meeting at ministerial 
level and the same Council meeting at the 
level of Permanent Representatives." 
The Council even specifies that : 
"The Council meeting at the level of 
Permanent Representatives is fully em-
powered to exercise the rights and duties 
ascribed to it in the treaty." 
15. This was precisely the starting point for 
Mr. de Bruyne's argument. He asked that the 
Permanent Council take over the duties which 
the Council could not assume at ministerial level 
because it did not meet frequently enough. In 
fact- and this can be seen clearly in Chapter II, 
paragraph A, of the twenty-first annual report 
of the Council where there is a difference 
between paragraph 1, dealing with consideration 
of East-West relations at ministerial meetings, 
and paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 which, alluding only 
to meetings of Permanent Representatives, refer 
to the Assembly's recommendations as the basis 
for the Council's discussions - it is only when 
meeting at ministerial level that the Council 
deals directly with political matters. Conversely, 
when meeting at the level of Permanent 
Representatives, it deals only with matters refer-
red to it by the Assembly. Yet Recommendation 
266 asked that the Council : 
and 
"Include regularly in its agenda considera-
tion of the various problems raised by the 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty" 
"Draw up a list of problems connected with 
the application of the treaty over which 
the governments of the seven member 
countries are divided so that they may be 
considered at ministerial level or that atten-
tion be drawn to them in the North Atlantic 
Council or in the European Council". 
16. In its reply, the Council recalled that any 
member government can propose that a particu-
lar matter should be discussed in the Council of 
WEU and that it was at present discussing the 
possibility that WEU might undertake addi-
tional work connected with the standardisation of 
armaments in Europe. 
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17. It is quite evident that such a reply is most 
inadequate since if the annual report is to be 
believed, apart from the one ministerial meeting, 
no government appears to have proposed to the 
Council any matter concerning the application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty. However, these 
problems exist - the first chapter of this report 
mentions some - and the Council is not dealing 
with them. As for the only matter which the 
Council has actually tackled, i.e. the standardisa-
tion of armaments in Europe, this question has 
taken a new turn since the creation at the end 
of 1975 of an independent body responsible for 
armaments programmes and that consequently 
any decision concerning WEU is at the very 
least being held back until such time as the 
governments give a clear idea of the nature and 
scope of the activities of that independent body. 
18. In short, your Rapporteur suggests that the 
Assembly repeat the requests it made to the 
Council in 1975 and in particular that it review 
the problems on which the governments of the 
seven member countries disagree, even if 
eventually the Ministers have to consider them 
in a framework other than WEU. 
19. Finally, although it is gratifying that the 
Council is maintaining relations with other inter-
national organisations it is surprising that the 
twenty-first annual report makes no mention of 
contacts with those whose activities most affect 
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
i.e. the nine-power political consultations and 
the European programme group whose forma-
tion and development directly concern the 
Council's study of the development of WEU's 
activities in the standardisation of armaments. 
Ill. Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
20. While the Council has constantly shown its 
desire to maintain good relations with the 
Assembly, the relationship between the two has 
developed, as is normal, in parallel with the 
evolution of the Council's activities. The Council 
has to be thanked for a number of measures 
which the Assembly finds satisfactory, and first 
and foremost for having sent the report on its 
activities in 1975 in time to meet the Assembly's 
requirements, as was already the case for the 
1974 report. It is likewise true that the Council 
has replied to a particularly large number of 
recommendations and eleven written questions 
and at the sitting in Bonn commemorating the 
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twentieth anniversary of the Assembly ministers 
from all seven member countries addressed the 
Assembly. Moreover, seven ministers from five 
countries addressed the Assembly at other sit-
tings during the twenty-first ordinary session. 
21. The Assembly also welcomes the fact that 
the reply to Recommendation 283 was endorsed 
by some WEU member countries and not all of 
them, thus bringing out, indirectly at least, the 
differences between its members on certain 
questions. The Assembly had been asking the 
Council to do this for a long time, such pro-
cedure being essential if the Assembly is to be 
properly informed not only about matters on 
which the seven countries are unanimous but 
also those on which they disagree. 
22. The Council's statement that : 
"Members of the Assembly were at liberty to 
question their governments whenever they 
wanted a more detailed consideration of 
various policy matters of particular concern 
to WEU" 
is of little value since it is contrary to normal 
government practice to reply to questions dealing 
with the policy of a third country. For instance, 
on 7th November 1975 Mr. Krieg put a written 
question in the National Assembly asking the 
French Minister for Foreign Mfairs whether 
some WEU member countries were questioning 
the paragraph of the Ottawa declaration 
recognising the importance of the French nuclear 
force. The French Minister's reply merely 
underlined the importance which France at-
tached to the terms of the declaration on 
Atlantic relations approved by the North 
Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19th June 1974, 
which gave little indication of the position of 
the WEU Council, which had declined to reply 
to Mr. Krieg's Written Question 160 put to it 
on the same subject. 
23. Furthermore, Mr. de Stexhe having put 
several questions on the Assembly's recommenda-
tions to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Mfairs, 
on 3rd January 1976 he received the reply that 
since WEU was dealing with these matters "it 
would be inappropriate for the Belgian Govern-
ment to give an individual reply to the above-
mentioned questions". These two instances show 
that the Council cannot leave it to governments 
to reply to questions put to it by members of 
the Assembly when they concern the application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
24. In general the Assembly is not satisfied 
with its present relations with the Council. 
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Although some of the replies to recommendations 
or written questions have been of importance -
reference has been made to some of them -
this has not generally been the case and it is 
difficult for the Assembly to accept replies such 
as were given to Written Questions 158 and 159 
on the effects of United States nuclear strategy 
on the western defence system. To say that "the 
Council are not in a position to appraise these 
matters" in fact amounts to saying that the 
Council is not in a position to apply the modified 
Brussels Treaty, which is quite unacceptable. 
25. Finally, the General Mfairs Committee still 
feels strongly about not being able to hold a 
joint meeting with the Council again in 1975. 
The luncheon to which it was invited after the 
ministerial meeting in London on 20th May 1975 
can in no way be considered equivalent to a 
joint meeting, since it was no more than a 
disjointed conversation between the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council and a number of WEU 
parliamentarians. The Council was thus in no 
position to discuss replies which committed only 
its Chairman-in-Office and consequently there 
was no real discussion between the Council and 
the Assembly. It should be added that since no 
minutes could be drafted after such a talk, it 
could in no way be likened to a joint meeting, 
although the members of the General Mfairs 
Committee will remember it as a useful and 
pleasant encounter. 
26. Insofar as the Council considers - as it 
has constantly asserted and in accordance with 
the Assembly's wishes - that the Assembly must 
be kept informed about all questions affecting 
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
even if the Seven use another institutional 
framework for such consultations, the Assembly 
cannot agree to the Council continually evading 
a discussion with the General Mfairs Committee 
on the major political questions set out in the 
questionnaire transmitted by the Committee for 
a joint meeting in 1975. 
IV. Conclusions 
27. In conclusion to this report, it seems dif-
ficult to believe that the Council is not shirking 
its duties in respect of the application of the 
political provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. As the Assembly has often stressed, it 
cannot agree to the Council anticipating the 
possible integration of WEU in the future 
European union and evading the tasks assigned 
to it by treaty, which will remain its responsibil-
ity as long as they have not been transferred 
to the European union by another treaty. More 
than any other, the twenty-first annual report 
of the Council gives reason to fear that this 
might be the case. 
28. Should the Council decide unilaterally to 
relinquish the role assigned to it by treaty, it 
4- I 
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would certainly not strengthen the European 
union but would rather leave it weak and power-
less for tackling defence problems which would 
be assigned to it sooner or later anyway. It 
should not be forgotten that as matters now 
stand WEU is still the only truly European 
body with treaty responsibility for defence 
questions. 
t.l. I 
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Draft Recommendation 
on detente and security in Europe 
The Assembly, 
Affirming that true East-West detente can be achieved only through substantial mutual, balanced 
and controlled reductions in armaments by both blocs ; 
Considering the growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet Union and 
its allies in Central and Northern Europe; 
Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final 
act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ; 
Regretting that in three years little or no progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR nego-
tiations; 
Concerned that the Soviet Union and its allies are still taking advantage of crises outside Europe to 
strengthen their political, economic and military positions in the world ; 
Considering that in face of the Warsaw Pact forces the members of the Atlantic Alliance no longer 
deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their collective security ; 
Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of detente, as 
this concept is interpreted in the West, a reduction of military strength in Western Europe has occurred 
without a lessening in the Soviet military threat ; 
Satisfied that matters emerging from the CSCE have played a large part in the Council's discussions 
in 1975; 
Considering that the application of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE on the movement of 
persons is one of the vital elements by which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire for detente ; 
Considering that there is still some uncertainty about the operation of NATO in the event of some 
members of the Atlantic Alliance falling prey to subversion directly or indirectly sustained by external mHi-
tary intervention ; 
Regretting that South Mrica's widely-condemned racial policies provided a pretext, although un-
justified, for Soviet and Cuban inte~vention in Angola, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Examine regularly the consequences of the CSCE ; 
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringements of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE ; 
3. Examine how great an effort each member country has to make to re-establish and maintain a secure 
balance between the forces of the two alliances in Central and Northern Europe ; 
4. Ensure that its members concert their views in the appropriate framework on any crisis arising out-
side Europe in order : 
(a) to avoid hasty action which might serve as a pretext for interference by the Soviet Union or 
its allies ; 
(b) to deter any further Soviet interference; 
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications for Western Europe of developments in the political, 
economic and military balance in Europe and the world ; 
6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in which the modified Brussels Treaty could be applied 
should one of the member countries fall prey to direct or indirect military intervention from outside. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Nowadays it is fairly current practice to 
compare the present phase of East-West relations, 
generally termed detente, with a preceding phase 
known as the cold war. The change from one to 
the other, it is said, came at about the time Ken-
nedy and Khrushchev were leading the two great 
world powers ; and these two personalities, each 
famous in his own way, are generally given credit 
for initiating measures intended to lead to far-
reaching changes in international relations. 
2. Fundamentally, one must not be mistaken 
about the different interpretations of detente. 
3. The West, until events have forced on them 
a more realistic appreciation, believed that the 
introduction of detente in place of cold war would 
lead and was intended to lead through relaxation 
of East-West tension to meaningful, peaceful 
coexistence, entailing mutual respect, without 
approval of each other's differing political, 
economic and social systems. 
4. From the Soviet point of view, i.e. the 
Marxist-Leninist principle of international rela-
tions as interpreted and exploited by the Krem-
lin for Russian nationalist purposes, there can 
be no real peace, either externally or internally, 
in an inexorable thread of contemporary history. 
Yet for easily-understood reasons it is now 
considered that this struggle has to be pursued 
within certain limitations imposed by the neces-
sity to avoid any risk of a nuclear war. 
5. Consequently, peaceful coexistence, which is 
the real basis of detente, is in Russian eyes not 
really peace but a continuing, expansionist 
imperialism (under the guise, for propagandist 
reasons at home and abroad, of a "class struggle"), 
using all means, other than those generally con-
sidered to be too dangerous. Even so, in the 
Soviet view there can be no doubt about the out-
come of their strategy : the establishment of a 
global Russian hegemony, masked, again, as "the 
victory of the proletariat", an inevitable process 
which could be jeopardised only if the capitalist 
powers were provoked into using weapons capable 
of radically destroying the strength of the coun-
tries representing the proletariat. It may even be 
said that, whereas in the Stalinist era military 
means were an integral, predominant part of the 
strategy of the Soviet Union, nowadays they are 
complementary. 
lOO 
6. This in no way means that the Kremlin is 
less aggressive or that its military strength has 
diminished. Quite the contrary ; for the safer it 
feels from a nuclear point of view and in terms 
of armaments in general, the more it will be 
tempted to advance as far as possible by other 
means, avoiding open warfare and so not putting 
at risk the gains acquired, particularly in Eastern 
and Central Europe, after the second world war. 
It may therefore be argued that in one, but only 
one respect, Soviet foreign policy is first and 
foremost a defensive policy insofar as the main-
tenance of existing Soviet colonialism in Europe 
is a continuing, fundamental aim. 
7. Otherwise, as was the case immediately after 
the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet Union now 
seems to be pursuing two quite distinct policies 
by different means. One is conducted with the 
Soviet State's own resources with a view to con-
solidating the status quo in Europe. The other is 
conducted through sometimes overt, sometimes 
covert support of rebel movements abroad, 
especially in the third world, or through activist, 
subordinate foreign communist parties, with a 
view not necessarily to establishing as a first step 
Soviet regimes in new territories, but primarily 
to weaken existing western or western-inclined 
positions and hasten the ruin of "reactionary 
capitalism", the phrase applied to all who stand 
in the way of Russian imperialism. 
8. Thus the Soviet Union no longer uses the 
same tactics as immediately after the first world 
war. Undeniably, its military strength has 
increased considerably and is still growing fast. 
On the other hand, the Soviet Union appears to 
be losing some of its grip on communist parties 
in countries inside and outside the Warsaw Pact 
and its influence on nationalist movements emerg-
ing throughout the third world. Many in all 
three categories seem increasingly to be as 
suspicious of the Soviet Union as of the West, 
no new country with two possible exceptions not 
occupied during the last quarter of a century or 
directly dominated by the Red Army has 
definitely joined the Soviet side : the first is 
Cuba, and the second is Indo-China - Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia - whose future allegiance 
is still in doubt. 
9. In reviewing the present state of detente we 
must first examine developments in the balance 
of military forces ; then consider the balance of 
political forces ; and finally review the real pro-
gress, if any, in the negotiations which seek to 
further detente, as we in the West and through-
out the uncommitted world understand that 
diversely-interpreted word ; i.e. a policy of live 
and let live allowing nations to place higher 
priority on social advances than on maintaining 
the military capacity to defend themselves. 
11. Balance of military forces 
10. At the end of the second world war, the 
military strength of the United States was 
overwhelming throughout the world. Thanks to 
its industrial lead, it had developed the most 
modern weapons, whereas the Soviet Union had 
been able to continue fighting only with 
American assistance. Furthermore, the United 
States was the only country to have nuclear 
weapons and for a long time it kept well ahead 
in this field. This provided it with an ultimate 
means of direct and indirect pressure on any 
enemy whatsoever and full security for its own 
territory. 
11. The Soviet Union has since made a sustained 
effort to catch up with and then overtake 
American military strength in every field. For 
instance, in 197 4 it was calculated that the Soviet 
Union had spent the equivalent of about $103,800 
million on defence, i.e. 10.6% 1 of its GNP, while 
the United States had spent only $92,700 million, 
i.e. 6.6 % of its GNP 2• In the event, as will be 
shown, its strength equals or exceeds that of the 
United States, just as the forces and resources 
of the Warsaw Pact equal or exceed those of the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
12. The Soviet Union has managed to do this 
only by maintaining a relatively low standard 
of living for its whole population and constantly 
giving priority to heavy industry and weapons 
industries over consumer goods. In addition it 
imposes the same constraints on its Warsaw Pact 
satellites. Conversely, during the same period, 
the western countries have devoted a far greater 
proportion of their gross national product to 
improving living conditions for the population. 
1. The British Defence Minister, reaffirming an earlier 
American report, announced on 18th May that a more 
accurate updated appraisal indicated a figure of an average 
11-12% over the last ten years. 
2. International Institute for Strategic Studies : The 
Military Balance 1975-76, London 1975, pages 5 and 8. 
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13. Thus, the Soviet Union now has a comparable 
nuclear capacity with the United States, greater 
if one contrasts 1,618 strategic missiles at the 
disposal of the USSR with 1,054 for the United 
States ; rather less if one takes into account the 
more numerous warheads fitted to American 
missiles and the present undoubted numerical 
superiority of the United States' nuclear bomber 
fleet ; greater again if one accepts that the 
USSR has seventy-five nuclear-armed sub-
marines, the Americans only forty-one. 
14. How this uneasy balance will be affected 
by two new weapons, the Russian Backfire 
bomber designed for long-range attack from 
distant bases, on the one hand, and the 
Americans' low-trajectory Cruise missiles, on the 
other, it is too early to say. 
15. Soviet superiority in conventional weapons 
is now beyond argument. According to The Mili-
tary Balance 1975-76, the United States deployed 
2,130,000 men in 1975 compared with 3,575,000 
for the Soviet Union. The number of Soviet air-
craft and tanks was also far greater. This 
disproportion is most marked in Northern and 
Central Europe, where the preponderance of 
Warsaw Pact forces and weapons has steadily 
increased in recent years. In Central Europe the 
Warsaw Pact countries have thirty-one armoured 
divisions, of which nineteen are Soviet, as com-
pared with twelve armoured divisions for NATO. 
Similarly, in Central Europe the Warsaw Pact 
has thirty-seven mechanised or airborne infantry 
divisions, of which twenty-one are Soviet, as com-
pared with fifteen for NATO. Admittedly, the 
Soviet divisions are less strong than NATO's and 
the ratio is only 895,000 troops (of which 595,000 
are Soviet) to 575,000 for NATO. 
16. The summary of the military balance of 
NATO along the central front vis-a-vis the 
Warsaw Pact is as follows : 
Total soldiers 
Soldiers in fighting 
units 
Main battle tanks 
Field guns 
Tactical aircraft 
NATO Warsaw Pact 
1 1.3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1.4 
2.7 
2.5 
2.3 
17. Only in Southern Europe, and for how long 
is uncertain, NATO still has a slight overall mili-
tary lead. But if the number of tanks deployed 
is considered, it can be seen that the Warsaw 
Pact has 19,000 in Central Europe and 7,250 
even in Southern Europe, whereas NATO has 
7,000 and 3,500 respectively. The total number 
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of fighter aircraft in Central Europe is 4,025 
for the Warsaw Pact, of which 2,400 are Soviet, 
compared with 2,000 for NATO, and, in Southern 
Europe, 930 for the Warsaw Pact compared with 
858 for NATO. 
18. It should be added that in an address to 
NATO leaders on 9th December 1975 Admiral of 
the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, RN, revealed 
that last spring the Soviet Union had for the first 
time used aircraft, instead of slower land 
transport methods, for rotating forces, which had 
cut rotation time by two-thirds. This means that 
it can strengthen its armies very quickly on any 
of its frontiers. 
19. In a recent statement to a United States 
Senate committee, the former Secretary of 
Defence, Mr. Schlesinger, said that the Soviet 
military effort was about 45% greater than that 
of the United States, and he estimated that there 
were 4, 700,000 Russian troops under arms ; i.e. 
twice the figure for the United States. This 
estimate is definitely higher than that given in 
The Military Balance but it may be considered 
that Mr. Schlesinger, when he said this, was best 
placed to receive information on the development 
of Soviet military strength. He also said that in 
recent years Soviet fighter aircraft production 
had been 70 % higher than that of the United 
States and that during the same period the Soviet 
Union had produced four times as many war-
ships as the United States, in its efforts to reach, 
then surpass parity. 
20. Turning now to the balance of naval forces 
which for a long time was tipped firmly in 
NATO's favour, this is obviously no longer so. 
The volume of current shipbuilding programmes 
in the Warsaw Pact countries - and particularly 
in the Soviet Union- suggests that the balance 
will shortly come down on the side of the Warsaw 
Pact. 
21. All available information about the develop-
ment of Soviet naval strength shows that 
although it does not yet outnumber the United 
States navy, Soviet warships are more modern 
and are being built at such an accelerated rate 
that in a year or two the Soviet navy may take 
the lead, numerically as well. 
22. In the Eastern Atlantic the balance of ready 
naval forces is as follows : 
NATO USSR northern fleet 
1 2 Surface ships 
Submarines 1 
Combat aircraft 1 
1.7 
1.5 
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23. This pressing development of Soviet military 
and naval strength demands that certain ques-
tions be answered. First, what is the purpose of 
this strength, since the strategic balance is still 
such that the Soviet Union cannot hope for a 
total military victory over the United States and 
its allies Y For it well knows that the United 
States would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons 
in any direct attack on the West and that Russia 
could not hope for shelter from unacceptable 
retaliatory destruction. 
24. Again, everything indicates that however 
strong the Soviet naval force may be, for geo-
graphic reasons it can hardly give the Soviet 
Union command of the seas. Despite the Soviet 
expansion its access to the open sea is still 
extremely difficult to maintain. This is, of course, 
clear in the case of the Mediterranean, where 
NATO's land positions should subject Soviet 
ships to destruction quickly after the outbreak 
of war, assuming that the Soviets still have no 
permanent land bases. It is common knowledge 
that they have tried to obtain such bases in 
Egypt, whence they have been now expelled, 
may still have some facilities in Mers-el-Kebir 
in Algeria, and outside the Mediterranean have 
succeeded in their aim in South Yemen and 
Somalia. Their lack of permanent harbour faci-
lities still extends to the Atlantic Ocean, to 
which the Soviet Union has possible access only 
from the north ; i.e. through the relatively nar-
row passages between Canada, Greenland, the 
British Isles and Norway, which could in the 
event be denied to the Soviet fleet in wartime. 
25. However, both Cuban loyalties and events in 
Angola may well provide future facilities in the 
South Atlantic : and the longer the Anglo-
Icelandic conflict lasts, the greater the danger 
not just of a break with NATO but instead even 
positive ties with Russia. 
26. It is, therefore, probable that Soviet naval 
development stems less from a desire to win a 
war which, in any event, would not remain 
purely naval, than from its determination to 
improve its military power and in consequence 
its political and economic positions throughout 
the world, without resort to war. Development 
of the Soviet navy obviously facilitates the 
establishment of such bases, also in the Indian 
Ocean, especially in the light of Britain's mili-
tary withdrawal from the whole area. Such bases 
might then be used to threaten the lines of com-
munication between members of the Atlantic 
Alliance and serve as a jumping-off point for 
expansion in Asia, Africa, or Latin America : 
as has already happened in Angola, due to the 
role that Cuba played, at the Kremlin's behest. 
27. For a long time, many observers explained 
the Soviet military effort as being a desire to 
catch up with and counterbalance Am~ric~n 
power. But it must now be noted that this aim 
has been reached and even significantly sur-
passed in some fields ; but there is still no sign 
of the Soviet Union even stabilising its arma-
ments efforts. On the contrary, they are still 
being accentuated. This means that its aim goes 
beyond its earlier declared purpose of obtaining 
parity. 
28. Even the attainment of parity was not 
necessary if defence was all the Kremlin had in 
mind. Western strategists always assert that to 
defend oneself in conventional weaponry and 
manpower against a potential aggressor, a ratio 
of one to three is sufficient. Yet the USSR seems 
determined, on the Central European front at 
least, to establish a ratio in excess of three to 
one and is steadily nearing this objective. 
29. Defence needs being irrelevant, therefore, 
what has the USSR in mind Y There are some 
possible conjectures other than nationalist, 
expansionist imperialism cloaked in an ideolo-
gical, political doctrine. 
30. There are, of course, those who seek to 
explain away the USSR's enormous and . still 
growing expenditure on armaments, conventional 
and nuclear, by Russia's fear of China and the 
threat that it presents to the Soviet Union's 
security. Your Rapporteur does not accept the 
validity of this point of view. It is, of course, 
true that Sino-Russian relations are very bad and 
their mutual hostility is virulent. Peking has 
never forgiven Moscow for the economic boycott 
that nearly wrecked their economy at the time 
of their dependence on the Soviet Union after 
the nationalists had been finally defeated. It is 
also true that the Chinese never lose an oppor-
tunity, in any age or at any leyel of society, to 
stress that large areas of their country have 
been illegally taken over by Russians during 
the last two hundred years and more, and in 
the schools maps still show substantial areas of 
Russia's eastern provinces as "temporarily 
occupied" parts of China. Having said this, 
China is in no economic state, nor are its armed 
forces adequate for an aggressive war against 
the Soviet Union. Their air force is very small, 
their capacity to deliver their comparatively 
limited nuclear weapons is at a very unsophisti-
cated stage of development, and they have vir-
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tually no navy at all. Their army is, of course, 
enormous numerically, but again their equipment 
does not match up in any way to the Russian 
armoury. Moreover, the biggest build-up of Rus-
sian offensive military might is on the European, 
northern and central fronts which have no 
relevance at all to a conflict with China. For 
their large submarine fleet could hardly be used 
in a Russo-Chinese war to any advantage, except 
possibly to deliver nuclear ~issiles whic~ the 
Russians could do far more easily and effectively 
from land bases in their Asian provinces. 
31. Moreover, none of the figures given in this 
report for the Russian and Warsaw Pact forces 
facing NATO with such an enormous prepon-
derance as against the West include any of the 
very large concentrations of troops and 
weaponry along their easte~ fla~. If one w~re 
to include those forces as bemg available to rem-
force the present menace to the West, the picture 
would indeed be even more black than it is. 
32. Another theory concerns the pres~nt eco-
nomic troubles facing the West. Certamly the 
Soviet Union is aware of the economic difficul-
ties of the West including the oil energy crisis 
since October 1973. Hence there may be fears, 
nonsensical and unreal, that the crisis may induce 
the West in desperation to use force to regain 
the economic positions in the third world which 
it has lost since the second world war ; and the 
Soviet Union wishes to be able to prevent this. 
33. Of course our economic problems undeniably 
are weakening the capitalist side in the economic, 
military and even political fields, thus providing 
the Soviet Union with an exceptional oppor-
tunity, at least if the situation r~mains un-
changed, of taking advantage of this weakness 
to intervene in areas where it had never yet been 
able to exercise a lasting influence. This has 
already proved to be the case in Angola where, 
for the first time, the Soviet Union has found 
a chance of gaining a firm foothold in Africa. 
In short the further weakening of the West 
would ~n the revolution which is to bring 
about victory for the proletarian, alias imperialist 
Russian cause throughout the world. 
34. The West as a whole is aware of the growing 
Soviet military potential, but clearly it does not 
yet intend to change a defence policy which 
seems to be more and more restricted by the 
various internal social and economic problems 
facing all the western countries ; except in the 
United States where a political decision to 
halt and reverse any further reduction in 
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defence spending has received bi-partisan 
public support. Most NATO allies earmark less 
than 5 % and some less than 4 % of their gross 
national product for defence, as against over 
10 % 1 by the USSR. If one uses the criteria of 
relative expenditure on defence on a per capita 
basis the West is particularly at a disadvantage 
compared with the USSR, the latter now even 
exceeding that of the United States. Problems 
caused by the economic crisis have hitherto led 
to reductions in the defence effort throughout 
NATO, notable exceptions being nowadays the 
United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Most recently France has announced 
that it will double its military spending during 
the next five years, devoting a bigger share of 
its arms budget to conventional forces entailing 
a rise on total defence expenditure to 22 % of 
the national budget by 1982 compared with 17 % 
this year. 
35. As was seen during the period just 
before the second world war, the democratic 
countries of Western Europe intent on solving 
social and economic problems, are not ready or 
willing to assume individual or even collective 
responsibility for their own defence on a Euro-
pean basis. Instead they seem prepared to risk 
their long-term security by continuing to rely 
on the American umbrella for the indefinite 
future. It should be recalled that if Britain, 
France and the other Western European coun-
tries had shown firmer political determination 
when confronted with the Nazi danger, and in 
particular had then made the necessary rearma-
ment effort, they might have managed to avoid 
a second world war taking place and would 
certainly have been able to shorten it. As it is, 
the West's defence is being impaired and it is 
to be feared that the repercussions could be 
even more serious than in 1940. 
UI. Political action 
36. If it is accepted that Soviet military strength 
is not being developed in order directly to pursue 
a strategy of expansion by means of arms, but 
only to reinforce one, a rationale can probably 
be found in its political techniques which vary 
from one part of the world to another. The 
Soviet challenge differs from country to country 
according to whether or not the local communist 
parties can hope to achieve power by legal means, 
1. See footnote to paragraph 11. 
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whether the countries are more or less developed, 
whether they have a large or small population 
or are more or less accessible to Soviet military 
and naval forces. In this view, there are several 
exceptionally sensitive areas in the world. 
37. Northern Europe offers a major field 
of activity for the Soviet Union. It contains 
only sparsely populated countries which could 
not alone defend themselves for long, if at all, 
except Sweden. Their territories are of primor-
dial strategic value because they are neighbours 
of the Soviet Union and dominate, geographically, 
the Soviet Union's access routes to the Baltic, 
North Sea and Atlantic Ocean. 
38. The Soviet Union would find it particularly 
worthwhile through political pressure to subor-
dinate them to its hegemonist policy - as it 
has already managed to do in the case of Finland 
- or to isolate them from the rest of the western 
world, then bring sufficient pressure to black-
mail them into neutralisation, including the right 
to use their territories, in times of war, or near-
war. 
39. In this context, Spitzbergen, Iceland and 
Greenland are of major importance, although 
or perhaps precisely because they are practically 
uninhabited. Certainly the Soviet Union has been 
continuously trying to obtain a share in Norway's 
influence in Spitzbergen. Norway has so far 
resisted this; but the Soviet Union has managed 
to have this territory, which commands the outlet 
:from its Arctic ports, demilitarised. Iceland's 
present dispute with the United Kingdom and 
several other members of the European Com-
munity over the claimed extension of its fishing 
rights has produced very tense relations within 
NATO, and Iceland has had no hesitation in 
threatening to withdraw from NATO if a satis-
factory solution is not found to the so-called 
cod war. Although Iceland's position is very 
weak juridically, cod :fishing represents more 
than 80 % of the country's exports. It is under-
standable that a country which has no other 
resources should use every means to protect its 
fishing interests ; more especially since most other 
powers are also demanding much expanded 
fishing limits of their own. 
40. Finland has proposed that the whole of 
Northern Europe be considered as a denuclearised 
zone for a very long time ; which would place 
it outside the system of protection, up to now, 
ensured by the Atlantic Pact. 
41. Other countries in that area, notably Nor-
way and Denmark, have consistently refused to 
swallow the bait. However, in the last few 
months the Soviet Union seems again to have 
taken up the main elements of Mr. Kekkonen's 
proposals. Its intentions are clear : to deprive 
NATO of control of the northern outlets of the 
Atlantic and thus allow the Soviet fleet unre-
stricted oceanic access to Africa, Latin America 
and elsewhere at all times. 
42. The Soviet Union can hardly hope for 
the Finlandisation or even the early neutralisa-
tion of Western Europe, but it can envisage an 
advance in this direction : to divide the countries 
of Western Europe through promoting interne-
cine hostility so as to bring them into conflict 
and prevent the Atlantic Alliance playing its 
role in the event of a crisis. To this end, it not 
only exploits Turco-Greek differences and the 
cod war ; but after a pause is again accusing 
unspecified revanchist elements in the Federal 
Republic of Germany of wishing to use force to 
change the de facto postwar map of Europe, 
although Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik included 
an understanding that the Soviet Union should 
drop the anti-German aspects of its propaganda. 
However, during the last MBFR talks it 
transpired that it was, as it has always been 
historically, German military strength rather 
than the presence of American forces in Europe 
which was and remains a basic subject 
of criticism by the Soviet Union and its allies. 
43. On the brighter side, although the com-
munist parties in Western Europe - in Por-
tugal, Spain, France and Italy - used to prove 
docile allies of the Soviet Union and often 
allowed themselves to be enrolled in the service 
of Soviet interests, the Kremlin's grip on their 
loyalties does now appear to be weakening. While 
their internal opposition to NATO, the EDC and 
the rearmament of the Federal Republic should 
not be forgotten, it would be a mistake to regard 
the apparent loosening of Russian control as 
wholly illusory. There is, too, no indication that 
the Soviet Union is seriously considering the 
likelihood of Western European communist par-
ties seizing absolute power in their own right at 
the present juncture. Yet the example of Por-
tugal has shown that local communists could be 
used to incite as much trouble as possible and 
seek to precipitate the internal disintegration of 
an important member of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Participation, too, by the Italian communist 
party in a coalition government is a real pos-
sibility in the not too distant future. Perhaps 
the same may be true of France, albeit in a longer 
time-scale. 
4*- I 
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44. This is probably the perspective in which 
we should consider the more open policy of the 
French and Spanish communist parties, whose 
political aim, for the time being, seems at the 
least to weaken their countries' effective partici-
pation in the Atlantic Alliance and at the same 
time to hinder any effective Western European 
union, which they probably fear might con-
siderably reduce their strength by diluting them 
in a grouping in which they would represent 
only a small minority of public opinion. Their 
Italian counterparts seem, for reasons which it 
is difficult to decide are genuine or tactical, to 
be developing a more conciliatory attitude to 
their country's NATO links. Nevertheless it is 
anyhow too early and hence dangerous to attach 
too much credence to recent statements made 
by these parties according to which they claim 
to be striking away from the Soviet line and to 
attribute permanent ideological value to posi-
tions which could well be due entirely to tactical 
considerations of achieving power first, softly-
softly, and then show their real hand, as did 
the Czech communist party, once in office. 
45. In this context, the Kremlin may have 
learned a lesson from its too precipitate attempts 
at a complete takeover in Portugal. There is little 
doubt that had their communist followers in 
Portugal contented themselves with a few min-
isterial posts while continuing to work for ulti-
mate complete control of the political and 
military machine, they might well have succeeded. 
Instead, the violent attempts to impose com-
munism in one stroke on an essentially-conserva-
tive people inflicted a serious setback. Never-
theless it would be premature to conclude that 
the rebuff they have suffered will prevent 
further endeavours. 
46. But the general elections on 25th April 1976 
showed that the Portuguese communist party 
obtained less than 15 % of the votes. With 40 
seats out of 259, it is not in a position to exerci..<;e 
a decisive influence on the leadership of the 
country by democratic means. 
47. The Soviet approach in the Middle East 
since the end of the second world war seems to 
be inspired by similar aims of emasculating the 
West, in its capacity and its will to resist further 
expansion. Bearing in mind the essential role 
of this area in supplying the West with oil, it 
is clear that the maintenance of a permanent 
state of friction and confrontation between Israel 
and its Arab neighbours or between various for-
ces within the Arab world can but weaken 
western positions and so jeopardise Europe's oil 
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supplies with all the attendant economic, social 
and political consequences. 
48. In that area, while Soviet military instal-
lations have up to now been of a temporary 
nature, the Russian Government has continued 
to deliver weapons to the countries with which 
it was on good terms and has thus at least 
encouraged them to pursue policies which prob-
ably brought it no immediate, direct reward, but 
from which per contra the West has suffered 
considerably, particularly after the Israeli-Arab 
war in 1973. Similarly, the prolongation of armed 
warfare within Cyprus and Lebanon can but 
continue to improve the Soviet Union's chances 
of future intervention without risk of promoting 
a major war. At the same time delicate situations 
for the West have been created in which the 
latter can protect its vital interests only by 
compromising its own desire not to become 
involved in the quarrels of others. 
49. The legacies of old colonialism have also pro-
voked violent anti-European reactions through-
out much of the underdeveloped world, and 
have thus helped to involve the West in a series 
of confrontations which have come near to 
exhausting their material and moral strength. 
In this respect the war on two fronts in Vietnam 
was particularly disastrous for the free world, 
since it made even totally committed western 
societies query the soundness of the values they 
were upholding. 
50. An even more recent case in point is 
Angola, where the Soviet Union, far from 
making no effort to hide its military and political 
assistance to the MPLA, has taken pride in 
doing so, both through the provision of arms 
and military advisers and by backing Cuban 
"volunteers". In the event the MPLA seems to 
have overcome all other nationalist movements 
in the country, albeit not necessarily permanently 
because tribalism in Africa is not amenable to 
Marxist concepts of society. 
51. In this instance the West was even more 
irresolute than usual, fearing, in spite of some 
encouragement to the contrary from a number 
of African States, that it was in danger of being 
condemned throughout most of the rest of the 
world for seeming to be propping up an apartheid 
South African Republic and a white minority 
in Rhodesia. In San Francisco on 3rd February, 
Mr. Kissinger recognised the western dilemma 
in this respect and hence its defeat in Angola 
but added: 
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"The United States Government has a duty 
to make clear to the Soviet Union and Cuba 
that Angola sets no precedent, that this type 
of action will not be tolerated again." 
52. The stake is now probably high enough for 
the West henceforth to demonstrate greater deter-
mination not to allow the Soviet Union further 
to exploit the ending of old style colonisation 
and so advance its influence across the African 
continent as far as the shores of the Atlantic. 
53. Soviet intervention in Angola confirms what 
Soviet leaders have often said, particularly 
during President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to the 
Soviet Union in November 1975. They are not 
thinking of detente, or of peaceful coexistence 
as we like to regard these aims ; to them, of 
course, these slogans are a proven successful 
method of allowing them to keep a grip on the 
countries they already control, while increasing 
their military strength and political influence 
elsewhere ; and of continuing to weaken remain-
ing western positions at no risk. The question 
now facing the West is to what extent it can 
allow itself to accede to Soviet proposals and 
continue to disarm, materially and morally, 
without risk of losing in advance the third world 
war which some observers think is already well 
under way, as Solzhenitsyn does, with never a 
shot being fired. 
IV. East-West negotiations 
54. To try to give substance to detente, the 
West instigated or agreed to a series of nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union in fields where 
it felt significant results could be achieved -
assuming mutual goodwill - by allowing cuts 
in military expenditure, by increasing trade and 
paving the way for political liberalisation within 
the Soviet Union and its allies. Results have been 
disappointing but the mere holding of negotia-
tions has encouraged public opinion, in the 
western countries at least, to believe that detente 
has become a reality and has justified reduced 
(western) efforts in the defence field. As long 
as negotiations continue on this "wishing will 
make it so" basis alone they must remain dan-
gerous for the Atlantic Alliance. The constantly-
diminishing proportion of the defence budget in 
the gross national product, and per capita, of 
most of the western countries is already proof 
of the magnitude of this danger. As long as 
detente is interpreted by the Russians as a 
stepping-stone to further expansion without risk 
of war, by the rest of us as a gain in terms of 
relaxation of tension, so shall we disregard at 
our peril the advantages which the ever-growing 
military strength by one, and only one, of the 
participants in detente puts in the hands of the 
USSR. 
55. This is the critical question in which pro-
gress in the various East-West negotiations 
should be measured. 
56. (i) The strategic arms limitation talks 
(SALT) were given fresh impetus by the meeting 
between President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev in 
Vladivostok. Another round of negotiations has 
since resumed, but, after a first agreement on 
keeping at the same level the strategic missiles 
which each side would have the right to hold, 
two difficulties have been encountered in draw-
ing up the texts due to the development of new 
weapons on both sides. The Soviets have long-
range bombers (Backfire) capable of reaching 
targets on United States territory from Soviet 
Pacific bases. The Americans have very low 
trajectory and very long range cruise missiles, 
purported to be capable of piercing any barriers 
which the Soviet Union might set up to defend 
its territory, despite their fairly low speed. The 
latter have agitated the Russians and for several 
months the negotiations have been in continuing 
difficulties over the characteristics of these two 
weapons. 
57. The development of Soviet intervention in 
Angola provoked immediate denunciation in the 
United States and prompted the American 
Government to seek political concessions ; i.e. 
respect for the principle of non-intervention in 
Angola, as a condition for signing the SALT 
agreement. This appears to have been the main 
purpose of Mr. Kissinger's visit to Moscow in 
January 1976. This effort was understandable 
in view of the Soviet Union's global strategy 
of using negotiations on armaments to obstruct 
the West's defence policy while continuing to 
initiate and adopt actions to undermine western 
positions whenever conditions permit. The 
American attempt failed, if only because the 
move was made too late. 
58. Despite this rebuff, Mr. Kissinger appears 
to have found a way of resuming the SALT II 
negotiations, without undue loss of face. However, 
it must be realised that the conclusion of a 
SALT II agreement would not noticeably alter 
the situation, nor would it allow, or hopefully 
encourage any significant reduction in the sums 
the Americans allocate for the defence of the 
West. 
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59. (ii) The mutual and balanced force reduc-
tion talks (MBFR) are also in difficulties. The 
Warsaw Pact countries have always insisted that 
all forces in Central Europe should be covered 
by the negotiations ; i.e. troops and tanks, air-
craft and tactical nuclear weapons. For a long 
time the West wished to limit the talks to land 
forces in the central sector. In December 1975 
it made a new offer, proposing to reduce the 
number of its tactical nuclear weapons on Euro-
pean territory from some 7,000 to 6,000 in 
exchange for the Soviet Union withdrawing 1,700 
of its tanks and 68,000 men. The United States 
also offered to withdraw 29,000 men from 
Europe. There would thus have been a definite 
move toward levelling out the number of tactical 
nuclear weapons deployed by both sides, and 
the overall level of Warsaw Pact forces would 
have drawn closer to that of NATO forces. 
60. The Warsaw Pact did not favour this pro-
posal, although it has not yet been formally 
rejected. Indeed it now seems that what the 
Soviet Union and its allies want is not so much 
just a reduction in American forces in Europe 
as, even more important, a reduction in the 
forces of the Federal Republic. Moreover, the 
Warsaw Pact countries still reject the essential 
aspect of the European approach, i.e. the prin-
ciple that the aim of the Vienna negotiations 
was and is to achieve equality in the conven-
tional force levels of the two alliances in Central 
Europe. They appear determined to maintain 
their superiority, basing their argument on the 
larger number of tactical nuclear weapons in 
NATO. 
61. It seems unlikely that the military negotia-
tions will succeed as matters now stand because 
of the deep-rooted political differences and suspi-
cions between the two sides. The lack of con-
fidence cannot be overcome by limited military 
cut-backs. Political problems make any real nego-
tiations on disarmament fruitless because the 
Soviet Union's apparent sole aim in considering 
any limitation of armaments is to allow the 
Warsaw Pact to consolidate its superiority, where 
it exists, and to attain parity where it does not 
exist. 
62. (iii) It is daily becoming more evident that 
the overall consequences of the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe which closed 
in Helsinki in August 1975, are disappointing. 
After conducting the negotiations with great care 
and many precautions, the western countries 
felt they should give public opinion reason for 
satisfaction as soon as possible, which led them 
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to agree to a rather unsatisfactory conclusion of 
a conference which, less hastily concluded, might 
have achieved really constructive results. 
63. The essential Soviet aim was to add a final 
juridical seal to the changes made to the map 
of Europe after the second world war which 
no peace treaty had ratified. Secondly, the Soviet 
Union sought to increase trade with western 
countries which in many fields were in a position 
to supply agricultural produce or consumer goods 
which the USSR desperately needed, and still 
needs. 
64. The West's aims were less clear, but there 
appears to have been some intent to take advan-
tage of the favourable situation which might 
arise from the conference, held at the request of 
the Soviet Union and its allies, to obtain a degree 
of ideological disarmament ; i.e. to transform 
peaceful coexistence into a more realistic defini-
tion of these words. This is probably why they 
insisted, or sought to insist, on the one hand on 
opening frontiers to the movement of persons 
and ideas, with few steps, if any, yet taken by 
the USSR to advance these aims, and the other 
on a number of military confidence-building 
measures. 
65. The compromises reached in the Helsinki 
final act could be considered acceptable if, and 
only if, applied identically by both sides, instead 
of one-sidedly. But in confidence-building 
measures, the only worthwhile achievement was 
acceptance of reciprocal notice of military 
manoeuvres in Europe involving more than 
25,000 men and the practice of inviting the other 
side to send observers to such manoeuvres. 
Notification of such manoeuvres has been given 
once by the USSR, seven times by NATO. 
The latter has, in regard to the major such 
manoeuvre, invited representatives of all the 
Warsaw Pact countries to send observers ; none 
accepted. The Soviet Union, on the single 
occasion of a notified manoeuvre, invited only 
two NATO countries - Greece and Turkey. 
66. (iv) This negative follow-up to Helsinki has 
been confirmed by the position adopted by the 
German Democratic Republic and the Soviet 
Union in their relations with the Federal Repub-
lic. This applies particularly as regards Berlin 
where in some respects there has been even a 
deterioration and the quadripartite agreement 
continues to be interpreted by the Russians in 
a most restrictive fashion. 
67. Two matters have illustrated the difficulties 
being encountered. 
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68. The first has involved children of former 
inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic 
who had escaped to the Federal Republic being 
handed over by the Pankow government to citi-
zens of the Democratic Republic for adoption. 
The correspondent of a German weekly who 
reported on these measures was expelled from 
East Berlin. However, in the end, the Federal 
Republic seems to have found a satisfactory 
solution to this particular problem. 
69. Secondly, the government of the German 
Democratic Republic agreed to sign an agree-
ment to improve access routes to West Berlin 
only if substantial financial concessions were 
made by the Federal Republic, which has under-
taken on the one hand to pay for the maintenance 
of these access routes on the territory of the 
German Democratic Republic itself, in the case 
of both the motorways and the railways. The 
Federal Republic has also made a large lump-
sum payment to allow western visitors to enter 
West Berlin. In all, the German Democratic 
Republic is expected to reap a financial profit 
of about DM 2,000 million per year from this 
new "accommodation" with the Federal Republic. 
The Federal Republic, however, derives some 
balancing advantages from the quadripartite 
agreement mainly with regard to transit access, 
affording a modest improvement in the quality 
of life for Berliners. 
70. Whether these negotiations have achieved 
anything or not, they clearly demonstrate that 
the Soviet Union can always count - or believes 
it can count - on the West to give ground 
rather than face an accusation of destroying 
detente! 
71. Thus the USSR can and often does achieve 
its aims whereas once the West embarks on 
any resistant positive reaction under ever-
stronger counter-pressure from public opinion, 
still bemused by an illusory detente, with the 
result that in the end it makes generous conces-
sions without any real guarantees that its own 
aims will be attained, or even its own basic 
interests preserved. As regards the limitation of 
armaments, a number of western countries have 
been making large-scale cuts in their defence 
budgets and consequently in their armaments 
since the MBFR talks opened although no results 
have yet been achieved. Similarly, the West 
accepted the hasty drafting of the Helsinki fina] 
act without obtaining the necessary assurances 
that its views would really be respected in the 
implementation of the agreement. 
72. Consequently, in many ways detente as now 
practised - in the West - appears to have 
much the same implications as did appeasement 
at the time of the Munich agreements. The few 
Soviet intellectuals who have managed to come 
to the West in recent years made no secret of 
the fact that this is how the Soviet Union sees 
western policy. Solzhenitsyn's protests against 
detente have been consistently damning. Is it 
surprising that, in the result, the USSR and its 
allies have the impression that Europe's position 
is weak and that the time is ripe for gaining as 
much ground as possible without resort to war, 
in order to prepare for the future, final victory 
of the Soviet Russian cause Y 
73. In summing up, must we not assume that 
it is the Soviet's purpose by the military threat 
of numbers and weapons and by the internal 
pressure of western communist parties to bring 
about the dissolution of NATO~ 
7 4. But the Russians are not supermen ; they 
too are suffering domestic economic difficulties 
and social strains. Their hold over Central and 
Eastern Europe does not seem as all-embracing 
as it was. The Sino-Soviet split is deep, and, 
whatever the implications of the recent political 
events in Peking, these do not seem to herald any 
early reconciliation. The Kremlin's communist 
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lackeys within the free world no longer dance 
100 % to their tune. 
75. In the conduct of its foreign policy, too, the 
USSR suffers its downs as well as its ups, as we 
in the West do. The rebuff by Egypt and the 
setback to their hopes of establishing a com-
munist or communist-dominated regime in Por-
tugal have been recent examples. 
76. So the Russians should not in their self-
confessed, expansionist aims neglect an impor-
tant lesson of history - the extraordinary will 
and capacity of free men everywhere, in the last 
analysis to resist and ultimately overcome chal-
lenges, from any source, to their cherished 
freedoms. 
77. Presently their Achilles' heel is their ina-
bility without external aid to feed their own 
people. 
78. In these circumstances and although we 
should seek to increase, not decrease East-West 
trade, on fair commercial terms there is a grow-
ing number of people in the West not least in 
the United States who find it difficult to support 
the export of foodstuffs to the USSR to enable 
it to continue to divert a disproportionate amount 
of its resources to armaments - to build more 
tanks at the cost of fewer tractors. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Detente and security in Europe 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Richter and Lord Peddle 
14th June 1976 
1. In paragraph 4 of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "little or no" and insert "little 
or insufficient". 
2. Leave out paragraph 5 of the preamble and insert : 
"Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen its 
political position by military means ;". 
3. In paragraph 6 of the preamble, leave out "no longer" and insert "should". 
4. Leave out paragraph 7 of the preamble. 
5. Leave out paragraph 11 of the preamble and insert : 
"Regretting that South Africa's widely-condemned racial policies and later intervention provided a 
pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola,". 
6. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "re-establish and". 
Signed : Dankert, Richter, Peddie 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Parts 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 fell; part 4 withdrawn). 
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Amendment No. 2 
Detente and security in Europe 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. RadifiB 
In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper : 
(a) leave out "re-establish and"; 
14th June 1976 
(b) leave out "a. secure balance between the forces of the two a.llia.nces in Central and Northern Europe" 
a.nd insert "a. sufficient balance in order to ensure peace". 
Signed : Radius 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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Amendment No. 3 
Detente and security in Europe 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Radius 
14th June 1976 
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "direct or indirect';. 
Signed : Radius 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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Amendment No. 4 
Detente and security in Europe 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett 
15th June 1976 
Leave out the draft recommendation in Document 703 and insert a revised draft recommendation 
as follows: 
"The Assembly, 
Affirming that true East-West detente can be achieved only through substantial mutual, balanced, 
and controlled reductions in armaments by both blocs ; 
Considering the growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet Union and 
its allies in Central and Northern Europe; 
Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final 
act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ; 
Regretting that no recent progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations; 
Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen its 
political position by direct or indirect military means ; 
Concerned that in face of increasingly powerful Warsaw Pact forces the members of the Atlantic 
Alliance will no longer deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their continuing collective security ; 
Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of detente, as 
this concept is interpreted in the West, a relative reduction of military strength in Western Europe has 
occurred vis-a-vis the Soviet military threat; 
Satisfied that matters emerging from the CSCE have played a large part in the Council's discussions 
in 1975; 
Considering that the application of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE on the movement of 
persons is one of the vital elements by which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire for detente ; 
Considering that there is still some uncertainty about the operation of NATO in the event of some 
members of the Atlantic Alliance falling prey to subversion directly or indirectly sustained by external 
military intervention ; 
Regretting that South Mrica's widely condemned racial policies and intervention provided a pretext, 
although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
I. Examine regularly the consequences of the CSCE ; 
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringements of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE ; 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Vote postponed to the next Sitting). 
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3. Examine how great an effort each member country has to make to maintain a continuing adequate 
balance to ensure peace with security ; 
4. Ensure that its members concert their views in the appropriate framework on any crisis arising out-
side Europe in order : 
(a) to avoid hasty action which might serve as a pretext for interference by the Soviet Union or its 
allies; 
(b) to deter any further Soviet interference; 
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications for Western Europe of developments in the political, 
economic and military balance in Europe and the world ; 
6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in which the modified Brussels Treaty could be applied 
should one of the member countries fall prey to direct or indirect military intervention from outside." 
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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. de MontflBqUiou 
(Chairman) ; MM. Warren, Riohter (Vice-Chairmen) ; 
MM. AdriaenaflfiB, Boucheny (Substitute : Cemeau), Mrs. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on European aeronautical policy -
guidelines emerging from the colloquy 
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 
Acknowledging the conclusions of the colloquy on a European aeronautical policy held in Toulouse 
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 under the aegis of its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions ; 
Aware of the difficulties in the aeronautical industry, which employs 400,000 persons, and the air-
lines, and the threats to the very existence of these sectors which may have serious consequences for Europe's 
security and well-being; 
Convinced that without an affirmation of political determination the governments concerned will 
be unable to take joint action to safeguard this industry; 
Regretting that governments have not yet adopted a position on the action programme for the. Euro-
pean aeronautical sector proposed by the Commission of the European Communities on 1st October 1975 ; 
Reiterating its regret that there is a risk of Eurocontrol being dismantled ; 
Aware that the problems cannot be solved through protectionism and the creation of a closed Euro-
pean market ; 
Advocating on the contrary an investigation of world markets and of possibilities of co-operation 
with the United States on a basis of equality and reciprocity and not as subcontractors, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Promote the creation in each member country concerned of a national aeronautical council associat-
ing, for instance, representatives of parliaments, ministries, manufacturers, arilines and trades unions under 
the chairmanship of the appropriate government representative ; 
2. Invite the national aeronautical councils to form a European aeronautical council to: 
(a) develop together with the Commission of the European Communities a European aeronautical 
manufacturing programme with a view to developing, producing and marketing large civil air-
craft; 
(b) arrange for joint financing for marketing these aircraft and study the possibilities of a European 
Import-Export Bank ; 
(c) ensure that Concorde remains in production and that Europe is able to benefit from the technical 
lead thus acquired ; 
(d) establish a civil aviation agency for Western Europe responsible for European airworthiness cer-
tification ; 
(e) develop in concert with the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) a joint policy for air 
transport and examine the possibilities of adopting a joint European position in negotiations 
between Western Europe and the rest of the world on problems such as landing rights and 
recognition of European airspace ; 
3. Create a study group to determine the military aircraft requirements of member countries in liai-
son with the Standing Armaments Committee ; 
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge the member States of Eurocontrol: 
4. To set themselves as a long-term aim in the future Eurocontrol convention, which will be applied as 
from 1983, the establishment of a joint agency for the control of air traffic networks, including major ter-
minal areas ; 
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5. To standardise equipment and systems to the maximum for the sake of efficiency and economy and 
in particular make a joint study in the Eurocontrol agency of new systems to be brought into service as 
from 1985; 
6. To draw up a common industrial policy for applied electronics in these fields, giving priority, when 
calling for tenders, to industries in the member States of the Eurocontrol community, and maintain a joint 
investment budget in the future agency with a view to procuring the said equipment through the agency ; 
7. To make the maximum use of the Eurocontrol agency in the field of research and development and 
draw up a joint research and development programme to avoid duplication wherever possible. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren, Rapporteur•) 
Introduction 
1. For the second time in three years the 
Committee organised a colloquy on European 
aeronautical policy, the first being held in Paris 
and this one in Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd Febru-
ary 1976. This report will analyse the guiding 
concepts and approaches which emerged during 
the two days of discussions between parlia-
mentarians, representatives of the aeronautical 
industries, airlines, European metallurgical 
unions and the national government departments 
concerned. 
2. Great changes have taken place in the out-
look for the aeronautical industry since 1973. 
The energy crisis and the consequent need to 
reduce fuel consumption have obliged indus-
trialists to make fundamental changes in the 
design of airframes and engines, which are the 
more difficult because of rising research, devel-
opment and production costs. In the early 1970s 
it was believed that air travel would develop 
by 15 to 18% a year. The present estimate is 
not more than 3 or 4% a year. This will mean 
that replacement of aircraft will take much 
longer than was foreseen some years ago and 
the next stage of technological improvement 
might materialise towards 1980 when the airlines 
will have to replace their then aging fleets of 
aircraft such as the Boeing 707 and the DC-8. 
Even quieter and more efficient engines than 
the RB-211 and CF-6 will have to be developed 
and NASA in the United States has earmarked 
important sums in its budget for this purpose 
which have to be matched by comparable Euro-
pean investment. 
3. Although co-operation in Europe should be 
extended beyond the mere sharing of develop-
ment and production - which everybody had 
hoped to achieve long ago - possibilities are 
now more restricted than in the past when many 
co-operative projects were concluded. Till 1975 
the emphasis was mainly on intra-European co-
operation. Now, co-operation with the United 
States is considered essential for the future of 
the aircraft industry. The French Secretary of 
State for Transport, Mr. Cavaille, said in his 
opening speech at the colloquy that such co-
operation was acceptable as a common venture 
between equal partners. An aeronautical Europe 
could not be founded on doctrines alone or on 
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abstract structure but required patience, un-
remitting application and the will to make 
progress, no matter how limited, whenever pro-
gress was possible, all within the indispensable 
framework of a realistic picture of the situation. 
4. It was generally regretted that no British 
Minister took part in the discussions and there 
was therefore no official comment on the nation-
alisation projects now being submitted to the 
British parliament. Nor was any German Min-
ister able to attend and give the views of his 
government on the future structure of the 
German aeronautical and space industry. The 
Minister in charge of co-ordinating all Federal 
aeronautical and space activities drew up a 
report in November 1975 and it would have 
been extremely useful if he had been able to 
comment on his report. 
5. The Committee conveys its most sincere 
thanks to Mr. Vergnaud, President of the 
Institute of Air Transport and President and 
Director-General of Air Inter, who acted as 
General Rapporteur in drawing conclusions from 
the colloquy and giving the Committee and the 
other participants the benefit of his wide know-
ledge and experience. 
I. Political aspects 
6. All those who attended the colloquy were 
convinced that Europe had to maintain its civil 
and military industrial capability and remain 
a centre of invention and innovation. Europe's 
security calls for a dynamic approach and can-
not be ensured if our countries fail to develop 
their technology and resources at the same rate 
as the most advanced countries. At the same 
time, the individual State is too narrow a frame-
work for the industry, which can exist and 
develop only in a wider European context. 
7. The links between aeronautical and defence 
policy are obvious, since 60 to 70% of the 
aeronautical industry is concerned with the pro-
duction of military equipment. If Europe is to 
defend its armaments industry it cannot allow 
its aeronautical industry to become nothing 
more than a subcontractor for its American 
counterpart. At the same time Europe must 
safeguard vital interests - employment, inde-
pendence, balanced trade, technological level -
that would be seriously threatened if it were 
excluded from the aeronautical world. 
8. It is regrettable that the Western European 
countries are taking so long to adopt a common 
position on a matter which governs the whole 
future of such an essential industry as the air-
craft industry. On 1st October 1975, the Com-
mission of the European Communities submitted 
its action programme for the European aero-
nautical sector which is just one of many reports 
which go unheeded by the Council of Ministers. 
The national parliaments should demand to 
know the reasons for the Council's failure to 
act. 
9. It is essential for Europe to have a powerful 
technological presence on the world stage, not 
only as a strategic arm for Europe's defence 
and transportation requirements, but also for 
Europe's foreign policy. United, Europe will 
stand to gain, but divided it will fall victim to 
ruthless competition from elsewhere and in this 
event European defence and foreign policy will 
be influenced and dictaJted by others. However, 
closer integration and co-ordination of Europe's 
total aerospace industry will not be easy. Time 
and again it has been pointed out that there 
must be a political and industrial desire to bring 
it about. 
10. There is still a great deal of nationalism 
in Europe as was shown during the Luxembourg 
summit conference on 2nd and 3rd April 1976. 
The Federal Chancellor, Mr. Hellmut Schmidt, 
summed up this meeting by saying: "Those who 
were expecting nothing, had every reason to be 
satisfied." In this field, as in many others, 
nationalism is political as well as industrial. 
Industry follows the market and, if its market 
is naJtional, it concentrates on that; if it is Euro-
pean, that market will be its goal, and if it is a 
world market, it will adjust to that level. Europe 
may not want or need federalism, but if it is 
to save itself it has to act in industrial affairs. 
11. The Committee's concern is that while there 
is much talk markets are being lost. This is the 
more regrettable as all ·western European 
countries are using public money to give increas-
ing support to aircraft production and air 
transport. With increased government participa-
tion with public money to safeguard and 
redevelop the aircraft industry and airlines 
there should be a greater effort to work together 
at all levels for the benefit of Europe and the 
workers in these advanced industries. 
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12. A political will to create and develop a 
European aeronautical market is fundamental. 
It must assert itself as quickly as possible on 
specific concrete points. This political purpose 
must go hand in hand with technological devel-
opment. 
13. There will be no future aircraft market for 
Europe unless it can assert a European political 
purpose. This condition is essential although not 
sufficient in itself. Moreover, the European 
industry has to build fully-competitive aircraft 
with guaranteed a:flter-sales support in the 
framework of programmes involving whole 
families of aircraft. 
U. Military aspects 
14. In the Committee's report on the European 
aeronautical industry1 it was found to be un-
believable that despite all the years of discussion, 
intelligent analysis, and political debate, so little 
was achieved within Europe to bring about a 
unified aerospace market in either the military 
or commercial fields. A solution to this lack of 
progress has to be found, certainly in the mili-
tary sense, if the capability of the Warsaw Pact 
countries is to be matched by the Atlantic 
Alliance. Western Europe must pay greater heed 
to the utilisation of its financial and technical 
resources in the selection of aeronautical equip-
ment. 
15. The military market in Europe is a highly 
political one because the ultimate customers are 
the governments of the Western European coun-
tries which, although the purchasers, are not 
the users. The users are the armed forces serving 
the governments. The distinction between pur-
chaser and user must be clearly observed and 
the effect of their choices on the economy of 
Europe evaluated. 
16. All governments seek to keep defence 
expenditure at as low a level as possible and at 
the same time have to come to grips with the 
competitive demands of the armed forces. The 
result is that individual armies, navies and air 
forces very seldom get exactly what they hoped 
for. 
17. With the multiplicity of governments and 
their separate fighting services, a united 
Western European market for defence equip-
1. Document 691, Rapporteur: Mr. Warren. 
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ment is certainly an ambitious aim. This has 
been the case now for more than twenty years 
- ever since Western European Union and 
NATO set common production and standardisa-
tion as their objectives. Yet ambition still 
remains ahead of reality. 
18. Integration of national operational require-
ments by the various national operational 
requirements staffs is necessary before harmon-
ising and agreeing on weapons specifications. 
This is an essential prerequisite of a more uni-
fied market. As was pointed out in the above-
mentioned report by the Committee, the political 
power has been available for many years and 
it is now necessary to show the political will. 
19. Machinery should therefore be set up to 
improve the harmonisation of operational require-
ments between European armed forces. This 
could follow from a European study on opera-
tional requirements under the aegis of the WEU 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
20. Manufacturers should show their willing-
ness to relinquish some of their individual com-
mercial and technical aspirations. If the govern-
ments now decided to pull together politically 
an effective method of collaborative procurement 
could be defined. This would improve the 
defence of Europe, the efficiency of its industry 
and reduce demands on taxpayers. 
21. The lesson learned last year by the decision 
of four European governments to buy the 
American F-16 combat aircraft was translated 
into a reaction of Western European manu-
facturers which through AECMA's President 
wrote to a number of Defence Ministers of Euro-
pean NATO countries making broad proposals 
for closer integration. Greater efficiency would 
make European defence equipment more com-
petitive internationally, and as a result pros-
pects would be very much improved in two ways: 
first, because European products would be 
cheaper and, second, wasteful intra-European 
competition would be significantly reduced. 
22. Although many bilateral and trilateral co-
operative programmes such as Alpha-Jet, Jaguar 
and the multi-role combat aircraft have been 
successful, intra-European competition has often 
been irrational and has inevitably benefited 
competition from the United States. 
23. Too often European governmental author-
ities have not realised that the American slogan 
"time is money" applies to them as well and 
that their decisions must be synchronised with 
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the planned unfolding of a project. One of the 
greatest secrets of American efficiency is the 
speed with which projects are implemented. It 
must be fully realised that when Europe buys 
military aircraft from the United States it is to 
the detriment of Europe's economy and Europe's 
aircraft industry. 
24. If the volume of purchases increases still 
further it will be a mortal threat to Europe's 
aircraft industry. 
25. Compensation deals offered by American 
industry are of only limited interest to Europe's 
industry and certainly not adequate. Europe's 
efforts must therefore be explicitly directed 
towards achieving true reciprocity with the 
United States. If the United States expects 
continued freedom to sell in Europe, an equal 
deal must be available for European industry 
in the United States. 
26. The Assembly of WEU has often pressed 
for effective joint development and procurement 
of weapons in Europe. Now at last there are 
signs of a wider movement of opinion and of 
the beginnings of action. Attached to the action 
programme of the Commission of the European 
Communities of 1st October 1975 is a draft 
resolution relating to the purchase and develop-
ment of aircraft weapons systems. In December 
the European Parliament passed a resolution 
advocating a European arms procurement 
agency. At the time of the colloquy a meeting 
of an ad hoc group was held in Rome outside 
the NATO framework bringing together the 
members of Eurogroup and France. What is 
needed now is identification of the organisation 
in Europe which can found and sponsor the 
agency. 
27. Discussions are now taking place on setting 
up an international secretariat for a procure-
. ment agency. Its tasks are evident: it should 
procure, where possible, existing European 
equipment for common tasks and bring together 
the bargaining power of all Europe in discus-
sions with the United States on procurement 
deals. It also should identify possible areas for 
joint development within Europe. Several of the 
smaller countries of the European Communities, 
and especially the Netherlands, believe that such 
an agency should be set up inside the European 
Community framework in order to establish a 
link with the Community on industrial policy. 
However, in view of the special nature of arma-
ments procurement and the political and mili-
tary weight attached to the manufacture of 
armaments, not forgetting export possibilities 
for the countries concerned, it seems unlikely 
that the larger Europea.'l countries would accept 
Community authority in this field. 
28. The question of trying to sort out a unified 
supply and procurement system for aircraft 
weapons systems is very complex but unified it 
has to be if action on the civil aeronautical side 
is to be taken. In the fields of engines and elec-
tronics, it is quite clear that no progress can 
be made if civil research and development of 
these systems is not associated with military 
requirements and budgets. 
29. It is obvious that in this field industrial 
co-operation is totally dependent on co-operation 
between the armed forces of the various coun-
tries. However, since the number of European 
industries is too large for the practical participa-
tion of all of them in a single programme, 
European-level co-operation is politically con-
ceivable only within the range of a political and 
military agreement on the entire range of 
combat, training, transport and special mission 
aircraft which respond to the defence needs of 
the continent. It is only in the context of a 
"domestic" programme of such vast dimensions 
that the European aeronautical industry can 
continue to compete on a world scale. In prin-
ciple, it seems reasonable to conceive that in 
face of total European requirements it should 
be possible to create a certain number of indus-
trial groupings, each responsible for the con-
struction of one or more types of aircraft, ensur-
ing that all the firms are assigned a sufficient 
volume of work to enable the regular perform-
ance of industrial activities and satisfactory 
participation in technological progress. Whether 
co-ordinated co-operation on such a scale is 
attainable is still questionable. For many years 
the Assembly has urged governments to inte-
grate the logistics of all its armies into a Euro-
pean or NATO framework. Not much progress 
has been made so far; it is again an essentially 
political and military problem and its solution 
rests with governments and armed forces and 
may finally have to depend on the achievement 
of European political unity. 
30. It has often been stated that continuous inter-
ference by American Government representatives 
or by those of American companies has led Euro-
pean governments to purchase American aircraft 
or other weapons systems. These American suc-
cesses however are mainly due to Europe's inabil-
ity to agree on its own military specifications. 
The continuing sad story of the TSR-2, the Mirage 
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series, the MRCA and the ACF (avion de combat 
futur) and now again the F-16 is the story of 
continuous failure to unify the variety of views 
and national interests. 
31. The history of F-104 replacements started 
already in 1967 when five European nations and 
Canada more or less reached agreement on the 
basic requirements for a successor to the F-104, 
but failed to follow this up. At least five combin-
ations of successive national air staffs and repre-
sentatives of the economic ministries have been 
working on this issue and in the end the F-16 
was considered the only acceptable choice for 
the money available. This example shows that 
it is extremely difficult to bring in under one 
European roof all our diverging tactical and 
strategic concepts, our different operational 
views and the converging interests of our econo-
mies. But it illustrates that the difficulties could 
have been overcome if the political will had been 
present. 
32. The most difficult problem facing the Euro-
pean aircraft industry is not how to organise 
itself or how to finance future projects but to 
agree on the types of aircraft the industry 
should restrict itself to. The answer to this 
question might only be found after some sort of 
European political union has been established. 
However, for the European aircraft industry 
this might be too late and the governments 
should be well aware of the fact that they cannot 
continue to evade difficult political and military 
questions if they wish to remain able to assure 
Europe's security and to retain a viable aero-
nautical industry in Europe. 
Ill. The civil aeronautical market in Europe 
33. According to the 1st October 1975 study 
by the Commission of the European Commun-
ities, prepared for its action programme, the 
United States market from 1969 to 1974 repre-
sented slightly less than half the western market 
for civil transport aircraft, the rest of the world 
and the European continent sharing the 
remainder almost equally. The Commission also 
observed that the European aeronautical indus-
try's share of sales in Europe was diminishing 
whereas the number of aircraft in use or on 
order throughout the world was steadily increas-
ing. 
34. In the last ten years European commercial 
aircraft manufacturers have lost ground in all 
DOCUMENT 704 
markets including their own domestic market. 
There has been a marked expansion however in 
the European markets for civil transport air-
craft; it increased from 14.7% of the world 
market in 1970 to 18% in 1974. Conversely, in 
the same period the share of European-produced 
equipment fell from 33% of the European 
market to 20.2% and from 9.5% of the world 
market to 5.9%. In the coming ten years Europe 
will probably spend some $10,000 million on new 
aircraft. 
35. The views of the European manufacturers 
vary on the solutions to the possibilities of 
capturing this $10,000 million market. The 
manufacturers of airframes prefer intra-
European collaboration whereas engine manu-
facturers consider it is essential to seek Ameri-
can partners because of the worldwide dimension 
of the market. The latter feel that the engine 
requirements of the European airframe manu-
facturers are insufficient to uphold the Euro-
pean industry. Any new civil engine should gain 
a foothold in the American airframe market if 
it is to survive. 
36. The airlines believe that even if the home 
of one product is Europe, capital intensive 
technology requires not a regional but a world 
market if one does not want subsidised order 
production without competition. The logical 
consequence of each kind of protectionism in 
the home market would be to completely shut 
off the world market. It is therefore very dif-
ficult to talk about a single aeronautical market 
for Europe. There is the market of the airframe 
manufacturers, the market of the engine manu-
facturers, and the single transport market -
the market of the airlines. 
(a) Airframe industry 
37. To quantify the European aircraft market, 
an ·approximation indicates that the European 
market in 1990 will represent the following new 
requirements for the European fleet: 
- 300 short/medium-haul aircraft of the 
160-seater type; 
- 350 shortjmedium-haul aircraft of the 
200-260-seater type; 
- 100-150 long-haul aircraft of the 200-
seater type; 
- 300 long-haul aircraft of the Boeing 747 
type. 
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38. For the short-haul low-density market and 
for a distance of not more than 2,000 km, 
Fokker-VFW is studying the possibility of 
building a follow-up of the F-28 Fellowship for 
some 100 passengers with an eye to sales of more 
than 400 aircraft over a ten-year period. 
39. The question is whether the European 
market is a specific one. The answer is that it 
could be a specific one and have its own special 
character, but that for economic reasons a spe-
cific European market is not possible. All Euro-
pean airlines want to standardise their equip-
ment and the aircraft industry must sell its 
products throughout the world. For aircraft 
production to be profitable, a minimum of some 
400 must be built per series. The figures quoted 
above for the numbers of aircraft required by 
Europe clearly show that profitability can be 
achieved only if there is significant penetration 
in the rest of the world, and if possible in the 
United States as well. 
40. One should recognise that public money 
is now being used to finance the purchase of 
much of the equipment for Europe's civil air-
lines. This public money is supplied by the 
European taxpayer and he is certainly not 
satisfied when he notices that his money is being 
spent to buy foreign aircraft while the home 
industries are working below their capacity and 
unemployment levels in Europe are rising. The 
action programme of the Communities recognised 
this fact and proposed to establish a common 
policy for the civil aircraft industry. The pro-
posals by the Community however seem much 
too radical to be implemented now or in the near 
future. Their solution calls for a single direc-
torate to surmount present problems. This 
however seems to go too far beyond the degree 
of integration actually possible for it to be 
achieved in the matter of aviation policy and 
probably for it to be acceptable to national air-
craft industries. 
41. The key to the Communities' proposals is 
whether the major governments and industries 
are prepared to commit themselves to a transfer 
of competence and authority to the Commission 
to develop a European programme and to deal 
with outside countries on a Community basis. If 
key individual States are going to make bilateral 
deals with individual major American aircraft 
companies it will become impossible to organise 
a common European aircraft industry and every-
thing which has been gained, as for instance in 
the case of Airbus, will be endangered. 
(b) Aero-engine industry 
42. For the engine manufacturers any major 
new civil project must be aimed at meeting the 
requirements of the United States market. The 
very nature of the world air transport business 
will ensure that the American customer sets the 
standards for many more years to come. The 
Europeans should not therefore allow themselves 
to be misled into thinking that they can go it 
alone on major new civil projects. They might 
only waste more vast sums of money. 
43. For the Americans the rapidly-increasing 
market opportunities in Europe mean however 
that they would also prefer the next major com-
mercial engines to be undertaken as trans-
atlantic collaborative projects. This however 
would entail complete partnership in design, 
manufacture, marketing and risk-sharing. 
44. In order to ensure flexibility of the aero-
engine industry so that it can react to market 
pressures without continued reference to 
cumbersome multinational bureaucracies a 
degree of centralised overall policy from the 
European Communities could be accepted. 
45. The Communities could also, basing them-
selves on national research institutes and organ-
isations, play a role in research and development 
of new aero-engines. Finally the Communities 
could play a role in arranging to finance the 
customers of the aircraft industries. Such a 
financial role could be a key . factor in securing 
sales. It must be remembered that airframes, 
engines and equipment each make up one-third 
of the value of an aircraft. Ground support, 
including training equipment, adds a further 
dimension to aviation business opportunity. 
46. The present individual systems: ECGD 
(United Kingdom), COF ACE (France), HER-
MES (Germany), etc., could be used to force 
a European capability to match the Export-
Import Bank by which American support to 
exporting companies operates. Europe should 
certainly be outward-looking in evolving its 
policy and not commit itself to artificial pro-
ducts for artificial markets. In the aero-engine 
industry, Rolls-Royce, MTU, SNECMA and Fiat 
have felt the need to enter into collaboration 
with United States partners for future new 
engines but, at the same time, they exploit their 
own existing inventions. What is especially 
needed is a quicker decision-making process to 
avoid losing the race. Europe should build on 
existing companies and amalgamations and not 
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create new ones. These companies should have 
proper commercial liberty, free from bu~e~u­
cratic interference, but encouraged by JOint 
government action. 
(c) Air transport industry 
47. After the complete failure of Air Union 
some European airlines realised that by tackling 
political problems first they had put the cart 
before the horse. In consequence, they concen-
trated their co-operative efforts on certain fields 
that warranted joint forces in order to meet the 
increasing demand on capital investment. The 
technical consortia Atlas and KSSU emerged, 
centred on the introduction of the Boeing 747 
and DC-10. It is mainly in the technical traffic 
and operational field that the airlines suffer 
from a variety of different legislations and rules. 
Promising activities in this respect have already 
started in the European Civil Aviation Con-
ference (ECAC). 
48. From the airlines' point of view a single 
European market for aeronautical products 
might not be so advantageous if it meant that 
they would have to order an aircraft for purely 
national or European reasons. They would there-
fore not agree with the Committee's report. w~en 
it expressed the wish that European airlines 
accept the Airbus in their fleets since this !lir-
craft is a European venture. Here however IS a 
misunderstanding. The report wished to empha-
sise that European governments should make it 
attractive for European airlines to buy Euro-
pean products as the United States does. 
49. The situation of the aircraft industry is 
amply illustrated by the report of the Commis-
sion of 1st October 1975 from which two facts 
emerge: (i) the productivity of the United States 
aircraft industry is twice that of the European 
industry; times have long since passed w~en 
this discrepancy was outweighed by an eqUiva-
lent wage gap; (ii) the relation of initiated air-
craft projects to those finally carried out and 
brought on the market has been five times as 
high in Europe as in the United States. The 
only way in which the Europeans can stand up 
to the Americans is by arriving at production 
costs enabling them, if not to undercut, at least 
to negotiate on roughly the same footing as 
American manufacturers. 
50. The European aircraft industry suffers 
from over-capacity against indigenous demands 
when the United States is so successful in selling 
in Europe and, although there is no lack of 
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ingenuity in designing new aircraft, they have 
so far failed to match United States sales achieve-
ments. Of the last ten programmes launched 
in the United States, the average number of 
aircraft sold was 512 per programme. In the 
case of the Western European programmes, only 
85 aircraft per programme were said; the latter 
figure simply means that the European manu-
facturers are continually going from prototype 
to prototype without arriving at long production 
runs when costs would decrease. At the same 
time, they see the national airlines "buying 
American" with taxpayers' money. 
51. American programmes, moreover, are much 
longer lived than European programmes pri-
marily because they have taken care to work 
from a first design to families of aircraft. 
Because of the longer runs of the American 
programmes the problems of production organ-
isation and production costs are more effectively 
dealt with in the United States than in Europe. 
American manufacturers offer highly efficient 
product support which lasts until the aircraft 
type in question is phased out of operation. The 
high standard of their complete logistic system 
is not yet sufficiently widespread in Europe -
Fokker, Rolls-Royce and Smiths give the same 
type of service as their American counterparts 
- and, since the lifetime of today's jets is in 
the order of fifteen to twenty years, it is abso-
lutely essential for the customers to gain con-
fidence in the manufacturer's ability and 
stamina in following up a programme. The air-
lines therefore have the impression that there 
are rather too many aircraft on the market com-
pared with the money available and that the 
number of new types of aircraft should be 
limited to solvent demand. 
IV. Special projects 
(a) Airbus 
52. In discussing civil aeronautical activities 
special attention should be given to the Airbus, 
its organisation and future. It has overcome 
early organisational problems, market problems, 
product problems and financial problems, and 
as the Airbus project could be the beginning of 
an ongoing solvent European programme it is 
of interest to discuss its accomplishments. The 
start of Airbus was extremely difficult as there 
was no world airline which had not already 
worked with Douglas, Boeing or Lockheed. 
Therefore, all the Airbus customers were "first 
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customers". When Airbus started there was an 
unfavourable trend in the European industry's 
production, unit costs being generally higher 
than in American industry. Nevertheless, in 
1975, Airbus Industrie sold nearly thirty air-
craft in a very difficult market context. The 
same year Lockheed sold four and Douglas seven 
or eight. A good structure for international co-
operation was established in Airbus Industrie. 
As the Airbus developed around a family of 
aircraft, Airbus Industrie was able to move on 
from the original version to other proposals such 
as a longer-range version, a four-engined version, 
etc. 
53. Airbus Industrie can now also offer fin-
ancing terms at least as good as those of the 
American competitors. It would nevertheless 
have been advantageous if something like the 
Export-Import Bank in America had existed in 
Europe; at least deals could have been con-
cluded much faster. It would be of great import-
ance if part of the United Kingdom's aircraft 
industry could be further integrated - Hawker 
Siddeley already supplies the wings - in which 
case Airbus Industrie could serve as a nucleus 
for federating the European aircraft industry. 
This would be possible if Airbus was developed 
as a 200-seat aircraft fitted with the Rolls-Royce 
RB-211 engine which would make it well-placed 
to secure a considerable share of the market 
created by the need to replace the Boeing 727 
and Trident type of aircraft. The immediate 
American competitors would require more 
launch cost expenditure and so this European 
project could lead rather than follow American 
aircraft. To exploit this opportunity Airbus 
Industrie needs every encouragement. 
(b) Concorde 
54. The Concorde SST programme is also of 
special interest as the collaboration between 
countries and companies was the first of this 
type to be established. It was decided that each 
French and British firm would make the com-
plete plane within its own factories. This arran-
gement proved to be quite expensive, although 
the research and development costs for Concorde 
were far lower than for the American SST pro-
gramme, which was abandoned. 
55. The present-day difficulties encountered by 
Concorde in its attempts to penetrate the mar-
ket, especially the American market, might lead 
one to believe that the United States is not very 
interested in this type of transport. That is not 
the case however. In 1962, and still today, the 
United States aircraft manufacturers are 
extremely interested in building a supersonic or 
hypersonic aircraft. McDonnell Douglas is now 
working on a Mach 2.2 supersonic aircraft and 
studying the possibilities of a hypersonic air-
craft with a speed of Mach 6. In 1962, imme-
diately after the decision by the British and 
French Governments to initiate the programme, 
President Kennedy in person announced the 
launching of the American SST programme. 
This announcement was made exactly twenty-
four hours after Pan American's decision to 
take up options on the Concorde. The aim of 
the American project was to maintain the United 
States' historic leadership in aircraft develop-
ment, demonstrate the technological progress 
which could be made in a democratic system of 
free enterprise, expand the United States' inter-
national trade, and strengthen its aircraft 
industry and create jobs for thousands of Ame-
ricans. It is an odd historical coincidence that 
now the Concorde awaits permission to land at 
the John F. Kennedy international airport. 
56. The Federal Aviation Agency study of the 
SST market showed that between three hundred 
and four hundred aircraft should be built. The 
agency made a lengthy study of what speed to 
choose between Mach 2 and Mach 3. In the end 
Mach 3 was chosen despite the challenge which 
technology of titanium structures represented. 
Eventually it proved impossible to fabricate 
these structures. The effort was too audacious 
and premature. In the study, the environmental 
problems were not mentioned except for one 
aspect - the sonic boom. 
57. The official Franco-British committee for 
the construction of Concorde has also been study-
ing this environmental problem. It did not study 
in much detail the subsonic noise which is the 
noise of an ordinary aircraft. The anti-Concorde 
petitioners in America are now fighting the 
decision by the Transportation Secretary, Mr. 
Coleman, to allow flights to the United States 
for a sixteen-month trial period on the grounds 
of Concorde's noise impact on populated areas 
adjacent to John F. Kennedy international air-
port. 
58. When the Concorde started its regular 
flights on 21st January 1976 the same ~ype .of 
financial problem arose as when the ftrst Jet 
liner, the Boeing 707 arrived in 1954. At that 
time all the world's airlines were equipped for 
intercontinental flights with the piston-engined 
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Constellations and DC-4 aircraft. The airlines 
were then claiming that there should be a big 
increase in fares because the services offered 
were very different. Then the United States 
decided that fares should remain the same. In 
the end they were nevertheless increased by 2 or 
3 %. The outcome for Concorde is rather dif-
ferent as the fares will be up some 20 %, which 
of course is of great importance for the profi-
tability of the airlines using Concorde. 
59. In January 1976, NASA produced and 
published a new report on the second genera-
tion supersonic aircraft, and again it gave a 
minimum market figure of 300 aircraft to the 
end of the century. With regard to specifica-
tions of the aircraft it calls for about 300 seats 
and is very much concerned with noise standards 
which have to be in conformity with the 
American National Environmental Policy Act. 
This, of course, raises serious problems in the 
development of the engine. The speed of the 
aircraft will be Mach 2. 
60. Apart from the French and British airline!!, 
no other airlines have so far bought the Con-
corde. It is a well-known fact that Lufthansa, 
for instance, believes that with the present data 
and economics of Concorde it cannot do business. 
However, Lufthansa and other airlines should 
reconsider their position now that Concorde is 
operational and the Americans are doing their 
utmost to keep it out of the United States, 
which would certainly not be their policy if 
Lufthansa's judgment was correct. 
V. Eurocontrol 
61. In its previous reports the Committee has 
paid close attention to Eurocontrol and its prob-
lems. In its last report 1 it drew the Ministerial 
Council's attention to Eurocontrol in its recom-
mendation. It is convinced that the life and 
development of an organisation such as Euro-
control depend on the political will to make it 
effective. When the convention setting up Euro-
control was ratified in 1963, moves were afoot 
for increasing European unification in many 
fields. Since then, there have been many dis-
appointments and what was acceptable in 1963 
may now, ten years later, be found too binding. 
62. Consequently, the Eurocontrol member 
States have decided to review the future of the 
1. Document 658. 
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organisation. Discussions are under way on a 
new convention to come into force in 1983 when 
the present convention expires. Greater flexi-
bility is considered necessary in view of the 
respective positions of the member States ; at 
the same time co-ordination of national policies 
with regard to air traffic control should be 
strengthened. More importance should be 
attached to joint planning and the profitability 
of systems. This is even more important as the 
Eurocontrol member States have decided to 
transfer the cost of control services progressively 
to the users. By unanimous decision they have 
just decided to raise dues to 75 % as from 1st 
April 1978. It is therefore particularly urgent 
for planning to be carried out jointly and for 
short- and long-term studies to be made by all 
the States with a view to obtaining maximum 
compatibility of control systems in order to 
avoid costly overlapping. Progress should be 
made towards a certain degree of standardisa-
tion based on generally-accepted operational 
requirements and jointly-established systems 
concepts. On this basis, common technical speci-
fications can be defined allowing European 
industry the opportunity of a good domestic 
base for world exports. 
63. When investments are considered it appears 
important both for the harmonious development 
of Eurocontrol and for the interest of European 
industry for Eurocontrol to be made responsible 
for planning and setting up installations and 
systems. This should be a gradual process start-
ing at the air traffic control centres, extending 
subsequently to peripheral installations. The 
States are still free to entrust all or part of 
their airspace to the organisation or not. How-
ever, the possibility should remain open to 
establish a common European agency which 
should be the long-term solution to air naviga-
tion control problems and would assure the 
highest degree of security in European airspace. 
VI. Air traffic rights 
64. In his opening speech at the colloquy, the 
French Secretary of State for Transport, Mr. 
Cavaille, stated that he found it difficult to under-
stand the connection so often made between the 
future of the European aircraft industry and 
the constitution of what has been called a true 
European airspace, within which the wave of 
a magic wand would apparently make frontiers 
disappear and eliminate national control over 
air traffic rights which are said to be hindering 
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a rational organisation of the airways and, conse-
quently of the aircraft industry. He did not 
claim that the present system was perfect or 
could not be improved. Perhaps a rather more 
dynamic concept of traffic rights or a some-
what less restrictive attitude to the problems of 
third level aviation might enable the airways to 
be improved a little. The already well-served 
heavy traffic routes could be supplemented by 
air links between population centres of lesser 
importance, many of which should be concen-
trated on the same routes to permit rational 
operations. A truly regional network could be 
extended to the whole of Europe. The growth of 
such a network could provide a complementary 
market for certain low-level or medium-capacity 
aircraft already manufactured in Europe. 
65. It would only be possible to establish a 
direct link between the airspace and the aircraft 
industry if one adopted a protectionist attitude 
whereby a monopoly of European civil and 
military markets would be given to European 
industries by imposing special measures and 
rules. 
66. In the Committee's report 1 it was stated : 
"Europe's passengers continue to remain in 
the hands of airlines which, with the 
backing of bilateral agreements between 
governments and the safety net of lATA, 
are virtually free to set any fare levels 
they want to." 
This paragraph presupposes that an integration 
of European airlines would really benefit Euro-
pean passengers and eventually European air-
craft manufacturers. It is possible that, through 
restructuring, some European airlines could 
become efficient operational units with a resul-
ting cost-cutting effect. This effect would pass 
through to the fare, thus opening up new buyer 
layers for scheduled air travel. 
67. The intra-Benelux talks on joining up 
KLM, Sabena and Luxair are being undertaken 
with this purpose in mind. 
68. However, the treatment of European air-
space as one political airspace in bilateral traf-
fic agreements with extra-European countries 
might well be a step backwards for the Euro-
pean airlines in sharing the world market. Due 
to the historical developments which led to indi-
vidual agreements by each European country 
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with third countries, a very good worldwide 
stock of traffic rights and market penetration 
was achieved. Moreover, each national airline 
draws a considerable demand potential from 
ethnic groups abroad due to some sort of nos-
talgic loyalty. 
69. In opposition to this assertion it must be 
pointed out that in Europe traffic rights are 
still negotiated as they were in 1945. The results 
of the system of bilateral agreements are not the 
best that could be achieved if another system 
were adopted. If one considers the European 
domestic market and intra-European air trans-
port on the one hand and trade between Europe 
and the rest of the world on the other, it can 
be seen that in 1973 intra-European traffic 
represented something like 80 passenger km per 
capita in Europe. Over the same period the 
American domestic market was slightly more 
than 1,200 passenger km. In other words, per 
capita domestic traffic is at present fourteen 
or fifteen times higher in America than in 
Europe. Of course the per capita gross national 
product in America is ten compared with six 
in Europe : distances in America are greater ; 
the European railways network is better than 
its counterpart in America, but on the other 
hand the network of motorways in America is 
superior to the European motorway network. 
All in all, the different situations in Europe 
and America do not justify the big gap in the 
abovementioned air transport figures. Perhaps 
the fact that United States domestic air fares 
are only half the European rates has a devast-
ating effect on demand. 
70. Looking at the figures for the world net-
work, and especially the Europe-America route, 
one can see that, on the one hand, three Ameri-
can airlines serve about twenty-five points in 
Europe and benefit from numerous fifth 
freedom rights which allow them to transport 
passengers between cities within Europe. Con-
versely, nineteen European airlines together serve 
only a dozen points in America and with no 
fifth freedom rights. It could therefore be said 
that organising European transport on a purely 
national basis has led to an extraordinary asym-
metry between Europe and the United States. 
Judging by these results, there is justification 
for reviewing this question. This might be in 
the long-term interests of air transport and also 
of the aircraft industry which needs room to 
expand. The interests of airlines and manu-
facturers are closely linked and necessitate 
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harmonisation of the European market and 
probably of European airspace too. 
VII. A European civil aviation agency 
71. Consideration should be given by member 
governments to the value of an agency to 
establish, monitor and negotiate civil aviation 
standards, airspace control, aviation operations 
and traffic rights. So far Europe has failed to 
recognise that the sum of its parts is greater 
than their national separation. The United 
States penetration of all our markets is proof of 
the need to examine not only our objectives but 
how to reach them. 
VDI. General aviation 
72. In this field too Western Europe is lagging 
well behind the United States. According to 
statistics for 1974, the United States had 
170,000 aircraft compared with about 5,200 in 
France, 5,000 in the Federal Republic, 4,000 in 
Britain and some 4,000 elsewhere in Europe. 
Where manufacturing is concerned it should be 
recalled that in 1974 20,000 aircraft were built 
throughout the world, 89 % of them in the 
United States. This is a market which should 
be viewed with more interest than in the past. 
For a long time it was the considered opinion in 
Europe that general aviation was for artisans 
only. In the United States it has been under-
stood for a long time that general aviation can 
be properly handled only by large industrial 
firms with vast resources. 
73. In order to promote this type of activity a 
number of problems should be dealt with in a 
European framework. Freedom of airspace and 
regulations for air traffic allowing small air-
craft to fly normally should be considered when 
a European aeronautical policy is being studied. 
Conclusions 
74. One of the most important questions regard-
ing the aeronautical industry is the personnel 
question : What will be the future of the 
industry's employees 1 Where 435,000 men were 
still employed in 1969, there were only 400,000 
in 1974. This reduction in manpower in Europe, 
some 8 %, was mainly due to an intentional 
cutback in the British industry from 234,000 in 
1971 to 201,000 in 1974. At the same time 
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employment in the United States aerospace 
industry fell by 32 % ; their employees now 
total 937,000. 
75. The 400,000 figure is, however, not evenly 
divided throughout the various countries. The 
United Kingdom work force of 200,000 equals 
half Europe's capability. The French aircraft 
industry now employs just over 100,000 the 
German industry about 40,000, the Netherlands 
industry 8,000. The question now is what influ-
ence will future policy decisions have on the 
work force of the different countries. It is quite 
clear that the choice of a European programme 
will have a great influence on the reduction, 
growth or change in employment. A wide selec-
tion of commercial opportunities might offer a 
better prospect for overall employment in the 
Community if the main military needs can also 
be fulfilled by European products. 
76. The representatives of the employees, in a 
memorandum from the European Metalworkers' 
Federation to the Commission, indicated that 
they think it extremely urgent to achieve more 
European co-operation. They fear however that 
between the manufacturers of aircraft on the 
one hand and the airlines on the other there 
is no serious will to collaborate. The different 
points of view between these two groups are not 
yet bridged and it might not be much use to 
propose a plan for after 1980 if today the 
manufacturers and the airlines are not willing 
to adopt a joint position and accept a joint 
organisation within the framework of the Com-
mon Market. It is all very well to say that a 
solution must be found at the political level 
but this is not the complete answer. The diffi-
culties between manufacturers and users will 
have to be solved, failing which the number 
of jobs will be affected and the consequences 
in different regions of Europe will be serious. 
77. On the industrial side one of the weakest 
points is, or was, in marketing and sales, 
although much progress has been made to 
improve standards. Co-ordination of sales might 
give employees more security. A concerted 
approach by industry and airlines will not be 
easy however as the effects of soaring fuel 
costs, world recession and the reduction in 
growth of air traffic have affected both manu-
facturers and airlines. There is no doubt that 
certain investment or construction programmes 
have lost much of their impetus. At the same 
time most of the major military aircraft pro-
grammes appear to be already committed and 
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the volume of military equipment budgets is 
being reduced in many major countries. This 
latter trend will have serious consequences for 
research and development and hence on the level 
of employment. 
78. In the civil transport field the tendency is 
also to keep to on-going programmes. In design 
offices especially the employment problem is 
becoming critical. 
79. So far Europe has had the necessary tech-
nological expertise. Its capacity for imagination, 
high standard of engineering, its production 
potential and its highly skilled 400,000-strong 
work force have not yet however achieved the 
same credibility as American manufacturers 
have in the world and especially the United States 
market. More effort must therefore be concen-
trated on the standards of after-sales support. 
This, too, presupposes that Europe's industry 
must not disperse its financial and technical 
resources but must concentrate its efforts on 
judiciously selected programmes involving whole 
families of aircraft. 
80. The Western European governments are 
now reaching the point at which they must 
choose between three possible solutions : a Euro-
pean venture without United States participa-
tion, a balanced programme among European 
manufacturers and one United States manufac-
turer, and co-operation amongst some, but not 
all, European firms with a United States firm 
under United States leadership. The second solu-
tion would involve setting up a single European 
entity to work with a United States manu-
facturer. There is no doubt whatsoever that no 
deal will be made whieh would jeopardise the 
Airbus or its derivatives. 
81. How should co-operation between manu-
facturing industries be organised Y So far it has 
been impossible to obtain a unanimous reply to 
particularly important questions such as : 
Should co-operation stem from the action of a 
supranational political authority or from the 
spontaneous convergence of industrial interest 1 
Should co-operation be achieved with an eye to 
confrontation between blocs or collaboration at 
world level ? Should co-operation be achieved to 
ensure at any cost the survival of an industry 
vital for the defence of the continent or in such 
manner as to place the lowest possible burden on 
the people of Europe ? And, above all, is co-
operation preferable to straightforward competi-
tion Y 
82. Agreement appears to exist in Europe on 
the fact that only through multinational pro-
grammes is it possible to undertake the develop-
ment of new civil medium- and large-capacity 
aircraft. But we must beware of spending time 
talking across the Atlantic until the Americans 
are ready to act again, alone as usual. 
83. Because of the political, social and econo-
mic premises for the development of an inte-
grated European industry, European co-opera-
tion can hardly be other than the result of a 
free choice of the industries and of the countries 
to which the industries belong. 
84. In order to arrive at such a choice, member 
countries which have not yet established national 
committees for the protection of their aeronau-
tical industries should be invited to do so. These 
committees should be composed of senior national 
civil servants, industrialists and representatives 
of the airlines. Special attention should also be 
paid to representatives of the unions working in 
these industries ; they especially have a large 
stake in the survival of the industries. 
85. The attitudes of the manufacturers and of 
the airlines could be discussed in such com-
mittees and convergence of their ideas might be 
achieved. A concerted effort should be made by 
the airlines and manufacturers to define air-
craft which meet the needs of the carriers, 
especially from the standpoint of performance, 
range and capacity. Such aircraft should be com-
petitive not only in terms of technical operating 
costs but also purchase price. 
86. It would seem only fair for European air-
lines to offer Europe's manufacturers the kind 
of understanding which, through a clearer pic-
ture concerning frequencies, capacities, and tech-
nical and operating standards, would ultimately 
lead to a progressively more homogenous fleet. 
In this way the European aircraft industry may 
have some assurance that an aircraft defined 
jointly will be purchased by the largest possible 
number of European airlines. 
87. An experiment is now being attempted by 
a tripartite working group of the United King-
dom, France and Germany, to define a medium-
range transport aircraft of around 200 seats. For 
more than a year, three airlines of these coun-
S-I 
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tries have been meeting to try to formulate a 
joint definition of such an aircraft. They have 
exchanged traffic forecasts, discussed their poli-
cies and are now trying to work out a joint 
formula for calculating operating costs. Their 
views have been put to the interested manufac-
turers who are now considering the project. 
88. This initial approach, which could be 
described as "micro-European", might perhaps 
be improved by broadening the circle of partici-
pants as studies progress. 
89. This is what is meant by the Committee's 
recommendation to form a joint senior Euro-
pean council for the aeronautical industry drawn 
from the national committees. Other tasks have 
also been mentioned in the recommendation, 
mainly concerning the organisation of financial 
support for research, development, production 
and marketing of aircraft. 
90. In order to evolve an efficient and compe-
titive European industry, AEC:MA has initiated 
a number of practical methods of unifying the 
aeronautical market. It has promoted collabo-
ration in the field of aeronautical research 
avoiding wasteful duplication and extending 
bilateral arrangements to three or more coun-
tries. Collaborative aerospace research arrange-
ments have been made between the United King-
dom, France and Germany and an organisation 
has been set up for this purpose. 
91. It is clear that AECMA, bearing in mind 
its limited function and resources, can make 
progress only if governments and industries 
make up their minds about the ways in which 
they wish to penetrate existing and new 
markets. 
92. Europe of course should also work in liaison 
with the United States and here a pragmatic 
approach is the only way possible. There should 
be a deliberate policy to strengthen engineering 
and other collaboration in Europe. First, because 
it is necessary if there is to be an effective Euro-
pean aeronautical industry, and second, because 
Europe's maximum technical strength needs to 
be developed in order to be able to collaborate 
with the United States in a satisfactory and 
constructive manner and avoid the long-term risk 
of total United States domination of the Euro-
pean market. 
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reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council 
DOCUMENT 705 
Appreciating the Council's interest in promoting technological collaboration in a European frame-
work; 
Regretting the absence of a medium- and long-term policy to encourage advanced technology 
programmes, although such a policy is necessary if Western European industry is to maintain a valid civil 
and military capability, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THB CoUNciL 
Include in its twenty-second annual report on its activities guidelines for a long-term European 
policy in sectors of advanced technology such as space, aeronautics, aviation, nuclear reactors, computers 
and electronics, taking both civil and military aspects into consideration and indicating how effective 
decision-making machinery could be set up in Western Europe. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur) 
1. The Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions was gratified to read 
that the Council follows its work with interest. 
Its work concerns the prog:re8!J of European col-
laboration and co-operation in many fields of 
advanced technology. The Committee is con-
vinced that the notion of security is wider than 
that of defence. A European rindustrial capabi-
lity has to be maintained in order to serve as 
a basis for our defence effort and provide the 
highest possible level of employment. If Europe 
failed to maintain its centres of invention and 
innovation such as the ·aerospace industry, the 
nuclear industry and many others, it would be 
unable to maintain its civil and military indus-
trial capability. 
2. It is regrettable that the Western European 
countries take so long to adopt common positions 
on matters which govern the whole future of 
essential industries in advanced technology. 
Results in the technological fields in which the 
European governments have been involved since 
the early 1950s have been mediocre if not insig-
nificant. 
3. In numerous reports on technological col-
laboration in a European framework, the Com-
mittee has pointed out that one of the greatest 
problems is the lack of proper decision-making 
machinery. Life in advanced societies is very 
largely a reflection of the work done by scien-
tists in earlier centuries. Their discoveries, placed 
in the hands of technicians, have enabled the 
material world to be :mastered but decisions 
regarding management can rarely be confined 
within national boundaries. However, the pro-
cess of decision-making is effective only within 
these boundaries. The Committee has therefore 
often pointed out that there is a need for a 
systematic intergovernmental and ultimately 
integrated European approach. A more rational 
policy is required if progress is to be made in 
European co-operation in research, technology 
and its application. 
4. An international parliamentary assembly 
can only advise governments on the policy they 
should follow, but there is a shortage of the 
necessary staff and experience for making con-
crete proposals in the different fields of advanced 
technology. 
5. Your Rapporteur believes that one of the 
activities of the Council should be to formulate 
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a medium- and long-term policy in the different 
sectors. The Council can draw on the experience 
and knowledge of the various ministries of State 
in the seven member countries. It also has access 
to outside sources, such as the Community 
offices or others outside Europe. However, with-
out a proper policy there can be no guarantee 
of success as your Rapporteur ascertained when 
he wrote his report on the International Institute 
for the M-anagement of Technology, which was 
discussed at the December 1975 session. The long 
years of preparatiOIIl for this institute were not 
used to harmonise the views of the participating 
governments on precise goals for the institute 
with the result that it was abandoned. 
6. Within the Euratom framework one CriSis 
after another has arisen since 1958 and, even 
today, there is no unam.imity between the govern-
ments concerned regarding the establishment of 
a nuclear fusion centre. 
7. The acute energy situation, heightened by 
the petroleum crisis, indicates the interdepen-
dence of countries and the limitations of policy-
making at national level. As energy is a key 
factor in the continuation of world growth and 
hence in maintaining social and political stabil-
ity, the Committee has given this problem much 
of its attention in a succession of reports. Special 
aspects of nuclear policies in Europe and col-
laboration with the United States, Japan and 
Canada have been discussed as well as the secur-
ity aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy and the future of second-generation 
nuclear reactors. The Council acknowledges the 
great importance of the subject, but no ensuing 
long- or medium-term policy is formulated. 
8. Europe is far more dependent on the export 
of its technology than countries such as the 
United States or Canada which have abundant 
and relatively well-balanced natural resources. 
Europe is and will be unable to achieve a high 
degree of independence in energy or in mineral 
and food resources. It must therefore be able 
to offset its dependence in this respect by the 
availability of advanced technology products. 
Only thus can Europe participate actively in 
worldwide trade and co-operation. 
9. In its report the Council also specifically 
mentions aviation and space. On both subjects 
the Committee has kept itself well informed, 
and not by documents alone. It has visited many 
organisations and industries and has been able 
to discuss with competent authorities and indus-
trialists the problems of aviation and space in 
order to acquire a wide spectrum of expertise. 
At the opening of the colloquy on a European 
aeronautical policy in February 1976, the Chair-
man of the Committee stated that despite diffi-
culties in the principal sectors of advanced tech-
nology the Committee's aim was to ensure that 
a solution was found through increased co-
operation between member countries. He stated 
that since 1973 the situation in the aeronautical 
industry had seriously deteriorated and that 
threats to the European aeronautical industry 
would become even more serious if we failed to 
work out an overall policy based on close con-
sultation and real co-operation between govern-
ments, manufacturers and airlines. Here a:gain, 
your Rapporteur would appreciate the Council 
taking a more active part in promoting such 
consultations and co-operation. 
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10. In the field of space, the new European 
Space Agency has made a successful start and 
more and more people are convinced that at least 
here Europe has provided itself with an instru-
n:ent capable of gaining its rightful place in this 
sector. There is a general consensus on the tasks 
which the agency should fulfil in the near future 
and the necessary budgetary provisions have 
been made up to 1978. Application satellites 
will now have to be built since the follow-up 
of space research lies in exploration of the earth 
and its environment. Earth resources satellites, 
satellites for ocean and sea exploration, tele-
communications, air traffic control, navigation 
and many others will soon be built and the 
industrial phase of space technology will start. 
As indicated in the report by Mr. de Montes-
quiou1 both the United States and Europe will 
have to draw up programmes and they will have 
to be co-ordinated. An overall European policy 
on new space application programmes will be 
necessary in order to ensure future payloads for 
Spacelab and the shuttle. 
1. Document 687, paragraph 18. 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. This report covers the period November 1975 
to April 1976. The texts of interventions in the 
parliaments of member countries communicated 
to the Committee secretariat are given in Col-
lected Texts 23. 
2. In accordance with Rule 42bis of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly, the Committee 
met in Paris on 4th December 1975, at the close 
of the Assembly's session, to select the texts 
adopted by the Assembly which it considered 
should be debated in the parliaments. It selected 
recommendations : 
- 273 on Western Europe and the evolution 
of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
- 274 on the European aeronautical 
industry; 
- 276 on the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe. 
3. These three recommendations were trans-
mitted officially to the Presidents of the parlia-
ments of member countries. The Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments is drawing the atten-
tion of the seven parliaments to the texts which 
it considers likely to arouse their interest and 
be discussed. 
4. It regrets that the texts it selects for trans-
mission to parliaments do not always receive the 
attention they deserve. It can easily be seen 
from the table at Appendix II that the texts 
selected in November 1973 (two recommenda-
tions) elicited only four questions and replies ; 
in June 1974, there were also two texts and four 
questions and replies ; in December 197 4 only 
one intervention was made on the single text 
selected; in June 1974, there were eleven ques-
tions and replies on the four texts selected for 
all seven parliaments (twelve houses). 
I. Reports on the activities of WEU submitted 
to the parliaments of member countries 
5. In France, there was a response to the WEU 
Assembly's last session, held from 1st to 4th 
December 1975, in both houses of the French 
parliament : a report on the session was given 
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in the French Senate Weekly Bulletin 97 of 6th 
December 1975 and in the National Assembly 
Bulletin 78 of 9th December 1975. It should be 
noted that these two bulletins are distributed 
free of charge to members of parliament and 
anyone who may ask for it and a preliminary 
report thus reached thousands of French homes 
immediately after the session. 
6. On 23rd October 1975, in a statement on his 
country's foreign policy, Mr. Thorn, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, reported 
orally on the activities of WEU 1 • 
7. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
government continues to submit half-yearly 
reports to parliament on the activities of WEU : 
in Bundestag Document 7/4355, the government 
reported on WEU activities during the period 
1st April to 30th September 1975. The delegation 
reported on the December 1975 session in Docu-
ment 7/4481. It should be noted that contrary 
to recent practice the texts of recommendations 
selected for transmission to the parliaments of 
member countries are no longer appended to 
this report but are included in the body of the 
text. 
D. Action taken on texts adopted 
8. While your Rapporteur noted a total of 
twenty interventions between June and November 
1975, during the period covered by this report 
and for the first time since 196C the total rose 
to near its normal level : fifty-six interventions 
during the current half-year. Although Collec-
ted Texts 23 shows that no texts have been com-
municated by the German Delegation, there has 
been a definite increase in all the other member 
countries : ten in Belgium, seventeen in France, 
ten in Italy, three in Luxembourg, eleven in the 
Netherlands and two in the United Kingdom, 
which proves that Western European Union as 
a European assembly still plays an important 
part in parliamentary life. 
9. For some time, the Assembly's Press Coun-
sellor has been sending journalists questions and 
replies likely to interest the larger newspapers. 
1. See Collected Texts 23. 
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This has started to bear fruit, and your Rap-
porteur thinks such action might usefully be 
extended to local and regional newspapers, the 
names of which might be submitted by members 
of parliament. 
Resolution 55 
10. Five questions were put on this resolution : 
one each in Belgium\ France 1 and Luxem-
bourg 1 and two in Italy 1 • According to the 
Belgian reply \ the modified Brussels Treaty is 
important because it provides for automatic 
assistance in the event of armed attack. 
11. The Italian Government 1 considers that 
WEU has and will have an essential role to play 
because it offers instruments of co-operation 
meeting defence requirements. 
12. Finally, the Luxembourg Minister for 
Foreign Affairs 1 indicated that the existing 
structure of WEU might play a useful role in 
joint consideration of European defence. He 
welcomed the fact that the Assembly discussed 
these matters and had made proposals to 
Mr. Tindemans. 
Recommendation 262 
13. Like last year 2, four Netherlands members 
of parliament again put questions 1 to the Min-
ister on the ratification of conventions on third-
party liability in the field of nuclear energy. The 
reply, which was far shorter than the previous 
one, was also much more vague. 
14. In reply to a question 1 put by Senator 
Bonaldi on the 1960 and 1963 conventions on 
third-party liability in the field of nuclear 
energy, the Italian Government stated that they 
had been ratified and would be implemented 
shortly. 
Recommendation 263 
15. The Italian Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cattanei, replied 1 at length 
to a question put by Mr. Bonaldi and described 
his country's relations with the Warsaw Pact 
member countries and the GDR. 
Recommendation 266 
16. In France, Senators Grangier 1 and Legaret 1 
put questions on the two-year delay in appoint-
1. See Collected Texts 23. 
2. See Collected Texts 21, page 14. 
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ing a new Secretary-General for WEU. The Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs trusted steps would be 
taken to end this situation and was pursuing his 
efforts in this sense. 
17. In the Netherlands, a similar question 1 was 
put by Mr. Waltmans, and Mr. van der Stoel 
said that the Netherlands Government was doing 
all it could to find a way out of the present 
impasse. 
Recommendation 269 
18. Mr. Wall 1 put a question during the debate 
in the House of Commons on 15th October 1975, 
to which there was a long reply by Mr. Rodgers 1, 
Secretary of State for Defence, on the problem of 
standardisation. 
19. Mr. Cattanei, Italian Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, replied 1 at length to 
a question put by Mr. Bonaldi, indicating that 
his government agreed with Recommendation 269. 
In his reply, he dealt with the problem of the 
cohesion of the member countries of the Alliance, 
the MBFR negotiations, the standardisation of 
armaments and the defence effort as an element 
of European unification. On 30th March 1976 
Mr. Bonaldi put a further written question 1 to 
the Italian Government. 
Recommendation 27 3 
20. In the Netherlands, Mr. Verbrugh spoke 1 
in the debate on the budget of the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs without eliciting an answer from 
the Minister. He then put a question 1 on the 
same subject to which the Minister replied 1 that, 
"without giving an opinion on the debates of the 
WEU Assembly", his country refused and would 
continue to refuse a European nuclear force. 
21. In reply to a question 1 put by Senator de 
Stexhe, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and Development Co-operation, indicated 1 that 
the Rome meeting in spring 1976 would deter-
mine the future shape of European co-opera-
tion in the field of armaments production. 
22. On 30th March 1976 Mr. Bonaldi put a 
further written question 1 to the Italian Govern-
ment. 
Recommendation 27 4 
23. In France, Senator Kauffmann 1 expressed 
concern about the future of Eurocontrol. The 
government replied on 19th February 1976. 
1. See Collected Texts 23. 
24. In Belgium, Senator de Stexhe 1 spoke about 
the European military aircraft procurement 
agency set up by the WED Standing Armaments 
Committee. The Minister did not wish to express 
a view. 
25. On 30th March 1976 Mr. Bonaldi put a 
further written question 1 to the Italian Govern-
ment. 
Recommendation 276 
26. In Belgium, Senator de Stexhe put a ques-
tion 1 on promoting permanent consultations in 
the framework of the WED Council. The Minister 
replied 1 that where the third basket was con-
cerned joint positions would be defined in the 
framework of the Nine. 
Resolution 59 
27. In the Netherlands, Mr. Dankert 1 spoke dur-
ing a debate on European union and put several 
questions on WED's place in that union. Mr. van 
der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs 1 , replied 
to all the points raised except the possible dis-
solution of the Assembly. 
Other interventions 
28. In France, Mr. Krieg put a question 1 on 
whether the signatory States and members of 
WED were respecting the provisions of the 
Ottawa declaration. The Minister replied on 
31st January 1976. Two weeks later, on 14th Feb-
ruary 1976, the same Minister replied 1 to a 
question put on 2nd August 1975 on questions 
put to the WED Council on NATO nuclear 
strategy. Mr. Radius put a question 1 on Euro-
group and NATO and the latter's proposal to set 
up a European secretariat, despite the existence 
of the WED Standing Armaments Committee. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that 
there was no question of France taking part in 
the work of Eurogroup and that fears about the 
creation of an Atlantic organisation were 
groundless. In the Senate, Mr. Menard 1 put a 
question to the Minister of Defence on the pro-
curement of armaments, WED and Eurogroup. 
To date, no reply has been recorded. 
29. Finally, in January 1976 the Chairman of 
the French Delegation 1 expressed concern at the 
absence of replies to questions on ·wED. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs gave him every 
1. See Collected Texts 23. 
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assurance that questions put by members would 
receive the attention of his Ministry and that he 
and his staff were at the disposal of members of 
the French Delegation. 
30. In the Netherlands, Mr_ Waltmans 1 repeated 
his anxiety about the Ottawa declaration, and this 
time the Minister indicated the reservations he 
had made when the declaration was signed 1 • 
31. In Belgium, Mr. Tanghe put questions to 
the Minister of Defence about Belgian member-
ship of bodies seeking greater joint production of 
armaments and equipment. The Minister, 
Mr. Vanden Boeynants, said that the name of 
the body mattered little : what counted was the 
result, but that nationalism was still a major 
obstacle. 
32. It is interesting to note that in the European 
Parliament on lOth March 1976, following an 
oral question by Lord Gladwyn on the repercus-
sions of European foreign policy on defence mat-
ters, WED's ideas on the standardisation of 
armaments and the maintenance of the WED 
Assembly were discussed. Your Rapporteur felt 
he should add the text of this debate to the texts 
from the various parliaments issued in the half-
yearly collected texts 1 • 
33. On 13th May 1976, a debate will be held on 
WED in the House of Lords at the request of 
Lord Beaumont of Whitley. Extracts will be 
given in the next volume of collected texts. 
m. Activities of the Committee 
34. The Committee visited the Luxembourg Par-
liament on 11th and 12th May 1976 and was 
received by the government and the Luxembourg 
and Vianden town councils. It also visited the 
dam on the River Our. The principal statement 
on the work of the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies is given at Appendix III(b) to this 
report. 
IV. Conclusions 
35. It is important to recall that apart from 
work at committee meetings and plenary sessions 
of the WED Assembly another important task 
is to make the Assembly's achievements known. 
The aim of the Committee for Relations with 
1. See Collected Texts 23. 
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Parliaments is to foster the publicity, public 
relations and propaganda aspects of WEU and 
promote its aims. 
36. Your Rapporteur believes that whenever pos-
sible the first task is to inform members of the 
national parliaments. What Western European 
Union represents, how it came into being and 
what use can be made of this Assembly should 
be explained in the national parliaments. This 
would be an essential lesson in civics which would 
enhance the reputation of our Assembly. 
37. While the Committee has no major problems 
of strategy and armaments to study, it does have 
a mission to carry out : propagate the knowledge 
that Europe turned its thoughts to defence long 
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ago and has an instrument that asks nothing 
better than to flourish and be developed and 
used as an institutional framework which there 
is no need to seek elsewhere. 
38. When solutions are sought in international 
conferences, they might already have been found 
in this Assembly of seven nations. 
39. That is why the Committee, at its meeting 
in May 1976, decided to take concerted and con-
centrated action to promote Resolution 59 on 
European union and WEU without waiting for 
its ratification by the Assembly and to put a 
question in all the parliaments on Document 701 
concerning pensions for international officials. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each session) 
Member countries 
C) 
;.:I 
Recommendations lJ ~ ~ adopted in l a:> j C) ] 0 ! ~ 1 -e~ t-1 ~ M ~ a:> ... ::l "00 ~ 
a:> 
~ 
1956 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1957 4 0 1 0 0 5 
1958 2 0 3 0 0 4 
1959 0 0 9 0 0 0 
1960 3 12 2 8 0 3 
1961 0 2 0 3 0 6 
1962 2 4 4 6 2 3 
1963 0 0 13 22 1 2 
1964 4 14 9 11 1 5 
1965 0 11 12 24 0 5 
1966 2 12 12 49 1 4 
1967 14 9 22 29 2 6 
1968 6 14 20 22 1 16 
1969 11 15 17 8 0 4 
1970 3 15 15 7 2 3 
1971 0 4 19 9 0 6 
1972 0 6 2 1 0 1 
1973 0 4 2 6 1 0 
1974 0 1 3 13 2 0 
1975 10 28 4 17 3 11 
1976 2 2 I 0 0 2 
Total 63 153 173 235 16 86 
Annual average 3.15 7.65 8.65 11.75 0.80 4.30 
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El 
0 
'g, 
.s 
~ Total 
~ 
~ 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 11 
10 31 
3 41 
2 46 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
47 126 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 76 
0 7 
189 915 
9.45 6.54 
DOOUHENT 706 APPENDIX II 
APPENDIX 11 
Table of interuentions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1974 
1 
.Sill ~ 8 -= ll ~ I 0 ~-~ ~~ l ~ s:l .8~ ~ .2 ! 1>. 0 ~ 'a "' l; ] .. ' I 3 ~ .gal ]~ 0 ~ 'i 1-j ~ E-1 3i Ill ill z i 0 ~ .... 0 .. s:~.. 1!0 ~s:l.. ~ E-1 p:j 
""' 
p 
246 1 1 
247 2 2 
248 X 2 2 
249 
-
June 250 - 15 
1974 251 1 1 
252 2 2 
253 2 2 
254 2 2 
255 X 1 2 3 
256 
-
Dee. 257 X 1 1 
1974 258 2 2 4 
259 
-
Other action 1 1 
260 
-
261 -
262 2 2 4 8 
263 2 2 
264 1 1 
265 -
June 266 X 4 2 6 26 
1975 267 -
268 1 1 
269 X 2 2 4 
270 X 2 2 
271 -
272 X 2 2 
273 X 2 1 3 6 
274 X 2 2 1 5 
275 
-
276 X 2 1 3 
277 
-
278 
-
Dee. 279 
-
1975 280 
-
281 
- 50 
282 
-
283 
-
Res. 55 2 1 3 2 8 
Res. 56 
-
Res. 57 
-
Res. 58 
-
Other action 2 17 4 1 1 2 1 28 
1976 I Res. 59 2 2 7 Other action 2 2 1 5 
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APPENDIX m 
(a) Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
22nd February 1963 
lOth October 1963 
11th-12th November 1964 
28th-29th April 1965 
15th-16th I>ecember 1965 
Paris 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Brussels 
30th October-lst November 1966 London 
23rd-24th November 1967 
2nd-3rd April 1968 
26th-27th March 1969 
27th-28th October 1969 
14th-15th April 1970 
1st-2nd April 1971 
4th-5th November 1971 
24th-25th February 1972 
18th-19th September 1972 
1st-2nd May 1973 
15th-18th October 1973 
8th-10th July 1974 
27th-28th October 1975 
11th-12th May 1976 
Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin) 
Luxembourg 
Rome 
Paris 
Bonn 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany) 
St. Helier (Regional parliament of the States 
of Jersey) 
Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State 
of Bavaria) 
Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily) 
The Hague 
Luxembourg 
(b) Statement by Mr. Wagener, Secretary-General of the Chamber, 
on the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies 
According to the Constitution, the Chamber 
of Deputies represents the country and exercises 
legislative powers jointly with the Grand Duke, 
and deputies are elected by the people. 
1. Electoral system 
1.1. Principles 
The country is divided into four electoral 
constituencies: South, East, Centre, North. 
The number of deputies in the Chamber 
depends on the size of the population, in a pro-
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portion of one deputy for 5,500 inhabitants. The 
Chamber now has fifty-nine deputies, twenty-four 
from the South, twenty from the Centre, nine 
from the North and six from the East. It should 
be noted that the number of deputies is deter-
mined not only by the number of electors but by 
the whole population including those without the 
right to vote, foreigners. 
Deputies are elected for five years. The last 
elections were held on 26th May 1974 so in prin-
ciple the next ones will be held in 1979. 
Voting is compulsory. Proxy voting is not 
allowed. Those who cannot take part in the ballot 
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must give their reasons for abstaining to the 
justice of the peace, with the necessary justifica-
tion. Unjustified abstention is punishable by fine. 
The punishment is heavier in the event of 
repeated abstention. There is no system of voting 
by correspondence. 
According to Article 51, paragraph 5, of the 
Constitution, "deputies are elected by pure and 
simple universal suffrage, by list, in accordance 
with the rules of proportional representation, the 
principle of the lowest electoral quotient and 
rules to be laid down by law". This constitutional 
provision calls for some explanation. 
The universal suffrage system allows all 
Luxembourg citizens, men and women, who fulfil 
the conditions laid down by the law to take part 
in electing deputies. 
Pure and simple universal suffrage ensures 
strict equality for all electors in the exercise of 
their right to vote. Unlike the system of universal 
suffrage with plural voting, it does not grant 
several votes to certain electors because of their 
education or special qualifications or the size of 
their estate. 
Deputies are elected by list, i.e. in each 
constituency the political groups standing for 
office must draw up lists of candidates, the total 
number of which must not exceed the total num-
ber of deputies to be elected in the constituency. 
Individual candidatures are considered as lists 
on their own. 
Seats are shared in accordance with the rules 
of proportional representation and the principle 
of the lowest electoral quotient. Unlike the major-
ity system, the system of proportional representa-
tion does not attribute all available seats to the 
majority but ensures fair representation of the 
minority. Seats are shared among the various 
lists of candidates in proportion to the number 
of votes received. The method of calculation will 
be examined later. 
1.2. Electorate 
In order to vote, it is necessary to fulfil the 
conditions laid down by law, not be excluded 
from voting under special legal provisions and 
be included on the electoral roll. 
All electors must fulfil the following con-
ditions: 
(1) be of Luxembourg nationality ; foreign-
ers have no political rights ; 
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(2) be at least eighteen years of age ; 
( 3) have civil and political rights ; 
( 4) be domiciled in the Grand Duchy ; the 
electoral domicile of a citizen is his 
usual place of residence, i.e. where he 
normally lives with his family. 
The following are excluded from the 
electorate and may not vote . 
(1) persons condemned for criminal 
offences; 
(2) persons condemned to terms of imprison-
ment for theft, fraud or breach of trust ; 
however, the right to vote may be 
restituted by reprieve ; 
(3) bankrupt persons and persons deprived 
of rights or in respect of whom a legal 
adviser has been appointed. 
Since the text of the Constitution is in 
principle applied strictly, this list should be 
limitative since the Constitution does not 
specifically authorise the legislative auhorities 
to lay down other cases of exclusion as it does, 
for instance, in the case of incompatibility 
between certain duties and election as a deputy. 
However, the legislature has interpreted Article 
53 of the Constitution more widely and extended 
exclusion to those condemned to terms of 
imprisonment for rece1vmg, fraud, false 
testimony, intimidation of witnesses, experts or 
interpreters, indecent assault or rape, prostitution 
or corruption of young persons, indecent 
exposure, adultery, bigamy and adulteration of 
foodstuffs or drinks. Other persons who may be 
excluded from the electorate are those who keep 
or have kept a disorderly house or brothel, who 
have had their guardianship suspended for mis-
conduct or infidelity or who have lost their 
parental rights, and certified lunatics. 
Inclusion in the electoral roll establishes 
the right to vote. In order to be able to vote, it 
is therefore not sufficient to fulfil the conditions 
laid down by law ; it is necessary to be included 
in an electoral roll. 
1.3. Eligibility 
Conditions of eligibility for candidates at 
elections are : 
(1) to be of Luxembourg nationality; 
(2) to have civil and political rights ; 
APPENDIX Ill 
(3) to be at least twenty-one years of age on 
the day of the elections ; 
(4) to be domiciled in the Grand Duchy. 
Cases of exclusion are the same as for 
exclusion from the electorate. 
The following posts are incompatible with 
the office of deputy : 
(1) member of the government; 
(2) member of the State Council ; 
(3) magistrate ; 
( 4) member of the Auditor's Office ; 
( 5) district commissioner ; 
(6) income tax inspector or State 
accountant; 
(7) regular serviceman on active duty. 
Moreover, Article 100 of the electoral law 
lays down that the following duties are also 
incompatible with the office of deputy : 
(1) government counsellor; 
(2) State-paid minister of religion ; 
(3) civil servant or official whose principal 
duties are State-paid ; 
( 4) primary schoolteacher. 
All these persons may of course stand for 
office at elections if they fulfil the other condi-
tions for eligibility laid down by the law. But 
if they are elected and agree to accept the office 
of deputy they must resign from their duties, 
employment or responsibilities. Acceptance is 
established on being sworn in as deputies. 
Conversely, if a member of the Chamber is 
appointed to duties, employment or responsibil-
ities which are incompatible with his office of 
deputy, he is bound to give up this office when 
he accepts such duties, employment or respon-
sibilities. 
1.4. Nomination of candidates 
Political groups must draw up lists of 
candidates nominated for elections. The number 
of candidates on these lists may not exceed the 
number of deputies to be elected in the 
constituency. Individual candidatures are con-
sidered as lists on their own. 
1.5. Elections 
Ordinary elections to replace outgoing 
deputies must be held every five years, on the 
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first Sunday in June. Should this fall on Whit 
Sunday, elections are held on the last Sunday 
in May. 
Should the Chamber be dissolved, new elections 
are held not later than three months after dis-
solution. 
By-elections are held in the event of a 
seat becoming vacant if there is no substitute on 
the relevant list. 
1.6. Voting 
Each elector has as many votes as there are 
deputies to be elected in the constituency. Votes 
may be cast in various ways, as follows : 
( 1) List vote. By placing a cross in the 
appropriate place at the top of a list, an elector 
may vote for the whole list and give one vote to 
each candidate thereon. In this event, he may 
cast no other vote under penalty of invalidating 
his vote. 
(2) Nominative vote. An elector may vote 
nominatively by placing either one or two cros-
ses in the appropriate place after the name of 
each candidate of his choice. In this event, he 
may not place more crosses than there are 
deputies to be elected in the constituency. An 
elector who votes nominatively may choose his 
candidates on the same or different lists, being 
careful not to vote more often than there are 
seats available (split vote). 
1. 7. Division of seats 
Seats are shared between the lists in propor-
tion to the total number of list and nominative 
votes obtained by each list. 
The method of calculation is governed by 
Articles 136, 137 and 138 of the electoral law. 
1.8. Verification of credentials 
It is for the Chamber alone to decide whether 
elections are valid. 
The Chamber verifies the credentials of its 
newly-elected members and settles any disputes 
which may arise. Any complaint about the elec-
tions must be made before the credentials are 
verified. 
2. Organisation of the Chamber 
2.1. Situation of individual deputies 
Newly-elected deputies take office at the first 
ordinary or extraordinary meeting of the 
Chamber. 
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So that they may carry out their duties with-
out hindrance and in full independence, the 
Constitution guarantees parliamentary immun-
ity for deputies. Immunity has two aspects : 
unaccountability and inviolability. 
(1) Unaccountab~"lity 
No deputy may be prosecuted or be the 
object of enquiries in respect of opinions and 
votes expressed by him in the exercise of his 
duties (Constitution, Article 68). Deputies must 
be able to speak freely in the interests of the 
country. They may not be prosecuted or arrested 
for statements made by them in the Chamber, 
even when such statements infringe penal law, 
i.e. slander, insult, libel, exhortation to riot, etc. 
Parliamentary unaccountability is perma-
nent, i.e. it protects a deputy during and outside 
sessions. It also covers former deputies for 
opinions expressed during their term of office. 
(2) Inviolability 
A deputy who commits a crime, 
misdemeanour or offence may not be arrested or 
prosecuted during the session without the author-
isation of the Chamber except in flagrante delicto 
(Constitution, Article 69). 
If the Chamber so requires, the arrest or 
prosecution of a deputy may be suspended dur-
ing the session and for its whole duration. 
Parliamentary inviolability does not protect 
a deputy outside sessions. 
A term of office is legally terminated if a 
deputy: 
- accepts a post as civil servant, State-paid 
official or State-paid minister of 
religion; 
- fails to attend regularly as required by 
the law. If the minutes of sittings show 
that a deputy has been absent for more 
than half the sittings of two consecutive 
ordinary sessions, his term of office is 
legally terminated. 
Candidates from each list immediately after 
those elected are asked by the President of the 
Chamber to complete the term of office of 
deputies on the same list whose seats become 
vacant by choice, resignation, death or any other 
cause. They are notified within fifteen days of 
the event leading to the vacancy. 
144 
APPENDIX Ill 
A deputy who, by accepting the duties of a 
Minister, had to give up his seat as a deputy, is 
fully reinstated as first substitute on the list on 
which he was elected when his term as Minister 
is over. 
2.2. Procedure in the Chamber 
The Chamber meets in the city of Luxem-
bourg. 
Sittings are public, except as laid down in 
the rules of procedure. 
A summary record of debates is published 
and circulated free of charge to all households 
on the electoral roll. 
Each year, the Chamber meets in ordinary 
session in accordance with the law and without 
being convened on the second Tuesday of October 
at 3 p.m. 
Sessions are opened and closed by the Grand 
Duke in person or by a representative appointed 
for the purpose, who is generally the Prime 
Minister. 
The Grand Duke may convene the Chamber 
in extraordinary session and adjourn or dissolve 
it. The Grand Duke is bound to convene an 
extraordinary session if one-third of the deputies 
so request. 
Ordinary sessions are those which begin in 
accordance with the law each year at the time 
laid down in the rules of procedure of the 
Chamber, i.e. the second Tuesday in October. 
Under the rules of procedure of the Chamber, 
deputies have the right to form political groups. 
A political group must have at least five members 
in order to be recognised. 
To facilitate and rationalise the work of the 
Chamber, the rules of procedure make provision 
for a working committee and standing commit-
tees and special committees may be formed. 
The task of the working committee is to 
assist the President of the Chamber in conduct-
ing proceedings and in particular to concert 
with the political groups on the best way of 
expediting the work of the Chamber. It consists 
of the President of the Chamber or his represen-
tative and representatives of the political groups. 
Each political group is represented by one dele-
gate and each delegate has a number of votes 
equal to the number of members in his group. 
The working committee has therefore been 
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defined as a concentrated emanation of the 
Chamber, which gives its opinion on the order 
of business of the Chamber and, where necessary, 
decides how long debates should last and the 
time limit for taking votes. 
Standing committees are generally respon-
sible for certain specific matters. They are set up 
by the Chamber at the beginning of each 
legislature, i.e. after each full election. The 
Chamber decides how many there should be, 
their titles and duties. Standing committees con-
sist of at least five and not more than eleven 
members appointed by the Chamber at the begin-
ning of each session. When setting them up, 
account is taken of the proportional representa-
tion of political groups. There are at present 
nineteen standing committees. 
Special committees may be set up by the 
Chamber or, at its request, by the President of 
the Chamber, in the same conditions as for 
membership of standing committees. Special com-
mittees are responsible for studying specific bills 
or motions. They are normally dissolved when 
they have tabled their reports on the bills or 
motions before them (Rules of Procedure, 
Article 16). 
Standing and special committees may set up 
sub-committees for which they determine the 
membership and responsibilities. If necessary, 
they may consult persons or bodies outside par-
liament and obtain information from them. 
Votes on bills or motions are always taken 
by verbal roll-call. In other cases the Chamber 
expresses its opinion by sitting and standing 
unless five members ask for a vote by roll-call. 
Each deputy may ask one or more colleagues 
to vote on his behalf in his absence. Proxy votes 
are taken after the votes of members present. No 
deputy may represent more than one of his col-
leagues (Rules of Procedure, Article 42). 
(3) Legislative procedure 
Like the Grand Duke, the Chamber has the 
right to initiate legislation. The parliamentary 
or the Chamber's proposal is called a motion for 
a bill, whereas the Grand Ducal or governmental 
proposal is called a bill. 
The normal procedure for governmental pro-
posals is as follows : 
The preliminary bill drawn up by the Min-
istry concerned is first submitted to the State 
Council for consideration. It is accompanied by 
an explanatory memorandum. 
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The opinion of the State Council is transmit-
ted to the government in the form of a reasoned 
report containing conclusions and, where 
appropriate, alternative proposals. 
Before submitting a bill to the State Council, 
the government may ask for its opinion on the 
principle. The State Council may draw the 
government's attention to the advisability of new 
laws and existing regulations. In both cases, if 
the government and the State Council agree on 
the principle, the government may ask the State 
Council to prepare the bill or regulation. 
Any changes to the initial bill must be sub-
mitted to the State Council for its opinion. 
The government submits the final text to the 
Grand Duke, with the opinion of the State Coun-
cil, with a request for authorisation to table it 
in the Chamber of Deputies. 
When the Grand Duke authorises the govern-
ment to table the bill in the Chamber, this is done 
in public sitting by the Minister concerned. 
The printed text of the bill and its 
appendices is distributed to the members of the 
Chamber. 
The bill is referred for examination to one 
of the following : 
- a standing committee ; 
- a special committee set up for the 
purpose; 
- two or more standing committees which 
will meet jointly. 
The public debate is divided into two parts : 
the general debate and the debate on the articles. 
The general debate covers the principle and 
the bill as a whole. It is followed by a debate on 
the articles taken separately and any relevant 
amendments. Each member of the Chamber may 
speak and deputies may table amendments during 
the debate. 
Amendments must be submitted in writing 
to the bureau of the Chamber. They must be 
signed by at least five deputies. If the Chamber 
decides that amendments should be considered, 
the amended texts are referred to the State 
Council. In this case, the debate may be 
suspended until the State Council has given its 
opinion. 
The Chamber votes no less than four times 
on each bill. It should be recalled that votes are 
taken by verbal roll-call or by sitting and stand-
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ing. A vote on a bill as a whole must always be 
taken by verbal roll-call. 
(a) Voting article by article 
No bill may be passed by the Chamber until 
it has been voted on article by article (Constitu-
tion, Article 65) . 
(b) The second statutory vote 
When the State Council has given its opinion 
on the new provisions introduced during the 
debate, on amendments adopted, on initial pro-
visions which are negatived, on articles amended 
in any way whatsoever and on all additional 
provisions accepted and on which the State 
Council did not give its opinion before the first 
vote, the Chamber votes a second time, after 
another debate, on all the modifications intro-
duced. 
(c) Vote on the bill as a whole 
Immediately afterwards, the Chamber votes 
on the bill as a whole. 
In countries with a bicameral parliamentary 
system, the vote on the bill as a whole expresses 
the final decision of each chamber and concludes 
their part in the legislative procedure. This is 
not so in Luxembourg. Because it is such a small 
country, it has only one chamber : the Chamber 
of Deputies. The moderating element which 
would be provided by a second chamber, perhaps 
elected at two levels, is therefore lacking in the 
Luxembourg legislative system. The authors of 
the Constitution realised this and endeavoured to 
offset this drawback by introducing procedure 
for a second constitutional vote. 
All bills are subject to a second vote, unless 
the Chamber, in agreement with the State Coun-
cil, meeting in public sitting, decides otherwise. 
There is an interval of at least three months 
between the two votes. 
After voting on a bill as a whole, the 
Chamber thus in principle has to vote on the 
same bill a second time, after a period in which 
it has time for reflection. 
The Constitution admittedly allows the 
Chamber to dispense with this second vote, but 
the State Council must agree. 
To compensate for the absence of a second 
chamber, the Constitution thus allows the State 
Council to go beyond its purely consultative role 
and grants it a true right of suspensive veto in 
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the legislative procedure. Here, the State Council 
does not merely given an opinion, it takes a 
decision. 
The legislative work of the Chamber is con-
cluded when a second vote is dispensed with or 
after the second constitutional vote three months 
later. 
Once a bill has been finally passed by the 
Chamber, it requires the assent of the Grand 
Duke. It cannot come into force until it has been 
promulgated by him and published in the 
Memorial. 
Assent, i.e. approval, by the Grand Duke of 
the text of a bill passed by the Chamber is the 
essential role played by the Grand Duke in the 
exercise of legislative powers. 
The implementation of the law after pro-
mulgation and publication is the task of the 
executive. 
In practice, the Grand Duke gives his assent 
to and promulgates the law by signing the text 
of the law, together with the promulgating text. 
In this case, he therefore exercises legislative and 
executive attributions with one signature. 
( 4) Parliamentary supervision of the government 
In financial matters, the Chamber supervises 
the government through the annual vote on the 
budget and taxes, the right to close the State 
accounts each year and by some supervision of the 
management of the common inheritance. 
Supervision by the Chamber of Deputies 
would be illusory if confined to consideration of 
budgetary estimates and not the financial opera-
tions carried out by the government on the basis 
of these estimates. The Chamber's right to close 
the State accounts is a corollary to its right to 
adopt the budget (Constitution, Article 104). 
Each year, therefore, the government sub-
mits general accounts to the Chamber showing 
income and expenditure during the financial year 
before last. These general accounts are first 
audited by the Auditor's Office and are 
accompanied by its opinion. The Chamber of 
Deputies closes the State accounts by a law 
(Articles 58 and 59 of the law of 27th July 1936 
on the State accounts ; Constitution, Article 104). 
The Chamber also has a say in certain 
appointments, it receives and considers petitions 
and has the right to initiate enquiries and to 
supervise the government through parliamentary 
questions, interpellations and motions. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on reserve forces 
(i) Considering that improved organisation, recruitment and training of reserve forces would allow: 
(a) a. considerable strengthening of the deterrent potential of the field forces of the European armies; 
(b) European defence to be based to a substantial extent on recourse to the widest possible mobi-
lisation of the people's energies in the event of attack ; 
(ii) Considering that the defence of Europe must not be based solely on nuclear deterrence and a modem 
and effective field force but must also be ensured by a. people's deterrent, expressing the will of the peoples 
of Europe to remain responsible for their own destinies ; 
(iii) Aware of the importance of the role which reserves can play in strengthening the links between the 
European peoples and their armies, particularly in keeping public opinion better informed about the import-
ance of defence problems ; 
(iv) Underlining the financial advantages of forming large-scale reserves, as opposed to an equivalent 
active force, when the proportion of national budgets devoted to defence tends to remain constant or even 
diminish and when personnel costs linked with the maintenance of active forces are continuously increasing 
to the point of sometimes jeopardising the implementation of certain equipment programmes; 
(v) Considering it necessary to harmonise the concepts which govern the organisation of reserves in 
Europe, in the framework of a common strategy for all the Western European States, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. (a) Together with the member States of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU, 
specify the type of tasks entrusted to the various components of the European defence system : nuclear 
forces, combat forces, internal defence forces ; 
(b) Consequently define requirements in respect of internal defence forces and combat forces with 
a view to harmonising the concepts of European States in this field ; 
2. To this end, set up a. group of experts consisting of senior defence officials to study measures likely 
to develop the contribution by reserves to the internal defence of European territory and inter alia consider 
the possibility of : 
(a) increasing the number of reservists who could be called up for internal defence, particularly 
where there is no system of conscription ; 
(b) producing special equipment for reserves for internal defence forces, combining power, simplicity 
and robustness, and ensuring that it is made available immediately in the event of mobilisation ; 
(c) improving training of reserve officers responsible for commanding the units forming internal 
defence forces, such training to include on the one hand periods of training in active units and 
on the other hand periods of training together with reservists in the ranks ; 
(d) adapting compulsory military service, where this exists, to the requirements of internal defence 
and consequently provide for a short but intensive period of active service followed by a number 
of training periods at regular intervals ; 
(e) organising internal defence forces on a. territorial basis by assigning the necessary number of 
national servicemen and the essential reservists, according to their place of residence ; 
(/) paying reservists undergoing periods of training at an appropriate rate; 
3. (a) Study measures likely to increase the availability and effectiveness of reserves for combat forces 
and inter alia seek means of improving the training of such reserves and the speed and efficiency of their 
mobilisation; 
(b) Pay particular attention to the question of the time required for the mobilisation and immediate 
use of reserve units in the field forces ; 
4. Consider setting up a European defence college where those responsible for Europe's defence and 
reserve officers would discuss their experiences and endeavour to define joint principles which might govern 
the use of reserves in Europe. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that 
this report is a wide-ranging review of the role 
of reserves and the spirit in which they should 
approach their task in order to achieve the best 
results for defending the nation and Europe. 
2. In conclusion to this study, the report will 
see what lessons can be learned from the position 
of the opposing forces and from the present use 
of reserves and propose improvements which 
might be advocated for strengthening the poten-
tial of WEU forces. 
3. In an appendix, the forces on both sides are 
examined: 
- Warsaw Pact ; 
- Atlantic Alliance. 
4. For each side, it then defines the charac-
teristics of their land forces in peacetime and 
their possible strengthening (M+ 1, M +7, etc.) 
in wartime. 
5. The study forecasts the future shape of 
war - attack with or without warning, light-
ening or long-drawn-out, conventional or nuclear 
war- and then consideration is given to NATO 
doctrines, the French concept, etc. 
6. In an appendix, the Rapporteur also gives 
a comparative table of the position of profes-
sional armies (United Kingdom, United States, 
Canada) and conscript armies (France, Germany, 
Italy, etc.) in terms of co-operation with their 
own reserves. 
7. Special cases such as Israel, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Vietnam and Yugoslavia are also studied 
and attached to the present report. 
General 
8. The purpose of this part of the report is to 
study the contribution made by reserve forces to 
Western Europe's defence effort. Your Rappor-
teur felt that this matter had not yet been con-
sidered with sufficient care and attention either 
by politicians or by the military authorities. 
9. There is an explanation for this lack of 
interest in such a serious subject : the very idea 
of reserves does not seem to belong to the stra-
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tegic context of European defence. According to 
traditional strategic thinking, the usual role of 
reserves is to bring field forces up to strength 
and provide replacements in the event of large-
scale conventional operations. Nowadays, this 
would imply widespread hostilities in Europe 
using conventional weapons (or at the most very 
low-strength nuclear weapons) after the fashion 
of the campaigns during the first and second 
world wars. 
10. But in the case of the European theatre of 
operations, in view of the number of nuclear 
weapons of all types available on the battlefield, 
wars of this kind are almost unimaginable in 
present circumstances. In any such event the 
belligerents could not avoid resorting to strategic 
nuclear weapons at a very early stage. 
11. Hence, preparation for widespread conven-
tional fighting has lost some of its interest : 
large-scale mobilisation of reserves seems out of 
the question in the event of war. 
12. The strength of an army no longer depends 
on numbers. As many observers have underlined, 
the army will have a diminished requirement for 
millions of men, but a growing requirement for 
new, mobile, immediately available combat-
ready forces, at full strength, trained and cohe-
rent. 
13. The present strategy of the European coun-
tries which are members of WEU is based on 
two elements: (a) nuclear deterrent forces, whe-
ther American, British or French ; (b) combat-
ready forces. These combat-ready forces have a 
twofold role: to deter any limited attack launched 
by conventional or tactical nuclear means and to 
resist any widespread conventional offensive for 
long enough to allow the political authorities to 
manage the crisis so as to ensure that the nuclear 
deterrent is as effective as possible. 
14. Reserves can play no role in the nuclear 
deterrent forces, which must be prepared to 
intervene at any time without outside support. 
15. Combat-ready forces may be brought up to 
strength only by a very limited number of reser-
ves which must be on call at all times and at 
short notice (within 24 to 48 hours), and they 
must consequently be fully trained. 
16. However, your Rapporteur believes it is 
essential for Europe's security to pay the price 
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to have such reserves capable of increasing the 
deterrent capability of combat-ready forces. 
Additional or replacement reserves to bolster 
combat-ready units can prolong resistance to 
attack which is important in view of the rapid 
attrition of front-line forces in modern warfare 
waged with particularly sophisticated and 
destructive weapons. Response to an attack 
would thus be as flexible as possible by raising 
the threshold of strategic nuclear deterrence. 
17. Reserve forces also have an even more 
important role to play in the field of defence : 
internal defence by mobilising the population in 
the event of invasion or occupation following the 
failure of nuclear deterrence. Recourse to arming 
the nation can be based only on a defence effort 
with the support of all sections of the civilian 
population who are fit to fight, i.e. mainly 
reservists. This people's deterrent aims at pre-
venting foreign occupation by the threat of losses 
and destruction far greater than the gain the 
invaded country may represent. Internal defence 
based on mobilising the population is necessary 
for three reasons : 
(i) it gives tangible shape to the people's 
desire to defend itself without which 
the nuclear deterrent loses its credi-
bility; 
( ii) it offers an alternative should the 
nuclear deterrent fail ; 
( iii) it demonstrates the close link between 
the army and the people from whom 
it is drawn. 
Both the majority and the opposition in France 
share a wide measure of agreement on this 
notion of deterrence by the people. 
18. In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes 
to underline the political importance of the prob-
lem of reserve forces. Consideration of the role 
of these forces does not merely imply raising 
a technical problem but also deciding whether 
the inhabitants of our States wish, in the event 
of emergency, to make an effective contribution 
to the defence of Europe. 
19. Your Rapporteur therefore feels that any 
study of the role of reserves in a modern defence 
policy inevitably raises two questions : 
- How can European public opinion be 
made more alive to defence matters des-
pite the deep-rooted feeling of security 
which it now seems to have ? 
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- How can the army be brought closer to 
the people and general misunderstanding 
and prejudices be dispelled as being 
harmful to Europe's defence and perhaps 
in the long term dangerous for its 
security 1 
20. On the basis of the foregoing considera-
tions, your Rapporteur will first deal with the 
role which reserve forces can play in a modern 
defence system. He will then make an objective 
assessment of existing reserve systems and 
examine the possibilities afforded by reserves 
for establishing closer links between the army 
and the nation. Lastly, he will make a few pro-
posals for improving recruitment, training and 
organisation of reserves at European level bearing 
in mind that reserves are an essential, but not a 
sufficient, instrument for deterring an enemy 
from launching a limited attack or parrying the 
possibility of operations based on ambiguity. 
Only mobilisation of the population on a strictly 
local and regional basis can muster the necessary 
and effective forces to oppose the enemy. 
I. The r8le of reserves in a modern 
defence system 
21. Reserves still have a place, and probably 
an important one, in a modern defence policy. 
However, their role appears radically different 
to what it was during the first half of this 
century. 
22. Taking defence as a whole, the military side 
can be divided into three functions : nuclear 
deterrence; maintenance of a permanently com-
bat-ready force; the preparation of internal 
defence based on mobilisation of all the nation's 
human and material resources in the event of 
invasion or foreign occupation. 
23. In each of the defence systems correspond-
ing to these functions, reserves play a very 
different role which must be defined in greater 
detail. 
24. (i) Nuclear deterrence is based essentially on 
strategic nuclear weapons. Their role is: "Poten-
tially and continuously to deter an aggressor by 
means of a threat which is intolerable in view 
of what is at stake." The importance of this 
element must not be taken lightly, in any defence 
policy, even in countries which have no nuclear 
weapons, since the effectiveness of the Atlantic 
Alliance in keeping the peace in the last twenty-
five years is mainly due to the existence of 
American nuclear weapons. 
25. In terms of nuclear deterrence, the role of 
reserves seems practically non-existent, first 
because nuclear weapons can be used only by 
highly-specialised and qualified staff and 
secondly and above all because such staff must 
be kept in a state of alert at all times. For 
everything related to nuclear weapons, the dis-
tinction between peacetime and wartime tends to 
fade. Such weapons must therefore remain in 
the hands of professional servicemen under the 
close control of the political authorities who must 
retain power of decision on the use of such 
weapons. 
26. (ii) A combat-ready force is also essential 
for the reasons which your Rapporteur has 
already given. It allows greater flexibility in 
deterrence and averts limited attacks by con-
ventional means. 
27. For restoring or maintaining peace as the 
case may be, it is useful for the Western Euro-
pean countries to be able to send forces to certain 
parts of the world at short notice, to ensure 
respect for decisions taken by the United 
Nations, for instance. It should thus be possible 
to use part of the combat-ready force, equipped 
solely with conventional weapons, for distant and 
limited operations. 
28. To carry out the tasks just mentioned, the 
combat-ready force must be a conventional one, 
ready to intervene at any time with the latest 
equipment and with tactical nuclear weapons if 
necessary but ready to fight without them if 
they are not essential. It must therefore include 
a large proportion of regulars. 
29. Your Rapporteur considers it essential to 
pursue a policy of maintaining a fairly high 
level of reserves in order to be able to reinforce 
combat-ready units 1 • 
30. As in the United Kingdom, reserves for 
reinforcing combat-ready forces might mainly 
be former regulars proficient in the use of the 
equipment and weapons with which combat-
ready forces are equipped and whose contracts 
might include specific obligations to keep their 
knowledge up to date and to be available for 
call-up at short notice. 
31. The role of non-regular reservists drawn 
from conscripts who have completed their corn-
I. Reserve forces are useful mainly for reinforcing the 
land elements of combat-ready forces. They play only a 
marginal role in strengthening sea and air forces for 
which mobilisation at very short notice is difficult. 
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pulsory military service, where this exists, is 
important, though limited. 
32. A policy of building up a relatively high 
level of reserves for the field forces might there-
fore draw on two types of reservist : ex-regular 
servicemen and na;tional servicemen who have 
completed their full period of active military 
service: 
- regular servicemen for combat-ready 
forces might be recruited for a relatively 
short period (one to three years), but 
remain on the reserve list for quite a 
long time. During their period of service, 
they would receive intensive training ; 
- national servicemen for combat-ready 
forces should be carefully selected and 
also have very advanced training. For a 
certain period after release, they would 
form a reserve capable of using the most 
up-to-date equipment. 
33. Such a policy of quick turnover and build-
ing up a high level of reserves would allow 
personnel to be kept up to date with the fast-
succeeding developments of new military tech-
nology on a continuing basis. This would help 
to eliminate the routine and technical conser-
vatism which often jeopardise the efficiency of 
units which should be constantly operational. 
34. Moreover, the rotation of personnel together 
with the formation of a large reserve is said to 
lower the maintenance costs of personnel in the 
field forces. The sums thus saved might be allo-
cated to improving equipment and weapons. 
35. The use of reserves also improves fighting 
efficiency. In a conventional war, even limited, 
the attrition of front-line forces is now extremely 
high. Progress in armaments has produced ter-
rible destructive power. For instance, in the 
October 1973 war, Arab and Israeli forces lost 
almost all their armoured divisions in less than 
a fortnight. 
36. Finally, there is a considerable political 
advantage in building up reserves. In view of 
their specialisation and permanent availability, 
there might be a tendency for combat-ready 
forces to form a military class aloof from the 
nation. To preclude any risk of a "Praetorian 
army", it would be advisable to develop the role 
of reserves in combat-ready forces in order to 
form a closer link between the active forces and 
the civilian world. Here it would be necessary to 
organise an easy transition from military to 
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civilian tasks, encouraging a relatively quick 
movement of personnel from combat-ready forces 
to reserve units. This would mean changing the 
status of military personnel in order to facilitate 
conversion to civilian life. Thus, the concept of 
a military career might be changed to one of 
military duties exercised for a limited period 
during which professional qualificationB might 
be obtained for use in civilian life. Moreover, 
in France, for instance, the equivalence of uni-
versity and military grades might be recognised. 
Your Rapporteur will deal with these matters 
in greater length in another chapter 1 • 
37. This would also justify an important role 
being given to civilians called up for military 
service in field forces and then transferred to 
the corresponding reserve. 
38. (iii) The people's deterrent should be a 
fundamental element of any defence policy. 
According to the white paper on defence pub-
lished by the French Government in 1972 : "The 
people's deterrent is the modern form of the 
national will to survive". The principle is based 
on the simple idea that there can be no real 
defence without the support of the people. 
39. The role of the people's deterrent force may 
be defined as follows : "To materialise the whole 
population's will to defend itself and to organise 
its active resistance to any attempt at disinte-
gration, aggression or even occupation." 
40. The nation must be organised in arms in 
such a way as to make it possible at all times 
to mobilise a large force everywhere on the 
territory. 
41. Reserves play an essential role in the organ-
isation of such a force. They consist mainly of 
persons who have had military training which 
allows them, when the time comes, to oppose 
occupation by the enemy and rouse the people's 
resistance to aggression. In peacetime, personnel 
on active service in the people's deterrent force 
must be mainly concerned with instructing and 
training duties. Basically they form a framework 
for receiving and organising future recruits. 
42. Reserves for the people's deterrent forces 
must be very large. The men involved in internal 
defence duties through mobilisation of the popu-
lation must constantly be replenished by new 
intakes from the same source. 
1. Chapter Ill : Reserves, a link between the army and 
the nation. 
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43. Moreover, apart from their military training, 
there must be no difference between reserves 
for the people's deterrent force and the rest of 
the population. Once called up, these reservists 
must be able to count on the support, solidarity 
and assistance of the whole population. They 
must therefore merge with it and identify them-
selves with it mentally and socially. 
44. People's deterrent force reserves will admit-
tedly only have relatively simple weapons. For 
them all to be armed and equipped adequately, 
they must not be given very complicated weapons 
which are expensive and difficult to handle. 
ConBideration should be given to adapting 
weaponB to the operational requirements of the 
people's deterrent forces which will mainly be 
responsible for harassing tactics and guerrilla 
operations. 
45. There are four main reasonB for an internal 
defence system based on large numbers of 
reserves: 
(i) Nuclear deterrence itself is meaningless 
without the backing of a people's deterrent. 
Political determination to resort to nuclear 
weapons will be credible only if there is an 
effective system for mobilising the population 
as an expression of the whole population's will 
to defend itself. In peacetime, large reserves 
organised to combine efforts in the event of war 
to fight the invader are the very leaven of 
nuclear deterrence and a guarantee that it will 
be effective. 
(ii) Secondly, an army of reservists, mobil-
ised on the spot, might prove extremely effective 
in a "non-battle" strategy. This theory is that 
a modern, mobile, powerfully-equipped army 
with the most up-to-date weapons will be forced 
either to concentrate and be a primary target 
for tactical nuclear weapons or to disperse, which 
is essential if it is to avoid nuclear destruction 
but would make it a target for dispersed mobile 
forces practising harassing tactics or guerrilla 
warfare. A limited attack by a conventional force 
might thus be harassed and eventually compelled 
to withdraw in face of a widespread popular 
uprising, organised flexibly, well dispersed and 
determined to repel the invader, even if the 
combat-ready force were wiped out and nuclear 
deterrence came to naught. Losses inflicted on 
the enemy by mobilising the population might 
be more than the territory is worth. The Viet-
nam war is a striking example of the success of 
a strategy of this kind, based on mobilising the 
wish of a whole nation to defend itself. 
(iii) Thirdly, it is increasingly evident that 
deterrence does not depend on nuclear weapons 
alone but is the result of firm determination to 
defend oneself with as full a range of weapons 
as possible, as was recently written : 
"Military history is full of these ups and 
downs: firearms deterred the combatants 
from using projectiles. But the latter did 
not disappear and demonstrators still throw 
stones at the police who do not shoot back. 
More recently, war gases appeared harmful 
enough for each side to be deterred from 
using them, but this did not prevent them 
from fighting by other means." 
We must therefore be prepared for all conceiv-
able types of war. The possibility of "changing 
wars" is in fact a great asset in a political and 
military emergency involving several nations. 
Should a strategy of conventional or nuclear 
deterrence fail, it must be possible to have 
recourse to non-conventional forms of warfare. 
(iv) Furthermore, the formation of large 
reserves in the framework of a people's deterrent 
strategy is a way of making the most of all the 
defence resources available in the countries of 
Western Europe, with democratic regimes. With 
these regimes, the people have before them an 
example of the kind of society to be defended. 
Should there be a move towards greater social 
justice, the people's devotion to their nation and 
to the democratic community of European States 
would certainly increase considerably. In a 
defence system based on mobilisation of the 
people, reserves are one of the institutions in 
which the people's accession to Western Europe's 
democratic heritage can best be expressed. They 
allow everyone to take part in defending values 
which are dear to them and thereby show their 
deV'otion to a type of society and way of living 
together. Only defence of this kind would be 
capable of mobilising all the energies of the 
European nations in the event of attack or inva-
sion. 
D. Objective assessment of existing 
reserve systems 
46. In the light of the foregoing considerations, 
your Rapporteur has endeavoured to make a 
brief review of policies followed with regard 
to reserves in certain Western European coun-
tries. 
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47. Countries with compulsory military service 
have a large number of reservists with military 
training : there are 1, 700,000 in the Federal 
Republic of Germany 1 and even more in France, 
which considers as reservists in the broadest 
sense all men aged between 18 and 35 who have 
completed their military service. Each year, the 
271,300 2 French conscripts who have completed 
their military service are placed on the reserve 
list for a period of from fourteen to eighteen 
years. The theoretical reserve level is thus very 
high. For the army, it counts more than 80,000 
officers, almost 300,000 non-commissioned offi-
cers and 2,500,000 other ranks. 
48. The number of reservists who can be used 
immediately in case of mobilisation is difficult 
to assess but in countries with compulsory mili-
tary service it is apparently very small compared 
with the total number of reservists. 
49. In France, in the event of the most wide-
spread mobilisation, the military authorities 
expect to recall about 20 % of the theoretical 
number of reserves within four to five days, i.e. 
at the most some 500,000 men. The Military 
Balance published by the Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London estimates at 400,000 the num-
ber of army reservists who could actually be 
mobilised within a few days. The fighting ability 
of some of these reservists would also be ques-
tionable since many of them would have had 
no training at all since demobilisation and about 
half of them would have completed their militar1 
service more than three years earlier. 
50. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
field troops (Feldheer) would have to be strength-
ened in case of mobilisation by a maximum of 
about 210,000 men. The territorial army would 
have to be increased fivefold, which would mean 
calling up about 300,000 reservists 8 • 
51. In a professional army as in the United 
Kingdom, the number of reservists who could 
be integrated quickly into the defence system is 
even smaller. There are only 69,000 men in the 
territorial and army volunteer reserves who 
carry out regular periods of training and can 
be mobilised at short notice 4 • 
1. Genna.n Government white paper on defence, 
December 1971. 
2. Military Balance, 1975-76. 
3. Source : German Government white paper on defence, 
January 1974. 
4. Statement on the defence estimates 1975. 
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52. The territorial reserve is one of the two 
components of the British reserve system. The 
other is the regular reserve. These are profes-
sional soldiers who, after completion of their 
active service, may be recalled at any time by 
Queen's Order. There are only about 58,700 non-
commissioned officers and other ranks 1 • To 
reach the total regular reserve strength, 20,000 
officers who can effectively be mobilised must 
be added to this figure. As members of the 
regular reserve have no training periods, their 
ability to carry out the duties which would be 
assigned to them on mobilisation may sometimes 
prove inadequate. In the event of mobilisation, 
British military headquarters apparently expect 
to call up about 70,000 men to bring the army 
in Germany up to strength. These would be 
drawn in equal proportions from the regular 
reserve and the territorial reserve. 
53. The number of reservists on which military 
headquarters in the Western European coun-
tries can really count is thus very low compared 
with available resources. This is true not only 
in France and the Federal Republic of Germany 
but perhaps also in the United Kingdom, where 
it might be possible to extend recruitment for 
the territorial reserve and also make better use 
of the regular reserve. 
54. The low level of reserves which could be 
committed in the early stages of a war is easily 
explained. The generally accepted view in Europe 
is that reserves are mainly intended to bring 
combat-ready forces up to strength. But the 
equipment and weapons available for these forces 
do not allow a large number of reservists to be 
called up. The contribution which reservists can 
make to combat-ready forces is perhaps under-
estimated : in Chapter I, your Rapporteur indi-
cated why he felt it desirable to f<Jrm larger 
reserves, even for combat-ready forces. 
55. Nevertheless, as matters now stand, the 
organisation of reserves appears to correspond 
to a certain extent to the requirements of these 
combat-ready forces whose role is to meet at very 
short notice a conventional-type offensive using 
conventional or even tactical nuclear weapons. 
56. In the Federal Republic, for instance, the 
ninth law amending the law on compulsory 
military service introduced a system concerning 
the organisation of reserves which seems very 
1. Anny Department "Abstract of Anny Manpower 
Statistics", No. 84, December 1975, page 45. 
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suitable for the requirements of combat-ready 
forces. Since this law came into force on 1st 
January 19761, a number of servicemen have 
special commitments on completion of their active 
service. For twelve months, they have to accom-
plish periods of training and must be able to 
rejoin their units at any time on notification of 
their call-up by press, radio, television or other 
means. This availability system (V erfugungs-
bereitschaft) is to allow reserves to be formed 
for immediate assignment to the field troops 
(Feldheer) which, in Germany, constitute the 
major part of the combat-ready forces. 
57. There is a similar system in the Netherlands, 
where demobilised servicemen may be called up 
at any time and without warning during the 
six-month period following the end of their legal 
active service. 
58. In the United Kingdom, reserves are organ-
ised in accordance with three principles : 
- it is assumed that any attack on Europe 
would ,be preceded by a period of poli-
tical tension long enough to allow the 
combat troops to be brought up to 
strength; 
- internal defence of British territory is 
not one of the essential tasks of the 
armed forces ; 
- reserves must be adapted as far as pos-
sible to the requirements of the order of 
battle. 
These principles led the British to make the 
territorial reserve mainly responsible for bring-
ing the order of battle up to strength. In the 
event of mobilisation, four-fifths of this terri-
torial reserve, organised locally into units at 
regimental or battalion level, would be required 
to go to Germany or other NATO forward posi-
tions. The regular reserve would be assigned to 
territorial reserve units or to active units in 
order to bring them up to strength. Most of 
the British reserves therefore seem to be ear-
marked for combat-ready forces and they are 
organised almost exclusively in the light of the 
requirements of these forces. 
59. In Belgium, the 30,000 reservists, who 
receive minimum training and are capable of 
forming a mechanised brigade and a motorised 
1. German Government white paper on defence, 8th 
January 1975. 
brigade, would also for the most part, in the 
event of mobilisation, be responsible for strength-
ening the combat-ready units. 
60. In France, combat-ready forces are brought 
up to strength by reservists who remain avail-
able to their units six months after the end of 
their military service. 
61. While reserves seem largely intended to 
bring combat-ready forces up to strength and 
replace their losses, their role (although capital) 
in the establishment of a real system of people's 
deterrence has been widely underestimated. But 
it is in organising internal defence by calling up 
the people that the best use could be made of 
the considerable resources available to the Euro-
pean countries which have a system of cons-
cription. At the beginning of this chapter, your 
Rapporteur underlined the large number of 
reservists with military training available in 
Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy and the Netherlands. 
62. However, if the governments decided to 
organise a balanced system of reservists to meet 
the requirements of both combat-ready and 
internal defence forces, they could make use of 
certain structures which already exist. 
63. In the Federal Republic of Germany for 
instance, the basic elements of a people's deter-
rent force exist in the form of the large number 
of reservists. The German army includes field 
troops (Feldheer) and internal defence forces 
(TerritorialJLeer). Reserves play a leading role in 
internal defence forces which are responsible for 
protecting German territory against amphibious 
or airborne operations and guaranteeing the free 
movement of the field troops. The territorial 
army consists mainly of security troops (Siche-
rungstruppen) 85 % of whom, after mobilisa-
tion, would be reservists. The basis of the terri-
torial army structure is the security companies 
(Sicherungskompanien) which in peacetime con-
sist of only a few men responsible for main-
taining weapons and equipment for a wartime 
strength of about 150. The security companies 
of which there will soon be about 300 are t~ 
be formed in the framework of the ad~inistra­
tive areas (Kreis). Security regiments (Siche-
rungsregimenter) may be formed by mobilisation 
at the level of administrative districts (Bezirk). 
They are to be equipped with tanks, anti-tank 
weapons and artillery. There is also provision 
for the formation of six internal defence groups 
(H eimatschutzkommando) in the event of mobili-
sation, organised in the framework of the 
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military regions. These internal defence groups 
are equipped with tanks, armoured vehicles for 
transporting troops and heavy anti-tank artillery. 
64. The method of training reservists is more-
over fairly well adapted to the requirements of 
internal defence. Courses for reservists in the 
territorial army correspond to the duties which 
would be assigned to them in that army in the 
event of mobilisation. Training exercises and 
courses followed by reservists are organised on 
a local basis. Exercises are either individual to 
improve their level of instruction, or by unit at 
the various levels of territorial defence (area, 
district and military region) to ensure the 
cohesion of the future internal defence units. 
Exercises are relatively frequent, since they are 
hel~ at lOOBt four times during the six-year 
period after the end of the period of military 
service. They last from four to twelve days. 
65. There is also a voluntary reservist associa-
tion (Reservistenverband) which provides more 
advanced training for its members. The associa-
tion is organised on a regional basis and is in 
permanent contact with the territorial army 
authorities responsible far reserves. 
66. In France, operational defence of the terri-
tory (DOT) is responsible for internal defence. 
The DOT, whose most recent organisation was 
set up in 1973, has active forces in the form of 
commando-type regiments, equipped with heavy 
arms and good communications equipment. Their 
task is to protect crucial military and civil areas 
whose operation is necessary for defence 1 • With 
the support of the gendarmerie, well organised 
and receiving a large number of reservists, their 
strength can be multiplied by four on M-day 
thanks to the extension of existing active regi-
me:r;ts and the creation of divisional infantry 
regiments formed solely from reservists recruited 
locally. Every year, one-third of the DOT reserve 
forces has two days' training. The system of 
mobilisation corresponds quite well to the 
requirements of internal defence forces. It is 
organised so as to allow decentralised mobilisa-
tion carried out with the participation of regular 
units, even if the latter are already partly enga-
ged. Moreover, the mobilisation infrastructure 
seems sound. It consists of a network of mobilisa-
1. DOT units are also responsible for : 
(a) co-operating with combat corps to ensure their 
freedom of movement ; 
(b) in the event of occupation, forming a starting-point 
for national resistance. 
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tion bodies and centres covering the whole terri-
tory. The mobilisation bodies are regular units 
responsible for their own mobilisation and for 
setting up other units (including twin units). 
Their capability is reduced to make their mobil-
isation responsibilities compatible with their 
peacetime tasks. The mobilisation centres are 
specialised in mobilisation questions. They 
consist of small detachments of regulars and have 
installations for stockpiling equipment. 
67. In Britain, the territorial army, reorganised 
since 1961, might be a first step towards using 
reserves in the framework of a people's deterrent 
strategy. It is essentially made up of associations 
(one per county) each member of which has a 
fortnight's training every year plus one week-
end per month and some evenings. Specially 
qualified personnel are in rather a different 
position : they are called up to their units only 
once a year for a fortnight. Recruitment is on 
a national basis. The territorial reserve is a very 
modest nucleus of people's defence in that it 
consists entirely of volunteers. 
68. It must be underlined, however, that the 
territorial reserve is not very large, nor are the 
tasks assigned to it real internal defence tasks. 
In the event of mobilisation, most of the terri-
torial reserve would be required to bring the 
British combat forces up to strength. 
69. As a result of this study of reserve systems 
in the Western European Union countries, your 
Rapporteur feels that a real people's deterrent 
system has yet to be organised although the basic 
elements of such a system are in place in many 
countries, including France and Germany. 
ID. Reserves, a Unk between the army 
and the nation 
70. Existing reserve systems seem unsatis-
factory. They do not always attach sufficient 
importance to establishing a proper internal 
defence system. 
71. The consequences are negative in that the 
people do not see themselves as potential defen-
ders of the society in which they live. The need 
for an army therefore eludes a growing number 
of people, particularly the young. 
72. Reserves could be an answer and promote 
closer links between the army and civilians. 
Reservists are an integral part of civilian life 
but insofar as they keep in touch with the army 
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they can play a very useful role as intermedia-
ries. They should keep the public informed of 
defence matters. They should also give active 
servicemen a better understanding of the trend 
of thinking and activities in the civilian world. 
73. But this assumes that there are plenty of 
reservists who realise what their role is, regularly 
conduct certain exercises and that they are 
generally recognised as being the basis of a 
people's defence system. 
The need for large numbers of reservists aware 
of their role 
74. Large numbers of reservists are essential for 
bringing the army and the people closer together. 
In a country like France, which has compulsory 
military service, all men between the ages of 18 
and 35 who have completed their legal period 
of military service are considered to be reservists. 
But this status should be accompanied by aware-
ness of the role and responsibilities it implies. 
Time spent in the army should not therefore be 
remembered as a bad dream. For instance, for 
the operational defence of the territory, a short 
period of military service (six months) on a 
territorial basis would be enough for training 
conscripts. This shorter period should be used 
very intensively so that the future reservists 
realise the usefulness and effectiveness of the 
defence effort. 
75. Moreover, the most should be made of the 
technical specialities of reservists. If they are 
posted to a duty station where they can use their 
professional abilities, they would feel they were 
playing an effective part in the defence effort. 
76. The number of reservists practising a pro-
fession during their military service might also 
be increased by introducing shorter periods of 
service. The technicality of the duties assigned 
to national servicemen and satisfactory material 
conditions of service should improve the future 
reservist's attitude towards the army. From this 
point of view, the situation of regular servicemen 
in the Bundeswehr provides a noteworthy 
example. 
77. For reservists to be fully aware of their 
role, they must not see the army as an oppressive 
organisation. Whatever their rank in the army, 
citizens must be protected from abuse of power 
in every form. Here again the Bundeswehr pro-
vides an interesting example : According to the 
1973-74 white paper on "The security of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the develop-
ment of the Federal armed forces", "the concept 
of the citizen in uniform shapes the spirit and 
morale of the armed forces. It is at the same time 
the connecting link between military service and 
the civilian way of life." 
The need for reserves to keep in touch with the 
regular army 
78. Large numbers of reservists, aware of their 
role, must also carry out certain exercises regul-
arly. Their obligations are no"t only of military 
interest. They allow them to keep in constant 
touch with the army and also, if the practice 
of self-instruction is developed (as in France), 
convey certain lines of thought and action peculiar 
to civilian life insofar as they are not in conflict 
with the requirements of warfare. 
79. In the Federal Republic, reservists have to 
undergo periods of training every two or three 
years up to the age of 30. The total duration is 
a maximum of forty-eight days, as being the 
least necessary for maintaining a link between 
the army and reservists. This link is the only 
way of ensuring that reservists effectively carry 
out their role of intermediary between the army 
and civilian society. 
The civilian view of reserves 
80. Filllally, the population should consider 
reserves as the basis of a people's defence system. 
This seems to be so in Yugoslavia, where the 
constitution provides that the whole population 
must take up arms against an invader whatever 
the circumstam.ces. The reserves, which are very 
large (1,500,000 men) are organised in such a 
way as to mobilise all the resources of the popul-
ation. They are decentralised and identified with 
the country's administrative and economic 
structure. The people thus feel that reserves are 
an essential guarantee of Yugoslavia's security 
and independence. Thanks to its reserves, the 
Yugoslav army is thus far better integrated with 
the nation than in many other countries. 
Adapting the regular army 
81. ~our Rapporteur considers that to increase 
the weight of reserves in the army in the frame-
work of a strategy of people's deterrence would 
prevent the army becoming an inward-looking 
body alien to civilian life. 
82. This means the regular army changing as 
well in order to adapt itself to the needs of 
people's deterrence. On the one hand, in certain 
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countries such as France and Italy its structure 
must allow subordinates to take part in organis-
ing military life. On the other hand, regular 
servicemen must be able to move more easily from 
military to civilian duties. In this connection, 
the situation in the German army is interesting. 
There is a high degree of technical training : in 
1972, 10,690 soldiers followed fuJ.l-time courses 
and more than 3,000 followed correspondence 
courses ; two universities are being set up in 
Munich and Hamburg reserved for officers but 
little different from civilian universities and 
lectures are given by non-military staff. 
* 
** 
83. To conclude this chapter, it should be under-
lined that, in the framework of people's deter-
rence, it is probably necessary to merge the 
nation and its military institutions completely. To 
entrust responsibility for defence to citizens 
through the appropriate organisation of reserves 
means giving national sovereignty control of 
weapons. In a defence system where technical 
means assign a larger role to regulars, the main-
tenance of compulsory military service for all 
and the existence of a large number of reservists 
among the civilian population guarantee the pro-
tection of democratic regimes. Britain admittedly 
does not seem to fall into this generalisation, but 
is this not due to the foot that its army has 
always been considered as an integral part of 
the national structure, however it may be 
recruited¥ 
IV. Proposals for improving the training, 
recruitment and organisation of reserves 
( i) Combat-ready forces 
84. The present organisation of reserves seems 
particularly adapted to the requirements of 
combat-ready forces. As your Rapporteur has 
already underlined, they are mainly destined to 
strengthen field forces. 
85. However, an effort still needs to be made 
in three particular respects : training reserves, 
reducing mobilisation time and transporting 
mobilised units to the theatre of operations. 
(a) Training reserves : For financial reasons, 
periods of training are often too short in the 
reserve forces of the WEU countries and do not 
allow reserves to be prepared for the type of 
warfare which must be waged by combat-ready 
forces. Members of the British regular reserve, 
for instance, are given no training. The often 
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very high level of ability reached during their 
active service thus drops after a few years. In 
France, peri<>ds of training are intended more 
to verify the smooth operation of mobilisation 
procedure than to provide real training for 
reservists. 
(b) Reducing mob't"lisation time : Effective and 
speedy mobilisation procedure is essential if 
reserves are to be used to any great extent. But 
military headquarters would probably have 
en<>ugh time for mobilising reserves if the war 
were preceded by a period of political tension. 
The contrary aBSUmption is unlikely, although 
allowance must be made for it. M<>reover, govern-
ments already seem to be aware of the need to 
reduce mobilisation time. In the United King-
d<>m, mobilisation plans were recently modified 
to reduce by some 30 % the time needed to 
depl<>y reserve forces in Europe. In the Federal 
Republic of Germany, mobilisation time is rela-
tively short (from a few hours to three days). In 
France, military headquarters consider that units 
for the combat-ready forces can be 100% opera-
tional within a maximum of five days. 
(c) Transporting reserves to the theatre of 
operations : This question mainly concerns the 
United Kingdom with the problem of crossing 
the Channel. A possible solUition might be to 
change legislation concerning the requisition of 
its civil, air or naval fleet. 
86. Your Rapporteur considers that there should 
be fairly strict requirements as regards technical 
qualifications and training for the recruitment 
of reserves for combat-ready forces in view of 
the very nature of the operational conditions to 
which combat-ready f<>rces are exposed (conven-
tional warfare using the most advanced techni-
ques, permanent availability). 
87. Finally, since the combat-ready forces of 
Western European countries have to operate 
together, could not oonsideration be given to 
organising exercises mobilising reservists from 
all the European countries in the framework of 
a c<>-ordinated plan Y 
( ii) People's deterrent forces 
88. Your Rapporteur considers that people's 
deterrent f<>rces oonstitute an area in which 
reserves can make a decisive contribution to the 
defence of Western Europe. 
89. Reserves for people's deterrent forces must 
be large since, in the event of mobilisation, their 
task is to organise resistance by the whole popul-
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ation. The system of conscription therefore seems 
particu1arly suited to the needs of deterrence by 
the people since it allows large reserves to be 
built up. In Britain, the extension of the terri-
torial army by campaigning for volunteers might 
be a way of building up the necessary reserves. 
90. Reserves should be organised locally. Mobil-
isation would thus be easier. Reservists would be 
keener to fight since they would all feel they 
were defending their home territory. Moreover, 
it would be easier to hold regular periods of 
training if reserves were organised locally and 
this would also allow the management of reserves 
to be decentralised which is essential for prepar-
ing non-conventional warfare consisting of 
harassment and guerrilla tactics. 
91. Research and investment should be made in 
respect of equipment specifically designed for the 
people's deterrent forces to produce powerful, 
simple and reliable arms. In this connection, the 
eastern countries seem to have managed to pro-
duce very effective equipment for guerrilla war-
fare, as can be seen from the success of the forces 
using it in Indo-China and Africa. 
92. Moreover, apart from the simplified weapons 
just menrtioned, recent progress in weapons 
technology offers a particularly suitable range 
of equipment fur the people's deterrent forces. 
Precision-guided weapons have been considerably 
improved in recent years ; they can be used very 
efficiently against tanks and fighter-bombers 
flying at low altitudes. Furthermore, despite unit 
costs which are still high, they are economical 
in terms of arms and munitions supplies and 
require neither the nerves nor the ability involved 
in handling slow conventional type wire-guided 
missiles. Although at present many of the 
prospects offered by these weapons are still 
purely speculative, quite possibly their develop-
ment might result in a reduction in the role of 
large armoured units, which are costly and 
vulnerable, and lead to a new type of army 
organised more flexibly and based more than in 
the past on mobilisaJti.on of the people. 
93. Recruitment of reserves for people's deter-
rent forces will be mainly from conscripts who 
have completed a shom period of active service 
to prepare them as efficienrtly as possible for 
internal defence. In countries which have no 
conscription, recruitment will be difficult and 
always very limited, which makes a strong argu-
ment for a conscript army. 
94. Pa:r<ticu1ar attention should be paid to 
training reserve officers responsible for corn-
manding units of the people's deterrent forces. 
Training should include periods in regular units 
and periods with other ramk reservists. 
(iii) Indemnities for reservists during periods 
of training 
95. In industrial societies, mobilising reserves 
raises the problem of remuneration for reservists. 
While in most countries young men still agree 
more or less willingly to make financial sacrifices 
during their legal period of service, they are 
unwilling to spend any time training on low pay. 
Since such training periods are necessary, they 
must be remunerated, within the limits of the 
salary lost, either from the n8!tional budget or 
by a joint contribution from the budget and from 
firms. For instance, oolleetive conventions might 
be drawn up for the difference between military 
pay amd the salary of the worker called up to 
be paid by the firm. 
(iv) Establishment of a European defence college 
96. Your Rapporteur considers it would be desir-
able to establish a European defence college ; it 
would improve harmonisation of str8!tegic and 
tactical ooncep1:s in Europe, particularly as 
regards the role of reserve forces. In view of the 
diversity of the tMks and methods of organising 
reserves, eo-ordination seems necessary and for 
this it might be useful to set up a European 
college open to civilian and military defence 
officials ,and experts. It would be above all a 
research centre quite distinct from the NATO 
oollege, whose functions are essentially pedagogic. 
Conclusion 
97. Reserves can make a very valuable con-
tribution to the defence of Europe by allowing 
a defence system to be established on the basis 
of a people's deterrent force. 
98. There is now a growing tendency among 
the countries of the Atlantic Alliance to base 
their defence policy on regular forces alone. In 
all these countries, the principle of conscription 
and oompulsory military service is being chal-
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lenged despite the advantages in training and 
recruiting reserves. In periods of economic dif-
ficulties, governments everywhere are trying to 
cut their defence budgets and therefore give 
priority to sophisticated weapons for field forces 
rather than training reserves. This policy is one 
of the main reasons for the increasing "conscrip-
tion crisis" in all the Western European ooun-
tries. 
99. It is esserutial for the governments and hence 
the military authorities of the Atlantic Alliance 
to specify what place they intend to give reserves 
in a ootional or oollective defence policy. Your 
Rapporteur is convinced that they should be 
given a prominent place in the framework of a 
strategy of people's deterrence and that govern-
ments are wrong to sacrifice this deterrent in 
favour of a far more risky element, a powerfully-
armed field force. 
100. Your Rapporteur feels that the tmining of 
reserves for territorial defence should be con-
sidered in the framework of WEU. The deter-
rence constituted by Europeans' desire for 
independence and their determination to defend 
their territory in case of attack primarily con-
cerns Europeans themselves. It is therefore 
normal for them to consult each other on this 
aspect of their defence policy. 
101. While questions affecting the deployment of 
oombat-ready fol"ces and nuclear deterrence 
should be worked out :at Atlantic level, those 
affecting people's deterrence should be tackled 
mainly at European level. 
102. The United States has far less need of a 
stmtegy of people's deterrence than Europe since 
its geographical situation and the strength of 
every aspect of its defence system preclude the 
possibility of invasion. 
103. If there is no European co-ordination of 
reserve training policies for organising a real 
people's deterrent system, this aspect of defence 
would have to be dealt with at national level and 
there would consequently be a lack of co-
ordination, however essential this may be if this 
type of deterrence is to be made as effective as 
possible. 
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The balance of forces in Europe 
In spite of detente, which seems irreversible 
because it meets the innermost interests of the 
nations concerned, Europe is still divided into 
armed blocs. 
Until these blocs become a thing of the 
past, and without prejudice to the sea:reh for 
understanding and co-operation between Euro-
pean countries on either side of the iron cur-
tain, your Rapporteur considers that some 
balance of conventional forces is still essential 
in Europe. 
In the event of conventional war, the armed 
forces of the WEU countries must be capable 
of prolonged resistance to attack, thus allowing 
governments time to wield the threat of recourse 
to first tactical and then strategic nuclear 
weapons, if necessary. 
The ideas expressed below are intended to 
provide food for thought in the WEU Assembly 
on: 
(a) the position of forces in Europe ; 
(b) the contribution which can be made by 
reserves to maintaining the defence 
capability of Western Europe. 
A. The position of forces 
1. Ground formatiom 1 
To compare the respective size of the forces 
of the two coalitions of States, it is useful to 
refer to the number of divisions on either side. 
This is a very approximate basis of comparison, 
since there are often differences in the organisa-
tion, size and equipment of divisions and some 
combat units are outside the normal divisional 
structure. 
TABLE I.A 
Central and Northern Europe 
of which: 
NATO France Warsaw divisions Pact in Soviet 
Union 
Divisions 
available in 
peacetime 27 2 68 30 
1. Source: Military Balance 1975-76. 
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France : Only the divisions stationed in 
Germany are included, four other French divi-
sions are stationed on national territory. 
United Kingdom and Portugal: Forces 
stationed on British or Portuguese territory are 
not included in the table. 
Warsaw Pact : German Democratic Repub-
lic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Soviet troops sta-
tioned either in these three countries or in 
Soviet western military regions (Baltic countries, 
Byelorussia, Carpathians). 
NATO : Belgium, Denmark, United King-
dom, Canada, Netherlands, United States, Fede-
ral Republic of Germany. 
TABLE I.B 
Southern Europe 
Warsaw of which: NATO Pact Soviet Union 
Divisions available 
in peacetime 39 31 8 
NATO : This table includes the ground 
forces of Italy, Greece and Turkey and British 
and American fo:rees which would be committed 
to the Mediterranean theatre. 
France : French formations are not included 
in this table. 
Warsaw Pact: Bulgaria, Hungary, Roma-
nia, Soviet troops stationed in Hungary and 
Southern Soviet Union. 
2. Manpower 1 
TABLE II.A 
Central and Northern Europe 
Warsaw of which: NATO France Pact Soviet Union 
Troops avail-
able in peace-
time 
(thousands) 625 50 895 595 
1. Source: Military Balance 1975-76. 
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TABLE II.B 
Southern Europe 
Warsaw of which: NATO Soviet Pact Union 
Troops available in 
peacetime (thous-
ands) 575 345 115 
The above figures are approximate. Tables 
II.A and II.B were drawn up on the same basis 
as Tables I.A and I.B. 
Troops from American brigades based in 
the United States, who could be transported 
to Europe at very short notice, are not included 
in Table II.A. 
3. Equipment 1 
The number of tanks may be considered as 
a particularly significant indication of the degree 
of equipment of a modern army. This is the 
figure used in the following table to compare 
the equipment of forces located in Europe. 
TABLE Ill 
Northern and Central Europe 
Warsaw of which: NATO Pact Soviet Union 
Main battle tanks 
in operational ser-
vice in peacetime 7,000 19,000 11,500 
Tanks in service in the French forces 
should be added to those in Table Ill (325 in 
the Federal Republic of Germany ; 485 in 
Eastern France). 
Although the Warsaw Pact armies appear 
to have far more tanks than the countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance, it must be underlined that 
they are probably of inferior standard. More-
over, the NATO and French anti-tank artillery 
is superior in number and efficiency to that of 
the Warsaw Pact countries. 
4. Aircraft 1 
Comparisons of aircraft are difficult. A 
superficial glance might give the impression that 
1. Source: Military Balance 1975-76. 
6- I 
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there is a major imbalance of fighter, interceptor 
and light bomber aircraft. In Northern and 
Central Europe, NATO has only about 1,750 
aircraft whereas the Warsaw Pact has 3,550. But 
western aircraft are very superior. Account must 
also be taken of French aircraft (more than 
500) and the large-scale reinforcements which 
the United States could bring in to Europe at 
very short notice (more than 5,000 aircraft). 
The Soviet Union has a reserve of only 4,000 
units, only some of which could be transferred 
to Europe in case of war. 
5. Conclusion 
It is not enough to compare the number 
of ground formations, their standard of equip-
ment or troop levels to assess the respective 
force of each side. In some respects the Warsaw 
Pact is undeniably better placed, in others the 
Atlantic Alliance has the advantage. Although 
the East has more troops, tanks and perhaps 
aircraft, it must not be forgotten that the 
Atlantic Alliance has about 7,000 tactical nuclear 
missiles, not including the French Plutons, 
whereas the Soviet Union has less than 3,500. 
Moreover, the forces stationed in Western 
Europe have more efficient anti-tank weapons 
in greater numbers. Finally, the standard of 
equipment in the Atlantic Alliance is generally 
far higher. 
It may be concluded from the above that 
the balance of forces in Europe is sufficient at 
present to make attack impossible. Defence 
arrangements cannot be broken down without 
setting off a very large-scale conventional attack 
with incalculable consequences. 
B. Contribution of reserves to the balance 
of forces 
The balance guaranteed by available forces 
in peacetime can be consolidated by a judicious 
use of reserves. 
Mobilisation time then becomes an essential 
parameter for assessing forces. 
Within a few days, the units of most mem-
ber States of the Atlantic Alliance can be raised 
to wartime level. This reinforcement of the 
combat force takes less than three days in the 
German army and five in the French army. 
Moreover, two American brigades ,and two divi-
sions stationed in the United States, whose 
equipment is in Europe, can be transported to 
Germany at very short notice. 
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The following table shows the level of Euro-
pean forces stationed in Central Europe and 
their possible reinforcement. 
TABLE IV 
Forces permanently stationed in Central Europe 
Country Troop Description level 
Regulars 
Federal Republic 250,000 Feldheer 
of Germany 
United Kingdom 52,000 British Army 
of the Rhine 
France 60,000 Combat forces 
(First Army) 
Belgium } 32,000 Forces in 
Netherlands 33,000 Germany 
Reserves 
Federal Republic 200,000 Feldheer 
of Germany reserves 
United Kingdom 35,000 Territorial and 
army volunteer 
reserve 
France 30,000 
Belgium 10,000 
Netherlands 10,000 
Forces providing support and replacements 
for field forces in Central Europe 
Country Troop Description level 
Regulars 
Federal Republic 63,000 Territorial army 
of Germany 
United Kingdom 10,000 Mobile force 
France 120,000 Remainder of 
combat force 
Nether lands 30,000 
Belgium 20,000 
Reserves 
Federal Republic 440,000 Territorial army 
of Germany 
United Kingdom -
France 150,000 Combat force 
reserves (approx-
ima.te figure) 
Belgium 30,000 
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There are three levels for Warsaw Pact 
divisions. Mobilisation of reserves must bring all 
units up to maximum strength within a few 
days. In Central Europe, eight Czechoslovak 
divisions, six German divisions, thirteen Polish 
divisions and twenty-seven Soviet divisions are 
at maximum strength. Two Czechoslovak divi-
sions and two Polish divisions are at intermediate 
strength. A number of Soviet divisions at inter-
mediate or minimum strength can intervene 
fairly rapidly. They would probably not upset 
the balance of forces. 
Your Rapporteur considers that the present 
organisation of reserves for the combat forces 
of WEU countries more or less meets the require-
ments of the balance of forces in Europe. On 
M +7, mobilisation would in fact not noticeably 
modify the present situation. It would be absurd 
to envisage the state of forces after several 
weeks' mobilisation: should there ever be a war 
in Europe it would be of very short duration. 
Your Rapporteur also considers that it 
would be most useful to have greater recourse 
to the reserves of the internal defence forces. 
In this way a people's deterrent could be estab-
lished which, particularly in critical areas such 
as Norway, would considerably strengthen 
Europe's defence. In Norway, moreover, a system 
for mobilising all the country's human and 
material resources has been organised to ward 
off any attack. A large well-equipped internal 
defence force, speedy and effective mobilisation 
procedure and exploitation of the difficult and 
rugged countryside should allow Norway, with 
the help of American and British reinforcements, 
to resist attack long enough for the Atlantic 
Alliance to resort to nuclear deterrence. The 
Norwegian defence system might have greater 
assistance from the European countries ; it 
might also be applied in other sensitive areas of 
Europe. 
Use of reserves in the framework of a 
strategy of people's deterrence has a decisive 
advantage : it guarantees the balance of forces 
on which peace in Europe is based but cannot 
be interpreted as a threat or an expression of 
aggressive aims. Indeed, people's deterrence is 
by definition defensive only. It therefore encou-
rages detente and affords protection against 
possible attack. 
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Reserves in three countries with conscription (France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy) 
and three countries with a professional army (United States, Canada, United Kingdom) 1 
France Federal Republic Italy of Germany 
Population 52 470000 62 600 000 55 500000 
(with~West Berlin) 
Length of compulsory 
military service 12 months 15 months Army ~ 12 months Airforce 
Navy 18 months 
Total strength of armed 
forces 502 500 495 000 421 000 
of which conscripts 271300 227 000 299 000 
Strength of army 331500 345 000 306 500 
of which conscripts 216 000 177 000 254 000 
Reserves 400000 1056 000 550 000 
Feldheer: 
615 000 
Territorialheer : 
441000 
Strength of navy 69000 39000 44 500 
of which conscripts 16500 11000 18 600 
Reserves 50000 27 000 65 000 
Strength of airforce 102 000 111000 70000 
of which conscripts 38 800 39000 26400 
Reserves - 100 000 30000 
l. Source: Military Balance 1975-76-
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United States Canada United Kingdom 
Population 215 810000 22 920 000 56460000 
Total strength of armed 
forces 2130000 77 000 345100 
Strength of army 789 000 28000 174 900 
Reserves 630000 15000 169 500 
Army National Guard : Regular reserve : 
405 000 108 500 
Army reserve: Territorial army and 
325 000 volunteer reserve : 
53300 
Ulster Defence Regiment : 
7 700 
Strength of navy 536000 14000 76100 
Reserves 115 000 2 700 36300 
Strength of airforce 612 000 35000 94100 
Reserves 148 000 700 31900 
Strength of Marine Corps 
(United States only) 197 000 
Marine reserves 33000 I 
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Reserve systems in countries using various forms 
of people's deterrence 
A. Sweden 
Sweden's defence is based on the mainten-
ance of a sufficiently large and weB-equipped 
army to ensure the country's neutrality. The 
aim of the Swedish Government is to deter 
invasion by the threat of losses and destruction 
far greater than the stake, i.e. the conquest of 
Sweden. 
Consequently, large sums are spent on 
national defence. The 1976 budget allocated 11 % 
for defence, i.e. 4.4 % of the gross national 
product. 
Very wide use of conscripts and reservists 
in the defence system avoids the high personnel 
costs involved in maintaining a large regular 
army. Expenditure on equipment, conventional 
only, represents about 30 % of the annual 
defence budget (compared with about 20% in 
France). In armaments research and develop-
ment, priority is given to equipment adapted to 
the requirements of prolonged resistance to 
aggression. Sweden also spends large sums on 
preserving and expanding its national armaments 
industries, particularly in sectors of advanced 
toohnology, thus retaining the wherewithal to 
remain independent. It has, for instance, pro-
duced its own light tanks, which are remarkably 
effective and excellent fighter aircraft. 
Swedish armed forces are organised on a 
total defence basis which implies compulsory 
military service and the formation of vast 
reserves drawn from former conscripts. 
The purpose of compulsory miJ:itary service 
is to train conscripts to a very high level. The 
duration varies from seven and a half to fifteen 
months according to the branch. 
On completion of full-time military service, 
Swedish citizens between the ages of 18 and 47 
have to accomplish periods of training and 
mobilisation exercises which are conducted at 
battalion level. 
During their period of service in the reserve, 
Swedish citizens attend five training periods of 
just under a month. 
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Thanks to this militia system, the Swedish 
army can call up 700,000 men in seventy-two 
hours. The 500,000 strong reserve constitutes 
9 % of the population. In the event of mobilisa-
tion, it provides all other ranks and four-fifths 
of the officers and non-conunissioned officers. 
A large proportion of the regular army has 
the duty of training conscripts on compulsory 
service and reservists attending training periods. 
Each year, 10,000 officers and non-commissioned 
officers train 35,000 conscripts and 100,000 
reservists. 
It is probably thanks to its defence policy 
that Sweden has managed to remain independent 
and neutral. The Swedish defence system can 
thus provide a wealth of lessons for Europe. It 
must be pointed out however that Sweden is 
in a very special situation : 
(a) the aims of its defence policy are modest: 
to prevent attack by threatening to 
inflict damage on the attacker out of 
proportion to expected gains ; 
(b) because of its geographical position in 
Northern Europe, Sweden could not be 
attacked without automatically sparking 
off a generalised war. 
B. Switzerland 
Switzerland's defence is based on the same 
principle as that of Sweden, i.e. "deterrence by 
the price of entry". By attacking Switzerland, 
an aggressor would have to expect : 
- very heavy losses of men and equip-
ment; 
- a fairly long campaign giving third 
powers time to intervene ; 
- heavy destruction; 
- stubborn resistance by the people ; 
- loss of prestige which no country could 
take lightly. 
Participation in national defence is a matter 
for the whole population. The basic principle is 
compulsory military service (Article 18 of the 
Constitution). A strong point of Swiss defence 
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is the full application of the principle of mili-
tary service. The country thus has a relatively 
large armed force thanks to ample use of reser-
vists. 
In principle, there is no exemption from 
military service. Only a medical examination 
determines whether a man is fit or not. If unfit, 
he must pay a compensatory tax, known as the 
military tax. 
Other ranks and non-commissioned officers 
are liable for military service for thirty years 
and officers for thirty-five years. There are 
three categories in the army : 
- the elite from the age of 21 to 32, for 
twelve years; 
- the Landwehr from 33 to 42, for ten 
years; 
- the Landsturm from 43 to 50, for eight 
years. 
After the age of 50 or 55, citizens join the 
civil defence services. 
The Swiss army is a militia. The militia 
system is distinguished by the special form of 
training - a fairly large number of short 
periods of service - and almost no career 
soldiers and officers (there are only 5,000 pro-
fessionals : 3,000 instructors and 2,000 frontier 
guards). 
The Swiss military organisation is thus 
based solely on conscription and the mobilisation 
of reserves. 
The training system is quite original and 
remarkably effective; there are two elements: 
basic training and annual refresher courses. 
(a) Basic training is given in a recruit training 
unit set up for the purpose and dissolved at 
the end of the period of training. The future 
soldier usually remains there four months. Once 
basic training is over, the soldier is incorporated 
in a given unit where he thenceforth carries out 
his call-up periods. 
(b) Annual refresher courses in the questions 
studied at the training units and necessary addi-
tional training are given in the framework of 
army units. During the elite stage, i.e. from 21 
to 32 years of age, privates and corporals attend 
eight three-week refresher courses and during 
the Landwehr stage three additional two-week 
courses. During the Landsturm stage, there are 
two weeks of courses in all In peacetime, there-
166 
APPENDIX Ill 
fore, men must accomplish 331 days of service, 
not including numerous weekends. The total 
comes to about a year if inspections, compulsory 
shooting and "special services" are included. 
The whole defence system is based on the 
mobilisation of reserves. About 625,000 men can 
be mobilised in 48 hours. Specialised officers are 
responsible for mobilising at unit level. They 
too are generally reservists. The mobilisation 
unit is located near the homes of the reservists 
concerned. 
The system is well adapted to the tasks of 
the Swiss army, which is mainly infantry. Equip-
ment generally seems satisfactory although some 
modernisation is necessary. Switzerland spends 
about 5 % of its gross national product on 
defence, which allows quite a lot of equipment 
to be procured. (For instance, it has more than 
800 battle tanks). 
The Swiss army consists of a mobile group 
formed of four army corps, with supporting 
aviation and air defence troops, and static 
defence responsible for the immediate defence 
of frontiers and the protection of certain routes 
towards the centre of the country. The mobile 
group or "campaign army" is formed from elite 
troops whereas the brigades which ensure static 
defence are made up of Landwehr units. Land-
sturm troops carry out civil defence tasks. 
Although it may seem particularly difficult 
to introduce the constraints inherent in the 
Swiss militia system in Western European coun-
tries, Switzerland nevertheless provides a suc-
cessful example of the systematic application of 
a strategy of people's deterrence. 
C. Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia's defence is organised in the 
light of past experience (the war of liberation 
against German invasion from 1941 to 1945) 
and a desire to preserve its own identity is spite 
of pressure from other countries (particularly 
the Soviet Union). 
Like Sweden and Switzerland, Yugoslavia's 
defence is based on the "high price of entry" 
doctrine. It aims at discouraging attack by show-
ing exceptional ability to resist invasion. 
The defence system is being reorganised, 
following the adoption of the law on national 
defence on 12th February 1969 after the Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia. 
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The strategy to be implemented in the 
framework of this new defence system may be 
twofold: 
- in the event of a minor attack by a 
neighbour with the support of a larger 
power, the Yugoslav people's army 
(YP A) formed mainly of servicemen 
recruited by conscription must halt the 
invader. The YP A has 190,000 ground 
forces and an airforce and navy of 
20,000 each. The YP A can be reinforced 
by reserves but their role is limited. At 
present, fewer than 20 % of conscripts 
join the YP A reserve at the end of their 
fifteen-month period of service; 
- in the event of a full-scale attack by a 
great power, the YP A's role would be 
to halt the enemy's advance in order to 
allow mobilisation of the "general peo-
ple's defence", which consists almost 
entirely of reservists. There are about 
500,000 men in the "general people's 
defence" forces. They may be assisted by 
internal defence forces (1,000,000 men). 
Once mobilisation has been completed, 
the YPA and the general people's 
defence forces together ensure the in-
depth defence of the territory. 
By the national defence law of 12th Feb-
ruary 1969, organic links were created between 
the YP A and the general people's defence 
forces. The latter are organised independently, 
however, at three levels : 
- municipal level in company-sized units ; 
- at the level of firms or groups of firms 
in defence units of various sizes ; 
- at the level of the republics in battalion-
sized units. 
Thanks to this sound, flexible and decen-
tralised structure, the general people's defence 
forces can be mobilised in twenty-four hours. 
They are armed with light anti-personnel 
weapons and some anti-tank equipment. 
Reservists in the ranks and non-commis-
sioned officers of the general people's defence 
receive a total of about lOO hours' training each 
year from reservists of the YP A. Reserve officers 
in the people's defence are trained by regular 
officers of the YP A. 
The general people's defence system is 
independently financed, not by the federation 
but by the republics or local authorities. 
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This defence system thus depends on the 
local authorities for financing and organisation 
in the framework of the Yugoslav concept of 
self-management. 
The Yugoslav people's army is an interesting 
example for Europe insofar as it is based on 
mobilisation of all the material and moral resour-
ces of the nation and embodies the desire for 
independence of a whole nation. However, 
although Europe may draw ideas from such a 
defence system, it can in no way transpose it as 
it stands. Yugoslavia is not a very industrialised 
country and is in a very rugged mountain area. 
The conditions of Yugoslav defence therefore are 
very different to those of Western Europe. 
D. Vietnam 
To describe the North Vietnamese military 
system in this report may seem to be introducing 
into the panorama of various methods of using 
reserves different considerations to those pre-
sented for other countries. 
However, this brief study may be of interest, 
although the emotional feelings which for various 
reasons Europeans may have towards events and 
fighting in the Indo-Chinese peninsula for thirty 
years must be set aside. 
From a strictly military point of view, 
much is to be learned from the war waged by 
North Vietnam and the resulting organisation 
of armed forces in that a deterrent at people's 
level was successful in pitting the weak against 
the strong. 
While Israeli experience allows an assess-
ment to be made of the role of reserves in the 
framework of a war between two balanced sides, 
experience in North Vietnam shows that it is 
possible to adapt defence to the presence of an 
enemy superior in both numbers and means. In 
case of attack, would this not be the position in 
Europe? 
The North Vietnamese army (in the widest 
sense, including Vietcong forces operating in 
South Vietnam) started as a revolutionary guer-
rilla force. Its origins and tactics transformed 
it into a powerful conventional army but at the 
same time institutionalised the use of forces 
which, in the western countries, would be reserve 
forces. 
The Vietnamese forces are certainly impo-
sing since they consist of 700,000 men, 685,000 
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in the army alone, with an impressive array of 
heavy armaments. 
This most conventional army - and here is 
the originality of the North Vietnamese system 
- depends on the existence of numerous reserve 
forces with continuous training in local militia 
units. There are one and a half million men and 
women in these forces in North Vietnam and 
when fighting came to an end there were 60,000 
active fighting forces in South Vietnam. 
The North Vietnamese command conducted 
fighting on the basis of this structure, which it 
made particularly effective in three ways: 
- by adapting equipment to the role appro-
priate to each type of force ; 
- by a precise chain of command and 
deployment of the various types of 
forces; 
- by tactics to obtain the best practical 
results from the combination of these 
forces in the light of weaknesses observed 
in the enemy system. 
Forces deployed by North Vietnam in the 
last stage of fighting were no longer a result 
of revolutionary improvisation but the result of 
extremely advanced and coherent reflection and 
strategic and tactical organisation. Results were 
obtained by the optimum use of all the human 
resources which can be furnished by a nation 
involved in a fight for its existence. 
( i) Appropriate armaments 
There are probably few armies in the world 
which have tried harder to adapt their equip-
ment to the type and tasks of the various forces 
available. Here, attention should be drawn to 
research in the socialist countries, and particu-
larly the Soviet Union, to develop equipment 
suitable for a form of people's, and thus rustic, 
war. This equipment effort is fourfold: 
- increasing the individual and collective 
fire-power of smaJJ. units by the use of 
the most up-to-date light arms in terms 
of weight/rate of firing/weight of muni-
tions. They can be carried for long dis-
tances, are reliable in operation and have 
effective but economical fire-power ; 
- increasing the number of collective anti-
concentration and anti-heavy equipment 
weapons which are portable and indetect-
able. The North Vietnamese infantry and 
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artillery had certainly mastered the use 
of anti-tank rocket launchers and artil-
lery rocket launchers, which caused the 
heaviest losses among the United States 
and South Vietnamese armies ; 
- ensuring powerful anti-aircraft defence 
even at lower echelons to offset the 
absence of air cover ; 
- ensuring high-quality and ample commu-
nications equipment, particularly for 
commando groups operating behind 
enemy lines. 
(ii) Chain of command 
The chain of command reflects what a 
country seeking in-depth defence can achieve. 
There are three main categories of units : 
- a powerful but flexible conventional 
corps capable of dispersing into smaller 
operational units but nevertheless retain-
ing strong fire-power; 
- regional units recruited on the spot, 
responsible for protecting combat force 
movements but also capable of hindering 
enemy deployment, making dispersal 
necessary and maintaining a permanent 
feeling of insecurity ; 
- militia or local guerrilla units whose main 
purpose is to create a permanent feeling 
of insecurity behind enemy lines with-
out engaging in large-scale fighting, 
inform regional and combat forces and 
prevent the enemy forces taking over 
the population. 
Setting aside the factors peculiar to the 
Vietnam war, such a chain of command sets an 
example for the combined use of regular and 
reserve forces by European countries in organ-
ising the ground defence of their territory, which 
would make way for the idea of people's deter-
rence. In the war in question, it proved its worth. 
As has been stressed by several observers 
of the Vietnam war t, the effectiveness of this 
chain of command is based on two main factors : 
- the technical and moral value of the 
combatants, their physical resistance and 
sense of discipline ; 
1. For instance, Colonel Ga.briel Bonnet in La guerre 
reoolutionnaire du Vietnam, Paris, Pa.yot, 1969. 
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- the ability of officers, combining leader-
ship with a detailed knowledge of all 
combat techniques. 
These two fundamental values can be 
obtained only by continuous training and keep-
ing in condition in an organised framework. In 
1970, General Giap therefore wrote: "Our army 
gradually passed from the volunteer system to 
compulsory military service." 
(iii) Strategy and tactics adapted to the enemy 
The principles of action by forces on the 
lines described above were defined by General 
Giap under the heading "military art" in a 
book published in 1970 entitled Guerre de libera-
tion. The principles are simple and well known 
to strategists in all countries. But we must be 
convinced that they still apply in modern war-
fare. 
- The first is the unity of defence, not only 
at political level but at strategic and tactical 
level, which combines the use of all possible 
forces: 
"It is only by closely combining the opera-
tional activities of regular troops, regional 
troops and self-defence militia, by combining 
guerrilla with normal warfare, minor 
engagements with large and medium-scale 
engagements that we can maintain and 
intensify war." 
- The second is the spirit of offensive 
which seeks to exploit all the enemy's weak 
points, account being taken of the technical 
means used by the defence. 
- The third is a continuing search for 
possible ways of the weak overcoming the strong, 
a principle which is apparently contrary to that 
of traditional strategy, but involves action to 
break up enemy forces, prevent them using their 
material superiority and finally reversing the 
proportion. 
- The fourth is a continuing search to 
destroy enemy units in all circumstances and 
wherever this can be done with success. 
- The fifth is the spirit of initiative, deter-
mination and flexibility in action based on the 
co-ordinated use of all forces, in-depth defence, 
by infi1trating the enemy's formations to paralyse 
them and make them passive, and increasing 
simultaneous but well-chosen offensive actions. 
6• - I 
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- The sixth principle is that armed forces 
responsible for such tasks do not just happen, 
they have to be shaped by a policy to make them 
permanently efficient both technically and tac-
tically. 
In conclusion, General Giap affirms, and 
this is the question now facing Western Europe, 
that a "large country, a powerful attacking 
army with modern equipment may well be beaten 
by a small but determined nation with ingenious 
and effective methods of warfare". 
Expressions such as "victory depends on 
troop levels", "victory depends on equipment 
and weapons", "it is superiority in the air that 
counts" can be rendered meaningless if the nation 
attacked has the willpower. 
E. Israel 
The example of Israel is frequently quoted 
when assessing the effectiveness of reserve forces. 
However, conditions in Israel are very different 
to the situation in Western Europe. Israel's 
strategy is not purely defensive ; its armed 
forces are organised for carrying out lightning 
preventive offensives. 
Israel has a total population of 3,200,000 
within its 1967 frontiers. 85 % are Jews. Except 
for the Druses, the remaining 15 % do not fulfil 
military service. There are more than 15,000 
regular servicemen and 110,000 conscripts, 
including 12,000 women, but a strength of 
375,000 can be achieved at short notice by mobil-
isation. 
Israeli army regulars form the combat units 
and are also responsible for fast, efficient and 
sometimes secret mobilisation. 
The period of compulsory service, which 
varies from two to three years depending on 
call-up age, is mainly devoted to training. In 
the reserve, a Jewish citizen who has completed 
his compulsory service must occupy the post for 
which he was trained. He has regular training 
periods (31 to 38 days a year according to rank, 
plus monthly commitments) and thus retains a 
high degree of combat-readiness. 
Men are called up for compulsory military 
service between the ages of 18 and 29. Women 
may be called up in certain conditions between 
the ages of 18 to 26. Jewish Israeli citizens 
remain in the reserve until the age of 49 (men) 
and 34 (women). 
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The basic unit of the Israeli reserve is the 
brigade. Three factors help to keep the units in 
a high state of readiness : 
- geographical proximity of the reservists 
concerned; 
- maintenance of equipment by regular 
servicemen ; 
- card index of reservists which allows 
them to be reached within a few hours. 
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It should also be noted that civil means of 
transport may be requisitioned at any time. 
The Israeli example can teach Europe much 
about the organisation of reserves and the flex-
ibility and effectiveness of mobilisation proce-
dures. But the Israeli experience is taking place 
in a very special context. Fortunately, Europe 
has neither the tension nor the mutual mis-
understanding and mistrust which are features 
of international relations in the Middle East. 
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In~ucto~ note 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows : 
Toulon, 4th Fe'brun,ry 1976 
Vice-Admiral Yves Bourdais, Prefet Maritime de la Troisieme Region and (French) Commander-
in-Chief, Mediterranean ; 
Captain Chaigne, Commander, Centre d'Essais de la Mediterranee. 
Malta, 2nd to 5th April 1976 
Rear-Admiral O.N.A. Cecil, RN, Commander, British Forces, Malta and (NATO) Commander Allied 
Naval Forces South-Eastern Mediterranean; 
Lt. Col. K. Wilkins, Commander 4th RM Commando ; 
H. E. Mr. W. R. Haydon, British High Commissioner and Mr. A. H. Wyatt, Deputy High Com-
missioner. 
Gibraltar, 12th and 13th May 1976 
H. E. Marshal of the RAF, Sir John Grandy, Governor of Gibraltar and Commander-in-Chief; 
Rear-Admiral S. R. Sandford, Flag Officer, Gibraltar a.nd (NATO) Commander Allied Naval Forces 
Gibraltar Mediterranean, and Captain B. R. Longworth, Chief-of-Staff ; 
Brigadier J. R. D. Sharpe, Deputy Fortress Commander, and staff; 
Air Commodore C. Fountain, Air Commander, and (NATO) Commander Maritime Air Forces 
Gibraltar, and staff; 
The Hon. Maurice Xiberras, Leader of the Opposition ; 
Sir Joshua Hassan, Chief Minister ; 
Mr. E. H. Davis, Deputy Governor and Mr. J. H. Greenfield. 
Madrid, 13th to 15th May 1976 
Mr. Robert Wade-Gery, Minister, British Embassy and Mr. R. D. Wilkinson; 
Mr. Jorge del Pino, Deputy Director, European Affairs, Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Carlos Fernandez Espeso, Counsellor and Mr. Luiz de la Torre; 
General Fernandez Vallespin, Chief of the General Staff ; 
Major General Lopez Saez, Chief of the Air Staff and Rear Admiral Martinez-Canavate; Colonel 
S. Gonzalo de Benito de Sola, Captain Gonzalez Aller, Spanish Navy, Colonel Martin de Santiago; Major 
Elety; 
Mr. Marcelino Oreja, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. Luiz Yaiiez, Foreign Relations Committee, Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE); 
Dr. Jaime Cortezo, Secretary-General of Izquierda Democratica. 
The Committee as a whole met in Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 where it attended a col-
loquy on a European aeronautical policy, organised by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions. 
The Committee then met in London on 15th and 16th March 1976 when it was briefed by: 
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Brigadier Kenneth Hunt (Retired), Deputy Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies; 
Mr. Richard Burt, Assistant to the Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies; 
Mr. Frank Judd, M.P., United Kingdom Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for 
the Royal Navy. 
The Committee next met in Rome on 6th April 1976 where it was briefed by: 
Mr. Brooke-Turner, Civilian Deputy Commandant of the NATO Defence College and by Captain 
0. K. Wang (Norwegian Navy), Captain R. A. Darlington (Canadian Armed Forces), Captain B. Ben-
venuti (Italian Navy), Mr. J. Coene (Belgian Foreign Office) of the directing staff; 
Mr. Amaldo Forlani, Italian Minister of Defence; 
and in Naples on 7th and 8th April where it was briefed by: 
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, and staff; 
Brigadier-General Lamberghini (Italian Army), Assistant Chief-of-Staff Operations; 
General Wilson, USAF, Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, and staff; 
Vice-Admiral Sir J. Ernle Pope, RN, Chief-of-Staff, HQ Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe. 
The Committee as a whole met finally in Lisbon from 17th to 19th May 1976 where it was briefed by : 
Mr. Adelino Amaro da Costa, Vice-Chairman of the CDS party and Mr. Fausto de Quadros; 
Dr. Mario Soares, President of the Socialist Party, PSP; Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes; Mr. Jose 
Medeiros Ferreira; Mr. Mario Sottomayor Cardia and Mr. Antonio Guterres; 
Admiral Frank Corley, USN, (NATO) Commander, Iberian Atlantic Area and Captain Lacy, USN, 
Chief-of-Staff ; and staff ; 
General Ramalho Eanes, Chief of Army Staff ; 
General Morais e Silva, Chief of Air Force Staff ; 
Dr. F. Sa Cameiro, Secretary-General of the PPD and other members of the party: Mr. Rui Machete, 
Minister for Social Affairs; Mr. Franco Sousa. 
The Chairman and two oldest members were also received by Mr. Melo Antunes, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 
At the Lisbon meeting, the Committee discussed and adopted the present report. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers 
who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise 
attributed, are those of the Committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on security in the Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world naval power presents the Soviet 
Government with new options for extending its influence if the Atlantic Alliance weakened in its deter-
mination to defend its freedom ; 
(ii) Aware that the many political uncertainties and local disputes and conflicts that affiict both allied 
and non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean area present an ever-present danger of major conflict 
arising through miscalculation or escalation ; 
(iii) Calling for the broadening and strengthening of the Alliance, based on freely-elected parliamentary 
democracies and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis ; 
(iv) Willing to see other appropriate countries such as Australia, New Zealand and, to the extent that 
it progresses to democracy, Iran associated with Alliance defence planning; 
(v) Welcoming the advent of a freely-elected parliament in Portugal and the announcement of free 
elections in Spain ; 
(vi) Recalling and reaffirming its earlier recommendations for the correct application of the Montreux 
Convention to prohibit the passage of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits ; for the provision of 
diplomatic advice from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders ; and for the NATO Gibraltar 
command to be transferred to the IBERLANT command, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS 
1. Call on the North Atlantic Council to broaden and strengthen the basis of the Alliance : 
(a) by negotiating with the Government of Spain that emerges from free elections the accession 
of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate r6le for the Spanish armed 
forces in the integrated military structure ; 
(b) by fostering the accession of Malta to the North Atlantic Treaty, should a. Maltese Government 
so request, or the conclusion of bilateral defence arrangements between Malta and Italy ; 
(c) by recognising the value of NATO military facilities being located on a basis of territorial diversity 
in the Mediterranean area; 
(d) by more publicly identifying all the member countries and the Alliance as a whole with NATO 
defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area ; 
(e) by providing military assistance to modernise the armed forces of Portugal to enable them to 
play a new and more vital role in allied defence plans ; 
2. (a) Call on the North Atlantic Council to declare that the Alliance will take appropriate measures 
to resist any external political or military pressure designed to change the government or policy of Yugo-
slavia; 
(b) Join with the other governments of the Alliance in making clear to the Soviet Union and to the 
country concerned the serious disadvantages for normal relations and detente if the status quo were changed 
through the granting of new military bases or facilities for Soviet forces in the Mediterranean area ; 
(c) Call on the North Atlantic Council to have full political and military contingency plans prepared 
to meet any of the foregoing eventualities, with no more secrecy than that required for their success ; 
3. Propose that the European programme group issue an annual defence white paper incorporating 
a joint assessment of the threat and statement of allied strategy, combined with separate chapters on 
national defence programmes. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The Committee has reported regularly on 
various aspects of the security situation in the 
Mediterranean. In the last five years it has sub-
mitted five reports devoted in whole or in part 
to the southern flank of NATO. Chapter IV of 
the report on European security and East-West 
relations1 dealt in particular with Turkey and 
the southern flank of NATO, following the Com-
mittee's first visit to Turkey in that year. The 
report on secucity and ·the MediteNanean2 was 
adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Y om 
Kippur war of 1973. The report on European 
security and the situation in the Eastern Medi-
terranean3 dealt in particular with the hostilities 
in Cyprus in 1974. In the spring of last year 
Chapter IV of the explanatory memorandum of 
the Committee's general report on the state of 
European security4 surveyed the Mediterranean 
area in general, and followed the Committee's 
visit to Greece and Turkey in that year. At the 
last part-session, the Committee reported in 
particular on developments in the Iberian penin-
sula and the Atlantic Alliance5• 
2. The many changes that have occurred in the 
Mediterranean in the last five years have focused 
attention in particular on the growing naval 
strength of the Soviet Union, yet not all changes 
have operated to the disadvantage of the Western 
Alliance. Today, in many countries of the Medi-
terranean littoral, significant political changes, 
or the <imminence of political changes, have intro-
duced many factors of uncertainty typical of the 
multipolar world. The uncertainties apply both 
to NATO countries and to non-aligned coun-
tries; to European countries llJS we11 as to those 
on the African shore. The uncertainties are a 
cause of anxiety as they appear to many to 
threaten changes of alignment. More serious still 
1. Document 537, 12th May 1971, Rapporteur : Mr. 
Boyden. 
2. Document 624, 7th November 1973, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Jung. 
3. Document 651, 14th November 1974, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Critchley. 
4. Document 671, 29th April 1975, Rapporteur for 
Chapter IV: Mr. Duvieusart. 
5. Document 682, lOth November 1975, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Critchley. 
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in the lllJSt five years, is the increllJSe in local 
sources of conflict. If the probability of renewed 
Israeli-Arab hostilities is lower than for some 
time past, the conflict in the Lebanon, the 197 4 
hostilities in Cyprus and the very unsettled 
relations between various Maghreb countries are 
both regrettable in themselves, and may always 
hold the seeds of wider conflicts into which the 
superpowers and their allies could be drawn. 
3. NATO strategy in the Mediterranean has 
undergone some change to meet the uncertainties 
of the new situation. More effort has now to be 
concentrated on crisis control through the asser-
tion of a peacetime presence, rather than on 
exclusive preparation for a major war, although 
the Alliance must always show its capability to 
wage the latter if only in order to deter it. 
4. The Committee believes that there will be 
no permanent solutions to the problems of the 
Mediterranean. The price of security is perpetual 
vigil.ailJCe and the maintenance of an adequate 
defence effort at all times, which must be 
demonstrated by a m less visible physical pres-
ence in the area than that of any potential rival 
or adversary. 
CHAPTER I 
The Mediterranean today 
5. The Mediterranean is a vital maritime trad-
ing link of nearly all NATO countries. Of 1,500 
merchant ships at sea in the Mediterranean on 
any typical day, no fewer than 1,200 belong to 
the NATO countries. Turkey, Greece and Italy 
depend entirely, and France to a large part, on 
seaborne supplies through the Mediterranean. 
6. Western Europe as a whole is dependent on 
seaborne imports from both the Mediterranean 
and the Atl®ntic. Its annual imports of petro-
leum amount to some 649 million tons, of which 
140 million cross the Mediterranean from North 
African suppliers. A further 10 million tons 
from North Africa transit the Mediterranean to 
the North American NATO countries. With the 
closing of the Suez Canal following the 1967 
Middle East war, the bulk of oil supplies -
444 million tons from the Middle East - now 
go by sea round the Cape. 
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7. The reopening of the Suez Canal in June 
1975 may not have immediately affected the 
pattern of oil shipments to any great extent, but 
daily shipping through the Camal has steadily 
grown from some ten ships a day to an average 
of thirty or forty. Up to 1st March 1976, nearly 
8,000 ships have passed through the Canal. 
Greece, the Soviet Union and the United King-
dom in that order appear to have been the largest 
users, followed by Liberia, whose flag is flown 
by many vessels destined for the ports of NATO 
countries. A further increase in merchant ship-
ping through the Caool is to be expected, parti-
cularly if some of the larger container ship 
operators switch to the Canal route. Meanwhile, 
Egypt is confidently proceeding with plans to 
enlarge the Canal to enable it to take ships up 
to 150,000 tons by the end of 1977. 
8. Freedom of passage for merchant shipping 
throughout the Mediterranean is of vital import-
ance to Western Europe and the NATO Alliance. 
CHAPTER II 
The Soviet navy 
9. The Soviet Union emerged from the first 
world war, the 1917 revolution and the subse-
quent civil fighting with virtually no fleet and 
damaged shipyards. It was not until 1926 that 
the Defence Council approved a new construction 
programme of some 65 vessels, and the first five-
year plan of 1928 laid heavy emphasis on the 
construction of submarines. The navy then plan-
ned had a largely defensive role designed chiefly 
for the protection of the seaward flanks of the 
land army. A decision announced in 1938 to 
build a fully ocean-going fleet was overtaken by 
the 1939 war at the beginning of which the 
Soviet Union already had 160 submarines 
nearly three times the number pOS'lessed by 
Germany. 
10. The Soviet navy did not play a large role 
outside Soviet waters in the course of the second 
world war. Following the invasion by Germany 
in 1941, half the Soviet fleet was lost and all 
its shipbuilding capacity destroyed. Significant 
naval operations were conducted on the southern 
£lank and in the rivers - already under the 
command of Admiral Gorshkov, later to become 
Commander-in~Chief. 
11. With the acquisition of German U-boats and 
German scientists at the end of the war, a new 
shipbuilding programme was embarked upon, 
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still with heavy emphasis on submarines. The 
first of the W class postwar submarines appeared 
in 1950, followed by the Sverdlov class of 
cruisers and the Skory class of destroyers. By 
the mid 1950s, there were 240 fleet submarines, 
designed largely for operations in the Baltic 
and Black Seas, together with some 25 Zulu 
class submarines of longer range, 14 Sverdlov 
cruisers and 85 Slrory destroyers. 
12. In 1956, the Soviet strategic deterrent first 
went to sea with the Zulu class submarine which 
carried two relatively short-range cruise missiles, 
to be followed by the G class and, in 1959, the 
nuclear-propehled Hotel class, still carrying cruise 
type missiles. The first American Polaris sub-
marine - although infinitely superior - was 
not operational until December 1959. 
13. Following the death of Stalin and Mr. 
Khrushchev's arrival in power in 1953, Admiral 
Gorshkov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of 
the Soviet fleet and set about an immediate 
modernisation programme, scrapping 300 older 
vessels but retaining nevertheless 14 of the 
Sverdlov cruisers. By 1957, the Krupny class of 
missile destroyer appeared with surface-to-
surface missiles SSN-1 with 150-mile range, 
probably requiring mid-course correction. Eight 
of these vessels were in service by 1961. The 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962, in the course of 
which the Soviet Union had to back down in its 
confrontation with the United States, and with-
draw its missiles from Cuba, demonstrated the 
inability of the Soviet Union to exercise world-
wide power in the absence of an ocean-going 
fleet. No doubt the Soviet Union had earlier fe1t 
the lack of such a fleet, particularly in the course 
of the Franco-British-Israeli invasion of Egypt 
in 1956, when the Soviet Union had been power-
less to support its ally Nasser, and to a lesser 
extent in the course of the Korean war, when 
it was unable to provide assistance to China, then 
an ally. The period 1962 to 1973 has seen the 
appearance of three different classes of cruiser 
ranging from the Kynda class of some 6,000 tons, 
to the Cresta and Kara classes, the latter of 
10,000 tons. These vessels carry surface-to-
surface missiles as well as surface-to-air missiles 
and modern anti-submarine equipment and heli-
copters, providing a fully ocean-going capability. 
14. The nuclear deterrent at sea re•ached the 
level of Polaris technology in 1968 when the first 
Y class nuclear-propelled submarine of 9,000 
tons, carrying 16 SSN-6 strategic missiles of 
1,300-mile range came into service. Like Polaris, 
these missiles ·can be fired when the submarine 
is submerged. Today, there are 34 Y class sub-
marines in service. They were followed by the 
Delta class of 9,000 tons in 1972 carrying 12 
SSN-8 missiles of 4,200 nautical mile range -
roughly equivalent to the Polaris 3, but probably 
Iilllt fitted with multiple warheads as is the latter. 
One Delta II ciass submarine carrying 16 mis-
siles was reported in service by 1973. With a 
displacement of 16,000 tons, this is probably the 
lrurgest submarine ever built by any country. 
15. For navaJ air power the Soviet Union 
remained totally dependelllt on land-based air-
craft until 1967-68 when the 15,000-ton Moskva 
and Leningrad helicopter carriers (described as 
anti-submarine warfare cruisers) came into 
operation. Carrying helii.copters suitable for an 
anti-submarine role, it is argued that these ves-
sels could also carry VTOL air-defence fighters 
when these enter service. A larger class of air-
craft carrier is now reported operational in the 
Black Sea. This is the Kiev, variously reported 
wt 35,000 or 45,000 tons, fitted with an angled 
flight deck of 180 to 200 metres in length. This 
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has no steam catapult or arrester gear facility, 
and is said to be capable of operating only VTOL 
or STOL aircraft. A sister ship, the Minsk, is 
nearing completion in the Black Sea and a third 
is under construction there. Press reports in 
February1 quoting French intelligence sources 
said the Kiev had been equipped with the Y akov-
lev 36 VTOL fighter and would shortly be sent 
to the Indian Ocean. It has not yet, however, left 
the Black Sea. 
16. The amphibious capability of the Soviet 
fleet remains limited by the standards of many 
western navies. The only sea-going amphibious 
ships are the 5,000-ton Alligator class of LST 
which entered service from 1965 onwards -
there are now twelve. The capability is completed 
with some 60 smaller LCT of some 700 tons. A 
Soviet force of marines is said to number only 
12,000. 
17. In summary, the principal combat units of 
the Soviet fleet today are as shown in the fol-
lowing tabLe : 
Soviet navy combat vessels 1976 
Description Number in service Hull age (and being built) (years) 
Strategic submarines 
Nuclear-propelled, ballistic missile 
(Polaris equivalent SSBN) 49(+11) 0-8 
Smaller SSBN (2-4 missiles) 9 14-18 
Nuclear-propelled, cruise missile SSGN 40 0-13 
Conventionally-propelled, ballistic missile SSB 23 15-18 
Conventionally-propelled cruise missile SSG 28 10-18 
Fleet submarines 
Nuclear-propelled SSN 32 (+ 3) 0-18 
Conventionally-propelled SS 220 0-20 + 
Surface units 
Cruisers, guided missile 20 (+ 2) 0-15 
Cruisers, gun 11 20-25 
Destroyers, guided missile 47 (+ 2) 0-20 
Destroyers, gun 59 ~20+ 
Frigates 111 7-20 + 
Corvettes, guided missile 26 (+ 2) 0-7 
Corvettes, gun 135 8-20 + 
Osa and Komar missile patrol boats 135 up to 15 
Amphibious 
Landing ship (sea-going) LST Alligator class 12 up to 10 
Landing craft (small) 140 up to 20 
Source: The Soviet navy today, J.E. Moore, 1975, and press reports. 
1. Le Monde, 26th February 1976. 
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18. While the Soviet Union has startled the 
world with its large naval shipbuilding pro-
gramme, and its sudden eruption into the oceans 
of the world from the mid-1960s onwards, it 
remains a navy inferior in size and quality to 
that of ,the United States. The standard of com-
fort on the Soviet ships is universally reported 
to be lower than that of modern western navies 
and some experts doubt the standard of mainten-
ance. Soviet crews enjoy less access to shore-
leave than their weste.rn counterparts are accus-
tomed to. Reports from Riga in January said 
that the crew of a Kronstadrt corvette (380 tons 
dating from the early fifties) with serial number 
628 had mutinied on 8th November 1975, some 
twenty of the crew and the communist party 
politieal officer having seized the ship and made 
for Sweden to demand asylum. Helicopters and 
aireraft were said to have fired on the ship and 
divemed it to Leningrad. 
19. The United States Navy Secretary, Mr. 
William Middendorf1 who :rooently drew atten-
tion to the massive Soviet naval buiJding pro-
gramme, nevemheless pointed out: "Although 
these 45,000-ton carriers are not nearly as capable 
as ours since they are equipped primarily with 
a VSTOL and helicopters, they do pose a oon-
siderable threat. In the meantime, we have four-
teen aircraft carriers ... (to be reduced to thirteen 
until the 1980s)." Mr. Middendorf could have 
added tbt three of the United States carriers 
are nuclear-propelled and all operate fixed-wing 
nuclear strike aircraft with ranges up to 800 
nautical miles. 
Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean 
20. From the negligible presence in the Medi-
terranean in the 1950s, the Soviet Union began 
to maintain a permanent presence in the 1960s 
which increased from a total of about twenty 
ships in 1965 to an average of a:bout forty by 
1968 with peak numbers rising at times as high 
as sixty. The mean total of some forty vessels 
comprises typically fifteen surface combatants 
and twelve submarines, the remainder being fleet 
auxiliary ships. The Mediterranean squadron, as 
far as the surface units are concerned, is main-
tained from the Black Sea fleet which at preserut 
totals one aircraft carrier, two helicopter car-
riers, seven cruisers, thirty destroyers, fifty 
frigates and about forty-five submarines. Under 
I. Speech to National Aviation Club in Washington, 
reported in Aviation Week and Space Technology, 8th 
March 1976. 
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the terms of the Montreux Convention on the 
Turkish Straits, the submarines are not allowed 
to enter the Mediterranean except for refit. The 
Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean are 
rotated from the Northern and Baltic fleets. 
21. In the 1950s, ,the Soviet Union was able 
to base a squadron of submarines in Albania but 
with the withdrawal of that country from the 
Warsaw Pact in 1962, the Soviet submarines 
were removed, apart from two which were seized 
at the time by Albania. With the adverut of 
Nasser in Egypt, the Soviet Union was able to 
develop Alexandria as a naval base, which it 
has still retained after the expulsion of Soviet 
military personnel by President Sadat in 1972. 
With the abrogation by Egypt of the Soviet-
Egypt friendship pact in March 1976 however, 
press reports 1 quote American intelJigence 
experts as expecting Alexandria to be closed to 
Russian vessels - a denial which will be parti-
cularly prejudidal to the operation of Soviet 
submarines. The only base in the Mediterranean 
remaining to the Sovielt Union would then be 
Latakia in Syria. While vessels of the Soviet 
fleet are able from time to time to make courtesy 
ealls in various ports on the southern shores of 
the Mediterranean, for supply and refit pur-
poses, they have to make use largely of anchor-
ages in various shallows and practise at-sea 
resupply from fleet auxiliary vessels. A Soviet 
submarine is usually to be found refitting in 
Yugoslavia which, maintaining a scrupulously 
non-aligned position, has offered similar facilities 
to warships of any country provided they dis-
charge their ordnance before putting into port. 
The press earlier in the year reported that Mr. 
Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, had failed 
to secure naval base and air base rights in Libya 
during his visit in 1975 2 • 
22. Soviet military supplies to Angola during 
the hostilities there were despatched both by air 
from Odessa, using staging facilities at Colomb-
Bechar in Algeria, as well as by sea from Black 
Sea ports, with some trans-shipment taking place 
in the sheltered anchorages in the lee of the 
Spanish island of Alboran in the Western Medi-
terranean. 
23. During the crisis in the Lebanon in March 
1976, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet demonstra-
ted off the coast with some two guided~missile 
cruisers and several submarines. At the same 
time, the United States Sixth Fleet deployed ten 
I. Daily Telegraph, 24th March 1976. 
2. International Herald Tribune, 2nd February 1976. 
surface units in the same area, including the 
aircraft carrier Saratoga 1 • 
Soviet naval deployment in the Indian Ocean 
24. 1968 saw the first Soviet naval movements 
in the Indian Ocean with a visit to many coun-
tries in the area by units of the Pacific fleet. By 
1970, extensive exercises were being held in the 
area. By 1974, the Indian Ocean squadron was 
being rotated with units both from the Pacific 
fleet and from the Northern and BaJ.tic fleets 
which had rounded the Cape of Good Hope. 
Press reports suggest that at its peak the deploy-
ment in the Indian Ocean area may reach some 
eighteen to twenty vessels ; it has included major 
units such as the helicopter carrier, Leningrad, 
and a Krupny class destroyer. Ships' crews are 
frequently rotated from the Soviet Union by air 
to points such as Aden, Berbera in Somalia and 
to Mauritius. 
25. Following the conclusion of the Soviet-
Somali treaty in 1972, the Soviet Union con-
structed a major naval base at Berbera in Somalia 
which now has an airfield with a 5,000-metre 
runway, and installations for storing and main-
taining naval surface-to-surface Styx missiles. 
Russian :fiamilies are in residence. The base is 
said to be protected by surface-to-air missiles and 
the Soviet Union has been busily modernising 
the Somali army. The permanent Soviet naval 
presence in ·the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf 
is principally based on Berbera, but many other 
facilities are in use. Further south, along the 
Somali coast, the port of Kismayu has been 
enlarged. The island of Socotra at the mouth of 
the Red Sea has a Soviet naval radio communica-
tions sllation and a rudimentary airstrip. Per-
manent mooring buoys have been laid in the lee 
of Soootra as they have in other anchorages 
around the Indian Ocean, off Mauritius, the 
Seychelles, and the Chagos Islands. The Soviet 
Union enjoys certain naval facilities in Aden 
where there is a shiore party of some ten naval 
personnel ·and the port is used for refuelling and 
minor repairs - as it is occasionally by the 
French navy. 
CHAPTER Ill 
The countries of the Alliance 
Italy 
26. Italy has an effective navy of some three 
cruisers, eight destroyers, ten frigates, seven cor-
1. Le Figaro, 15th April 1976. 
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vettes and ten submarines. The mean age of these 
vessels ranges from about ten to sixteen, but some 
hulls are thirty years old. There is a steady 
building programme - one cruiser, two des-
troyers, two frigates and four submarines are 
less than ten years old. Apart from the sub-
marines, the Italian navy alone is more powerful 
than the mean size of the Soviet squadron in the 
Mediterranean. A fleet modernisation pro-
gramme of 1,000 bi1lion lire has recently been 
voted in the Italian parliament and is to be 
implemented in the years to come. It will provide 
for considerable new building. 
27. Italy is the most important single country 
to the Alli!ance on its southern flank. It houses 
the main NATO headquarters subordinate to 
SACEUR - Allied Forces Southern Europe at 
Naples which the Committee visi.ted in April -
together with :£our subordinate headquarrters. 
Italy provides important air bases, naval faci-
litie.s, nuclear ammunition storage and communi-
cations installations, as well as missile-firing 
ranges which are used by NATO countries of the 
central as well as the southern region. 
28. The vital and loyal collltribution of Italy 
to the mutual defence arrangements of the North 
Atlantic Treaty make it natural that the political 
uncertainties of that country should be of con-
cern to other members of the Alliance. The out-
spoken comments of Dr. Kissinger, the United 
States Secretary of State, have however caused 
some resentment. Most recently for example, on 
13th April, addressing the annual meeting of the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Dr. 
Kissinger said1 : 
"As Secretary of State, I have the obliga-
tion to make clear what I feel the conse-
quences of certain events are, even if we 
canrot necessarily control them. I believe 
the rudvent of communists in Western Euro-
pean countries is likely to produce a 
sequelllce of events in which other European 
countries will also be tempted to move in 
the same direction. 
This, in turn, is going to produce govern-
ments in which the degree of co-operation 
that has become characteristic of Atlantic 
relations will become increasingly difficult, 
in which their own internal priorities are 
going to be away from concern with 
defence, which wi1l produce new oppor-
tunities for outside pressures and a move 
1. International Herald Tribune, 15th April 1976. 
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towards a more neutralist conception of 
foreign policy." 
Dr. Kissinger's views were contested by Mr. 
George Ball, a former Under-Secretary of State, 
and other Democrat officials at the conference. 
29. Dr. Kissinger's is a transatlantic view that 
regards all communist parties in any country as 
an alien i:nBtiturtion posing a threat to democracy. 
It is a perception of communism that is at vari-
ance with that of the friendly neighbourhood 
communist immortalised in the world of Don 
Camillo. The Committee notes that the Secretary-
General of the Italian communist party, Mr. 
Ber1inguer, addressing the twenty-fifth congress 
of the Soviet communist party in Moscow on 
27th February spoke in favour of : 
" ... an Italian foreign policy which, in the 
framework of our countries' international 
alliances, would contribute actively to 
detente and defend firmly the sovereignty 
of the Italian people against any foreign 
interference in our internal affairs." 
Mr. Berlinguer's allusion to NATO echoed 
around the world.1 
30. In interviews in Rome on 18th April, Mr. 
Georgio Amendola, a member of the executive 
committee of the Italian communist party, said: 
"We accept a NATO defensive policy and 
NATO bases." 
While Mr. Giovanni Cervetti, a seruior economic 
expert of the Italian communist party, said: 
"Actions towards withdrawing from NATO 
would create instability in Europe, we 
want to work toward doing away with the 
system of military alliances and blocs. Until 
this can be accomplished, we do not favour 
changes forced by a unilateral Italian 
action, including budget spending and the 
nuclear presence." 
Mr. Cervetti conceded, however, that the Italian 
communists would hope to push NATO more in 
the direction of co-operation and collaboration 
with the rest of the world. He said that NATO 
should take the lead in seeking a ban on nuclear 
weapons in Eastern and Western Europe. 
31. Far more serious is the attempt on the part 
of the Italian communist party to make a 
spurious and dangerous distinction between 
1. International Herald Tribune, 28th February 1976. 
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NATO bases and United States bases in Italy-
which are present under NATO agreements and 
are an essential part of Alliance defence plan-
ning - and to call for the dismantlement of the 
latter. In the draft recommendation, the Com-
mittee calls for all member countries and the 
Alliance as a whole to be more publicly identified 
with NATO defence arrangements in the Medi-
terranean area. Ministerial mee:tings of the North 
Atlantic Council could be held more frequently 
in Italy, Greece and Turkey; BJt permanent 
level, the ambassadors of all the NATO coun-
tmes should pubHcly visit the headquarters and 
defence installations in Italy ; naval an:d air 
contingents from northern countries should par-
ticipate in exercises in the Mediterranean area 
as much as possible. 
32. The Brussels Treaty is a mutual defence 
treaty, and the Committee has a duty to express 
its views on the defence and foreign policy of 
the countries of the Alliance, inasmuch as they 
may affect the security of the Alliance as a 
whole. The Committee does not believe that it 
should attempt to comment on the internal poli-
tics of member countries. As the Committee has 
urged in a previous report 1, NATO should be 
composed exclusively of democratic countries 
whose governments emerge from free elections 
and enjoy, and are seen to enjoy, the support of 
the majority of the population. The Committee 
notes that in Europe communist parties have 
never secured control of governments in free 
elections, control has resulted only when Soviet 
armed forces have been present in their country. 
France 
33. France has an important navy which 
includes two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, nine-
teen destroyers, twenty-four frigates and nine-
teen submarines. Since the Soviet fleet became 
more active in the Mediterrnnean, it has been 
French policy to concentrate a growing propor-
tion of its navy at Toulon rather than Brest. In 
1976, vessels in the Mediterranean will indude 
two aircraft carriers and a cruiser. Mr. Yvon 
Bourges, the French Minister of Defence, speak-
ing to the Navy Academy on 24th March, drew 
attention to the age of many French vessels : 
"Most of our boats will be twenty-five 
years old at the end of the decade and 
will be progressively withdrawn from ser-
vice... quantity counts leas than capability 
1. Document 682, lOth November 1975, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Critchley. 
provided by modern weapons. A choice has 
to be made to meet our priority tasks." 1 
It is anticipated that the next long-term defence 
plan in .France will devote more resources to 
conventional forces, following a period during 
which most emphasis has been placed on nuclear 
forces. 
34. Following French withdrawal from the 
integrated military structure of NATO in 1966, 
the French Mediterranean commander in Tou-
lon ceased to hold the NATO subordinate com-
mand of Command.er Western Mediterranean 
(COMEDOC), and the French Mediterranean 
fleet ceased to be earmarked for assignment to 
NATO. Admiral de Joybert, former Chief of 
Naval Staff, has frequently drawn attention to 
the growing power of the Soviet navy and the 
vulnerability of western countries to submarine 
attack because of their large dependence on 
seaborne imports. Speaking at the Centre d'Etu-
des et de Recherche de Defense d'Aujourd'hui 
(CERDA) recently, Admiral de Joybert, after 
pointing out that France received 85 % of its 
supplies by sea, said : 
"F11ance is incapable of protecting its mer-
chant ships beyond mid-Atlantic and 
Western Mediterranean landfalls... it is 
within the Atlantic Alliance and European 
union that allied naval power could be 
established to counter any blockade." 2 
35. French co-operation with the NATO 
southern command in Naples is in fact reason-
ably close, within the limits of present French 
policy, to NATO. French naval vessels regularly 
participate in joint exercises, and maritime 
patrol aircraft also co-operate with the NATO 
maritime patrol headquarters, COMARAIR-
MED. There is a permanent exchange of liaison 
officers between the NATO Naples headquarters 
and the French naval headquarters at Toulon. 
Various contingency plans have been agreed 
with NATO. 
36. Over the la8t two years, France has built 
up a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, based 
chiefly on the Island of Reunion. While some 
reports have spoken of a force of eighteen to 
twenty vessels, it seems that combat surface 
vessels may usually number about five, and 
will include from time to time a cruiser or an 
aircraft carrier and two submarines. A fleet 
1. Le Figaro, 25th March 1976. 
2. Le Monde, 9th March 19711. 
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auxiliary oiler has been adapted to serve as 
command ship. Press reports have spoken of the 
possible installation of French naval facilities 
on other Indian Ocean islands, including Les 
Glorieuses, Tromelin, Europa, Bassas da India 
and Juan de Nova. Following the decision to 
gl'ant independence to Djibouti at the mouth of 
the Red Sea, this port will presumably become 
less important for the French navy. 
37. While the possibility of communist parti-
cipation in an Italian government has attracted 
much comment in the Alliance, there has also 
been some interest in statements by spokesmen 
for the French communist party concerning 
defence problems. The French communist defence 
expert, Mr. Louis Baillot, took part in a discus-
sion on 8th April <at the Fondation pour les 
Etudes de Defense Nationale. The French com-
munist paper l'Humanite on 19th April found 
it necessary to deny earlier press reports accord-
ing to which Mr. Baillot at the conference had 
said that the communist party recognised the 
existence of the deterrent force as a phenomenon 
which one could not fail to take into account 
and which in present circumstances could 
be considered an element of politieal independ-
ence for France. According to participants in 
the conference, Mr. Baillot is supposed to have 
said that it was not sufficient to have nuclear 
weapons to have a national defence : the problem 
was that of the tasks to be assigned to the 
strategic nuclear force rather than its physical 
existence. 
Greece, Turkey and the problem of Cyprus 
38. The Committee has reported fully in 
earlier reports 1 on the important contribution 
made by Greece and Turkey to NATO mutual 
defence arrangements, and on the unfortunate 
disputes between the two countries, involving, 
in particul,ar, operations in Cyprus in 1974. Both 
Greece and Turkey have common frorutiers with 
Warsaw Pact countries ; their geographical posi-
tion, in particular the corutrol of the Black Sea 
exit and Turkey's proximity to the Middle-East, 
make them vital members of the Alliance. 
39. Following the events in Cyprus in 1974, 
and the return of Greece to a democratic regime, 
that country had announced the withdrawal of 
its armed forces from NATO command, and 
demanded negotiations with NATO on its con-
tinued relationship with the organisation. As the 
1. Document 651 and Document 671, Chapter IV. 
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Committee poinJted out at the time, the Greek 
step, whiLe much to be regretted, was in no way 
as dramatic as would have been a complete 
withdrawal from the integrated military struc-
ture of the Alliance. Greek officers continued 
to serve in all irutegrated NATO headquarters, 
except the combined 6th ATAF and Land South-
East headquarters at Izmir in Turkey. NATO 
communications and other facilities in Greece 
continued to be available to the Alliance. 
40. Following the 1974 decision, Greece 
approached the problem of negotiations with 
NATO in a calm and constructive spirit, sub-
mitting in October 1975 proposals as a basis of 
negotiation which suggested that : 
( i) in peace, Greek armed forces would 
be pLaced exclusively under national 
command; 
( ii) in the event of a general conflict, 
there would be total defence co-oper-
ation; 
( iii) the arrangements to cover such 
co-operation in a crisis should be 
worked out immediately ; 
( iv) any large-scale operations on Greek 
territory, in peace or in war, would 
require the prior agreement or per-
mission of the Greek Government ; 
( v) the Greek Government would reserve 
the righrt to decide when Greek armed 
forces should participate in NATO 
manoeuvres ; 
(vi) Greece would offer NATO three 
advantages: (a) NATO would con-
tinue to control and use the early 
warning, communications and other 
defence infrastructure installations 
built on Greek territory with NATO 
resources ; (b) there would be con-
tinued exchange of information ; 
(c) nuclear weapons would be main-
tained on Greek territory. 
NATO counter-proposals for a basis of the forth-
coming negotiations were worked out during the 
winter and after approval in the North Atlantic 
Council were formally submitted to Greece on 
9th March 1976. 
41. In addition to the agreements with NATO, 
Greece has a number of bilateral arrangements 
with the United States concerning defence 
arrangements, and Greece demanded their 
re-negotiation in 1974. On 15th April 1976, a 
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new four-year defence agreement between 
Greece and the United States was initialled 
which provided for $700 million worth of defence 
aid and United States assurances, expressed in 
a letter of lOth April, to the effect that the 
United States would "actively and unequivocally 
oppose" miLitary moves by either Greece or 
Turkey in the Aegean, and stating the United 
States belief thatt "the present dividing lines 
in Cyprns cannot be permanent". Greece at the 
same time was said to have given assurances 
that it would not extend its territorial sea in the 
Aegean from the preserut six to twelve nautical 
miles, which Turkey had stated would be a 
casus belli. In exchange, the United States wi1l 
continue to enjoy the use of four important 
bases in Greece - the Athens air base ; the 
communications station at Nea Makrio; the very 
important port and air base at Suda Bay in 
Crete and the electronic listening post at Hera-
klion in Crete. This agreement, like the parallel 
one concluded with Turkey, is subjeet to appro-
val by the United States Senate, which has not 
hitherto approved military aid on a longer-term 
basis than two years. 
42. As far aa relations with Turkey are con-
cerned, the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Karaman-
lis, on 17th April expressed his opinion that 
differences with Turkey could be settled peace-
fully, and proposed the conclusion of a non-
aggression pact. Mr. Caglayangil, the Turkish 
Foreign Minister, on 19th April welcomed the 
constructive Greek proposals and suggested in 
due course a meeting between the two Prime 
Ministers. 
43. Meanwhile, Greek armed forces still do 
not participate in NATO exercises, nor are 
NATO exercises being heLd on Greek territory. 
The Committee hopes that the forthcoming 
negotiations with NATO can be successfully con-
cluded to provide for the resumption of such 
necessary activities. 
44. Following the Turkish occupation of parts 
of Cyprus in 1974, the United States Congress, 
in February 1975, imposed an embargo on 
United States defence assistance to Turkey, an 
embargo which has seriously handicapped the 
effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces, par-
ticularly the air force. Turkey countered by 
restricting the operation of and threatening to 
close the twenty-six United States defence bases 
in Turkey. On 26th March this year, a new 
defence agreement was however concluded 
between the United States and Turkey which 
provides for defence assistance to the value of 
$1 billion in exchange for the continued use of 
the bases under Turkish authority ; the agree-
ment is to cover a four-year period and, like the 
parallel agreement with Greece, will require 
the approval of Congress. 
45. Unfortunately, little or no real progress 
can be reported towards normalising the situa-
tion in Cyprus. The February round of talks 
between representatives of the two commun-
ities in Vienna under the aegis of the United 
Nations Secretary-General proved abortive and 
on 17th April, following an exchange of pro-
PQSals for a basis of the next round to be held 
in May the Greek-Cypriot Government stated 
' bl " that the Turkish proposals were "unaccepta e , 
containing no concrete territorial offer. The 
United Nations peacekeeping force remains in 
place and there are reports that the 40 % of 
the island taken by Turkish forces in 1974 has 
been partly settled by immigrants from Turkey. 
Mr. Denktash, Vice-President of the Republic 
of Cyprus in the pre-existing situation, uni-
laterally proclaimed the existence of the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus in 1975, and has now 
announced that elections will be held in May, 
prior to the resumption of the talks in Vienna 
between the two communities. 
46. The British defence bases in the two 
sovereign base areas in Cyprus have not been an 
issue in the inter-communal dispute. The British 
defence white paper, issued in March 1976, 
reports that : 
"Substantial reductions have been made 
to our forces in Cyprus ; RAF fixed-wing 
aircraft are no longer permanently based 
on the island." 
The white paper for 1975 had reported : 
"We will retain our membership of 
CENTO, but will no longer decLare any 
forces to the organisation : the CENTO-
assigned Canberras and Nimrods will be 
withdrawn from Malta by 1979 and we 
will no longer permanently station Vulcans 
on Cyprus." 
47. The headquarters of British Forces Near 
East, and of the British Near East Air Force, 
previously based in Cyprus, were closed on 
31st March 1976. British forces at present in 
the sovereign base areas are : one armoured 
reconnaissance squadron ; one infantry batta-
lion ; two infantry companies ; some helicopte.rs. 
Headquarters Near East Air Force remams 
there. Britain also contributes forces to the 
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United Nations force on the island, the contri-
bution being one armoured reconnaissance 
squadron, one infantry battalion less two c~m­
panies and a flight of helicopters. The third 
report of the British House of Commons defence 
and external affairs sub-committee, issued on 
25th March 1976, expressed concern for the 
soourity of service property in Cyprus where 
the army has now to protect ninety-nine square 
miles with fewer than two thousand men. It 
reported the withdrawal of all fixed-wing air-
craft including Vulca:ns, Lightnings and Her-
cules' from the island, as well as the withdrawal 
of all anti-aircraft missiles. It stated that the 
very expensive airfield at Akrotiri would hence-
forth be open for only a few hours a day. The 
airfield, radar instahla.tions and the important 
electronic listening post which, among other 
things, can provide valuable data about Soviet 
naval communications in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean now remain without provision for air defenc~, although the Commons sub-committee 
was assured that the base could be reinforced 
in time of tension to make a significant contri-
bution to the southern flank of NATO. 
48. It is clear that, whereas in the 1950s 
British forces in Cyprus were regarded as poten-
tial reserves for the Middle East, the island is 
today more important for the defence of NATO 
interests. Addressing the sub-committee on 
Cyprus in February, Mr. Callaghan, then 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, said that although it was not 
the time to strengthen the sovereign base areas, 
Britain had no intention of Leaving them. They 
were still a British base, not a NATO base, but 
it was "more of a NATO interest today than it 
was when we went there" 1 • Britain also finds 
the sovereign base area of use for army training, 
particularly of commandos. 
49. The Committee believes that while the 
political situation in many NATO oount~es. of 
the Mediterranean seaboard holds uncertamt1es, 
the value of a diversity of bases in the area 
under different sovereignty must not be over-
looked. 
Malta 
50. Malta was an important British naval base 
during the war, and in the early years of NATO 
accommodated the headquarters of the NATO 
Commander-in~Chief Mediterranean - a British 
1. The Times, 28th February 1976. 
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command in the days when the British navy 
was still present in some force in the Mediter-
ranean. FolLowing the independence of Malta, 
and under the Prime Ministership of Mr. Borg 
Olivier of the Nationalist Party, some proposals 
were made in 1964 to evolve some sort of asso-
ciate membership of NATO for the island, but 
the proposals came to nothing. When Mr. Dom 
Mintoff of the Malta Labour Party won the 
elections in 1971, the NATO headquarters, by 
then down-graded to the status of subordinate 
headquarters to CINCSOUTH in Naples, was 
transferred from the island to be eo-located 
with CINCSOUTH headquarters. The British 
naval commander remaining in Malta still has a 
NATO wartime function as commander of naval 
forces in the South-East Mediterranean. 
51. In March 1972, Malta signed a new seven-
year defence agreement with the United King-
dom, underwritten by NATO, to expire on 31st 
March 1979. In exchange for annual payments of 
£14 million (of which £5.25 million are provided 
by Britain and £8.75 million by NATO) Malta 
granted the United Kingdom in peace and war 
the right to station armed forces in Malta and 
to use facilities for the defence purposes of 
the United Kingdom and of NATO, and further 
undertook not to permit the forces of any party 
to the Warsaw Pact to be stationed in Malta 
or to use military facilities there. On the signing 
of the agreement, Mr. Mintoff was quoted as 
saying that Malta would become politically and 
economically independent on the expiry of the 
seven-year agreement "in the sense that there 
will be no bases... we will give them free or not 
at all". Referring to Malta's good relations with 
Libya, Mr. Mintoff added that Britain had given 
an assurance that the base would not be used 
against any Arab country. 
52. The British defence white paper of March 
1976 states that : 
"resulting from the concentration of our 
resources in the Eastern Atlantic and 
Channel areas, Britain's naval forces will 
cease to be assigned to NATO in the Medi-
terranean from April 1976. Our only per-
manent ship presence in the area will be 
the Gibraltar guard ship. However, HM 
ships will continue to visit the Mediter-
ranean from time to time and will par-
ticipate in exercises there with our NATO 
allies as well as contributing to periodic 
activations of the NATO naval on-call 
force Mediterranean. The naval headquar-
ters and facilities in Malta will be reduced 
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gradually, prior to a total withdrawal 
when the military facilities agreement 
expires in March 1979 ... part of the Can-
berra and Nimrod force based in Malta 
wiLl remain declared to the Central Treaty 
Organisation for the time being ... ". 
British forces ·at present in Malta in addition 
to the naval headquarters amount to one Royal 
Marine commando group including a commando 
artillery battalion aDid the Canberra and Nimrod 
aircraft. 
53. Malta is an island between Europe and 
North Africa, its people speak a Semitic lan-
guage akin to Arabic, although English is also 
widely spoken. Through the Knights of St. John, 
it had long historical links with Italy and since 
the Napoleonic wars with the United Kingdom. 
The population of some 300,000 is large for the 
very small area of the island - about 240 square 
kilometres - with few indigenous resources 
beyond its excellent natural harbour. The Mal-
tese economy was for a long time essentially 
that of the military base, and Mr. Mintoff has 
been at pains to secure assistance from many 
quarters in an endeavour to achieve economic 
independence. China has provided some £17 mil-
lion in economic aid and China's experts are 
engaged in bui1ding a dry dock capable of taking 
300,000-ton ships which is scheduled to be ready 
for 1977-78. The Maltese dockyard has benefited 
from the reopening of the Suez Canal, and pro-
vides the major single source of employment on 
the island. OfficiaUy unemployment amounts to 
5,000 out of a working force of some 100,000, 
but unemployment in real terms has been estim-
ated to be as high as 12 to 13 %, concealed in 
part through government-organised pioneer 
corps. In December 1975, Mr. Mintoff re-nego-
tiated the association agreement with the Com-
mon Market which provided for aid of some 
26 million units of account. It does not appear 
to be Mr. Mintoff's policy to seek full member-
ship of the European Community ; it is felt 
that Malta might wish to apply for regional 
aid if it does not succeed in establishing suf-
ficient industry to replace total foreign assist-
ance of some £30 million per annum by 1979. 
54. Maltese defence forces were recently 
reorganised to provide cadres which run the 
pioneer corps and another labour corps. The 
forces provide some helicopter patrols and man 
some anti-smuggling ships, and provide guards 
for diplomatic missions. The professional forces 
amount to some seven hundred officers and men 
of the Royal Malta artillery (which continued 
to serve in the British army up to 1971 when 
it was withdrawn from BAOR to Malta). Proud 
of its traditions, the Royal Malta artillery still 
wear the badges of the British Royal artillery. 
55. Elections are due in Malta later in 1976. 
There is speculation in some circles that if the 
Nationalist Party won the elections, there might 
be interest in seeking eventually full member-
ship of the Common Market, and possibly resur-
recting the 1964 proposals for associate member-
ship of NATO -a policy which would amount 
to a reversal of Mr. Mintoff's pol,icy of seeking 
to play a bridging role between Europe and 
the Arab wor1d, especially Libya. The possibility 
of such a reversal of policy is diseounted in 
other circles in Malta. 
56. With adequate bases in Sicily only fifty-
eight miles away, NATO has no requirement to 
maintain a peacetime presence in Malta. After 
the expiry of the defence agreements in 1979, 
it will be highly desirable however that NATO 
vessels should continue to show their presence 
in Malta from time to time, and that Warsaw 
Pact forces should continue to be excluded from 
the island. Unlike Cyprus, the military facilities 
in Malta are not on the sovereign territory of a 
NATO country and would not provide the ter-
ritorial diversity that the Committee sees as an 
advantage in the case of Cyprus, unlffl'! of course 
Malta were to join NATO or conclude a bilateral 
defence arrangement with Italy. 
United Kingdom forces in the llfediterranean 
57. The present status of British forces in 
Cyprus and Malta has been described above ; 
that of those in Gibraltar is described below. 
The 1976 defence white paper is quoted in para-
graph 51 above describing the reduced British 
naval effort in the Mediterranean, which 
amounts to the occasional presence of groups of 
ships which may take part in NATO exercises 
while in transit through the Mediterranean, and 
in the British contribution of a f11igate to the 
NATO navaL on-call force in the Mediterranean 
which is usually activated for about a fortnight 
twice 'a year. Britain contributes one battalion 
and one attack squadron of aircraft to the 
Allied Command Europe mobile force, the land 
element of which is of brigade group size, and 
is deployed periodically on exercises in the 
Mediterranean area. 
58. The United Kingdom contributes spe-
cialised units to SACEUR's general strategic 
reserve which provides an optional deployment 
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capability to North Italy. The British 1976 
defence white paper describes forthcoming chan-
ges in the organisation of the British contri-
bution: 
"By April 1978 the land element of the 
United Kingdom mobile force will be 
reduced from the present division of three 
brigades (nine battalions) to a new for-
mation of five battalions which will be 
known as the Sixth Field Force and based 
in South-East district. This new force will 
contain a limited parachute capability of 
one battalion group, wiLl be provided for 
deployment to such areas of allied com-
mand Europe as are agreed with SACEUR. 
It will be equipped with the latest anti-
tank and air-defence weapons. It is further 
understood that the option is also retained 
of deploying two air force strike squadrons 
to Italy if required by SACEUR. The 
Royal Air Force also uses NATO airfields 
in Southern Eu11ope for training purposes." 
Gibraltar 
59. British forces in Gibraltar amount to one 
frigate, one infantry battalion, and a number of 
Hunter aircraft which, among other functions, 
provide close surveillance of the Straits of 
Gibraltar and movements of Soviet warships 
through them. The defence white paper of March 
1976 states that : 
"As a result of the 1974 defence review, 
there will be a 10 % reduction of service 
manpower by April 1978, although the gar-
rison will continue to be based upon an 
infantry battalion." 
There is also a locally-raised territorial army 
company and artillery battery. The British naval 
commander in Gibraltar assumes NATO func-
tions in the event of hostilities as commander 
Gibraltar Mediterranean area. Since 31st March 
1976, there is no mine counter-measure capabil-
ity and no prospects of any being available. 
60. The political situation in Gibraltar, a Bri-
~tish colony since the treaty of 1713, now with 
internal self-government, was reported on by the 
Committee in November 1973 1 • Since then, there 
have been no significant changes in the situation 
concerning Spanish claims to the territory, or 
the attitude of the Gibraltar population which, 
I. Document 624, paragraphs 60-63, Rapporteur : 
Mr. Jung. 
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in September 1967, voted by 12,762 votes to 44 
in favour of retaining the present 1inks with the 
United Kingdom. Both government and opposi-
tion parties are in favour of the British 
defence presence. On 25th February 1976, Mr. 
Areilza, the Spanish Foreign Minister, in a 
television interview, hinted at the possibility 
of a "new approach" to Gibraltar. Press reports 1 
following his visit to London on 2nd March 
suggested that in his talks with the British 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Areilza gave the impres-
sion that a democratic Spain would be able 
to take a more flexible attitude than pre-
vious governments. The frontier with Spain has 
been completely closed since 1969 however. 
Although the Spanish Government has permitted 
telephone communications to be restored briefly 
at Christmas 1975 and Easter 1976, there 
appears to be no immediate prospect of change 
in the situation. 
61. An economic study of Gibraltar 2 under-
taken by a private British consultant company 
in collaboration with a Spanish firm, maintained 
that fundamental political changes would have 
to take place in Spain before any choice could 
be put to the people of Gibraltar, but con-
cluded that integration with Spain offered the 
best long-term prospects for economic prosperity. 
The barren rock is totally dependent on imports 
for its food supplies and British defence expen-
diture on the island accounts for £8 million 
of the total GNP of £18 million. The Gibraltar 
dockyard has a regular naval refit programme 
for Leander class frigates and minesweepers. 
62. In its 1973 report referred to above, the 
Committee made no recommendation concerning 
Gibraltar. In its report at the end of 1975 3, 
the Committee expressed the view that the use-
fulness of Gibraltar would be enhanced if the 
dispute with Spain was settled, and that if 
Spain were to become a full member of NATO, 
Gibraltar would cease to be militarily relevant. 
The Committee suggested that the NATO Gibral-
tar command should be transferred from 
NAVSOUTH in Naples to the IBERLANT com-
mand in Lisbon, thus coming under SACLANT's 
collltrol. IBERLANT is in practice the major 
NATO command with which the Gibraltar staff 
1. Daily Telegraph, 19th March 1976. 
2. Gibraltar : British or Spanish ? The Economic 
Prospects (Wilton House), quoted in the Times, 15th 
March 1976. 
3. Document 682, paragraphs 40 and 42, Rapporteur : 
Mr. Critchley. 
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has operational contact and communications 
between the two are being improved. 
63. In paragraph 49 above, the Committee 
draws attention to the value of territorial diver-
sity of NATO bases in the Mediterranean area 
under different sovereignty. If Spanish bases 
should cease to be available to United States 
aireraft for any reason in the future Gibraltar 
' can provide facilities for maritime patrol aircraft 
at a strategic point for surveillance of both the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean. 
United States forces in the Mediterranean 
64. The United States Sixth Fleet permanently 
based in the Mediterranean normally comprises 
two aircraft carriers, fourteen surface combat 
vessels and a number of submarines. The marine 
amphibious unit with the Sixth Fleet comprises 
some six amphibious ships with one battalion of 
marines embarked. The Sixth Fleet is fully 
capable of resupply at sea and includes a number 
of auxiliary vessels for the purpose. In early 
April, during the Lebanon crisis, when two 
cruisers and several submarines of the Soviet 
Mediterranean squadron were off the coast, the 
Sixth Fleet concentrated about a quarter of its 
force in the area, including the aircraft carrier 
Saratoga. From time to time, vessels of the 
Sixth Fleet cruise in the Black Sea to demon-
strate the right of passage through the Turkish 
Straits in accordance with the Montreux Con-
vention. The missile destroyer Sellers, the gun 
destroyer V esole were there for four days in 
the third week of April. The Sixth Fleet is 
earmarked for assignment to NATO and comes 
under command of CINCSOUTH in Naples in 
the event of hostilities. 
65. CINOSOUTH's subordinate air comman-
der, Commander Allied Air Forces Southern 
Europe, is concurrently commander of the 
United States Sixteenth Air Force based in 
Spain which commands all United States air-
craft in Southern Europe. Staff estimates of 
United States aircraft currently in the South 
European theatre, including Spain, Italy, Greece 
and Turkey, amount to forty-eight of the F-4 C, 
D and E variants; twelve F-111E; and some 
ten reconnaissance RF-4C. Considerable further 
reinforcements of United States aircraft for the 
southern region are earmarked for assignment 
in the event of hostilities. 
66. The United States army units in the 
southern theatre >account for some 3,000 men in 
Italy, 800 in Greece, and 1,200 in Turkey. 
Among other flillCtions, the army units maintain 
the stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons in the 
area, which, in the event of hostilities, can be 
released to the nuclear capable delivery systems 
in the hands of the forces of the NATO coun-
tries in the area. 
Portugal 
67. The Committee reported fully on the situa-
tion in Portugal and that country's contribution 
to NATO in its last report in November 1975 1 • 
Since that report was adopted, the crisis of 
authority in Portugal has been overcome ; moder-
ate elements of the armed forces have been in 
effective control of them since November 1975 
when the army largely went back to its bar-
racks, and a new pact between the armed forces 
movement and the five leading political parties 
was signed on 26th February, providing for a 
four-year transitional phase during which Por-
tugal would live under "supervised freedom". 
The pact finally fixed the date of the parlia-
mentary elections at 25th April and that for the 
election of the President art 25th June. The 
pact provided that the President of the Republic, 
who will be simultaneously President of the 
Council of Revo1ution and supreme commander 
of the ·armed :florces, will have the power to 
appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister after 
consulting the Council of Revolution and the 
political parties represented in the legislative 
assembly, taking into account electoral results. 
The atmosphere created by the pact permitted 
the constituent assembly to complete work on 
the new constitution according to schedule, and 
the parliamentary elections held on 25th April 
were conducted in a more satisfactory atmos-
phere than those for the constituent assembly 
the previous year, intimidation of parties right 
of centre being significantly reduced. The elec-
tions confirm the leading positions of the Socia-
list and Popular Democratic Parties, but 
reversed the order of the third party, giving 
the Democratic Centre (CDS) a narrow lead of 
one seat in the Assembly over the communist 
party. Consultations to lead to the formation of 
the new government which would be based on 
the political parties in the legislative assembly 
were in progress during the Committee's visit. 
The previous government under Admiral Aze-
vedo as Prime Minister with Major Melo Antunes 
as Foreign Minister was to remain in power 
until after the presidential elections in June. 
I. Document 682, Rapporteur: Mr. Critchley. 
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68. In its previous report mentioned above, 
the Committee noted in paragraph 32 : 
"... the Portuguese armed forces, if they 
overcome their present problems of disci-
pline and authority, must in future face 
problems of motive and objective... the 
army is clearly too large for any con-
ceivable external defence role. It is tempt-
ing to think that although in the past 
Portuguese forces have not been directly 
assigned to NATO, a smaller streamlined 
force with more modern equipment might 
make a useful contribution to some parti-
cular NATO function such as the ACE 
mobile force, or other mobile reserves -
such projects could provide useful train-
ing objectives for a modern professional 
army. In the present situation, there is no 
sign of political support for any increased 
or high-profile contribution to NATO." 
The press now reports discussions with NATO 
countries for the creation of an air-mobile 
armoured brigade equipped with Gtlrman or 
United States tanks 1 • 
69. On 1st January, the government announced 
a 78 % reduction in the defence budget to 2,000 
million escudos for 1976 (about $70 million) 
which compares with some 17,000 million escu-
dos in 1975, which was already 40 % lower than 
the 1974 defence budget. 
70. On 24th January, General Ramalho 
Eanes, Chief~of-Staff of the Portuguese army, 
announced a "national military project" for its 
reorganisation. The size of the army was to be 
reduced by 40 % from 45,000 men to some 
26,000. The period for military service would 
be reduced from twenty-four months ·to twenty-
one months in 1976 and fifteen months in 1977. 
The plan provided for an operational corps of 
10,800 men, highly trained and with modern 
equipment, having a deterrent role responsible 
for the defence of the territory against external 
aggression and, in exceptional circumstances, to 
assist in ensuring internal security. A territorial 
corps would comprise 6,500 men for administra-
tion and 9,600 responsible for training and local 
defence. It could be used when necessary to 
provide internal security 2• 
71. Defence questions and Portugal's contri-
bution to NATO do not appear to have been a 
I. International Herald Tribune, 30th April 1976. 
2. Le Monde, 27th January 1976. 
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significant issue during the recent election 
campaign. Mr. Cunhal, the communist leader, 
was reported as saying on 21st April that the 
communists had no intention of pressing for 
Portugal's departure from the Atlantic Alliance 
if they became part of a left-wing coalition : 
"The question of NATO membership will 
eventually have to be considered in the 
general context of East-West detente and 
European security. But we are not impa-
tient to tackle this issue." 
At the same time, Mr. Cunhal claimed that the 
naval and air exercise Open Gate 1976, which 
the NATO-IBERLANT headquarters outside 
Lisbon had announced was to be held off Portu-
gal during a period of some four days beginning 
on the Monday following the elections, was a 
measure of outside pressure aimed at influencing 
the elections. The IBERLANT spokesman 
pointed out that the exercise had been planned 
two years previously. 
72. Portugal has a smaJJ but relatively modern 
navy comprising sixteen frigates less than ten 
years old with a further two under construction ; 
fifteen corvettes and four submarines, as well as 
lighter forces. The air force, apart from counter-
insurgency aircraft left over from the colonial 
wars, is equipped with largely obsolete aircraft : 
two squadrons of G-91s and one squadron of 
F-86Fs. One hundred M-47 tanks in the army are 
similarly antiquated. 
73. Portugal makes a most important contri-
bution to NATO mutual defence arrangements, 
notably in the naval field, and in the base facil-
ities that it provides on its territory. The major 
problem facing the young democracy in Portugal 
is of course the economy which has suffered 
heavily from the world depression, the drop in 
production and loss of tourist trade during the 
politically unsettled period of the last two years. 
The Committee welcomes the emergence of demo-
cracy in Portugal with a freely-elected parlia-
ment. It expresses the hope that stable govern-
ment will ensue. It calls for full political and 
economic support for Portugal from the coun-
tries of the European Community and of NATO. 
CHAPTER IV 
Other countries 
Spain 
7 4. In its last report, the Committee examined 
the situation in Spain in some detail and expres-
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sed the belief that "the Spanish people must 
shortly take their place in NATO and the Euro-
pean Community ... " and added that any formal 
agreements between NATO and Spain concluded 
before the emergence of democracy in that coun-
try " ... would so alienate public opinion both in 
the NATO countries and in Spain that the very 
existence of the Alliance and any possibility of 
lasting future agreement with Spain would be 
jeopardised ... " The report was adopted shortly 
before the death of General Franco on 20th 
November 1975. 
75. Today, prospects for the emergence of 
democracy in Spain are brighter, but the outcome 
is far from certain. ReportedJy under pressure 
from the King, Mr. Arias, the Prime Minister, 
in an announcement on 28th April obviously 
timed to forestall May-day demonstrations, 
because detailed bills were not ready at the time, 
said that a referendum on constitutional reforms 
would be held in October. The parliamentary 
reform bill published in the Spanish press on 
14th and 1&th May\ during your Rapporteur's 
visit to Madrid, provides for the present Cortes 
to be replaced by a two-ehamber parliament. 
Congress, the lower house, is to be composed of 
300 members direc:tly elected by universal suf-
frage; the Senate will be composed of 285 mem-
bers, of whom 200 will be elected by universal 
suffrage from candidates nominated by local 
authorities and trades unions, 40 will be the 
present life members of the Cortes, 25 appointed 
by the King and 20 by academic institutions. 
The two chambers are said to have equal powers, 
but amendments to the constitution and matters 
affecting human rights must be approved in the 
Senate before they can be discussed in Con-
gress, while the reverse proce.ss will apply to 
finance bills. The life of Congress will be four 
years, that of the Senate six years ; no provision 
is made for earlier dissolution. 
76. The Council of the Realm under the new 
bill would be composed of eleven members, five 
chosen by each of the Senate and Congress and 
six ex-officio members from military and eccle-
siastical posts. There have been no proposals to 
change the method by which the government is 
formed - the Prime Minister is at present 
appointed by the King from three names pro-
posed by the Council of the Realm, while the 
other Ministers are chosen by the Pr,ime Minister 
with the approval of the King. Opposition cri-
1. Ya., ABC. 
--- -- ---------
tics of the new proposals suggest that the govern-
ment might not be representative of the majority 
in parliament; moreover the Senate's pre-
eminent role in matters of constitutional amend-
ment and human rights is not considered demo-
cratic. The King has recently received members 
of the christian democrat and socialist opposition 
when doubts of this charaeter were expressed 
and it appears that a sympathetic attitude was 
adopted by His Majesty. 
77. In his announcement on 28th April referred 
to above, Mr. Arias said the reforms would result 
in the "full recognition of political freedoms 
with no exclusions except those who want to 
conquer power to impose a tyranny". The com-
munist party would therefore not take part in 
elections which were promised for early next 
year, the draft eleetoral bill to be published by 
15th July. 
78. The new legislation would provide freedom 
of assembly and demonstration, legalise poli-
tical groups and reform the pena1 code to 
abolish restrictive provisions against political 
parties and political activities. The Committee in 
its previous report described the emergence of 
tolerated political groupings in Spain and noted 
the creation of the "Platform for democratic 
convergence" grouping various christian demo-
crat and socialist parties active in Spain. It also 
noted the formation of the Junta Democratica 
around the then exiled communist party and 
sma1I splinter socialist groups. The report noted 
that: "As there seem no prospects of the com-
munists being reoognised, the final touchstone 
[of democracy] may be the official attitude to 
the PSOE" (main socialist party). The announce-
ment in the spring of a merger between the plat-
form and the Junta thus providing a common 
front between the main socialist party and the 
oommunists among others may now lead to an 
impasse if the present authorities maintain their 
attitude of non-recognition of the communist 
party. 
79. Spain is now living in a half-world be-
tween toleration of political activity and the 
arrest or continued imprisonment of selected 
political activists. For the first time in forty-four 
years, the •congress of the General Workers' 
Union (UGT) was held in public in Madrid, con-
cluding on 18th April. The congress of a christian 
democrat party (UEDC) was also held in public. 
Yet the press conference arranged to announce 
the common front between the "platform" and 
the "Junta" was stopped and led to selective 
arrests. 
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80. While numerous political figures are emer-
ging on the Spanish scene, it is probably too 
early to speak of politicaL "parties" as, except 
for the reportedly well-organised communist 
party, the grass roots organisation of the newly 
emerging parties can hardly get under way until 
their existence is legalised. Though tolerated 
political activity will remain technically illegal 
at least until the announced, but as yet unde-
fined, constitutional reforms are promulgated. 
81. Since its formation on 11th December last 
year, the new government under the former 
Prime Minister, Mr. Arias, including Mr. Areilza, 
a noted liberal, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
has lost no time in establishing closer links with 
the European Community and NATO. By 15th 
March, Mr. Areilza had completed visits to the 
nine countries of the European Community; on 
his return from Bonn, Luxembourg and Paris, 
he said in Madrid on lOth January that: 
"Spain's fundamental objective is to 
achieve integration into the Community; 
then, in second place, integration into the 
Atlantic Alliance might take place." 
82. Talks aimed at full membership of the 
European Community might "get under way 
this year, provided the last of the reservations 
and political stumbling blocks which some groups 
in some Community countries have, disappear." 1 
The Council of the European Community is 
clearly divided over the speed with which nego-
tiations with Spain should be undertaken. On 
20th January, a statement was issued saying 
that: 
"The present situation no longer prohib~ts 
the renewal of contacts with Spain ooncern-
ing the negotiations which were interrupted 
last October" [i.e. negotiations on associa-
tion.] 
Mr. Callaghan, then United Kingdom Foreign 
Minister, added afterwa11ds ·that application for 
full Spanish membership could not be enter-
tained until Spain was : "Well down the road 
towards a pluralistic democracy." 1 
83. In Brussels on 16th February, Mr. 
Areilza called on Mr. Luns, the Secretary-
General of NATO, reportedly to discuss the co-
ordination of Spanish defence arrangements 
with NATO - the first time the Secretary-
General had received a Spanish minister. 
1. The Times, 12th January 1976. 
2. The Times, 21st January 1976. 
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84. Traditionally, the three services in Spain 
have been represented in the government by 
three separate service officers. In the govern-
ment formed on 11th December, for the first 
time, a service officer, Lieutenant-General Fer-
nando Santiago Diaz de Mendevil, was appointed 
Deputy Prime Minister with special responsibility 
for co-ordinating the affairs of the three ser-
vices. This is seen by some Spanish defence 
experts as a step on the way to the necessary 
creation of a modern defence ministry in Spain. 
85. In a sudden change of policy after General 
Franco's dooth, the Spanish Government decided 
as rapidly as possible to liquidate the residual 
colonial commitment in the former Spanish 
Sahara, and arranged for the rapid withdrawal 
of the 10,000 troops there. Hitherto committed 
to arrange a consultation with the (very few) 
inha;bitants of the territory, Spain preferred in 
the event ,to sign a rapid agreement with Morocco 
and Mauritania providing for the partition of the 
territory between them. 
86. In a television interview on 25th February, 
Mr. Areilza pointed out that the recently 
concluded defence agreement with the United 
States provided for the withdrawal of the 
American nuclear submarines from the base at 
Rota because of danger of pollution and explo-
sion, as well as the fear that Spain could become 
a nuclear target in the event of war. He believed, 
however, that nuclear weapons might have to 
be used for the defence of Europe and added : 
"We have not signed a non-proliferation 
treaty. We want our own capability one 
day - we do not warut to be the last in 
line if that is to be the tendency in the 
years to come." 1 
87. Service officers who held senior command 
in the civil war have long retired from the 
Spanish armed forces, not all of whom today can 
be considered conservative elements. Many of the 
middle-ranking officers have received periods of 
training in military schools of various NATO 
countries, particularly the United States, espe-
cially as far as training of sophisticated air-
craft, surface-to-air missiles is concerned. The 
withdrawal from the Sahara is reported to have 
caused some resentment in the army. On 8th 
March, the trial opened in a military camp to 
the North of Madrid of nine service officers 
accused of sedition and belonging to the illegal 
1. Le Monde, 27th February, Daily Telegraph, 26th 
February 1976. 
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Democratic Military Union (UDM) formed some 
two years ago to press for democratic reforms 
in the courutry. H is reported to have 1,000 mem-
bers in the armed forces. A tenth officer, Cap-
tain Jose Ignacio Dominguez of the air force 
escaped to France and had been acting as an 
external spokesman for the movement. Signifi-
cantly in March he held a press conference in 
Algiers to protest against the "betrayal of the 
Saharan people." 
88. Perhaps the chief success of Mr. Areilza 's 
foreign policy in the defence field so far was 
the conclusion of the treaty of friendship and 
co-operation between Spain and the United States 
of America on 24th January 1976, which includes 
mutual defence commitments which hitherto 
have been covered only by less far-reaching 
executive agreements between the two govern-
ments not subject to ratification. Article I of the 
treaty establishes a Spanish-United States coun-
cil under the chairmanship of the Spanish 
Foreign Minister and United States Secretary 
of State. Supplementary agreement No. 1 pro-
vides for the chief-of-staff of each country to 
be the permanent military representative on the 
council and to form a joint military committee 
which will set up a combined military co-ordina-
tion and planning staff to be established in 
Madrid "to facilitate co-ordination between the 
Spanish armed forces and the armed forces of 
the United States, as well as other forces dedi-
cated to North Atlantic defence". The Spanish-
United States council, as one of its basic objec-
tives, will work toward development of appro-
priate co-ordination with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation. 
89. Article V of the main treaty recognises that 
co-operation of the two parties "has strengthened 
the security of the western world" and establishes 
"a defence relationship between Spain and the 
United States of America". Supplementary 
agreement No. 5 provides that the combined 
military co-ordination and planning staff shall 
prepare plans "for actions which couJd be taken ... 
in case of an attack against Spain or the United 
States in the context of a general attack against 
the West". The supplementary agreement defines 
a "geographical area of common interest" wilthin 
which the planning Sltaff is to work. It covers 
the area of the Atlantic westwards from the 
African and European coasts lying between 
latitude 23 degrees north (i.e. virtually the same 
as the Tropic of CalllCer to which the North 
Atlantic Treaty applies) up to latitude 48 degrees 
north (i.e. the latitude of Brittany), reaching 
westwal'ds to 23 degrees west (just short of the 
Azores). The area covers the whole of Spain 
and emends into the Mediterranean as far as 
7 degrees west longitude (i.e. a little short of 
Corsica and Sardinia). The supplementary agree-
ment envisages the possibility of command head-
quarters being established under the combined 
staff as it provides that "Spanish liaison officers 
shall be assigned to such headquarters as are 
agreed upon." 
90. Supplementary agreement No. 6 provides 
for the United States to continue to use its 
military facilities on Spanish territory which 
include the Rota naval base and airfield, the 
Torre.ion and Zaragoza air bases, the Baroenas 
Reales firing range and the Moron air base, 
together with eighteen other minor installations 
elsewhere in Spain. Tanker aircraft based in 
Spain are to be reduced to a maximum of five 
aireraft at Zaragoza. The nuclear submarine 
squadron will be withdrawn from the Rota base 
progressively between 1st January and 1st July 
1979. The United States undertakes not to store 
nuclear devices or their components on Spanish 
soil. 
91. Supplementary agreement No. 7 provides 
for co-operation in the acquisition and produc-
tion of military equipment. It provides for 
guaranteed loans of $120 million a year, the 
gift of military equipment to a value of $75 
million and training to a value of $2 million a 
year. $50 million is donated towards modernising 
Spanish radar and air control facilities, 72 F-16 
fighter .aircraft are to be made available as soon 
as possible ; pending their delivery 42 F-4E air-
craft are to be leased to Spain at a price of 
$53 million - $2 million less than the United 
States pays Spain for the return of 34 F-4C 
aireraft. The United States will also consider pro-
viding data and equipment for the production 
in Spain of specific defence items subject to 
detailed agreements. The treaty and its supple-
mentary agreements will come into force when 
ratified by Congress and the Spanish Cortes and 
will then remain in force for five years, subject 
to its extension for additional five-year periods 
by mutual agreement. The total of loans and 
grants covered by the agreement is $1.22 billion, 
of which $735 million are devoted to defence 
and ·$485 million to other forms of co-operation, 
including nuclear energy plants. 
92. The Committee notes that the geographical 
area defined in supplementary agreement No. 5 
referred to above overlaps with several existing 
NATO command areas. In the Atlantic, of the 
7 - I 
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commands that come under SACLANT, the new 
Spanish-American area includes the whole of the 
IBERLANT command (headquarters Lisbon) 
and smaller parts of WESTLANT (headquarters 
Norfolk, Virginia) and EASTLANT (headquar-
ters Northwood, United Kingdom). In the Medi-
terranean, the new command includes the whole 
of the Gibraltar Mediterranean area and vir-
tually the whole of the former Western Mediter-
ranean command which, prior to French with-
drawal from the NATO integrated military 
structure, came under the French admiral at 
Toulon. General Haig, NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, in his capacity as comman-
der of United States forces in Europe, has now 
been invited to visit the Spanish forces. 
93. The signature of the treaty was widely 
welcomed in the Spanish press but criticised in 
opposition circles. The main socialist party 
(PSOE) published a communique protesting that 
the treaty would commit the Spanish people for 
five years, although it was to be submitted for 
ratification to the O:Jrtes which was not elected 
through universal suffrage.1 
94. The Committee recognises that Spain makes 
a valuable contribution to western defence, at 
present through its association with the United 
States and in more limited ways through certain 
arrangements with other NATO countries. It 
cal.Js for the negotiation of a protocol for the 
accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty, 
with the government that will eventually emerge 
following free elections to a reconstituted parlia-
ment. This timetable is necessary to ensure the 
full support of the majority of the population 
of Spain and of the other NATO countries for 
this accession. 
95. In the previous report of the Committee 2 
the Rapporteur noted four proposals for co-
operation with NATO which Spain would seek 
at the present time. Your Rapporteur now under-
stands that the Spanish authorities would appre-
ciate receiving formal notification of all NATO 
exereises held in proximity to Spanish territory ; 
he himself suggests that ·there would be mutual 
benefit in permanent links between Spanish and 
NATO early-warning radar systems. 
Austria 
96. Not strictly a Mediterranean country, 
Austria is mentioned in this report because its 
1. Le Monde, 27th January 1976. 
2. Document 682, paragraph 14. 
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territory provides several obvious access routes 
for an attack on Italy, and because it is a neutral 
country, precluded by its peace treaty from 
talcing part in a military alliance. The Austrian 
defence capability has been criticised as being 
totally out-of -date in an article in Die Presse 
of 1st March, based on a secret defence report. 
An Austrian officer, Major Hans Aehrenthal, 
was arrested on 2nd April charged with commu-
nicating the report to the press. 
Yugoslavia 
97. Since President Tito's break with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc in 
1948, Yugoslavia has followed an independent 
line and in 1961 took the initiative in organising 
a third world movement stressing Yugoslavia's 
independence of either bloc. Yugoslav leaders 
stress the virtues of their particular form of 
communism which they refer to as a socialist 
system of self-management, and stress their inde-
pendent non-aligned position in foreign affairs. 
But President Tito, 83, is now an old man and 
the succession cannot be long delayed. The 
Yugoslav communist party continues to discover 
pro-Moscow ceLls in its midst. Most recently, on 
14th April, nine pro-Soviet dissidents were sen-
tenced to terms of imprisonment of up to twelve 
years, having been found guilty of organising a 
"Marxist-Leninist communist party of Yugo-
slavia" to overthrow the President and bring 
Yugoslavia under foreign control. They were par-
ticularly charged with establishing contacts with 
pro-Soviet Yugoslav emigres in the Soviet Union, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania. 
Altogether, since the beginning of 1976 alone, a 
total of 23 Yugoslavs have been sentenced to 
imprisonment for similar offences. 
98. At the same time, a Soviet submarine can 
usually be found under repair in a Yugoslav 
port, although Yugoslavia has offered similar 
facilities to warships of any country, provided 
that ordnance is unloaded before entry into 
Yugoslav territory. Yugoslav military equip-
ment is a mixture of Russian and American. 
Following the break with the Soviet bloc, the 
United States supplied considerable military aid 
between 1951 and 1961 to a value of some $1.75 
billion. This includes the M-47 tank and F-84 
aireraft which can be considered obsolete today. 
From the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia has received 
T-54 and T-55 tanks (its total tank invenrtory 
being some 1,500), some anti-tank guided 
weapons and 110 MiG-21 fighter bombers. The 
United Strutes is now preparing a new and signi-
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ficant arms deal with Yugoslavia and has 
included $1.5 million for cash sales in the 
security assistance programme beginning 1st 
October 1976. Yugoslavia is expected to receive 
the very latest TOW anti-tank missile which is 
in short supply in the West. It is suggested that 
enough missiles would be provided to counter a 
possible Soviet airborne occupation of Yugoslavia 
which would inevitably use lighter tanks than 
would a land attack across Romania - which 
could hardly be undertaken without Romania's 
consent. Yugoslav military leaders in January 
were quoted as saying that they would need to 
destroy at least 2,000 tanks in such a situation 
and that anti-tank missiles were required for 
the purpose. 
99. Last October the press carried reports 1 
of a document reputedly smuggled out of Russia, 
signed wilth the pseudonym "Samokhin", claim-
ing that Romania and Yugoslavia had speeded 
up joint construction of a fighter bomber with 
British engines and a Swiss missile. Signifi-
cantly, the document claimed that the Soviet 
leaders regarded Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania 
and Austria as their "rightful property", but 
that Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania were 
"socialist" countries considered as "defectors". 
Pointing out that the United States had failed 
to intervene in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Vietnam, the commentary suggested that any 
American action in Yugoslavia would be limited 
to the evacuation by helicopter of the American 
Embassy and the Yugoslav communist party 
central committee, if there was fighting in the 
streets of Belgrade. 
100. Yugoslavia has a small indigenous arms 
production capability, and it has frequently been 
reported that Romania for some years has had 
no access to Soviet arms supplies since Romanian 
foreign policy became increasingly independent. 
President Sadat of Egypt visited Yugoslavia in 
April, reportedly in seareh of arms assistance, 
but it was subsequently reported that Yugo-
slavia would be unable to overhaul Soviet MiG 
aircraft in Egyptian hands, but that Yugoslavia 
was considering the delivery of unspecified 
weapons to Egypt. 
101. Yugoslavia has an army of some 400,000 
men, but following the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia by the Soviet Union and ather Warsaw 
Pact countries in August 1968, it has set up a 
sort of large-scale home guard termed a "peo-
l. Daily Telegraph, 15th October 1975. 
pie's defence" which can reportedly mobilise 
some three million citizens within forty-eight 
hours re'ady to defend specific targets and con-
duct guerrilla warfare. In an exercise in the 
Northern Republic of Croatia over the weekend 
24th-25th April 1976, a million people were 
mobilised, including both men and women of all 
ages. Organised by local communist party offi-
cials, the exercise was said not to have involved 
the regular army, 'and to have been aimed against 
invasion and natural disasters. The "no sur-
prises" operation was the largest held since the 
second world war. 
102. The "Samokhin" document referred to 
above is a reminder of the uncertainties and 
dangers inherent in the so-called Brezhnev doc-
trine to which the Committee has frequently 
called attention. "... When the internal and 
external forces hostile to socialism seek to turn 
back the development of any socialist country 
to restore the capitalist order, when a threat 
emerges ... to the security of the socialist com-
monwealth as a whole, this is... a matter of 
concern for all socialist countries. It goes with-
out saying that ... military aid to a fraternal 
country w thwart the threat to the socialist 
order is an extraordinary ... measure" said Mr. 
Brezhnev on 12th November 1968 in explanation 
of the Soviert invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yugo-
slavia has always been considered a "socialist 
country" by the Soviert Union. 
103. The senior United States State Depart-
ment adviser, Mr. Helmut Sonnenfe1dt, gave a 
privarte talk to a meeting of United States/ 
European Ambassadors in London in December 
1975. Garbled reports about that talk received 
wide publicity and in April an official non-
verbatim summary of the remarks was issued to 
the press. 1 The summary says : 
"The Soviets' inability to acquire loyalty 
in Eastern Europe is an unfortunate his-
torical failure, because Eastern Europe is 
within their scope and area of natural 
interest. It is doubly tragic that in this 
area of vital interest and crucial impor-
tance, it has not been possible for the 
Soviet Union to establish roots of interest 
that go beyond sheer power. 
It is, therefore, important to remember 
that rthe main, if not the only, instrument 
of Soviet imperialism has been power. 
1. International Herald Tribune, 12th April 1976. 
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... With regard to Eastern Europe ... This 
inorganic, unnatural relationship is a far 
greater danger to world peace than the con-
flict between East and West ... So it must be 
our policy to strive for an evolution that 
makes the relationships between the Eastern 
Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic 
one ... So, our policy must be a policy of 
responding to the clearly visible aspirations 
in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous 
existence with~n the context of a strong 
Soviet geopolitical influence. This has 
worked in Poland. ... A similar process is 
now going on in Hungary ... The Romanian 
picture is a different one ... The Romanians 
have striven for autonomy, but they have 
been less daring and innovative in their 
domestic systems. They remain among the 
most rigid countries in the internal organ-
isation of their system ... 
Finally, on Yugoslavia, we and the West-
ern Europeans, indeed, the Eastern Euro-
peans as well, have an interest which 
borders on the vital for us in continuing 
the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet 
domination. Of course we accept that Yugo-
slav behaviour will continue to be, as it 
has been in the past, influenced and con-
strained by Soviet power. But any shift 
bruck by Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit 
would represent a major strategic setback 
for the West. So we are concerned about 
what will happen when Tito disappears, 
and it is worrying us a good deal. 
So our basic policy continues to be that 
which we have pursued since 1948-49, 
keeping Yugoslavia in a position of sub-
stantial independence from the Soviet 
Union. Now at the same time, we would 
like them to be less obnoxious [i.e. to the 
United States] and we should allow them 
to get away with very little. We should 
especially disabuse them of any notion that 
our interest in their re}rutive independence 
is greater than their own and, therefore, 
they have a free ride." 
104. There were strong Yugoslav (and Roma-
nian) objections to reports of Mr. Sonnen.feldt's 
talk. Mr. Cornel Burtica, Secretary of the 
Yugoslav communist party central committee, 
in an article in Scinteia on 13th April, rejected 
the proposed "organic relrutionship" with the 
Soviet Union, adding "relations between the 
Socialist countries are based on a new revolu-
tionary concept, on a new type of unity, which 
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supposes the perfoot equality in rights, and the 
rigorous observation of the principles of inde-
pendence and national sovereignty." 1 
105. The Committee notes in passing that Yugo-
slavia waa among the countries invited to send 
observers (along with Turkey and Greece, Bul-
garia and Romania) to Soviet manoeuvres held 
in the Caucasus - the first to be notified under 
the Helsinki agreement. Iran, not a party to the 
agreement, waa not invited although the manoeu-
vres which began on 25th January were near 
the Turkish and Iranian frontiers. 
106. Yugoslav relations with Italy are normal-
ised ; agreement has now been reac~ed on the 
residual border problem in the Tneste area. 
Yugoslav relations with Albania have recently 
been strained, however, because of the problem 
of ethnic Albanians on Yugoslav territory in the 
province of Kosovo on the Albanian frontier. 
Thirty-one persons were sentenced to imprison-
ment by a Yugoslav oourt at the end of February 
for organising a clandestine movement advo-
c.a.ting the unification of Kosovo with Albania.2 
107. The Balkan conference held in Athens on 
Greek initiative from 26th January to 5th 
February 1976 was attended by representatives 
from Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania and 
BuLgaria. Albania, although invited, refused to 
attend. Turkey was reported sceptical about the 
possibility of achieving concrete results on 
subjects proposed by Greece for practical co-
operation in the Helsinki spirit - transport, 
telecommunications, energy, environment and 
agricuLture - with a view to tightening Balkan 
solidarity as a guarantee against possible Soviet 
intervention in Yu~avia when the regime in 
that country changes. Significantly, Bulgaria 
was reported to have blocked any attempt to 
institutionalise muLtilateral co-operation between 
the countries ·and the final communique said 
merely that conference proposals would be refer-
red to the governments for selection of those 
considered "useful or acceptable to them". 
108. In view of the uncertainties surrounding 
the future of Yugoslavia, the Committee calls 
for a clear declaration on the part of the NATO 
countries to the effect that no external interven-
tion will be tolerated in rthis country. 
Albania 
109. Albania in the 1950s was a member of the 
Warsaw Pact and provided a base for a squadron 
1. LB MondB, 15th April 1976. 
2. International Herald Tribune, 2nd March 1976. 
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of Soviet submarines, two of which were repu-
tedly seized by Albania when that country 
broke with the Soviet Union in 1962. Since then, 
Albania has taken a rigidly anti-Soviet line in 
all its fu:feign relations, having sided with China 
in its dispute against the Soviet Union. On 20th 
April, the Albanian newspaper Zeri I Populit 
carried yet another denunciation of Soviet 
attempts to "wipe out all traces of national 
sovereignty" in the countries of Eastern Europe 
which had become mere provinces of the Soviet 
State.1 The third purge in two years haa just 
been announced of those described by the Alba-
nian leader Enver Hodja, as "... traitors who 
sought to weaken our friendship with China, to 
bind Albania to Soviet revisionism".2 There is 
no likelihood of Albania returning to the Soviet 
sphere in present circumstances, but it could 
again provide very useful submarine bases if 
its policy were to change as a consequence of 
successful Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia. 
The Eastern Mediterranean 
110. The Committee has reported twice on the 
situaltion in the Middle East since the October 
1973 war 3• Since that time, the prospect of 
renewed Egyptian-Israeli hostilities has dimin-
ished, especially since the signing of the Sep-
tember 1975 agreement, while in general the 
influence of the Soviet Union has been declining 
ever since July 1972 when Soviet military per-
sonnel were expelled from Egypt. But the failure 
so far to find a lasting settlement, and one that 
will find a place for the Nestinians, has been 
at the root of the internal fighting in the 
Lebanon with the inherent danger of wider 
hostilities. 
Syria 
111. Syria has a Long common frontier with 
Turkey, a NATO country, as well as with Israel 
and the Lebanon. The Soviet Union gained con-
siderable influence in the 1960s, it has the use 
of the port of Latakia for its Mediterranean 
squadron, there are 2,500 Soviet military advisers 
in the country and the Syrian armed forces have 
been heavily equipped with Soviet equipment 
which, at one time, was more modern than any 
possessed by Turkey. There are now reported to 
be seven hundred modern T-62 tanks, as well as 
1. The Times, 21st April 1976. 
2. Le Figaro, 3rd May 1976. 
3. Document 624, 7th November 1973, Rapporteur : 
Mr. Jung; Document 651, 14th November 1974, Rap-
porteur: Mr. Critchley. 
many anti-tank ailid surface-to-air guided 
weapons and forty-five modern MiG-23 fighters 
as well as 250 MiG-21s. Press reports speak of 
Soviet millitary deliveries to the value of over $1 
billion since the 1973 h~ilities with Israel. 
Nevertheless, the extent of Soviet influence has 
been declining since 1970, Presidelllt .Assad being 
less pro-Soviet than his predecessor. Apart from 
the use of Latakia, there are no Soviet military 
bases in the country. 
112. Syrian intervention in the Lebanon civil 
fighting, although it initially appeared to foster 
intervention by Palestine liberation forces in 
favour of left-wing Arab elements, has in fact 
been a carefully controlled operation. The UIJJited 
States on 20th April recognised it as such when 
the White House press secretary, Mr. Nessen, 
saying that the United States remained opposed 
to military intervention in the Lebanon "that 
could lead to a military confrontation or a Middle 
East war" added "if you look at the nature and 
the intent of what Syria is doing in the Lebanon, 
overall they have played a constructive role." 1 
On 14th April, Mr. Rabin, in an article in 
Maariv said that Israel would intervene in the 
Lebanon if Syrian forces passed a certain "red 
line" - considered by most observers to be the 
river Litani which flows into the Mediterranean 
some twenty-five kilometres north of the Israeli 
:firontier. Iraq, Egypt and Libya have made it 
clear that a Syrian conquest of the LebaiiJOn 
would not be tolerated. 
113. Since 1975, Syria has been seeking to 
widen its sources of armaments. It was reported 
to have bought fifteen helicopters and two 
thousand anti-tank missiles from FraDJCe. It was 
also said to be attempting to buy from North 
Vietnam American ·tanks and artillery captured 
during the fighting there. 2 United States 
"security support assistance" for 1975-76 inclu-
ded the sum of $90 million for Syria. 
Lebanon 
114. Soviet influence has never e~tended to the 
Lebanon whose small a:rmed fumes have been 
supplied with American, British and French 
equipment. These forces have never been involved 
in the various Israeli wars, but the toleration of 
Palestinian baBeS in the territory has been the 
cause of conflict and reprisal strikes by Israel. 
Finally, the failure to find a solution to the 
1. International Herald Tribune, 21st April 1976. 
2. Daily Telegraph, 15th October 1975. 
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problem of the Middle East as a whole has led 
to the civil fighting in the Lebanon initiated by 
left-wing Arab forces sympathetic to the Pales-
tinians. While the integrity of the country 
appears to be uneasily assured by the policies 
of both the Arab countries, Israel and the United 
States, it is unlikely that internal political stab-
ility can be achieved so long as the Palestinian 
problem remains unsolved. 
Israel 
115. The Israeli-Egyptian agreement of 1st 
September 1975 makes a great contribution to 
stability between Israel and Egypt, although the 
document does not claim to be more than a 
limited step - the parties " ... are determined to 
reach a final and just peace settlement by means 
of neg:otiati<mS called for by the security council 
Resolution 338, this agreement being a significant 
step towwros that end" (Article 1). With the 
creation of a demilitarised buffer zone between 
the two countries in the Sinai desert, equipped 
with early-warning stations, some of which are 
manned by United States personnel, albeit 
civilian, the agreement virtually incorporates a 
United States guarantee to supervise the peace. 
An unpublished agreement between Israel and 
the United States provided for extensive military 
and economic assistance to Israel and a similar 
understanding in connection with the agreement 
guamnteed economic and (smaller) military aid 
for Egypt. 
116. While there is no prospect of Soviet 
influence extending into Isra~l, a lasting settle-
ment of the Middle East conflict, including a 
settlement of the Palestinian problem, remains 
an overwhelming western interest. 
Egypt 
117. Soviet influence has considerably and 
steadily declined in Egypt sinoo the expulsion 
of most Soviet military personnel in July 1972 
but there is still a Soviet presence in the country. 
The Soviet military bases and aircraft manned 
solely by Soviet personnel have gone, but mili-
tary advisers remain in certain technical posi-
tions, while civilian co-operation continues with 
many Russian experts in the Helwan steelworks, 
over three hundred in a new aluminium works 
and others in the areas of electrification, the 
Aswan dam, etc. The press reports a total of 
between one thousand and three thousand mili-
tary and civilian Soviet technicians remaining 
in the country, a figure that compares with some 
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two hundred technicians from France. In March 
1976, Egypt finally denounced the Egyptian-
Soviet treaty of friendship and, on 16th April, 
it was announced that twenty persons had been 
arrested, alleged to be part of a communist net-
work. Simultaneously, five Russian technicians 
fr:om the Helwan steelworks were expelled. Fol-
lowing the abrogation of the treaty, Egypt 
announced that the remaining naval facilities at 
Alexandria, which housed Soviet subilla!rines, 
would be withdrawn effective on 14th April.1 
118. It would be wrong to consider the present 
trend in Soviet-Egyptian relations as realign-
ment of Egypt with the West. Following its 
emergence from quasi-colonial status under the 
British, Egypt under Nasser was glad to accept 
Soviet 8Upport, especially after the 1956 British-
French-Israeli invasion. Yet after a decade 
during which the Russians made themselves too 
much at home, the Egyptians found Soviet tech-
nology to be inferior to that of the United States 
or Germany, Russian cu1ture inferior to French, 
and Russians more arrogant than the British.2 
Egypt now wants "normal" relations, both with 
Moscow and the West, which will not place 
Egypt in a subservient position to eithe,r. Heavily 
dependent on money from the Arab oil States, 
Egypt cannot make further concessions towards 
Israel for a permanent peace settlement until the 
Palestinian problem is settled, and Israel makes 
territorial concessions to Syria and Jordan. 
119. Meanwhile, Egypt is seeking to broaden 
its sour-ces of arms supplies. In March, the pur-
chase of three military hovercraft from Britain 
Wlas announced and Egypt has examined the 
p<l"!Sibility of fitting Rohls-Royce Spey engines 
to the MiG-21 aircraft now that spares are no 
longer available from the Soviet Union. The 
projeet was abandoned as too expensive but 
Aviation Week reports proposals for an Egyptian 
designed aircraft which would take the Spey or 
the RB-199 engine. Egypt is discussing with 
British, French and United States companies the 
possibility of installing helicopter production 
facilities in Egypt 3 • On 20th January, Mr. 
Fahmi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, announ-
ced in parliament that France had agreed to 
compensate Egypt for the l<>El'!l of military equip-
ment in the 1973 war. France had previously 
concluded a contract for the supply of Mirage 
1. Daily Telegraph, 15th April 1976. 
2. Willia.m E. Griffith : uSoviet influence in the Middle 
East", Survival, January-February 1976. 
3. The Times, 3rd March 1976. 
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F-1 aircrnft - reportedly forty - to Egypt. 
Egyptian approaches to Yugoslavia in this con-
nection have been reported above. On 21st April, 
Egypt signed a military protocol with China 
understood to cover the provision of spare parts 
for Egypt's MiG fighters. China had previously 
supplied eighteen replacement engines for MiGs.1 
On 13th April, the United States House of 
Representatives cleared proposals for the sale of 
six C-30 aircraft to Egypt under an agreement 
which is said to include provision for the training 
of some twenty Egyptian pilots. Thls appears 
to be the first instalment of the limited United 
States military assistance offered privately in 
connection with the Egyptian-Israeli agreement 
of 1st September 1975. 
Libya 
120. Under Colonel Kadhafi, oil-rich Libya 
with a gross national product of some $6,000 
million fur a population of only 2.25 million is 
the unpredictable enfant terrible of the Arab 
world, at loggerheads with most of it. But the 
fall in the demand for oil since 197 4 has reduced 
Libya's oil revenue, leading the cou:ntry to co-
operate more closely with other oil producers. 
Libya has idedlogica1 disputes with its two neigh-
bours - Egypt and Tunisia - in both of which 
countries conspiracy trials are in progress of 
individuals charged with conspiring to overthrow 
the governments at Libya.n inspiration. Libya's 
military equipment has been supplied by both the 
Soviet Union and France and includes fifty 
modern Soviet T -62 tanks and 280 older models. 
The French-equipped air force has some ninety 
Mirage III-E and Mirage V aircraft. 
121. At the end of 1975, disagreements were 
reported within the ruling revolution command 
council (CCR), leading to the arrest of two 
members of that body and the flight to Tunisia 
of Major Al-Mhaichi accused of organising a plot 
against Colonel Kadh:afi because of the Islamic 
nature of Libyan policy. A purge of the Libyan 
armed forces is reported to have folllowed. But 
Colonel Kadhafi 's position does not seem to be 
threatened at the present time. 
122. Libya for some time has appeared a pos-
sible base for Soviet forces, although hitherto 
Colonel Kadhafi has maintained that he will not 
allow any foreign bases to be installed in his 
country. Thus, United States intelligence sources 
are said to have reported that Mr. Kosygin, the 
1. The Guardian, 22nd April 1976. 
Soviet Prime Minister, failed to secure naval and 
air base rights in Libya during his visit to the 
country .in 19751• But now the press reports2 
that Colonel Kadhafi has handed over the former 
United States Wheelus air force base (now ool·led 
Okba Ben Nafie) to the Soviet Union, Libyan 
personnel having been ordered off the base. The 
Russians were reported to have built hangars in 
Tripoli and Benghazi for planes that were 
"carrying out wide-scale reconnaissance missions 
over the Tun.isian borders, which affirms that 
Kadhafi is planning to move militarily against 
Tunisia". Avillltion Week of 22nd March 1976 
reported the appearance of Soviet MiG-25 Foxbat 
reconnaissance aircraft carrying out high-level 
reconnaissance missions over Western European 
NATO countries, the Mediterranean and the 
Near East. The Committee understands that 
these aircraft have been detected in the Medi-
terranean area. Aviation Week reported that 
with a ceiling of 95,000 ft. Foxbat was beyond 
the reach of present allied surface-to-surface 
missiles. Your Rapporteur has put a question to 
the Council, asking it to confirm or deny this 
report 8 • 
123. Mr. Mintoff, the Prime Minister of Malta, 
was successful in securing some Libyan assistance 
for his country, in particular the loan of a 
number of helicopters with Libyan pilots. 
124. The Committee would view with great con-
cern any establishment of Soviet bases in Libya 
which could only lead to a deterioration of the 
situation in the Mediterranean. 
The Maghre·b 
125. Of the three Maghreb countries, Tunisia, 
Algeria and Morocco, Algeria has always had 
somewhat closer links with the Soviet Union. 
Algeria's modest armed forces of some 63,000 
are equipped with semi-{)bsolete Soviet T-34 and 
T-54/55 tanks but ·also with anti-tank guided 
weapons and reportedly surface-to-air missiles. 
The air force has some thirty-five MiG-21s and 
older MiG-17s. Fohlowing the abrupt Spanish 
decision at the end of 1975 to withdraw from the 
former SpanJish Sahara, handing over the major 
part to Morocco, there was a serious deterioration 
in relations between .AJ.geri:a and Morocco, the 
former country supporting the Polisario move-
1. International Herald Tribune, 2nd February 1976. 
2. The Guardian, 29th April 1976, quoting the Cairo 
newspaper Al-Gornhouria. 
3. Written Question 169. 
, •• - l 
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ment of the Sahara population which, from 
demanding independence from Spain, had turned 
to resisting the occupation of the territory by 
Moroccan forces ·in January. On 25th January, 
the Moroccan authorities announced that one of 
their F -5 aircraft had been shot down over 
Mauritania by a Soviet Sam-6 surfooe-to-air mis-
sile. Without naming Algeria, the announcement 
claimed the incident as pmof of foreign interven-
tion in the area. 
126. The Organisation of African Unity was 
chiefly responsible for mediation between Algeria 
and Morocco, and its Ministerial Council meeting 
in Addis Ababa on 1st March failed to support 
publicly the Polisario movement, rulthough some 
twenty out of forty-seven members were said to 
have spoken in favour of it. Partly as a con-
sequence of the Saharan conflict, Algeria's rela-
tions with France have also deteriorated, Morocco 
having commenced a programme of modernisa-
tion of its equipment with the signature of a 
contract for the purchase of twenty-five Mirage 
F-1 fighters from France in December 1975, 
with an option for a further fifty. Deliveries 
begin in 19801 • Morocco is also to purchase 
twenty-four F-5E fighters from the United 
States - Morocco is reported to be among the 
first ten foreign countries in receipt of miLitary 
equipment from the United States. 
127. Algeria has had some support in its dispute 
from Libya which has stationed some of its 
French Mirage F-1 aircraft in Algeria. 
128. The isolation of Algeria, which has obvi-
ously been in recent receipt of Soviet military 
equipment, as Sam-6 missiles had not been previ-
ously reported in its possession, leaves Algeria 
open to approaches from the Soviet Union. On 
20th January, .ALgeria denied yet again that it 
had threatened to open the former French naval 
base at Mers-el-Kebir to the Soviet Union. But the 
Algerian air base at Colomb-Bechar is reported 
to have been used for staging by Soviet planes 
:lilying military supplies to Angola2 • 
129. One possible stabilising factor in the un-
satisfactory situation in the area was the signa-
ture at the end of April of new association agree-
ments between the Com.mon Market and Tunisia, 
Algeria and Morocco, which are expected to be 
followed by similar agreements with Egypt, 
Syria, Jordan and Libya. 
1. Le Figaro, 15th January and 23rd February 1976. 
2. L'Expr68s, 25th January-lst February 1976. 
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CHAPTER V 
The NATO commands 
130. The NATO headquarters in the Mediter-
ranean area have been mentioned in connection 
with the various NATO countries described 
above. The command structure as a whole is 
shown at Appendix II. The Committee draws 
attention to the great achievement of the allied 
countries in establishing a coherent command 
structure with assigned and earmarked forces 
and all its ·associated infrastructure. For more 
than thirty years, there has been no major con-
f1ict in the area of the Alliance ; the validity 
of the defence commitment lies in the daily 
demonstration of the preparedness of the Alli-
ance manifested by the integrated military struc-
ture. It is inconceivable that the two world wars 
of the twentieth century could have broken out 
if the allied powers had been able to establish 
in peacetime a coherent operational structure on 
the lines of that maintained by NATO today. 
Integrated headquarters 
131. In the six major integrated headquarters 
in the southern region, military staffs drawn 
from the countries assigning forces to the area 
have full plans for the use of the forces that 
come under command in the event of hostilities, 
and in addition regularly command these forces 
in inter-allied exercises from time to time; they 
are ready at any time to assume operational 
control in the event of hostilities, and the air 
defence structure already assumes such functions 
in peacetime on a 24-hour basis, manning the 
radar early-warning stations, and exercising the 
power to scramble fighters to intercept uniden-
tified aircraft. 
132. The existence of integrated staffs drawn 
from countries whose arnned forces have different 
traditions and, to a certain extent, different 
objectives, is a success in itself which has remain-
ed largely intact, despite disputes between parti-
cipating countries that have been noted a;bove. 
The Committee expresses the hope that with the 
opening of negotiations between Greeee and 
NATO, it will be possible for Greek officers to 
return to the joint headquarters of 6th AT AF 
and Land South-East. 
133. On its visit to headquarters AFSOUTH 
in April, the Committee noted the presence of a 
political adviser from the United States foreign 
service, as is usually the case in NATO head-
quarters where, as in this case, the commander 
200 
is a United States officer. In its previous report 1 
the Committee noted that such advisers were not 
to be found in all NATO headquarters, and 
recommended that po1itical advice be institu-
tionalised, and the political authority of the 
Secretary-General, Chairman of the North 
Atlantic Council, recognised at the same time. 
It was suggested that the Secretary-General 
should assign political advisers, from his political 
affairs diwsion, to all NATO headquarters. The 
Council has not yet replied to Recommendation 
278 in which the Assembly made this proposal. 
NATO infrastructure 
134. On the recommendation of the integrated 
headquarters, NATO has collectivezy financed 
and constructed a large number of military 
installations throughout the Mediterranean area, 
which include in particular the airfields, the 
early-warning radar and communications system, 
storage for fuel and ammunition including 
nuclear ammunition. There is today a require-
ment for updating the communications system 
and the early-warning system, the first is being 
undertaken through the NATO integrated com-
munications system project, the latter would be 
considerably enhanced if airborne warning and 
controL aircraft becoone available (AWACS). 
Exercises 
135. Joint exercises by a1lied forces under 
NATO command play a vital deterrent role, both 
in improving the readiness of the forces and in 
demonstrating publicly the ability of the Alli-
ance to act together in the event of aggression on 
one of its members. In an area where the land 
forces of the three main NATO countries indi-
genous to the area - Italy, Greece and Turkey 
- are not in a position to provide mutual sup-
port for geographical reasons, arrangements for 
joint naval and air operations, as well as air-
borne and amphibious land operatlions are of 
particular importance. The NATO naval on-call 
force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) is a 
particularly valid demonstration of allied unity. 
It was last brought together on 9th April for 
exercise "Dynasty Form" off Izmir in the 
Aegean Sea. On this occasion, it comprised des-
troyers, frigates and support ships from Italy, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States in an exercise that lasted for about a 
month under the command of Commander Allied 
1. Document 682, paragraph 43. 
Naval Forces Southern Europe, Admiral Luigi 
Tomasuolo (Italy). The mobile force of Allied 
Command Europe provides a land component of 
a brigade group size, comprising battalions from 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
United Kingdom and the United States which 
can be deployed very rapidly to any threatened 
area on the southern flank, providing an imme-
diate demonstration of allied solidarity as well 
as useful local reinforcements. 
Problems of naval command areas 
136. The Committee notes that the headquarters 
of South-Eastern Mediterranean area located in 
Malta (the commander is traditionally a British 
admiral) would have to leave the island when 
the defence agreement with Malta expires in 
1979. This command could no doubt be exercised 
from the British sovereign base areas in Cyprus 
but these eannot provide port facilities. Altern-
ative sites would be either Suda Bay in Crete, 
or Izmir in Turkey where headquarters 6th 
ATAF and Land South-East are already located. 
137. Command of the Western Mediterranean 
(COMEDOC) was previously exercised by a 
French admiral from Toulon prior to the with-
drawal of France from the integrated military 
structure in 1966. The Committee notes that the 
Spanish-American command area established 
under the treaty signed in January covers the 
whole of the former Western Mediterranean. It 
would be logical to assign this command to a 
Spanish admiral, after conclusion of negotiations 
fur rthe entry of Spain into NATO in the manner 
the Committee has suggested above. 
138. The Committee in an earlier report1 has 
drawn attention to the problems of oo-<>rdination 
associated with the Gibraltar-Mediterranean 
command, and has proposed that primary res-
ponsibility for this area be transferred from 
SACEUR to SACLANT, the Gibraltar command 
becoming subordinate to the IBERLANT head-
quarters ·in Lisbon. It reaffirms this recom-
mendation now. 
CHAPTER VI 
Contingency planning for future crises 
139. While deterrence on the central front is 
exercised by the presence of comparatively large 
l. Document 682, lOth November 1975, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Critchley. 
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and modern military forces in clearly -defined 
positions devoid of geographically grey areas, 
the situation on the southern flank of NATO is 
one where the indigenous forces 'are smaller and 
less heavily armed, but where geographical and 
political uncertainties, and the ever-present pos-
sibility of localised conflicts result in a greater 
risk of major conflict by miscalculation. The 
Committee recommends that careful contingency 
planning should be undertaken by NATO to 
provide against, 'and therefore deter, any mis-
judged action on the part of the Soviet Union 
which could lead to conflict. 
Yugoslavia 
140. In the sootion on Yugoslavia and Albania 
above, the Committee has called for a clear 
declaration on the part of the NATO countries 
to the effect that no external intervention would 
be tolerated there. It is important that careful 
pl'ans should be made to deal with the situation 
that might arise when President Tito leaves the 
political scene. It is not impossible that the Soviet 
Union would claim at that time that the Yugoslav 
leadership had ceased to be representative, and 
in defence of "socialist" principles seek to inter-
vene in the interests of the Yugoslav people 
and of what it calls the socialist commonwealth 
as a whole. In justification, it might seek to show 
that its assistance was called for by some Soviet 
puppet figure in the country. Soviet and other 
Warsaw Pact for·ces might initially be massed 
on the frontiers of Yugoslavia and airborne units 
standing by, as they were prior to the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. 
141. The defence arrangements of Yugoslavia 
which have been described above are certainly 
capable of offering considerable resistance. In 
such a situation, the NATO countries, at the 
request of the recognised Yugoslav authorities, 
should be prepared, severally and jointly, to fly 
in additional supplies of equipment, especially 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems which would 
be most needed to deter a blitzkrieg. If these 
measures, together with the NATO declaration 
for which the Committee has called above, should 
prove insufficient to deter an armed penetration 
into the country, a further immediate measure 
of support could be provided by allied tactical 
aircraft which could operate from bases outside 
Yugoslavia and from carriers of the United 
States Sixth Fleet. NATO forward air control 
units with appropriate communications equip-
ment could be flown or parachuted into Yugo-
slavia in such a situation to join Yugoslav forces 
DOCUMENT 708 
in the field and provide accurate terminal guid-
ance for allied air strikes. The existence of such 
preparations in peacetime should be sufficient to 
deter miscalculations on the part of the Soviet 
Union. Such contingency plans would ensure that 
the onus of initiating hostilities would rest at all 
times on the adversary. 
Other non-aligned countries 
142. Malta, Libya and Algeria are all countries 
where, at various times and in various situations, 
there is speculation about the possible installa-
tion of Soviet military bases which would pose 
a serious threat to the interests of NATO coun-
tries. The essence of realistic contingency plan-
ning is to ensure that the onus of initiating 
hostilities wlways rests on the potential adversary. 
Plans for such contingencies therefore can be 
designed only to demonstrate to the Soviet Union 
as well as to the country concerned the dis-
adVlantages of permitting the status quo to be 
changed through the installation of further 
military bases. Economic measures affwting the 
countries concerned as well as the provision of 
military assistance to any third countries that 
might consider themselves threatened by such a 
development are among the measures to be con-
sidered. 
A future Angola 
143. It is appropriate to consider here the impli-
cations of the Soviet-inspired and supported 
intervention by Cuban forces in Angola. Soviet 
suppLies and military advisers were transported 
by sea and air through the Mediterranean on 
that occasion. Contingency planning by the 
NATO countries ·agairult further intervention in 
Afrioo. must start first with much 0loser political 
co-ordination within the North Atlantic Council. 
In the particular case of Angola, there was pro-
bably a mistaken appreciation by certain western 
countries, in particular the United States, con-
cerning the need to support particular factions 
among the three Angol:an independence move-
ments. United States financial support for 
ce:vtain factions in Angola proved ineffective, and 
hence counter-productive, because it could be 
portrayed as justification for Soviet and Cuban 
intervention. 
CHAPTER VII 
Conclusions 
144. The Committee's principal conclusions are 
set forth in the draft recommendation: 
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Preamble 
145. (i) The growing naval power of the Soviet 
Union is described in Chapter II of this explana-
tory memorandum. (ii) Parag:vaph 2 of the intro-
duction lists some of the local con:filicts in the 
Mediterranean area, which are referred to in the 
sections on the countries concerned. (iii) Chapter 
VI describes certain contingency plans the COIIIl-
nrittee has in mind. 
146. (iv) Australia and New Zealand, since the 
1975 elections, have taken a closer interest in 
mutual defence plans. Australia will make avail-
able to United Kingdom and United States war-
ships the enlarged Cockburn Sands naval base, 
and examine the possibility of lifting the previous 
ban on nuclear-propelled warships using Austra-
lian povts. New Zealand places no limitation on 
the use of ports by allied warships. Both coun-
tries have stressed the importance of the ANZUS 
defence pact, and on 1st May a twelve-day naval 
exercise "V·aliant Heriltage" was held off Cali-
fornia involving 41 ships, 200 aircraft and 18,000 
men from the forces of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States; Iran has become an important military 
power in the Middle East, perceived by many 
as a factor of stabililty in the area. 
147. (v) Developments in Spain and Portugal 
are described in the respective sections. (vi) The 
Committee has frequently drawn attention to the 
fact that aircraft carriers, defined in the 1936 
Mollltreux Convention as " ... surface vessels of 
war, whatever their displacement, designed or 
adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying 
and operating aircvaft at sea ... ", are not among 
the categories of warship that are authorised to 
pass through the Turkish Straits under the terms 
of the convention ; most recently in Recommen-
dations 254 and 256, the Assembly has called for 
the convention to be correctly applied. The pro-
posal concerning political advice for NATO head-
quarters is mentioned in paragraph 133 above, 
that concerning the transfer of the Gibraltar 
command in paragraphs 62 and 138. 
Operative text 
148. Paragraph 1: (a) Spain. The position of 
Spain has been described in the section on that 
country. The overlapping of the new United 
States-Spanish defence planning area with the 
NATO area is mentioned in paragraphs 88-92, 
the Committee's proposal in parag:vaph 94. (b) 
Malta. See paragraphs 50-56 above. (c) The 
advantages of territorial diversity for NATO 
military facilities is mentioned in the case of 
Gibraltar (paragraph 63), Cyprus (paragraph 49) 
and Malta (paragraph 50). (d) The need for more 
public identification of ahl. member countries with 
NATO defence arrangements in the Mediter-
ranean area is stressed in paragraph 31. (e) The 
possibility of a new specific role for Portuguese 
forces is mentioned in paragraph 68. 
149. Paragraph 2: (a) The need for a clear 
declaration on Yugoslavia is stressed in para-
graphs 97 et seq and 108. (b) The situation in 
Libya, the Maghreb countries and in Malta is 
described in the respective sections of the explan-
atory memorandum, and the contingency envis-
aged in the recommendation is mentioned in para-
graph 142. (c) Political and military contingency 
plans are discussed in Chapter VI, paragraphs 
139-143. 
150. Paragraph 3 : The Committee has noted 
that the two-yearly defence white paper issued by 
Germany is also pubLished in English and 
French ; the German Government has been kind 
enough to make copies available to al1 members 
of the Committee. The Netherlands defence 
white paper of July 1974 was also issued in 
English. Most member countries now have a 
tradition of publishing regular statements of this 
nature on their defence policy, in many cases 
prefaced by a (national) assessment of the threat 
and statement of allied strategy as perceived by 
the country concerned. 
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151. The Committee now proposes that in order 
to provide the new European programme group 
with a vehicle for the necessary concertation of 
European defence policies, while at the same time 
providing valuable documentation for parlia-
ments and the public, the group should be 
requested to publish a defence white paper com-
prising a joint assessment of the threat, and a 
joint statement of allied strategy to couTIJter the 
threat. The white paper could then incorporate 
separate TIJational chapters describing the defence 
effort and forces of each country. The Committee 
envisages that this white paper would be pub-
lished in all national languages of the participat-
ing countries. 
Opinion of the minority 
152. This report was adopted in Committee by 
eleven votes to two with two abstentions. A 
minority of the Committee would have preferred, 
in place of the present text of paragraph 1 (a) 
of the draft Recommendation, to have recom-
mended the WEU Council to foHow the evolution 
of the situation in Spain, and to negotiate the 
accession of that couTIJtry to WEU when its 
internal regime had been made genuinely demo-
cratic. In place of paragraph 1 (d), the minority 
would have recommended the WEU Council to 
study the question of European security in the 
Mediterranean, in order to bring together the 
political and strategic concepts on which the 
defence of the various WEU countries is based 
in the Mediterranean. 
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APPENDIX I 
Spanish/United States ''geographical area of common interest'' 
under the treaty of 24th January 1976 and NATO command areas 
-
23%0 N (NATO) 
United States /Spanish 
area boundary 
NATO Command boundary 
APPENDIX I 
1/12,900,000 
204 
I I 
APPENDIX II 
NATO military command structure 
Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area 
North Atlantic Council (Brussels) 
I 
Military Committee and International Military Staff (Brussels) 
I 
I 
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
SACLANT (Norfolk, Virginia) SACEUR (Casteau, Belgium) 
I I r T 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, I 
CINCSOUTH (Naples, Italy) 
T I 
Commander Iberian Commander Allied Naval Commander Land Commander Air Forces Commander Land 
Atlantic Area, Forces Southern Europe, Forces Southern Southern Europe Forces South-Eastern 
COMIBERLANT COMNAVSOUTH Europe (Verona) COMAIRSOUTH Europe, 
(Oeiras, Portugal) (Naples) COMLANDSOUTH (Naples) COMLANDSOUTH-
I I EAST I (lzmir) : I I 
Island Commander Commander 5th ATAF I Commander 6th ATAF I Madeira __ .J (Vicenza) (lzmir) 
I I I I 
Gibraltar Medi- Western Mediterranean Central Mediterranean North Eastern Maritime Air terranean Area, Area, MEDOC (formerly Area, MEDCENT Mediterranean Area, Mediterranean, GIG MED Toulon, now temporarily (Naples) MEDNOREAST MARAIRMED (Gibraltar) exercised by (Ankara) (Naples) 
NA VSOUTH directly) 
Eastern Mediterranean South Eastem Submarines 
Area, MEDEAST Mediterranean Area, Mediterranean 
(Athens) MEDSOVEAST SUBMED (Naples) (Malta) 
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Country National currency unit 
(0) (1) 
Belgium ................... Million Frs. 
France .................... Million Frs. 
FederaJ. Republic of Germany Million DM 
Italy ......•.............. Million Lire 
Luxembourg ............... Million Frs. 
Netherlands ............... Million Guilders 
United Kingdom ........... Million £ 
TOTAL WEU ........ 
Canada • 0 •••••••••••• 0 0 ••• Million $ 
Denmark .................. Million Kr. 
Greece •••••••• 0 •• 0 0 ••••• 0 Million Drachmas 
Norway .................. Million Kr. 
Portugal .................. Million Escudos 
Turkey .....•............. Million L. 
United States 0. 0. 0 •••• 0. 0. Million $ 
TOTAL NON-WEU . . . 
TOTAL NATO 0 0 I 0 0 0 I 
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COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1971-75 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
Defence expenditure (na.tional currency) current prices Defence expenditure (US $ million) a GNP at factor cost (US $ million) a Population (thousand) Defence expenditure as % Defence expenditure per head a 
1971 1972 
(-5) (-4) 
39670 44140 
34907 37 992 
25450 28 720 
1852 2162 
442 517 
4466 4974 
2 815 3 258 
2131 2238 
3195 3 386 
15480 17 211 
3022 3 239 
14699 16046 
8487 9961 
74862 77 639 
1973 1974 1975 t 
(-3) (- 2) (-1) 
48941 57 395 69791 
42284 48153 56495 
31908 35 644 38 095 
2 392 2852 2 961 
601 710 786 
5 612 6423 7 266 
3512 4207 5070 
2 405 2862 3ll3 
3520 4439 5130 
19866 24126 43917 
3505 3938 4589 
16 736 25108 26552 
12192 15 831 . . 
78472 85 906 88 983 
e = Preliminary estrmate 
I= Forecast 
1971 
(I) 
814 
6 285 
7 291 
2990 
9 
1275 
6 853 
25 517 
2111 
431 
516 
430 
5ll 
585 
74862 
79446 
104 963 
1972 1973 1974 
(2) (3) (4) 
1003 1258 1474 
7 435 9 466 10001 
8 912 ll928 13 775 
3 705 4106 4391 
12 15 18 
1535 2 006 2 387 
8145 8 611 9845 
30 747 37 390 41891 
2 259 2403 2 926 
487 582 728 
574 670 804 
491 602 713 
589 651 985 
718 870 1140 
77 639 78472 85 906 
82 757 84250 93 202 
113 504 121640 135 093 
GNP (f.c.): Gross na.tional product at factor cost, current prices. 
a. Figures affected by change in exchange rate. 
1975 f 1971 1972 1973 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
1998 25758 32129 41527 
13 510 134 987 164 831 213 759 
16228 192 158 227 368 305 421 
4677 92013 108 168 126 770 
23 1021 1253 1671 
30ll 33152 40574 53416 
12033 119 889 138 058 157 055 
51480 598 978 712 381 899 619 
3082 79 764 90224 104119 
932 14474 17424 23051 
1464 9 788 ll317 14658 
916 10896 12 807 16485 
1041 6284 7 768 10 Ill 
. . ll910 15 291 19 822 
88983 967 018 1064012 1 190 989 
. . 1100 134 1218 843 1379 235 
. . 1699112 1931224 2 278 854 
Source: Defence expenditures according to NATO definition from NATO press release M fDPC /2(75)18. 
of GNP (f.c.) 
1974 1975 e 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 e 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975/ 1971 
------------(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
48 557 61072 9 673 9 711 9 742 9772 9801 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.3 84 
231765 292 887 51250 51700 52135 52 577 53050 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.6 123 
339 946 393 746 59204 59 599 59 923 60041 59439 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.1 123 
135 438 157 908 54005 544ll 54901 55 361 55 749 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.0 55 
1955 2294 345 348 353 357 360 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 26 
62 709 76064 13194 13 330 13 438 13 541 13 690 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 97 
172 728 216 191 55 712 55891 56 033 56 068 56 236 5.7 5.9 5.5 5.7 5.6 123 
------------
993 098 1 200162 243 383 244 990 246 525 247 717 248 325 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.3 105 
----------
124623 130 800 21595 21848 22125 22 479 22 771 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 98 
26019 31208 4963 4992 5 022 5 045 5 075 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.8 3.0 87 
17 897 20375 8 831 8 889 8 929 8 962 8 998 5.3 5.1 4.6 4.5 7.2 58 
20330 25 887 3903 3933 3 961 3 985 4 013 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.5 110 
12 668 14503 8 632 8590 8 564 8 782 8 712 8.1 7.6 6.4 7.8 7.2 59 
27 958 35 083 36 221 37150 38 090 39 348 40 371 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.1 . . 16 
1286 030 1359 720 207 053 208 846 210 410 2ll894 214 013 7.7 7.3 6.6 6.7 6.5 362 
----------
1515 525 1617 576 291198 294 248 297 101 300 495 303 953 7.2 6.8 6.1 6.1 . . 273 
-----------
2 508 623 2 817 738 534 581 539 238 543 626 548 212 552 278 6.2 5.9 5.3 5.4 . . 196 
Notes: GNP and defence expenditures are ca.lculsted in nationa.l currency and converted to United States $ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are not therefore a.lways comparable 
between countries, whereas figures of defen<~ expenditures as % of GNP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion. 
For the period 1971-75, the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Oountry 
Belgium & ~embourg 
- 1971 
- 1972 
- 1973 
- 1974 
- 1975 
Oanada 
- 1971 
- 1972 
- 1973 
- 1974 
- 1975 
Denmark 
- 1971 
- 1972 
- 1973 
- 1974 
- 1975 
France 
- 1971 
- 1972 
- 1973 
- 1974 
- 1975 
Fed. Rep. of Germany 
- 1971 
- 1972 
- 1973 
- 1974 
- 1975 
Greece 
- 1971, 1972 
- 1973 
- 1974, 1975 
Unit 
Franc 
Canadian Dollar 
Kroner 
Franc 
Deutschmark 
Drachma 
US $ per unit Units per US S 
0.02052 48.74 
0.02272 44.01 
0.02571 38.90 
0.02567 38.95 
0.02863 34.93 
0.99037 1.0097 
1.00943 0.9907 
0.99945 1.0005 
1.02248 0.9780 
0.98990 1.0102 
0.13491 7.4122 
0.14390 6.9495 
0.16523 6.0522 
0.16408 6.0947 
0.18163 5.5056 
0.18004 5.554 
0.19570 5.110 
0.22387 4.467 
0.20770 4.815 
0.23914 4.182 
0.28647 3.49 
0.31030 3.22 
0.37383 2.68 
0.38647 2.59 
0.42599 2.35 
0.03333 30.00 
0.03373 29.65 
0.03333 30.00 
Oountry Unit US $per unit Units per US $ 
Italy 1,000 Lire 
- 1971 1.61438 0.61943 
- 1972 1.71347 0.58361 
- 1973 1.71649 0.58258 
- 1974 1.53952 0.64955 
- 1975 1.57937 0.63317 
Netherlands Guilder 
- 1971 0.28565 3.50 
- 1972 0.30864 3.24 
- 1973 0.35746 2.80 
- 1974 0.37163 2.69 
- 1975 0.41439 2.41 
Norway Kroner 
-1971 0.14230 7.03 
- 1972 0.15168 6.59 
- 1973 0.17169 5.82 
- 1974 0.18106 5.52 
- 1975 0.19956 5.01 
Portugal Escudo 
- 1971 0.03478 28.75 
- 1972 0.03670 27.25 
- 1973 0.03889 25.71 
- 1974, 1975 0.03922 25.50 
Turkey Lira 
- 1971 0.06889 14.52 
- 1972 0.07207 13.88 
- 1973 0.07133 14.02 
- 1974 0.07199 13.89 
- 1975 0.07149 13.99 
United Kingdom £ 
- 1971 2.4342 0.411 
- 1972 2.5000 0.400 
- 1973 2.4520 0.408 
- 1974 2.3401 0.427 
- 1975 2.3733 0.421 
(US$) 
1972 1973 1974 1975/ 
------(22) (23) (24) (25) 
------
103 129 151 204 
144 182 190 255 
150 199 230 273 
68 75 79 84 
34 44 51 63 
115 149 176 220 
146 154 175 214 
------
126 152 169 207 
------
103 109 130 135 
98 116 144 184 
65 75 90 163 
125 152 179 228 
69 76 ll2 120 
19 23 29 . . 
372 373 405 416 
------
281 284 310 . . 
------
210 224 246 . . 
Al'PBNDIX ill 
Defence expenditure as % of tota.l WEU 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 f 
(26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
3.19 3.26 3.36 3.52 3.88 
24.62 24.18 25.32 23.88 26.25 
28.57 28.98 31.90 32.88 31.52 
11.72 12.05 10.98 10.48 9.09 
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
5.00 5.00 5.37 5.70 5.85 
26.86 26.49 23.03 23.50 23.37 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
8.27 7.34 6.43 6.99 5.99 
1.69 1.58 1.56 1.74 1.81 
2.02 1.87 1.79 1.92 2.84 
1.69 1.60 1.61 1.70 1.78 
2.00 1.92 1.74 2.35 2.02 
2.29 2.34 2.33 2.72 .. 
293.38 252.50 209.87 205.07 172.85 
311.34 269.15 225.33 222.49 .. 
4ll.34 369.15 325.33 322.49 .. 
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B. MANPOWER CONTRIBUTION 
I Country Period of compulsory military service Total in armed forces 
-Months- (thousands) 
1975-76 1975-76 
(1) (2) 
--
I Belgium ................. 12 7 87 
2 France .................. 12 502 
3 Germany ................ 15 495 
4 Italy .................... 12 I 421 
5 Luxembourg ............. nil 0.55 
6 ]lether~ds .............. 16-181 112.5 
7 United Kingdom ......... nil 345.1 6 
8 TOTAL WEU ............. 1,963.15 
9 Canada .................. nil 77 
10 Denmark ................ 9 34 
ll Greece ....•.............. 24 161.2 
12 Norway ................. 12 8 35 
13 Portugal ................. 24• 217 
14 Turkey .................. 20 453 
15 United States ............ niP 2,130 
16 TOTAL NON-WEU •........ 3,107.2 
17 ToTAL ]lATO ............ 5,070.35 
1. Selective draft ca.lls were terminated on 27th January 1973 ; those previously drafted complete 24 months service. 
2. Navy 18. 
3. Air force 18-21 ; na.vy 18-21. 
4. Navy 48; air force 36. 
5. Including forces enlisted outside Britain (8,900). 
6. Air force 15 ; na.vy 15. 
7. If serving in Germany 10 months. 
Sourcu: Numbers in armed forces and period of military service: Institute for Strategic Studies uThe Military Bala.noe, 1975-76". 
Labour Force: OECD Labour Forces Statistics, 1963-74, total employment. 
e - Estimate. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Total employment Total in a.rmed forces 
(millions) as % of total employment 
1974 
(8) (4) 
3.80 2.3 
21.10 2.4 
25.69 1.9 
18.72 2.2 
0.15 0.37 
4.58 2.5 
24.77 1.4 
98.81 2.0 
9.14 0.8 
2.36 1.4 
3.17 5.1 
1.66 2.1 
3.08 7.0 
14.87 e 3.0 
85.94 2.5 
120.22 2.6 
219.03 2.3 
Document 708 
Amendment No. 1 
Security in the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENT No. 11 
tabled by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Sieglerschmidt and Lord Peddie 
15th June 1976 
I. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "if the Atlantic Alliance 
weakened in its determination to defend its freedom". 
2. In paragraph ( iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "freely-elected parliamentary 
democracies and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis" and insert "parlia-
mentary democracy and human rights and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet 
any crisis in the treaty area". 
3. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
4. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "announcement of free 
elections in Spain" and insert "signs of democratic developments in Spain". 
5. Leave out paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert "by negotiating in due 
time with a democratic Spain the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty". 
6. Leave out paragraph l(d) of the draft recommendation proper. 
7. Leave out paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper. 
8. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
Signed : Dankert , Sieglerschmidt, Peddie 
1. See 5th Sitting, 16th June 1976 (Part 1 agreed to; part 2 amended and agreed to; part 3 agreed to; part 4 
agreed to ; part 5 amended and agreed to ; part 6 withdrawn ; part 7 agreed to ; part 8 negatived). 
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Amendment No. 2 
Security in the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Radius and others 
15th June 1976 
I. In paragraph ( iii) ofthe preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out all the words after "Alliance". 
2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "appropriate" and replace 
"Iran associated with Alliance defence planning" with "Iran associated with the Alliance". 
3. Leave out paragraph l (c) of the draft recommendation proper and insert "by recognising the value 
of NATO military facilities located in several countries of the Mediterranean area". 
4. In paragraph 2(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "detente" and 
insert "of any installation of new Soviet bases or similar facilities in the Mediterranean area". 
Signed: Radius, de Montesquiou, Burckel, VaUeix 
1. See 5th Sitting, 16th June 1976 (Part 1 negatived; part 2 fell; part 3 agreed to; part 4 agreed to). 
210 
Document 708 
Amendment No. 3 
Security in the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
15th June 1976 
tabled by Mr. Valleix and Mr. de Bru.yne 
In the draft recommendation, before the words "RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER 
GOVERNMENTS", insert the following: 
"RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
(a) Examine regularly all questions relating to the security of Europe in the Mediterranean and 
thus foster a rapprochement of political and strategic concepts underlying the defence of the different 
member countries of Western European Union in the Mediterranean basin; 
(b) Follow the evolution of the situation in Spain and examine the conditions and possibilities for 
that country joining Western European Union when its internal regime conforms with the principles 
on which the modified Brussels Treaty is based;" 
Signed : Valleix, de Bruyne 
1. See 5th Sitting, 16th June 1976 (Amendment agreed to with the deletion of paragraph (b)). 
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Strategic mobility 
PREUMINARY REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT ORDER 
on strategic mobility 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
I. Military movements within the NATO area 
II. Military movements outside the NATO area 
Ill. Military capability and strategic mobility 
Conclusion 
19th May 1976 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Oritchley (Chairman); 
MM. Klepech, Dankert (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Averardi, 
Beauguitte (Substitute : Delorme), Bizet (Substitute : La 
Oombe), Boulloche, Buck, HaaB6, Hardy, Kempinaire (Substi-
tute: Breyne), Konen, de Koster (Substitute: Piket), 
Laforgia, Lemmrich, Menard (Substitute: de Montesquiou), 
Pawelczyk (Substitute : MUller), Pumilia, Reale, Richter, 
Riviere, Roper, Scholten, Schugens, Tanghe (Substitute : 
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Duvieusart), Urwin (Substitute: Whitehead), Vedovato. 
N. B. The namiJB of Repr68entativ68 who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
DOCUMENT 709 
Draft Order 
on strategic mobility 
The Assembly, 
Noting that the armed forces of the Soviet Union enjoy worldwide strategic mobility based 
on a modern navy and a large air transport fleet, complete with bases and facilities acquired through 
political penetration of key countries in all the oceans of the world ; 
Aware that it is of vital importance to the security of Europe that the armed forces of all 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance should have strategic mobility throughout the area of the Atlantic 
Alliance and to other areas where they exercise responsibilities, 
REQUESTS THE CoMMITTEE oN DEFENCE QuESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS 
To continue its study of the problems of strategic mobility and report at an early date. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Your Rapporteur was instructed to report 
on the material and political difficulties of 
securing strategic mobility, including refuelling 
facilities and overflying rights for air forces, 
and bunkering facilities and rights of passage 
for warships, both within the NATO area and 
worldwide. 
2. Preliminary enquiries have revealed no col-
lected body of information on arrangements for 
moving military forces which are largely made 
by the foreign ministries and movements control 
departments of ministries of defence in the 
member countries. The present report is therefore 
an interim progress report, because more time is 
required to collect all the relevant information. 
3. The subject covers many issues which are 
being debated in the framework of negotiations 
on the law of the sea, the next session of the 
United Nations conference being due to open on 
2nd August. It is not only a possible universal 
agreement on a twelve-mile territorial sea, with 
its impact on many international straits, that 
could affect the movement of forces, the impli-
cations of an even larger exclusive economic 
zone have also to be borne in mind. Arrange-
ments for international movement of forces are 
of close concern to NATO countries both for the 
movement of forces within the NATO area, 
whether on exercises for training purposes or as 
reinforcements in a crisis (and there appear to 
be no uniform arrangements for the passage of 
allied warships or military aircraft among the 
NATO countries), as well as to enable member 
countries to be able to deploy forces outside the 
NATO area in the parts of the world where the 
Soviet Union and its allies are deploying con-
siderable military force - the Indian Ocean and 
Southern Africa are particular cases at the 
present time. 
4. Your Rapporteur proposes to study in 
particular the following aspects of strategic 
mobility. To provide an information basis for 
Chapters I, 11 and Ill below, he is preparing a 
questionnaire for circulation to ministries of 
defence of the allied countries. 
I. Military movements within the NATO area 
5. The report will study existing requirements 
for military movements within the NATO area, 
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including deployment of forces to battle posi-
tions ; special commitments such as the air and 
land components of ACE mobile force ; the 
movements of other joint forces such as the 
standing naval forces Atlantic and Channel, the 
naval on-call force Mediterranean ; the move-
ment of troops, aircraft, etc., to training areas 
outside their own country ; arrangements 
required for the movement of reinforcements in 
an emergency. The report will attempt to show 
the diversity of existing arrangements between 
different NATO countries and recommend 
suitable standardised arrangements which should 
desirably be agreed upon by all NATO countries. 
U. Military movements outside the NATO 
area 
6. The report will discuss the requirement and 
facilities which exist for moving military forces 
by air or sea to other countries of the world, 
where member countries of the Alliance have 
defence commitments, or where it may be 
desirable that member countries should be 
enabled to deploy military forces. The Middle 
East, the Indian Ocean and the African con-
tinent will be examined as well as the possible 
contribution of contingents to United Nations 
peacekeeping forces. A relatively small number 
of countries can provide the key for transit 
arrangements for access to these areas. 
M. Military capability and strategic mobility 
7. The report will examine the existing 
capabilities of Soviet and allied forces to deploy 
in various parts of the world, including air 
transport capability ; the range and autonomy 
of naval forces ; amphibious capabilities -
provided for example by helicopter carriers and 
landing ships. 
Conclusion 
8. A definitive report will be submitted as 
soon as the necessary information has been 
assembled. In the draft order attached to this 
interim progress report the Committee asks the 
Assembly to note the importance of the subject 
and to request the Committee to pursue its study 
and report back. 
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RepUes of the Council to Recommendations 273 to 283 
RECOMMENDATION 273 1 
on Westem Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance 
- consideration of current problems 2 
The Assembly, 
14th June 1976 
Considering that, however Europe's defence may be organised, the Atlantic Alliance remains the 
essential guarantee of European security ; 
Noting with interest the views expressed by the Commission of the European Communities in its 
report on European union of 26th June 1975 concerning the defence responsibilities of the European union; 
Recalling that the WEU Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with defence respon-
sibilities ; 
Underlining that accession to the modified Brussels Treaty is still open in particular to any country 
called upon to take part in a European union ; 
Noting that "the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives is fully empowered to 
exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty" and that "the Council are at present discussing 
the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the stan-
dardisation of armaments in Europe" (Reply to Recommendation 266); 
Considering the Council's refusal to reply to questions put by members of the Assembly on nuclear 
strategy and NATO defence plans to be contrary to normal parliamentary democratic procedure and conse-
quently unacceptable (Written Questions 158 and 159), 
REOOII:IMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Implement in the framework of its responsibilities the principles defined in Resolution 55 of the 
Assembly, and in particular : 
(a) ensure that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are applied in full until such time 
as the European union has the necessary powers and means of action to exercise defence res-
ponsibilities ; 
(b) maintain all its activities as long as they have not been attributed by treaty to the institutions 
of the union ; 
2. Ensure that no member country enters into any international undertaking liable to limit its parti-
cipation in a European union with responsibilities covering external policy and defence matters ; 
3. Explore and implement here and now the possibilities afforded by the modified Brussels Treaty, 
particularly in the field of arms policy ; 
4. Consider forthwith how to make truly European bodies responsible for preparing a defence policy 
to be implemented by the forces of the member States ; 
5. Invite the European Council, as an organ of the EEC, to consult the WEU Assembly on any plans 
it may draw up concerning the defence of Europe. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty.First Ordinary 
Session (9th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Leynen on behalf of the General Affairs Committ~ 
(Document 680). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 273 
1. The Council are aware that they have a. continuing responsibility to examine problems of solidarity 
and defence arising for European countries. At the same time, it is their view that when these problems 
are studied, progress towards the unification of Europe should be taken into account. In this context the 
Council recall paragraph 9 of the Ottawa declaration, with which they are in full agreement. They reaffirm 
the validity of the modified Brussels Treaty, the provisions of which are binding on member States, and 
constantly follow its application with care. In this connection, the Council are of the opinion that close 
consideration should be given to the recent proposals on the establishment of a European union and in 
particular to those relating to the long-term prospects for achieving a common defence policy as a logical 
completion of the union. 
2. The Council and the member governments of WEU in their international policy are constantly guided 
by the principle that no member country should accept any undertaking liable to limit their participation 
in the process of the unification of Europe. 
3 and 4. Defence problems are a major concern of the Council and the modified Brussels Treaty which 
commits the member States to come to each other's assistance in the event of aggression forms a. fund-
amental element in the security system of Europe. The Council therefore attach great importance to the 
application of the provisions of the treaty and of the protocol relating to the levels of member States' 
forces and armaments. In the case of armaments policy, the Council will continue to follow closely and 
to facilitate all work in progress on the standardisation and interoperability of defence equipment which 
is carried out in WEU and other competent bodies. 
5. The problem of European security is of fundamental importance and of immediate concern. The 
subject may come up for consideration in the framework of the Nine and it is to be hoped that when such 
matters are examined, account will also be taken of ideas and work originating outside the Community. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1976. 
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RECOMMENDATION 274 1 
on the European aeronautical industry 2 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the action programme for the European aeronautical sector submitted by the Commission 
of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers ; 
Likewise welcoming the activities of the European Civil Aviation Conference, the association of 
European airlines and the Association Europeenne des Constructeurs de Materiel Aerospatial ; 
Aware of the formation of the Group of Six by the main European aircraft manufacturers; 
Regretting that the range of Eurocontrol's activities is being diminished, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Call upon member countries to recognise: 
l. That it is essential to ensure the unified civil and military aerospace manufacturing and user market 
without which divergent national policies will continue to prevail ; 
2. That a European military aircraft procurement agency as proposed by the Assembly and later by 
the Commission requires the juridical basis of the modified Brussels Treaty on which the Standing Armaments 
Committee is also based; 
3. That the weakening of Eurocontrol would be detrimental to Europe and that the organisation should 
be developed in accordance with its Charter and that there is no point in defining European air space if 
a European organisation which is working effectively is downgraded to the task of co-ordinating national 
air traffic services. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary 
Session (13th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 691). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 274 
1. The Council, like the Assembly, welcome the activities of those European bodies within which manu-
facturers and users consult together, with regard to their actions in the field of aviation. 
On the military side, the Council would welcome any efforts designed to create in Europe a single 
military market which would benefit manufacturers and users equally. 
Such a development would improve the prospects of the European aeronautical industry. Duplication 
of work should, however, be avoided where other European organisations are engaged in similar activities. 
The European programme group, set up in Rome on 2nd February 1976, is competent to deal with 
the entire field of armaments co-operation. The European programme group can therefore deal with matters 
relating to the military aeronautical industry. 
2. H a military aircraft procurement agency were to be established, it would be necessary to consider 
very carefully beforehand how the modified Brussels Treaty might be affected by the setting up of such 
an agency. 
3. The Council do not see themselves in a position at present to state their views on Eurocontrol whose 
importance is rightly emphasised by the Assembly, since the problems involved in the further development 
of that organisation vary greatly among the individual member countries. Moreover, the future of this 
organisation is at present under consideration (since, in fact, the convention by which Eurocontrol was 
set up terminates in 1980). It is therefore premature to express a view on this point. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th May 1976. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 275 1 
on United States-European co-operation 
in advanced technology 2 
DOCUMENT 710 
Aware of the political and technological necessity for Western Europe and the United States to 
co-operate in such fields of advanced technology as space, nuclear energy, oceanography, computers and 
electronics ; 
Conscious of the fact that the Soviet Union has a highly-developed industry for civil and military 
products of advanced technology which makes it the greatest power on the Eurasian continent ; 
Satisfied that joint European-American space ventures undertaken to date have been successful 
and that the Spacelab project is progressing smoothly ; 
Fearing that the space shuttle flight will constitute the end of the European Space Agency's parti-
cipation in the Spacelab programme ; 
Fearing, further, that in the absence of new major space programmes in the United States or Europe 
there will be no further activities for this aBBociation ; 
Considering the budgetary restrictions in both the United States and Western Europe; 
Regretting that in many other fields of advanced technology Western Europe has not organised 
itself so well as in space matters and that co-operation with the United States has therefore proved to be 
far more complicated, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNcn.. 
1. Mter reviewing the present policies and varying approaches of member countries, promote and 
develop an overall European policy in advanced technology in order to guarantee Western Europe's place 
in the world and foster fruitful co-operation with the United States ; 
2. Give active consideration to Europe's need for an oceanographic authority of its own and arrange 
for such a body to be formed in the framework of an existing European organisation ; 
3. In liaison with the European Space Agency, join the United States Government in working out 
an advanced space programme for future joint payload development for the Spacelab and the shuttle. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary 
Session (14th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 687). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 275 
1. The Council agree with the Assembly on the need to seek an overall policy designed to 
guarantee Western Europe's place in the world and to foster fruitful co-operation with the United 
States on an equal footing. 
European policies on advanced technologies are co-ordinated through several existing inter-
national bodies such as the EEC and the European Space Agency. European policies are already 
formulated through these organisations which provide the opportunity for strengthening Europe's 
technological base and co-ordinating with other States. 
The work done in these various organisations represents a not inconsiderable effort in the 
direction sought by the Assembly. 
2. The Assembly's recommendation has been forwarded to the appropriate departments in member 
States. 
The Council wish to point out, however, that suitable machinery for the regular co-ordination 
of oceanographic research between European countries already exists within the EEC (particularly 
the Scientific and Technical Research Committee) and the group on co-operation in scientific and 
technical research (including nineteen Western European countries) and is capable of being further 
developed. 
Moreover, at international level, a programme of ocea'nographic studies has been launched 
by NATO in its Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society; several member countries of 
WEU are taking part. Finally, several European countries are members of the International Council 
for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), of which the United States is also a member. 
3. Among the tasks entrusted to the European Space Agency when it was set up was that of 
co-ordinating member States' space policies and programmes. The Agency is carrying out this task 
in full agreement with its member States, which include six of the WEU member countries. The 
Director-General of the Agency is in constant touch with the competent United States authorities, 
and, in particular, with NASA, for the purpose of implementing the Spacelab programme as at 
present laid down and ultimately of establishing permanent co-operation based on the practical 
results of the first joint space experiments. 
The Spacelab arrangement between European Governments and the European Space Agency 
provides for further studies on how to develop Spacelab principles a.nd technology after the first 
flight (projected for 1980). Therefore it would be premature to apply more than preliminary thinking 
to the problem raised in the recommendation. 
In conclusion, the fear expressed in the preamble that European participation in the shuttle 
system might cease would appear to be unfounded. It is true that budgetary restrictions in the 
various States necessitate strict economy, but implementation of the programme should not be 
threatened. The sharing of work on the payload programme between the participating countries is an 
important contribution to ensuring viability of the system and to concentrating the available finan-
cial resources where they are of most use. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1976. 
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on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe 11 
The Assembly, 
Hoping that the Final Act of the Helsinki conference may lead to considerable progress in detente, 
understanding and co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe ; 
Noting furthermore that the principles set out in that text concern relations as a whole between all 
the signatory countries ; 
Deploring that the positions adopted by the Soviet Union and other member countries of the Warsaw 
Pact in the months following the conference indicate an excessively restrictive interpretation of certain 
principles laid down in the Final Act ; 
Underlining the need to reach early agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction in the level 
of forces of the two alliances in Central Europe ; 
Considering that such a reduction should not result only from a compromise between the United 
States and the Soviet Union but must take account of the interests of all the European countries ; 
Considering further that the balance of military forces remains the principal guarantee of security and 
peace in Europe for the foreseeable future, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Ensure the maintenance of continuing consultations between its members on all matters raised by 
the application of the Final Act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ; 
2. Ensure furthermore that any negotiations on force reductions do not lead to a weakening of Western 
European security and the creation of further imbalance in that area ; 
3. Ask member governments to define, for instance in the framework of nine-power consultations, a 
joint position for its members on matters raised by the third basket of the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe ; 
4. In no event accept any principle contrary to that of the sovereign equality of States defined in the 
Final Act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ; 
5. Ensure that the quadripartite agreement on Berlin is strictly applied. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(14th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mrs. von Bothmer on behalf of the General .Affairs 
Committee (Document 683). 
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1. The maintenance of continuing consultations between members of WEU on all matters raised 
by the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE is assured by the regular meetings of a 
working group set up for this purpose within the framework of the political co-operation of the 
Nine, as well as through the discussions on the subject within the North Atlantic Council and its 
committees. 
2. Those member governments of WEU which are involved in negotiations on mutual balanced 
force reductions in Central Europe can state that they have consistently refrained from any step 
during these negotiations that could lead to a weakening of Western European security and will 
continue to do so in the future. 
3. Member countries will insist on the application of the recommendations in the Final Act of 
the CSCE, which formed part of the "third basket". They intend to pursue the objectives which 
were theirs in this sphere in the course of the CSCE negotiations, concerting their policies and 
harmonising and co-ordinating their positions. 
4. The principles set forth in the "declaration on principles'' guiding relations between partici-
pating States are all of primary significance and each of them will be interpreted taking into 
account the others. 
There exists no intention on the part of member States of WEU to adopt any position or 
accept any interpretation contrary to any of the principles listed in the declaration. 
5. The Council share the Assembly's view regarding strict compliance with and the full appli-
cation of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1976. 
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on second-generation nuclear reactors 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering the need to continue research and development for peaceful purposes in respect of advan-
ced nuclear reactors ; 
Aware of the tremendous financial outlay required for the successful conclusion of this research 
and development ; 
Recognising the vast industrial complex required for the construction of these nuclear reactors 
and power plants ; 
Conscious of the political and economic advantages deriving from the installation of multinational 
regional nuclear fuel centres ; 
Aware of the advantages of such installations for better guaranteeing peace, security and control 
in respect of nuclear materials, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge the member governments 
I. To formulate a long-term common nuclear energy policy, act immediately on decisions already taken 
in the Community and the OECD, and define the extent of co-operation with the United States; 
2. To promote the further development of the European nuclear power industry to meet the increased 
requirements for nuclear power plants on the world market ; 
3. To make known in national parliaments and European assemblies their opinions on the United 
States proposal for multinational regional nuclear fuel centres. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary 
Session (14th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 686). 
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1. As regards the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the member countries of the Euro-
pean Community are pursuing a. common policy based on the treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community. Decisions taken by the OECD Council or the Steering Committee of the Nuclear 
Energy Agency of the OECD are carried out by member countries with due regard to their obligations 
under the Euratom treaty. Co-operation between the member countries and the United States of America. 
and between the Community and the United States has been resting for years now on the basis of 
co-operation treaties. Under the present circumstances and in the light of experience, the member govern-
ments deem the extent of that co-operation to be adequately defined. 
2. The member governments have for many years been promoting the further development of the 
nuclear power industry so as to meet the growing requirements of the rest of the world as well. Firms in 
the individual countries are perfectly capable of meeting the requirements for nuclear power plants on 
the world market. 
3. The United States proposal to operate fuel centres under multinational direction and at regional 
level must be welcomed as a. possible further step towards diminishing the dangers of nuclear prolifera-
tion. But it also raises a number of political, ecological, legal and management problems which need to 
be closely examined. The IAEA has begun a study on the question of fuel centres. As soon as its findings 
are available, and as soon as the debate that has arisen in the United States on this set of problems has 
produced some clarification, the member governments will be able to express well-grounded views on the 
United States proposal both to the national parliaments and the Assembly. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th May 1976. 
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(i) Aware that the undiminished military capability of the Warsaw Pact countries, in particular the 
continued modernisation and world-wide operations of the Soviet fleet, call for an adequate defence effort 
based on a viable economy ; 
(ii) Believing that NATO and the European Community are the twin institutions through which the 
countries of WEU, by pooling their resources, can retain their freedom and secure decent living standards 
for their people ; 
(iii) Believing further that the strength of NATO and the European Community lies in the freely-expressed 
support of the peoples of the exclusively pluralist democracies that compose them, and that membership 
of countries with totalitarian regimes should not be tolerated in the future ; 
(iv) Expressing its support for the present government in Portugal as a first step towards a fully demo-
cratic government, stressing the importance of Portugal's membership of NATO and its contribution to the 
defence of Europe, and expressing the hope that close links can now be established between Portugal and the 
European Community ; 
(v) Welcoming the growing public expression of demands for political freedoms in Spain, and believing 
that the Spanish people must shortly take their place in NATO and the European Community, to both of 
which they can make a valuable contribution ; 
(vi) Recognising that formal defence agreements between NATO or the member countries and Spain 
could provide ephemeral practical advantages, but believing that any such agreements concluded before 
the emergence of democracy in Spain would so alienate public opinion both in the NATO countries and in 
Spain that the very existence of the Alliance and any possibility of lasting future agreement with Spain 
would be jeopardised, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNOIL 
l. State clearly that although, unlike the Soviet Union, the western democracies will never intervene 
by force to change the internal regimes in any country, it is of importance to them that democracy should 
flourish in all countries that are naturally part of Western Europe; 
2. Urge member countries to ensure through their representatives in the European Community and in 
NATO: 
(a) that no formal agreements are concluded with totalitarian regimes in Western Europe; 
(b) that financial, economic and technical help is provided for Portugal with a view to encouraging 
progress towards a truly democratic pluralistic parliamentary system of government ; 
(c) that an examination of the problems of the Alliance's naval forces command structure in the 
IBERLANT and NAVSOUTH areas be made; 
(d) that diplomatic advice be provided from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary 
Session (14th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandwn: see the Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Docwnent 682). 
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1. It is the guiding principle of the western democracies in their foreign rela.tiona not to intervene 
in the internal affairs of other countries. They have at all times adhered to this principle and, whenever 
they have deemed it advisable, have incorporated it in the text of agreements and decla.ra.tiona governing 
their international rela.tiona. At the same time, this attitude cannot conatitute an obstacle to, or be regarded 
as in any way inconaistent with, any expressiona of sympathy by the western democracies for trends of 
opinion now emerging in favour of a. pluralist democracy in countries where it has not yet been fully 
established. 
2. (a) The Council welcome developments which have taken place or are becoming apparent in those 
Western European States previously under authoritarian regimes. The Assembly's recommendation must 
be conaidered in the light of these developments which they recognise are not the same in each country. 
(b) In October of last year, the member countries of the European Economic Community approved 
emergency economic aid to Portugal through the European Investment Bank, to the extent of 180 million 
units of account including interest rebate. This Community aid does not exclude the possibility of addi-
tional bilateral aid. The main purpose of the emergency EEC aid is to help Portugal through a difficult 
period in advance of the conclusion of negotia.tiona on additions to the EEC /Portugal free trade agreement. 
These additiona will include a. financial protocol. 
(c) Member nationa participating in the integrated military structure of NATO are satisfied that 
the NATO military authorities are conacious of the need to enaure that the military organisation remaina 
effective and efficient at all times. To this extent, the structure is under continuous review. 
(d) The North Atlantic Council and the Defence Planning Committee ensure that the NATO mili-
tary authorities are provided (through the Secretary-General and the international staff) with political 
and diplomatic guidance. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th May 1976. 
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on the International Institute for the Management of Technology 2 
The Assembly, 
Noting with regret the situation of the International Institute for the Management of Technology 
which was established in Milan in 1971; 
Considering this situation as a step back on the path of European collaboration and wishing to rescue 
as much as possible of this joint venture ; 
Conscious of the fact that Belgium, Denmark and Ireland have not signed the convention setting up 
the International Institute for the Management of Technology but participate in the European Council 
and that Austria, which is not a member of the European Council, has signed it, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Study, together with all the governments concerned, the possibility of using the institute's premises 
and other assets in Milan for alternative purposes in the interests of Europe ; 
2. Submit the findings of its study to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and eventually 
to the European Council for implementation. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary 
Session (14th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 685). 
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In the event of the International Institute for the Man.a.gement of Technology being wound up, a 
problem would arise concerning the future use of its premises and other assets in Milan. 
Member States are fully aware of this problem. The question of using these premises and assets for 
alternative purposes in the interests of Europe is at present under review within the Communities. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1976. 
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Considering that by their civilisation, culture and political, economic and social system, the Scan-
dinavian countries belong to Western Europe; 
Noting that economic, political and military factors imposed by the situation of Northern Europe 
now prevent these countries taking their place in a European union with responsibilities which include 
foreign policy and defence matters ; 
Considering that the European Community (which includes Denmark) ca.nnot wait for these countries 
to be in a position to take part in the undertaking before forming a union, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Consider, in the framework of its study on "the possibility that Western European Union might 
undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe", how countries 
of Northern Europe might be associated with this undertaking both in the Atlantic Alliance and in WEU ; 
2. Invite the Scandinavian countries to send observers to an ad hoc meeting to study any project for 
the joint production of armaments. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary 
Session (14th Sitting). 
2. Expl.ana.tory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Steel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 684). 
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Norway, Denmark and Iceland are members of the Atlantic Alliance and play a full part in 
discussions in the North Atlantic Council and in the Defence Planning Committee of matters relating to 
the procurement of defence equipment. In addition, Norway and Denmark are members of the Eurogroup 
and participate actively in its activities in the European defence procurement field. Furthermore, it is 
envisaged that additional work among European countries on this subject will take place in an independent 
group open to all the European members of the Alliance including, of course, its Northern European 
members. None of the Northern European countries, however, has so far expressed interest in any form 
of association with the activities of WEU. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th February 1976. 
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on European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Having considered the present situation of research, development and production in the field of 
armaments in the light of the report by its Defence Committee ; 
(ii) Informed of the important statements made to it in Paris on 5th December 1974 by Mr. Van Elslande, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, on a joint European armaments policy; 
(iii) Aware that, despite progress made in this field in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, for instance 
the principles on co-operation in the field of armaments laid down by Eurogroup on 23rd May 1972, new 
concrete possibilities exist, particularly among the member countries of WEU, for a decisive improvement in 
co-operation where the active collaboration of France would be a great advantage; 
(iv) Noting that the serious economic situation affecting most member countries of the Alliance and the 
ensuing budgetary difficulties have repercussions on the defence potential; 
(v) Underlining consequently the urgent need to rationalise the defence effort of all the member countries 
in order to avoid waste due to the multiplication of projects for weapons or weapons systems and the wide 
diversity of models produced for one and the same defence task ; 
(vi) Aware that, in view of the geographical situation of Europe, deterrence, if it is to be credible, a]so 
requires conventional forces and that national armed forces should be able to operate jointly to achieve 
a strong defence potential with chances of success ; 
(vii) Considering that a growing awareness is developing among governments, parliaments, public opinion 
and national and international groups and that a flow of ideas is developing which should allow the necessary 
measures to be taken in the framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance ; 
(viii) Aware of national interests in the field of armaments and their importance for security of employ-
ment, but convinced that they do not preclude either bilateral or multilateral co-operation and, on the 
contrary, make it appear far more rational; 
(ix) Noting the initiatives and suggestions from across the Atlantic seeking to establish new means of 
co-operation between the United States and the countries of Western Europe in the field of armaments; 
(x) Noting also the proposals made by the Commission of the European Communities in its report on 
European union dated 26th June 1975; 
(xi) Aware of the agreement in principle reached by the Defence Ministers of the European countries 
on 5th November 1975 to establish a European defence procurement secretariat open to all European mem-
bers of the Alliance, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
I. Recognise that the aims which member countries are committed to pursue in the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance on a basis of equal rights and obligations are : 
(a) to strengthen the defence potential of the Alliance as a whole, especially in Europe, so as to 
establish, in the face of the continuously increasing armaments of the Warsaw Pact, the balance 
of forces which is essential to the security of free Europe and the progress of East-West relations; 
(b) to maintain a technical potential in the countries of Western Europe and develop a competitive 
European armaments industry with sufficient means for research and production ; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary 
Session (14th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Lemmrich on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 689). 
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(c) to seek a better balance between the means available on both sides of the Atlantic and establish 
reciprocity in respect of the procurement and production of armaments ; 
(d) to promote a European identity and the idea of European union by implementing effective and 
lasting co-operation in the fields of research, development, production and logistics which are 
still a national responsibility and hence require governments to take decisions based on defence 
requirements and the joint interest of the Western European countries; 
2. Welcome the decision of the North Atlantic Council that, at its spring meeting, a special meeting 
should be held at ministerial level to study Atlantic and European co-operation in the field of armaments, 
and give it its full support ; 
3. (a) Take up on behalf of WEU the declaration on principles of equipment co-operation adopted on 
27th May 1972 by the Ministers of Defence of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom ; 
(b) Organise the development of new weapons allowing a high return to be ensured and economic 
solutions to be found ; 
(c) Establish within the Atlantic Alliance detailed political guidelines covering the following fields 
and take a decision on them : 
- harmonisation of military tactical concepts ; 
- definition of military requirements of the Alliance ; 
- alignment of equipment, calibres, fuel, etc., in order to ensure the interoperability of arms 
and equipment and improve logistics in the armed forces of the Alliance ; 
- the standardisation of future armaments and equipment programmes ; 
(d) Pay particular attention to the problem of destandardisation of armaments due to the prolifer-
ation of projects in each country and above all to the creation of new weapons systems accompanied by 
the use of older systems ; 
(e) Examine the means of reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee; 
4. Urge member governments : 
(a) with regard to research, development and production, to endorse fully the measures necessary 
for carrying out joint undertakings with as many partners as possible ; 
(b) to seek means to avoid the economy of a country being affected by giving up an armaments 
programme in favour of a joint undertaking ; to this end, consideration might be given to setting 
up a burden-sharing body ; this should be decided with other appropriate bodies ; 
(c) to draw up a list of programmes for armaments which might be procured jointly both by European 
countries and by the North American allies; WEU should launch this idea and the decision 
should be taken with the Atlantic Alliance ; 
(d) to give active consideration to the practical possibilities in Western Europe of establishing in 
the long term a two-way transatlantic flow of trade in armaments, ensuring that this becomes 
possible only when the countries of Western Europe co-operate in the development and produc-
tion of armaments as real partners carrying the same weight as the United States ; 
(e) to pay particular attention to the export of armaments to non-member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance and endeavour to ensure an early settlement of outstanding questions; 
5. Report to the Assembly on the results of its study on the possibility of giving WEU additional tasks 
connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe ; 
6. Give absolute priority at political level to problems of co-operation in the field of armaments and the 
standardisation of armaments and not become discouraged in the short or long term by the difficulties 
involved; 
7. Transmit the present recommendation to the North Atlantic Council. 
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1. The rapidly increasing strength of the Warsaw Pact's ground, naval and air forces, which exceed 
discernible defence requirements, compels the member countries of the Alliance, and hence the members 
of WEU, to maintain and improve the efficiency of their armed forces. Only a balance of power between 
East and West can guarantee the security of all members of the Alliance, in particular the European 
countries, and make possible a policy of relaxation of tension aimed at stability. 
Since all member countries of the Alliance have an equal interest in security it must be the duty 
of each to make an adequate contribution towards meeting the requirements of the Alliance. 
In the long term, the countries of Western Europe will be able to make an effective defence contri-
bution only if they have the means and capability of equipping their forces in keeping with modern standards. 
Special importance should therefore be attached to building and maintaining a sound and sophisticated 
armaments industry in Europe. 
This industry can only survive and expand if it is competitive and has sufficient means for research 
and production. Its survival further supposes a better balance between the procurement and production 
of armaments on both sides of the Atlantic. Smooth co-operation within Europe in the field of armaments 
will moreover provide impulses for further European unification. 
2. The WEU Council support any actions which promote co-operation in the field of armaments and 
further interoperability within the Alliance and particularly among the European members of that body. 
3. The Council recall that guidelines for equipment collaboration were adopted by the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors of NATO in February 1973 as a basis for its work. 
The Council welcome the results achieved at the first meetings of the European programme group 
for co-operation in the field of armaments held in Rome and consider them to be a step in the right direction. 
Avoiding destandardisation will be as important as promoting standardisation. The phasing-out 
of old weapons systems should be co-ordinated, so that the foundation is laid for joint new procurements 
on a more rational basis. 
4. The problems involved in greater standardisation and co-operation in the field of armaments are 
being dealt with in WEU, NATO, the Eurogroup, and now also in the programme group for European 
co-operation in the field of armaments. All governments in the Alliance are at present seeking to participate 
as far as possible in joint multilateral projects in which national interests will also have to be taken into 
consideration. It is of great importance, therefore, that compensation mechanisms should be developed 
to take account of national interests on a case by case basis. 
The programmes for armaments which are at present being planned and developed by the various 
members of the Alliance are discussed in the competent bodies. There is at this juncture no need for a 
new special list to be drawn up. 
The member governments of the Alliance start from the assumption that a two-way transatlantic 
flow of trade in armaments cannot be established until the European NATO countries are able to bid on 
favourable cost-benefit terms. The European countries will seek to achieve this by undertaking joint projects. 
5. The Council have instructed the Standing Armaments Committee, as a task for the immediate 
future, to produce a detailed outline programme for a study which, in the form of a descriptive analysis 
of the situation of the armaments industries in member countries, would help to give a clearer insight 
into the industrial and economic implications of the standardisation of armaments. 
6. Since co-operation and standardisation in the field of armaments lead to a strengthening of the 
defence potential and rationalisation of procurement, the governments of all member countries attach 
particular importance to these activities. The competent political bodies are aware of the difficulties involved 
in co-operation in the field of armaments but will not let themselves be discouraged by delays or temporary 
failure. 
7. The Council have forwarded the text of this recommendation to the North Atlantic Council, as 
requested. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th June 1976. 
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on the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on 10th November 1975 2 
The Assembly, 
Underlining the importance for European security of maintaining peace throughout the Mediterranean 
basin; 
Alarmed by the threats to peace arising from the recent increase in hostilities in the Middle East 
between various national and religious communities ; 
Noting that the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on lOth 
November 1975 can but contribute to the deterioration of the situation in that area, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Ensure that its members consult each other in the framework of WEU, without prejudice to their 
action in the framework of the European Community or the Council of Europe, in order to define a joint 
policy in the United Nations and prevent any sectarian use of the second decade for action to combat 
racism; 
2. Promote the development of economic, cultural and political co-operation between Western Europe 
and all the Eastern Mediterranean countries with a view to helping these countries progressively to terminate 
their division into opposing blocs. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Tweuty-First Ordinary 
Session (14th Sitting). 
2. Draft recommendation submitted by Sir John Rodgers on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 693). 
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The Council wish to point out that close co-operation was established in the United Nations between 
the nine member countries of the EEC when the General Assembly voted on Resolution 3379 on Zionism. 
Considering the equation of Zionism with racism unacceptable, these nine countries, which all voted against 
the resolution, will seek to ensure that the adoption of this text does not jeopardise the legitimate struggle 
against racism and racial discrimination, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and of the 1965 International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. In so 
doing, they will seek to prevent abuse of the decade for action to combat racism. They also agreed to hold 
close consultations with a view to adopting a joint position whenever reference is made to Resolution 3379 
in connection with the work of the United Nations. 
Member countries attach great importance to the early achievement of a negotiated settlement in 
the Middle East. Aware that the development of economic, cultural and political co-operation between 
Western Europe and all the Eastern Mediterranean countries could have a favourable influence on the 
course of events in the region, the Council are following attentively the efforts which the EEC is making, 
as part of an overall Mediterranean approach, to establish close economic relations with the countries 
concerned. In May 1975, for example, an agreement was signed between the EEC and Israel; other agree-
ments have been concluded with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Negotiations are also in progress with 
a number of Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Syria and Jordan. 
Finally, the Euro-Arab dialogue, bringing together the EEC countries and the members of the Arab 
League, is developing satisfactorily and the two sides have already begun work on the practical definition 
of areas of co-operation. This is of general political significance as is demonstrated by the joint decision 
to convene the first meeting of the General Commission for the dialogue (to be held in May). 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1976. 
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on air forces on the central front 2 
The Assembly, 
Aware that both organisational shortcomings and the lack of interoperability in equipment still 
prevent the aircraft now available to allied commanders on the central front from being used to optimum 
effect; 
Welcoming, however, the establishment of the new command Allied Air Forces Central Europe 
which has already resulted in some organisational improvement, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments, through their representatives on the North Atlantic Council: 
1. To recall the provisions of the resolution to implement the Final Act of the London Conference, 
adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 22nd October 1954, which "confirms that the powers exercised 
by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in peacetime, extend not only to the organisation into an 
effective integrated force of the forces placed under him but also to their training;" to ensure that this 
resolution is effectively applied, in respect of both training and command integration, especially to ensure 
that the decision of the Defence Planning Committee of 14th June 1974 to establish a new air force command 
structure headed by Commander AAFCE is applied at all levels ; 
2. To foster arrangements, bilateral if necessary, to make ~ll appropriate airfields available to assigned 
and earmarked central front air forces ; 
3. To call for substantial improvement in the interoperability of assigned and earmarked air forces 
on the central front, the further development of common tactical concepts and, in the longer term, the 
establishment of an integrated logistics system ; 
4. To give urgent consideration to the multilateral financing of improved communications and appro-
priate early warning systems. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary 
Session (14th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandwn: see the Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Docwnent 690). 
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The question forming the subject of Recommendation 283 is primarily a matter for the integrated 
organs of the Alliance. For their part, the member countries of the Council of WEU which participate in 
the NATO integrated system recognise that the establishment of the new Command Allied Air Forces 
Central Europe is a valuable measure in the continuing implementation of the Final Act of the London 
Conference 1954. These countries will do all in their power to ensure the success of the new structure. 
The question of the availability of all appropriate airfields to assigned and earmarked central front 
air forces has already been the subject of bilateral discussion in relation to reinforcements, and the require-
ment for airfield availability is kept under review by the air force planning staffs of the member nations 
concerned in conjunction with SACEUR. 
The member countries of the Council which are part of the integrated structure of NATO generally 
support the call for improvement in interoperability, the further development of common tactical concepts 
and the establishment of an integrated logistics system. It must be recognised, however, that total uni-
formity is not always desirable. A suitable mixture of operating concepts could have the advantage of 
creating additional problems for an aggressor. 
As regards full interoperability, that is, the ability to operate aircraft of one Allied Tactical Air 
Force from the airfields of another, the WEU countries which are part of the integrated structure of NATO 
recognise that this must be a longer term aim and requires a much greater degree of standardisation. The 
same is true of an integrated logistics system. In view of current financial stringency these countries believe 
that it would be wrong to spend large sums of money pre-stocking Allied Tactical Air Force airfields with 
the stores required by another ATAF for the sake of a short-term solution. 
Finally, while agreeing that there is an urgent need for improved communication and early-warning 
systems, the countries concerned are aware that there are technical and financial problems to be overcome. 
These are currently being studied in NATO. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th February 1976. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the r8le of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today 
The Assembly, 
Recalling the decisive role constantly played by the United States (and Canada) in ensuring security 
and peace in Western Europe ; 
Considering the maintenance and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance to be the only military guarantee 
of lasting peace in Europe ; 
Considering that its maintenance and cohesion require continuous and frank consultations in many 
fields between the European and American members of the Alliance ; 
Considering that it is the duty of the European and American members to help each other effectively 
avoiding any policy or undertaking contrary to the principles of democracy; 
Considering that since the second world war member States of the Atlantic Alliance have not 
always managed to fulfil the obligations to adhere to such principles; 
Recalling, finally, that next to the alliance for the necessary military defence a genuinely compre-
hensive policy for security and peace should consist of relevant and fully adequate components in the 
field of social-economic solidarity between the rich and the poor parts of the world population, as well as 
in the field of elimination of all discrimination on grounds of race, colour or creed, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
l. Encourage its members to initiate or consistently afford their support in the appropriate frame-
works to the following policies which are essential components of a comprehensive security policy : 
- necessary military defence and mutual, balanced and controlled disarmament ; 
- defence and the promotion of parliamentary democracy ; 
- respect for the equivalence of men and peoples ; 
- recognition of the fact that all men are entitled to a fair share of this earth's wealth and its 
possibilities of well-being ; 
2. Constantly remind its partners in the Atlantic Alliance and elsewhere (notably in the OECD) of 
these guidelines ; 
3. Ensure that NATO, like the Council of Europe, WEU and the European Communities, groups only 
countries with democratic regimes ; 
4. Give the Assembly a fair assessment of relevant difficulties and dangers facing the Atlantic Alliance 
as such or individual member countries and, if possible, the means for meeting them. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The subject is a mer a boire. This paper 
cannot contain more than a rather superficial 
and necessarily subjective choice out of innumer-
able facts and trends, relevant to the relationship 
between Western Europe and the United States 
(and Canada). It is bound to be controversial, 
political, non-scientific. 
2. History has once again made it abundantly 
clear that the two sides of the Atlantic cannot 
survive as parliamentary democracies without 
some sort of alliance between them. Whatever 
the differences - and there are many, some of 
them deeply rooted - they have somehow enough 
in common in terms of civilisation, interest and 
potentialities to bring them together every time 
a vital crisis of worldwide proportions threatens 
mankind. And as we have been living since the 
second world war under the aegis of "one world 
or none", such crises will remain with us for 
a long time to come. By our own vices and our 
own failures of vision and by those of others. 
3. Given the situation in the world today, it is 
also simply common sense that we should all 
require an institutionalised and lasting Atlantic 
Alliance ; of course not a rigid but a flexible 
one. An honest paper about the relationship 
between the United States/Canada and Western 
Europe should therefore be based on solidarity 
between them and the conviction that they belong 
together. 
4. The realisation of interdependence and the 
conviction of solidarity should by definition 
include frank exchanges on all relevant subjects 
and topics between the members. Relevant differ-
ences of opinion and outlook about actions, state-
ments or policies within the Alliance should be 
discussed among the members without endanger-
ing the Alliance as such. The same is true of 
certain things or procedures in one country or a 
group of countries that are not understandable 
for the others. 
5. When one of the member countries has to 
deal with a problem situation that threatens to 
become an obsession and make government and 
people blind to objective analysis, fellow members 
of the Alliance should feel free to start a dialogue 
without fear lest it be taken as an unfriendly 
gesture. 
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6. For example, the Rapporteur is thankful 
to the United States for the fact that, in the late 
forties (Indonesia) and again in the early sixties 
(West Irian), they made it clear to the Nether-
lands authorities that military action, however 
good their intentions might have been initially, 
had to stop in the interest of all concerned. 
11. World War I and World War II 
(i) World War I: 1914-1918 
7. During the first world war, the central 
powers included Bulgaria, (imperial) Germany, 
(imperial) Austria, Hungary, Turkey. Allied and 
associated powers included Belgium, Brazil, 
China, Cuba, France, Italy, Montenegro, Portu-
gal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, United Kingdom, 
United States (since April 1917 : resumption by 
Germany of unrestricted U-boat warfare) ; 
Soviet Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria and 
Turkey concluded successively an armistice before 
the allied powers proper signed the armistice of 
November 1918 and the peace treaty of 
Versailles 1 in June 1919. The treaty provided 
for the creation of the League of Nations. A 
guarantee was also given by the United States 
and United Kingdom to France in the event of 
an unprovoked German attack. These factors 
were the reason for the United States Senate 
refusing to ratify (August 1918). Germany lost 
its colonies and became a republic. The peace 
conditions were disastrous for German economic 
recovery ; mainly because of the influence of 
Clemenceau and Lloyd George : President Wilson 
was forced to accept many compromises, deviat-
ing from the principles laid down in his 
"Fourteen Points" of January 1918. Keynes 
("Economic consequences of the peace" 1919) 
criticised the reparations clause (132,000 million 
gold Reichsmark) 2 as a disaster. 
8. The Battle of Verdun (February-December 
1916, 300 days and nights) employed three-
quarters of the entire French army (Petain) ; the 
two sides lost 700,000 men each during this battle 
alone. The Germans lost, as they did the battle 
of the Marne in 1914. 
1. By the "peace of Versailles" of 1783 (Britain, France, 
Spain and the United States), the United States was 
recognised as an independent State. 
2. i.e. about $ 500,000 million at current value. 
(ii) World War 11: 1939-1946 
9. Seven axis powers (Nazi Germany, imperial 
Japan, fascist Italy, etc.) against forty-nine allies 
(France, United Kingdom, United States, USSR, 
China, etc.). The axis powers were defeated. 
10. During this war the allies decided to form 
the United Nations Organisation (San Francisco, 
April-June 1945) ; on 28th April 1945, Mussolini 
was killed by partisans and on 30th April 1945 
Hitler was dead. 
11. On 7th May 1945 the German forces 
surrendered finally to General Eisenhower. 
12. After the first two atomic bombs in history 
(dropped by the United States on 6th August 
1945 on Hiroshima and 9th August 1945 on 
Nagasaki ; 106,000 killed, 110,000 injured) Japan 
surrendered on 2nd September 1945. 
13. The Government of France concluded an 
armistice with Nazi Germany on 22nd June 1940 
and with Italy on the 24th : on the 16th Marshal 
Petain had replaced Paul Reynaud as head of 
the French administration, the so-called Vichy-
Government. The Free French carried on with 
the war against the axis : leader General Charles 
de Gaulle. 
14. Eight European countries on the allied side 
(now members of one or more western alliances) 
lost a little less than 2,000,000 people (military + 
civilians), about 1.5% of their populations (1940 
figures) ; six European countries on the allied 
side (now communists) lost about 25,000,000 
people, approximately 8 % of their combined 
populations (1940 figures). For the USSR alone, 
the number is estimated at 20,000,000 (almost 
10 %) . The relatively largest toll of human lives 
was paid by Poland, more than 5,500,000 were 
killed, more than 10 % of its 1940 population. Of 
course the most terrible massacre was that of 
Jews all over Europe by the Hitler regime ; 
four or five million (i.e. about 75 % of the 
Jewish population of Europe in 1940) were 
slaughtered for no other reason than that they 
were Jews. The United States : 230,000 killed. 
China : 26,000,000 killed ( 4.5 %) . Casualties on 
the axis side : Germany 3,500,000 (5 %) ; Italy 
575,000 (4.5 %) ; Japan 2,500,000 (3 %). 
15. Why are these facts included in this paper ? 
In the first place more and more parlia-
mentarians are of a generation with no personal 
experience of war, occupation, prison, concentra-
tion camps and torture. But, more important 
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even, many of the older generations no longer 
realise acutely enough what hell it was, how 
many casualties there were, what a burden the 
war effort was and the price it cost. 
16. Rationally speaking, Hitler would have won 
if he had not attacked the USSR, and if the 
United Kingdom had not stood its ground during 
the Battle of Britain in 1940. Or perhaps even 
if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbour; 
although the massive United States lend-lease 
operation before Pearl Harbour might have been 
an indication that it would not have allowed the 
axis to win in the end anyway. 
Ill. The post-war phenomenon 
17. The post-war phenomenon is the fact that 
in a very few years the defeated (axis) powers 
in Western Europe and Japan were accepted 
in western alliances as practically equal ptartners 
and had instituted parliamentary democracies. 
The lessons of Versailles and the period between 
the wars had been learned, although of course 
with the help of Soviet expansionism and well-
understood self interest. But, nevertheless, it 
seems quite unique in history, and should be 
presented as such to all younger people and 
future generations. 
18. The example and impetus were given by the 
United States: on 5th June 1947, in a speech at 
Harvard University the Secretary of State, 
George Marshall, introduced the Marshall Plan: 
"It is logical that the United States should 
do whatever it is able to do to assist in the 
return of normal economic health in the 
world, without which there can be no poli-
tical stability and no assured peace. Our 
policy is directed not against any country or 
doctrine but against hunger, poverty, 
desperation and chaos... The initiative, I 
think, must come from Europe... the pro-
gramme should be a joint one, agreed to by 
a number of, if not all, European nations." 
19. On 27th June 1947, the Foreign Ministers 
of France, the United Kingdom and the USSR 
met to discuss the offer. Later the USSR rejected 
the offer. No communist country accepted. 
Czechoslovakia first accepted, but later withdrew 
its acceptance. Finland and Spain did not 
participate. Sixteen countries accepted : eight of 
the present nine Common Market members 
(except West Germany) ; on 15th December 1949, 
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West Germany joined the Marshall Plan J. ; five 
other European countries, which are now 
members of NATO; Austria, Sweden and 
Switzerland, now members of the Council of 
Europe. Together they outlined the European 
Recovery Programme, which was handed to 
Marshall on 22nd September 1947. In 1948 these 
sixteen set up the OEEC in response to the 
Marshall Plan (the Federal Republic of Germany 
joined the OEEC in 1955). 
IV. NATO 
20. Already in 1948 the Brussels Treaty Organ-
isation was formed as the first post-war interna-
tional defence treaty in Western Europe (between 
the three Benelux countries, France and the 
United Kingdom). It still embodies the most 
strict obligations of mutual military and other 
assistance in case of attack. On 6th May 1955 
the organisation was renamed Western European 
Union ; Italy and the Federal Republic of 
Germany also became members. 
21. As already indicated, in Eastern Europe the 
USSR started immediately after the war to 
transform the countries that had been occupied 
by Nazi Germany, and were located between the 
USSR and Germany as well as the Soviet zone of 
Germany, into communist-ruled countries. One 
after the other they were forced to accept 
minority regimes in their fear of Soviet troops 
and Soviet civilian staff. In 1948 Czechoslovakia 
received the same treatment, and this was the 
last straw: plans were made in Western Europe 
and North America to establish an Atlantic 
defence organisation. During the preparatory 
negotiations there were some objections to the 
inclusion of dictatorial Portugal, but they were 
dropped when it become clear that others would 
withdraw altogether if Portugal was not accepted 
as a member : they estimated that the Portuguese 
territories were absolutely essential strategically. 
22. The year 1949 saw the birth of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (4th April) : the 
members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation 
together with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, 
Norway, Portugal and the United States 2 • Later 
1. On le.t June 1948 the United Kingdom, United 
States and France called for German representation in 
the European Recovery Programme and for drafting a 
federal constitution in West Germany. 
2. Ireland declared that it was impossible to join as 
long a.s it wa.s divided. 
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the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece and 
Turkey joined NATO. 
23. In 1949 it became known that the USSR 
had made progress in developing the atomic 
bomb and on 8th March 1950 it announced that 
it had such a bomb. 
24. Clearly NATO was prepared and formed 
just in time and there have since been no threats 
on the European continent by communist 
countries to annex or bring a non-communist 
country under such a rule. 
25. Because of its success, NATO's existence as 
generally accepted originally by the democratic 
parties in the member States and its task within 
its area have increasingly become a subject of 
public and parliamentary discussion. New genera-
tions were not aware of the threats of the past 
and did not fully realise that if the balance of 
power in Europe disappeared the threats might 
be revived. The membership of dictatorial 
Portugal and, later, also of Greece after it had 
turned into a dictatorship as well (1967) became, 
for many groups within the democratic member 
countries, a serious obstacle for the credibility of 
NATO. This feeling was enhanced by the fact 
that United States forces and bases on the 
territory of Franco Spain would no doubt be 
part of the NATO defence system in time of 
crisis. Criticism finds strong backing in the first 
paragraphs of the treaty ; the second paragraph 
reads as follows : 
"They are determined to safeguard the free-
dom, common heritage and civilisation of 
their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule 
of law. They seek to promote stability, and 
well-being in the North-Atlantic area." 
26. Defenders of its membership have always 
pleaded geo-military reasons; some going so far 
as to state that the quoted sentences are not part 
of the treaty, that the treaty as such contains 
only the numbered articles and that the first 
three paragraphs are nothing more than a 
preamble and as such not binding upon any 
signatory while only the numbered articles (1 to 
14) contain the treaty proper, which obviously 
is not true. Such statements and the mentality 
that they demonstrate have not been helpful in 
silencing the critics or increasing credibility. 
Acceptance of one dictatorial member allowed 
another member to be kept, even when it was 
turned into a dictatorship (Greece), and to agree 
to certain United States forces being based on 
the territory of Franco Spain - forces that no 
doubt in times of crisis will be part of the NATO 
defence system. 
27. Other factors quoted to diminish NATO 
credibility among groups in the member countries 
have been for instance: 
(a) The development of independent nuclear 
forces in two European member countries. 
(b) The colonial war in Algeria, although until 
1963 France's Algerian departments came within 
the treaty area. Fortunately it was historically 
de Gaulle's greatness that stopped the war once 
and for all without creating a civil war at home. 
(A French member of the Committee was wholly 
opposed to this and some other comparable 
paragraphs.) 
(c) The Suez war in 1956 with the participation 
of two NATO members: the United Kingdom 
and France. The Suez crisis coincided more or less 
with the Soviet aggression in Hungary. That was 
the main reason why Western Europe, or NATO, 
was unable to do or say anything relevant or 
plausible. 
(d) The inability of the member States to find 
_t>eaceful and lasting solutions for serious quarrels 
between themselves (Greece/Turkey over Cyprus ; 
United Kingdom and Iceland over cod fishing, 
etc.). In C.L. Sulzberger's article in the Inter-
national Herald Tribune of 31st January 1976 
entitled "The cancer along the edges of NATO", 
written in Brussels, he considers the question "Is 
a little NATO as originally favoured (Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, the United King-
dom, the United States, Canada and the Benelux) 
not better?". Furthermore Sulzberger states 
NATO has not proved useful as a club within 
which disputes can be settled". 
(e) The fact that one of the major European 
members, France, has left the military structure 
of NATO and ordered the NATO military head-
quarters to leave French territory (1966). 
(j) Indo-China ; this will be dealt with in a 
further chapter. 
(g) The inability so far to co-ordinate the manu-
facture of standardised armaments deemed neces-
sary for NATO to maintain a balance of power 
apart from nuclear weapons, although military 
experts continuously state that such measures 
would make a difference of thousands of 
millions of dollars a year and would consider-
ably increase the defence potential. The measures 
necessary to solve this problem have not material-
ised in the twenty-seven years of the Alliance's 
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existence. That seems due to lack of political 
courage and will. Behind this lack is the power 
and the pressure of vested interests of individual 
member countries and of military industrial 
complexes within those countries. No wonder the 
continuous call for higher defence budgets does 
not sound very credible. To enlarge on the level 
of forces and armaments would go entirely 
beyond the scope of this report. 
(h) Adding to NATO activities the so-called new 
dimensions, for instance environmental questions 
(at the suggestion of President Nixon). This does 
not conflict with the treaty but the treaty dates 
from 1949 and in the meantime other inter-
national agencies have been created that are 
better suited and equipped than NATO. If NATO 
thinks that "new dimensions" will increase the 
acceptability of its organisation, then it is wrong : 
NATO is judged by what it does or does not do in 
the military defence field. 
28. Since World War II and the creation of 
NATO, discussions in Western Europe on the 
desirability or necessity of some sort of institu-
tionalised European co-operation for defence 
have never stopped. Many plans and suggestions 
have been made. So far WEU is the only idea to 
have materialised 1 • Its creation on 5th May 1955 
as the successor of the Brussels Treaty Organisa-
tion was due to the fact that the planned Euro-
pean Defence Community had been stranded in 
the French Parliament (1954). The Eurogroup 
within NATO is entirely unofficial and has no 
charter of any kind. France does not take part 
in this group. 
29. The latest proposals are that when the 
Common Market develops into the European 
1tnion, foreign policy and defence should become 
an essential part of its fields of activity and 
competence. The report of the Belgian Premier 
for the Council of the EEC (December 1975) 
tries to indicate how, step by step, the target 
of such a European union can be reached. So 
far it does not seem likely that there will be 
enough support to speed up all the necessary 
measures and decisions. As long as the UDR in 
France is strong enough to block every 
substantial step towards making the EEC supra-
national and every attempt to obtain full French 
participation in the integrated NATO forces, 
there will be no clear indication of what the 
priorities of other EEC and NATO members 
ultimately will be when final decisions have to 
1. See paragraph 20. 
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be taken. Very often a number of members may 
seem to be one hundred per cent and uncondition-
ally in favour of speedy progress when they feel 
sure that a veto from one or two other members 
will block the proceedings anyway. 
30. Since 1955, NATO has had a North Atlantic 
Parliamentary Assembly composed mainly of 
parliamentary defence specialists from the 
member States. The status of the Assembly is 
vague and weak. Its existence is not founded on 
any treaty, but on an ad hoc decision of the 
parliaments of the member countries. 
31. Every civilian and every military senior 
executive of NATO should have an undisputable 
record as an unswerving advocate of parlia-
mentary democracy. Otherwise NATO's raison 
d'etre will become more and more undermined. 
32. The presentation of NATO, its structure and 
deeds and what is known about other military 
blocs to public opinion in the member countries 
in general and to parliamentarians and their 
constituencies, should be fair, 100% truthful, 
modern and overt. Why not lay the facts on the 
table publicly ? Facts that are known in any case 
wherever relevant. Especially in military matters 
there is too much unnecessary secrecy, on the 
childish assumption that things are unknown in 
highly-interested quarters outside the Alliance. 
We all know that classification of secrets and top 
secrets is often used to make duties and 
individuals look more important than they are. 
Let us never forget that parliamentarians (and 
the electorate) of the member countries decide 
whether NATO will live or die. 
33. Since there is a balance of power in nuclear 
weaponry - perhaps with a difference in 
percentage of over-kill capability - superpowers 
will not start a war, unless one or more of 
them have rulers who are too ill, physically and/ 
or mentally, to think rationally, realistically and 
conscientiously. We know that it is not sure 
whether this condition will always be fulfilled. 
We also know that it will become increasingly 
easy to produce nuclear weapons in a growing 
number of countries. The world therefore has a 
right to know what structures and safeguards 
exist in the countries and alliances to minimise 
the possibility of an Armageddon being started 
by a lunatic, criminal or a totally irresponsible 
person or group of persons. Even in the western 
world there reigns an almost complete silence 
about these things. 
34. Assuming that the above condition is 
fulfilled, then the situation sooner or later allows 
the superpowers new freedom to assume political 
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and perhaps military commitments outside the 
area of mutual guarantees, by "helping" 
befriended regimes or groups (minorities or not). 
That may first happen covertly through 
intelligence services and later overtly. It has 
been practised for a long time by the USSR and 
probably to a lesser extent by the United States 
in the NATO treaty area and the Warsaw Pact 
area respectively. The United States has been 
very active in Latin America and Indo-China, 
the USSR in Angola and elsewhere. Smaller 
countries have the same appetite in the Middle 
East and in Africa. There is nothing new under 
the sun. The risks of small and not so small 
wars, with so-called conventional weapons (almost 
a blasphemy) will be with us for a long time. 
35. Delay in the inevitable decolonisation process 
and the fact that decolonisation occurred, at least 
initially, against the free will of the colonial 
rulers contributed to the risks of war. But apart 
from these factors, decolonisation could not be a 
smooth process. The difference in standards of 
living, the ever-growing gap between rich and 
poor and the arbitrary frontiers drawn between 
the new nations shaped by colonial conquests are 
only some of the factors that made a smooth and 
peaceful transition in many cases impossible. 
36. In Eastern Europe events were the reverse 
of decolonisation as has been previously recalled. 
The countries of the Warsaw Pact are still 
satellites of the USSR. They know that deviation 
from the Moscow line may be stopped at any time 
by Soviet military interference as has happened 
several times. 
37. The recently-expressed deep indignation of 
the United States Secretary of State about the 
consequences of these developments (for instance 
in Africa) is rather astonishing. It is, of course, 
an alarming development, but one that could 
and should have been anticipated. It calls for 
careful thought, research and new policies, not 
initially military ones, because they will not cure 
anything basically. 
V. Detente 
38. NATO's accepted tasks are not only defence 
in the strict sense of the word, but also the 
promotion of disarmament (MBFR, Vienna) and 
detente (CSCE, Helsinki), all three in the context 
of avoiding war. 
39. After three years, the MFBR negotiations 
have still not reached a conclusion. The parties 
seem to have come to a stalemate. 
40. The conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe (35 countries : 6 communist and 27 
non-communist European countries, the United 
States and Canada) opened on 3rd July 1973 and 
was concluded on 1st August 1975 in Helsinki. 
The final act was signed by Heads of Govern-
ment. It consists of about 55 printed pages and 
deals with a great variety of subjects. It is not 
a treaty and therefore it does not need to be 
ratified by the parliaments. It is a declaration 
of adherence to many very high-minded 
standards of behaviour and a statement of very 
noble intentions. Of course, such an act does not 
include sanctions. The chapter about trade and 
industrial co-operation includes a recommenda-
tion for arbitration ("an appropriate means of 
settling such disputes"). 
41. If all parties which signed the act had one 
and the same interpretation of each and every 
clause, and if all parties were from now on to 
behave in accordance with the final act and with 
one and the same interpretation of its text, 
paradise would no longer be lost in greater 
Europe. Nobody expects such a future. Every-
body knows the semantic problems and the 
everlasting ability of individuals and govern-
ments to read into such a text what seems most 
expedient for their own interests. Even then there 
is a choice of interests : in the short, medium or 
long term (in totalitarian States it is often easier 
to emphasise longer term interests than in demo-
cratic States with their periodical free elections). 
The fact that the USSR took the initiative of 
convening the CSCE makes the conclusion of 
the conference endorsed by all participating 
parties primarily a success for the Soviet Union. 
The degree of agreement among all non-com-
munist European participants (including the 
United States and Canada) during the negotia-
tions was remarkable. Generally speaking, all 
participants are convinced that it was right 
to hold this unique conference and many think 
that the final act potentially has a positive 
value for the future. It is perhaps not 
impossible that the high standards professed may 
be useful for dissidents within communist 
countries in promoting some progress towards 
less repression. Some signs are already visible. 
Nevertheless it will be a very long process and 
there will be setbacks. The recent report of 
Amnesty International on the USSR is terrify-
ing. It is, of course, easier in the western world 
to remind democratic governments successfully of 
the high standards to which they have reaffirmed 
their adherence whenever there is an appropriate 
opportunity of doing so. 
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42. It seems obvious that if communist countries 
were to comply with the intentions of the final 
act in the western democratic interpretation, 
totalitarianism would splinter and that cannot 
be the plan ! Conversely, if the western world 
were to accept all the consequences of the act -
for instance in the fields of trade, economic and 
technical co-operation - according to the Soviet 
interpretation, the communist regimes would be 
free to choose one important sector after the 
other - for example the consumer industry 
or transport - in the western world and take 
over such sectors by fixing prices on a low enough 
level. Free trade between countries with a market 
economy and countries with a State economy (or 
"command economy") has dangerous aspects for 
the first category if the second category is able 
to be selective, patient and stubborn. Of this 
there have already been examples, for instance 
in the shipping sector. 
43. The impact on NATO of detente as shaped 
by Helsinki will not be felt immediately, but it 
could develop favourably or just the opposite, 
also depending on the wisdom of such bodies 
as the Common Market and the OECD, as well 
as of individual countries. 
VI. United States; Indo-China 
44. United States involvement in the war in 
Indo-China was a result of the Truman doctrine 
(12th March 1947) : the United States ought "to 
support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or outside 
pressure". This doctrine was primarily meant as 
a basis for aid to Greece and Turkey. The 
doctrine was reaffirmed by the Eisenhower 
doctrine (5th January 1957) and by President 
Kennedy's inauguration speech (20th January 
1961). By these repeated reaffirmations the 
doctrine has outlived its relevance and usefulness 
far too long in its worldwide shape. They 
suggested that the possibility of carrying the 
doctrine into effect by action would last forever 
notwithstanding changes in the world. That 
illusion is still not entirely dead. 
45. The interpretation and application of those 
principles have been influenced gravely by the 
plague of McCarthyism that afflicted United 
States public opinion and politics in the late 
forties and the fifties. It was a gulf of intolerance 
of any liberalism marked by wild accusations 
and prosecution of every adversary as a com-
munist. In February 1950 Joseph McCarthy 
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(1909-1957), Senator since 1946, announced that 
there were 205 communists in the State Depart-
ment alone. In December 1954 the Senate 
censured him for bringing the Senate into 
dishonour and disrepute. But his impact lasted 
a long time: "many Americans suspected most 
liberals, and even suspected those who tried to 
be politically impartial, of being sympathetic to 
the communist cause" 1• Witch-hunting deprived 
several government agencies - primarily the 
State Department and the Pentagon - of South-
East Asia experts, and it continued while 
McNamara was Minister of Defence during the 
administrations of Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson. 
46. It seems that President Kennedy sensed 
that the escalation of the Vietnam war under his 
responsibility was ill-advised, but that he was 
convinced that he should wait to make a radical 
change in policy in Vietnam and in his 
collaborators until he was re-elected in the 
autumn of 1964, presuming that he would obtain 
a good working majority. He was assassinated on 
22nd November 1963. (Part of the files of the 
Warren report on the assassination will remain 
inaccessible for a long time to come ; Gerald 
Ford was a member of the Warren commission.) 
47. The effect of all this was apparently that, 
to a large extent, the results of the "expert 
research" in the department and in the CIA 
became more and more what the civilian and 
military executives wanted rather than an 
independent basis for the executives to reconsider 
the viability of new courses - a phenomenon that 
is not a monopoly of the United States, nor of 
governments. The fact that the Secretary of State, 
Dean Rusk, was mentally and in ambition not 
a "State Man" but a "Pentagon Man" contributed 
considerably to this development 2 • 
48. American involvement, no doubt initiated by 
worthy intentions and not by ambitions of 
conquest, became - as we all know - a big and 
endless tragedy for the American people and 
more lasting for the people in Indo-China with 
tremendous losses of human lives, vast devasta-
tion, tragic uprooting of population and waste 
of enormous sums of money. The alarming factor 
for the future is that some top Americans, civilian 
and military, still maintain that the Vietnam 
war could have been won if only Congress and 
the media had not made it impossible to give 
1. Penguin dictionary of politics, 1973. 
2. "The best and the brightest", David Halberta.m, 1969. 
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the executive and the military the tools they 
needed. Even in the last moments President 
Ford and Mr. Kissinger asked for sufficient 
means to prevent a Vietcong victory in Hanoi 
although many non-communist experts had 
known for a long time that the war was already 
lost. 
49. Such weaknesses are to be found in many 
other places in the western world ; many who 
were not prominent during the war and the 
occupation and, for instance, who failed to see 
in time that decolonisation was inevitable, have 
nevertheless been able to continue their careers 
in public office, proudly claiming infallible 
expertise in analysing the present and future 
political trends. 
50. These paragraphs are not written with 
pleasure or satisfaction ; nor is there any touch 
of anti-Americanism to nourish extremists of one 
side or the other. There is no justification 
for European haughtiness ; European nations 
were no better when they were powerful rulers 
in the world; rather the opposite, as the United 
States will well remember in this bicentennial 
year. 
51. Here it is only fair to recall that the whole 
Vietnam involvement was thrown into the lap 
of the United States by the French. They had 
fou~ht the Vietminh of Ho Chi Minh (since 1945) 
until they were defeated in Dien Bien Phu (7th 
May 1954). Before that they had (14th June 
1949) installed Bao-Dai as ruler of the whole of 
Vietnam. Recognised experts maintain that if 
France had accepted an independent Indo-China 
with Ho Chi Minh the situation might have 
developed as in Yugoslavia under Tito. It was 
hardly realistic to expect that the Geneva agree-
ment (20th July 1954) would be respected. The 
same seems true of the Paris agreements of 
197 4 1 ; every careful reader of the text must 
have recognised, for instance, that the very short 
terms, mentioned for reaching the different 
phases for implementing the agreements were 
already technically totally unrealistic. 
52. The justification for including a chapter on 
Indo-China is that the Vietnam war had and 
will continue to have for a long time to come 
a tremendous impact on the American nation, 
1. This also applies to the case in 1949 between the 
Nether~ds and the Netherlands East Indies (except 
West lr1a.n) when the latter became independent with 
the name Indonesia and accepted a constitution as a 
federal State and a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. 
on the status and image of the United States as 
such and on its capability to function adequately 
as the only superpower in the western world. A 
lost war is very hard to stow away as every nation 
and many western nations know. It is the more 
so, the more powerful and proud the nation 
concerned. The impact is in fact world-\\'ide. 
Television, other media and many documentary 
books have contributed to the propagation of 
this impact. The publication of books such as 
"The Pentagon Papers" and "The end of a 
Presidency" should not be deplored. That such 
large parts of "everything" about the Vietnam 
war, the Watergate affair, the Nixon nightmare, 
the CIA, the FBI, Lockheed, Gulf, etc., can be 
published, is one of the greatest contributions of 
the United States to freedom, democracy and 
other human rights these days. Its value and its 
challenge may be wider and deeper than any one 
of us can anticipate. 
VII. The United States and Western Europe 
53. Disquieting aspects of W atergate and the 
Nixon drama seem to be that it was even possible 
for a person, well-known for his characteristics 
from the very beginning of his political life, to 
be elected to the most powerful office of President 
of the United States, the second time even with a 
landslide victory ; that so many collaborators 
kept silent for such a long time ; that many 
of them after dismissal and/or even conviction 
were offered non-public, well-paid jobs of their 
choice ; that without the tapes there would not 
have been a majority in Congress for impeach-
ment, or even if the very last tape had not 
become publicly known ; that several of the 
top people opposed impeachment until the last 
moments, and that some of them still hold very 
high office. Nevertheless, the decision of Presi-
dent Nixon and Mr. Kissinger to end the negation 
of the existence of the giant People's Repub!ic 
of China will remain famous as a policy of 
necessary realism and of great historical 
importance. 
54. It is to be deplored that the United States is 
not prepared or able to come to a solution about 
the Panama Canal, nor to foster dynamic co-
operation and solidarity with Latin America as 
a whole without showing preference for 
dictatorial regimes. Nor has it offered a Marshall 
Plan for all, as in Europe in 1947, with a view 
to ending the monopoly of big companies in 
that hemisphere. 
55. There is an acute danger of major war in 
Southern Africa. It seems almost sure that the 
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MPLA in Angola will remain in charge of the 
whole territory. Non-recognition helps nobody 
but the more extremist elements within the 
MPLA. This makes the position of Ian Smith's 
minority regime acutely untenable and on a 
somewhat longer term that of Vorster in South 
Africa as well: in Namibia and on its own soil. 
·western powers and the United States have been 
too lenient for too long towards those regimes. It 
is now five to twelve, and obvious that this 
western policy has not been a genuine brother 
service to the white minorities. The EEC's recent 
statement that it objects to any foreign inter-
ference is hardly helpful without the strongest 
possible pressure on both regimes to prepare 
without delay for at least a very radical change 
in attitude towards the justified ambitions of 
majorities. With that condition, every possible 
assistance should be offered. 
56. The case of Soviet missiles in Cuba as 
handled by President Kennedy was a blessing for 
mankind. It was a shock to realise that all military 
chiefs had advised the opposite decision. The 
wisdom of the permanent boycott of Cuba ever 
since seems doubtful. 
57. Going further back in history, the allied air-
lift (America had the lion's share) during the 
Berlin blockade by the USSR from 24th July 
1948 until 21st May 1949, with 277,264 flights, 
was not only a master operation, but also a 
definite sign of solidarity among the NATO 
partners which should never be forgotten. The 
treaty had been signed fourteen days before 
the beginning of the airlift. 
58. The fall of President Nixon has created a 
vacuum of power, credibility and cogency that 
will last at least until a new and irreproachable 
administration is firmly in the saddle with a 
workable majority in Congress. The present 
government is understandably very busy at home 
with the elections but at the same time seems too 
much in a hurry in many sectors of foreign 
policy, anxious to round these off before the 
transfer. 
VIII. Miscellaneous notes 
59. Many totalitarian communist countries call 
themselves "socialist" and/or even "democratic". 
It is deplorable that western media and even 
governments also complicate the semantics by 
not always using the words communism or com-
munists when talking about those countries and 
by not reserving words like socialism and 
socialist for non-totalitarian and democratic 
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systems, groups or parties. But, of course, there 
are people for whom it is all tweedledum and 
tweedledee. 
60. The recent tendency of some socialist parties 
in the western world to accept or to consider 
a coalition with communists in national govern-
ments or even before elections is a new 
phenomenon in the postwar epoch. The French 
socialists were the first to accept such a coalition 
as they had done before World War II. The 
French communist party is one of the strongest 
in Western Europe and is proclaiming loudly 
that it is not a satellite or obedient subordinate 
of the USSR. But at the same time newpapers 
reported that the leader Marchais accused the 
Federal Republic of Germany of shameless and 
greedy imperialism and of seeking the destruction 
of the French economy ; basically he is against 
the Common Market. 
61. In Italy the situation is different. Elections 
being very near now, it seems best not to enlarge 
upon the situation further in this report but to 
wait and see. 
62. It should be clear from the beginning that 
whenever a member of western alliances turns 
totalitarian or dictatorial it has to leave those 
bodies. In the meantime the other western 
countries and their political parties are challenged 
to avoid any such development at home by 
demonstrating flexibility, creativity and wisdom, 
adequate to the requirements of an ever-changing 
world. 
63. It is rather significant that The Economist 
is pleading for consideration of the desirability 
of coalitions with communist parties in some of 
the western countries. The journal suggests that 
perhaps it is better to have a try with the com-
munist party in Italy heading an alliance of 
the left 1 • 
64. If renowned commentators such as Sforza 
are right, the era of supreme power of Brezhnev 
in the USSR is over, but he is being allowed 
to carry on for a time, because he has apparently 
accepted defeat in his struggle for emphasis on 
more consumer goods instead of giving priority 
to technological and military investments in the 
new five-year plan. That does not sound hopeful 
for SALT and MBFR, nor for stability at the 
top of the USSR. 
l. See International Herald Tribune, 18th February 
1976, and The Times, lOth February 1976. 
248 
65. The death of Chou En-lai and the age of Mao 
mean that the giant and potential superpower 
China will possibly undergo important changes 
as well. A virtual second cultural revolution is a 
possibility and the anti-USSR policy is bound 
to continue for some time. The non-communist 
world would be wrong, however, to assume that 
the antagonism between the two will last forever. 
It is not impossible that, in time and in certain 
circumstances, the two will come to an under-
standing and join forces. 
66. Evidently Yugoslavia has been tightening 
its grip in recent years on all groups of 
ideological or political dissidents. When in 
January 1976 the United States decided to renew 
the sale of arms, with the professed aim of 
bolstering Yugoslavia's independence, it was 
aware that the weapons might be necessary for 
internal purposes at the end of President Tito's 
life as well as for avoiding any interference 
from outside during the struggle for stability and 
against disruption of this federal republic. 
Whether the announced visit of Brezhnev to 
Yugoslavia will mean a more lasting rapproche-
ment remains to be seen. 
67. An unknown- but certainly important-
percentage of "the state of the world" (and that 
of the United Nations) is determined by the 
distribution of wealth, well-being and power. 
That distribution, especially between continents 
and countries is intolerable. That has been a fact 
for a very long time. But it is only recently 
that, through wars and the modern media, the 
realisation of that intolerable situation has been 
brought home - even visually - to very 
substantial and fast-growing parts of the world 
population. It has not only become intolerable, 
but it will not be tolerated much longer unless 
the world community is given a real prospect of 
a fairer share. 
68. This prospect is not yet in sight. The poor, 
the less privileged proposed some sort of "new 
world economy". Some exponents of the well-off 
nations (among them Mr. Kissinger) reacted with 
the view that the existing order had served us 
well and there was no need for a new one. Who 
are meant by "us"? Not the world population 
as a whole! 
69. It is true that the proverb "Don't throw 
old shoes away before you have new ones" is a 
sound one. It is true that the decline of the OECD 
community as a prosperous and a dynamic one 
would not automatically make other communities 
better off. But these truths do not make the 
statement that the present economic world order 
"has served us well and that there is no need 
for a new one" also true. Why should our first 
reaction so often be entirely negative ~ This is 
not the place to enlarge on this subject. This part 
of the memorandum does not call for a new 
dimension of activity for NATO. It only wants 
to contribute to awareness of the fact that this 
dimension is an existential one of the context 
within which the Atlantic community and NATO 
have to find their proper places and attitudes. 
70. The present state of the world calls for 
vigilance and preservation of a certain "balance 
of power" on the part of the so-called "free 
world" and primarily of the wealthy part of it. 
But we should at last realise that a relevant 
security policy cannot serve its purpose any 
longer when it is monolithic. It has different 
components. The three most important ones are : 
(i) (military) defence; 
( ii) social - economic solidarity of the 
rich with the poor ; 
( iii) banishment of discrimination (race, 
colour, religion, etc.). 
71. The first has been tackled quite adequately 
since 1949 ; but it is the only one, with the 
consequence that too much of our thinking about 
security, our industries and our economies has 
become militarised. The second component is 
lagging far behind and the gap between rich 
and poor is still widening. In the period 1960-74 
the NATO countries spent $2,600,000 million; in 
1973, $122,000 million. In 1973 the Warsaw Pact 
countries spent about $75,000 million according 
to the statistics available. Over the same periods 
(1960-74 and 1973) the NATO countries spent 
$125,000 million and $7,000 million on foreign 
economic aid, i.e. one twentieth and one 
seventeenth respectively of the amount spent on 
defence. The Warsaw Pact countries spent just 
$1,000 million: one seventy-fifth! The third 
eomponent (banishment of discrimination) has not 
been tackled adequately and consistently either ; 
several of the previous paragraphs have explicitly 
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or implicitly dealt with that. It is tragic that 
the initiatives of the one western superpower, 
the United States, of the first postwar years 
have come to an end. Let us never forget : 
October 1945 United Nations ; July 1946 
independence of the Philippines and a policy of 
promoting decolonisation everywhere ; March 
1947 Truman doctrine ; June 1947 Marshall 
plan; January 1949 "Point four"; April 1949 
NATO. All the components of a genuine and 
comprehensive security policy are present ! 
72. Let us hope that the awareness and 
ereativity of leadership will be revived in a shape 
that is truly of our times. 
73. And what about Europe 1 For decades, 
Europe and its partners on the other side of 
the Atlantic Ocean have faced the challenge of 
finding the right policies in very diversified 
sectors of life. They are co-operating in many 
postwar international bodies. If Europe was more 
united and integrated, this co-operation would be 
more effective and less sensitive, because they 
would be more equal instead of one big brother 
dealing with several kids. Alas, even the smaller 
Europe of the EEC has so far not been able to 
integrate to form a genuine European union. 
Too many people do not realise that many seg-
ments of their national sovereignty have already 
disappeared because of the interdependence of 
the modern world. Just disappeared, while in an 
integrated Europe several of those lost segments 
would revive as vital European decision sectors 
of the supranational entity, visible and under 
real parliamentary control. Such a Europe could 
develop an identity of its own, each of its 
components undoubtedly keeping its own national 
identity, unless it has already an identity not 
worth the name. What would be lost would be 
the present nationalistic identity, but that would 
evidently mean a gain for all. 
74. Amazingly, Europe has still time to come 
to its senses, also because of the existence of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. How 
long or how short that time will be, nobody 
knows for certain. 
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Security in the Mediterranean 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur 
ADDENDUM 
to the draft recommendation on 
security in the Mediterranean 
contained in Document 708 
Add new operative paragraphs as follows : 
15th June 1976 
I. (/) by advising the Secretary-General to assign political advisers from his Political Affairs Division 
to all significant NATO military headquarters ; 
(g) by transferring the Gibraltar Mediterranean Command from the Command of Allied Naval 
Forces Southern Europe to that of the Iberian Atlantic area ; 
1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 3 with 
0 abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Oritchley (Chairman) ; 
MM. Klepsch, Dankert (Vice.Chairmen); MM. Averardi, 
Beauguitte (Substitute : La Oombe), Bizet, Boulloche, 
Buck, Haase, Hardy (Substitute: Lord Peddie), 
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Kempinaire, Konen, de Koster, Laforgia, Lemmrich, 
Menard, Pawelczyk, Pumilia, Reale, Richter, Riviere, 
Roper, Scholten, Schugens, Tanghe, Urwin, Vedovato. 
N. B. The names of Representatives who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The Committee adopted its main report on 
security in the Mediterranean 1 in the course of 
its visit to Portugal from 17th to 19th May and 
for that reason was unable to take fu1l account 
of all the information obtained from the visit. 
Since then, the Committee has also received the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 278, which 
the Assembly adopted on the Committee's pre-
vious report on developments in the Iberian 
peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance 2 ; the com-
munique issued after the ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council in Oslo on 21st May 
has been issued and the Committee has held an 
informal meeting with the Council in Brussels 
on 31st May, following the ministerial meeting 
of the Council earlier that day. 
2. In this short supplementary report, the Com-
mittee takes account of these more recent deve-
lopments, and proposes an addendum to the draft 
recommendation embodied in the main report. 
Portugal 
3. At the conclusion of its visit to Lisbon, in 
the course of which it was briefed by leading 
representatives of the government, political 
parties and armed forces whose names appear in 
the introductory note to the main report \ and 
to all of whom it expresses its thanks, the Com-
mittee proposes no change to relevant passages 
of the draft recommendation in the main report 
-paragraphs (v) of the preamble and 1 (e) of 
the operative text - and confirms for the most 
part the relevant parts of the explanatory memo-
randum (paragraphs 67-73). 
4. As far as paragraph 72 on the Portuguese 
armed forces is concerned, the Committee implied 
that priority should be given to modernising the 
equipment of the army and air force. It is impor-
tant, in view of Portugal's serious economic situ-
ation, and the very important contribution it 
makes to NATO in providing base and com-
munications facilities at strategic points on its 
mainland and in the Azores and Madeira, that 
l. Document 708. 
2. Document 682. 
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the Alliance as a whole or those countries in 
a position to do so, shouLd assist Portugal in 
providing not only the modern equipment the 
armed forces need, but aLso the necessary train-
ing, both to operate technical equipment and to 
co-operate with other NATO forces. After the 
long years of the colonial wars there is a feeling 
in the Portuguese armed forces that they are 
neither equipped nor trained to co-operate with 
other NATO forces in the very different type of 
operations that NATO defensive contingency 
plans provide for. 
5. Among Portugal's requirements are the right 
armour and anti-aircraft armament for the air-
transportable brigade mentioned in paragraph 68 
of the main report and aircraft for air defence 
and other roles. In due course, the Portuguese 
navy will need more modern equipment by way 
of ocean-going frigates and other vessels. 
6. The Committee was impressed by the firm 
resolve to maintain Portuguese commitments to 
NATO that was expressed by both political and 
military authorities which addressed it, and the 
wish for Portuguese participation in NATO to 
be a full and equal one. The Committee supports 
that wish, knowing that the obstacles raised by a 
communist presence in many sensitive posts have 
now been overcome. 
Reply of the Council to Recommendation 278 
7. The Assembly adopted Recommendation 278 
on 4th December 1975, on the previous report 
of the Committee. The Committee welcomes, as far 
as it goes, the statement in paragraph 1 of the 
reply asserting the right of the western demo-
cracies to express sympathy with trends of opi-
nion favouring pluralist democracy in countries 
where it is not established. 
8. As far as paragraphs 2 (c) and 2 (d) of 
the reply are concerned, the Committee finds 
that they do not take account of the precise 
points concerning political advisers for NATO 
commanders and the transfer of the Gibraltar 
command that were contained in the explanatory 
memorandum to Document 682. Accordingly, the 
Committee proposes an addendum to the draft 
recommendation contained in the main report 1 , 
1. Document 708. 
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which adds to the operative text an explicit state-
ment of the two points the Committee is now seek-
ing to make, an explication of which is to be 
found in paragraphs 133 and 138 of the main 
report. 
North Atlantic Council final communique of 
21st May 1976 
9. Referring indirectly to events in Angola to 
which the Committee has drawn attention in the 
main report, the communique states : 
"... the pursuit of a genuine and durable 
detente is possible only if all States con-
cerned exercise restraint both in their rela-
tions with each other and in their actions 
in other parts of the world. The necessary 
confidence could not be established between 
East and West if crises and tensions were 
to be avoided in Europe only to appear else-
where. In this regard, Ministers undel"1ined 
that all signatories of the CSCE final act 
have recognised the close link between peace 
and security in Europe and in the world as 
a whole." 
In its main report, the Committee has called for 
contingency planning by the NATO countries 
against further intervention in Africa. 1 
10. On the Mediterranean, the communique 
states: 
1. Document 708, paragraph 134. 
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"7. Ministers took note of the report on 
the situation in the Mediterranean prepared 
on their instructions. They emphasised the 
importance they attach to maintaining the 
balance of forees throughout the Mediterra-
nean area. They requested the Council to 
continue its eonsultations on this subjeet and 
to report to them at their next meeting. 
Ministers noted with satisfaction the pro-
gress made regarding new defenee co-opera-
tion agreements that will open the way to 
enhancing allied defences in the South-
Eastern region. 
They expressed concern at the serious situa-
tion arising from the continuing instability 
in the Middle East and reaffirmed that 
rapid progress must be made towards a just 
and lasting settlement of the conflict." 
The allusion to defence agreements in the second 
paragraph refers to the bilateral United States-
Greek and United States-Turkish agreements 
described in the Committee's main report 1 • The 
Committee regrets that the communique does not 
make mention of progress towards democracy in 
Spain, as by implication the WEU Council has 
done in paragraph 1 of the reply to Recom-
mendation 278 mentioned above. It was left to 
Dr. Kissinger in his press conference at the end 
of the North Atlantic Couneil meeting to say: 
"We have always thought, and still think, that 
Spain should be brought as rapidly as possible 
into the western institutions." 
l. Document 708, paragraphs 41 and 44. 
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